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Uncle Tom and Mr. Charlie—McCarthy and Yancey
Intergroup Attitudes and Social Ascent—Elder
Black Invisibility—Johnson, Sears, and McConahay
Skin Color and Mate Selection—Udry, Bauman, and Chase
Ability to Alter Skin Color—Henshel

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LEONARD W. MOSS

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IN THIS ISSUE

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
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- . 1963*b*. "Social Demography." In *The Behavioral Sciences Today*, edited by Bernard Berelson. New York: Basic Books.
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IN THIS ISSUE

ROBERT M. MARSH and HIROSHI MANNARI are professors of sociology at Brown University and Kwansei Gakuin University, Nishinomiya, Japan, respectively. In 1969-70 they collaborated in Japan in a comparative study of the social organization and modernization of Japanese manufacturing firms. Mannari's main interests are industrial sociology and the Japanese business elite; Marsh's are cross-societal comparative analysis, complex organizations, and social stratification. The present paper is the first to be published on the basis of their year's field work, which combined the analysis of company personnel records, interview, questionnaire, and observational data in several Japanese companies.

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RONALD ANDERSEN

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- 1184 **Books Received**

IN THIS ISSUE

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In Memoriam: William Lloyd Warner, 1898–1970

William Lloyd Warner was one of the great men of social science. With the mind of a scientist and the heart of a great hunter, he tracked down those powerful systems of social privilege and status—caste and class—within which all of us are trapped.

He stood alone in our time, the greatest of the empiricists. His studies of the social class systems within American society constitute a model for man's objective study of himself. Warner examined society just as one studies an organism in the laboratory, without prejudice and without theoretical dogmatism. He was determined to understand America as it was, as a functioning system of socioeconomic classes.

His work therefore is admirable most of all for its objectivity. In this he had no peer in his day. And he had no peer in *the scope of his studies*. He sought to master the complexities of the whole system, not only of social stratification, but also of economic institutions and (in his greatest work, *The Living and the Dead*) of people's traditions.

His stature was perhaps not fully appreciated by his contemporaries. But in the years following the publication of the first volume of the Yankee City Series, the dominant current in American sociology was the study of social classes. In the two leading journals, during those twenty years, there was only one major emphasis in research, the study of social class behavior.

His influence has spread all over the world and to all the social sciences. Not only sociology and anthropology owe him a great debt, but also political science, economics, and psychology. In the latter discipline, his article "The Society, the Individual, and His Mental Disorders," published more than thirty years ago, inspired the writing of many of the best works on the relationship between culture, social structure, and individual behavior. His creative influence extended to research in psychiatry, epidemiology, education, child development, industrial organization, legal research, and American history.

One was most impressed by the vigor of his mind, by his great zest and enthusiasm for the study of the most complex of all realities, man. To the end, he was exploring new fields. *Navigare necesse est, vivere non necesse*.

Some things in life can be neither avoided nor mastered. They must be endured. And Lloyd knew how to endure. But his was the spirit of those who explore. *Navigare!*

ALLISON DAVIS

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An Empirical Study of Military-Industrial Linkages¹

Stanley Lieberman

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Military-industrial relations are examined from both the elitist and pluralist perspectives on power. Neither theory readily accounts for all of the empirical data. On the one hand, elitist theory explains the relatively high level of military spending after World War II as well as the deep dependence on military expenditures among some large corporations. However, both the regression and input-output analyses indicate that the economy does not require extensive military outlays. Indeed, there is some evidence that most corporations would be more prosperous if the government shifted to nonmilitary expenditures. These discrepancies suggest that a third interpretation may be in order. Based on the assumption that a growing division of labor leads to increasingly specialized needs and vested interests, the hypothesis of compensating strategies is presented. Under this notion, political decisions that run counter to the interests of the majority will occur even if the government is not dominated by a small number of elite interest groups. Rather, such a pattern may result from a process in which the diverse interest groups seek to maximize their net gains. This alternative perspective is illustrated by the composition of Senate committees.

A major controversy exists in macrosociology over the forces which influence national policy in the United States and other advanced industrial societies. On the one hand, the elitists argue that a relatively small group of people, representing a narrow range of interests, determine national policy across a range of domains including foreign affairs, military spending, and major domestic programs. By contrast, the pluralist school views national decision making as a process influenced by a broad and diverse array of interest groups, with no single group or set of groups powerful enough to consistently dominate the national political system. Although the two schools are not diametrically opposed, as Kornhauser's comparison (1968) suggests, they are contradictory on a number of counts.² However, despite the fact that national political systems are a

¹ I am deeply indebted to Mrs. Lynn K. Hansen for her invaluable research assistance and critical suggestions. The paper also benefited from a critical reading by Mr. Gordon W. Clemans and helpful suggestions from Professors Herbert L. Costner, Richard M. Emerson, and S. Frank Miyamoto. In addition, I received many comments from colleagues and students in the Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology, University of Washington. The figures were prepared by Mr. Charles B. McVey, former draftsman in the Center for Studies in Demography and Ecology.

² Both Rose (1967) and Pilisuk and Hayden (1968) provide excellent reviews of the rather extensive literature developed by both the elitists and pluralists. There are

central concern in sociology, efforts to untangle the conflicting theories often appear more like ideological debates than contributions to scientific knowledge.

There are two special obstacles to overcome before the contradictory implications of elitism and pluralism can be resolved. First, scholarly positions on this subject must be judged by their ability to develop a comprehensive system that takes account of the available information rather than by their implications for contemporary politics. Because of the political overtones, both the elitists and pluralists approach the issues polemically, as if total rejection of the rival theory is the only possible way such a dispute can be resolved. It is true that some scientific controversies are eventually resolved when a body of empirical research persistently supports one theory and is incompatible with another.³ But rival theories in the social sciences often turn out to be incomplete and distorted parts of a greater truth, such that neither is consistently supported by empirical research. The theoretical controversy over heredity versus environment, for example, is now rejected because it involved a false and unnecessary polarization.

The second major obstacle stems from the difficulties of conducting empirical research relevant to these theories. Not only are sociologists unable to make direct observations on the decision processes, but it is difficult to design research that encompasses the broad range of political events covered by these conflicting theories. No single research effort can be sufficiently comprehensive or critical, for example, to provide a conclusive test of the Marxist argument that capitalism generates a surplus that can only be used up through war and waste (see Baran 1957; Baran and Sweezy 1966). As a consequence, overinterpretation of the results is all too easy. Actually, each empirical study must be viewed only as contributing to an aggregate of investigations that deal with national power.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL LINKAGES

This study focuses on one facet of the theoretical controversy, the relation between military expenditures and large corporations in the United States, the so-called military-industrial complex. According to one leading elitist (Mills 1959, p. 276), "American capitalism is now in considerable part a military capitalism, and the most important relation of the big corporation to the state rests on the coincidence of interests between military and corporate needs." Mills goes on to assert that there is a

some particularly useful evaluations of the power-elite theories of C. Wright Mills. See the criticisms by Bell (1958) and by Gracey and Anderson (1958), as well as the extensive list of reviews and evaluations compiled by Horowitz (1963).

³ I assume that empirical research also supports those implications on which the two theories do not differ.

"coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence." Pluralists also recognize the existence of a military-industrial complex (see, e.g., Rose 1967, pp. 94-98), but they view this as but one of many interest constellations. Accordingly, they deny the elitist claim that this particular complex has unique breadth, scope, and coordination (see the review by Pilisuk and Hayden 1968).

Several facets of the dispute can be submitted to empirical study. Indeed, unless one claims that power and influence are unrelated to position in the social structure, it is clear that many of the issues raised by the elitists and pluralists call for a quantitative approach, dealing with matters of degree and frequency rather than absolutes. How extensive are the overlapping interests of major institutions? To what degree, and in what domains of national policy, do these connections modify and influence the decision-making processes? Has there been a substantial change in these relations over time?

There is little reason to doubt that a "military-industrial complex" exists if by this phrase is meant a set of commonly shared interests between the military and some major corporations. Certain striking features of these linkages, recognized by both theoretical schools, are: the interchange of personnel between the military and their corporate suppliers, the network that exists within the business sector, and the role of large corporations as suppliers to the military.

Circulation of Personnel

The 100 largest primary military contractors in the 1957-58 fiscal year, recipients of three-quarters of the money awarded, employed 218 former generals or admirals (Janowitz 1960, p. 376). Altogether, these 100 contractors employed some 768 former military officers who had retired with at least the rank of colonel or naval captain. The linkages have increased several fold during the past decade. The 100 largest primary military contractors in the 1968 fiscal year employed 2,072 former military officers who had been colonels, naval captains, or higher.⁴ Excluding five companies for which data are not available, this means an average of twenty-two former officers per major contractor.

The increasing interlock between suppliers and the military during the decade suggests the possibility of a growing community of interest between the two sectors of the society. Personal contacts between high-ranking officers and their former colleagues can affect negotiations, particularly when the military officers themselves may soon seek employment from the corporations after their military retirement (U.S., Congress, Senate 1969, p. S3072-3). Admiral Hyman Rickover has described

⁴ Based on employment on February 1, 1969 (U.S., Congress, Senate 1969).

a number of ways that military contracts may be negotiated to maximize the contractor's gain, for example, contract manipulation, research and development advantages, patents, shoddy procedures for cost accounting, and the like (Joint Economic Committee 1968).

Coordination Among Corporations

Underlying the power-elite thesis is the proposition that large corporations operate in concert, coordinating their activities and interests. "Would it not be strange," Mills (1959, p. 123) asks about large businesses, "if they did *not* consolidate themselves, but merely drifted along,

TABLE 1

OUTSIDE BOARD MEMBERS OF THE MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY,
NEW YORK, 1965, BY PRIMARY COMPANY AFFILIATION

Corporation (and Rank)	Principal Activities
American Machine and Foundry (150).....	Bowling, leisure time products, specialty industrial machinery
American Telephone and Telegraph (U-1)....	"Bell" system, electronics
Bethlehem Steel (18).....	Steel
Campbell Soup (93).....	Soup, other food products
Coca Cola (68).....	Soft drink syrup, juices
Columbia Gas System (U-10).....	Natural gas distributor
Continental Oil (39).....	Crude oil, fertilizer, petrochemicals
E. I. duPont de Nemours (12).....	Chemicals, synthetic fibers
Gillette (204).....	Razors, wave kits, pens
International Nickel (F-70).....	Nickel, platinum, copper
New York Life Insurance (I-4).....	Insurance
Pennsylvania Railroad (T-2).....	Railroad
Procter and Gamble (24).....	Soap, foodstuffs from vegetable oils
Singer (60).....	Sewing machines, calculators
Standard Oil of New Jersey (2).....	Petroleum
J. P. Stevens (86).....	Textiles
State Street Investment.....	Mutual fund

NOTE.—Data not available on two additional organizations represented on the bank's board: Bechtel Corporation; The Duke Endowment. Letters *F*, *I*, *T*, and *U* indicate corporation is ranked, respectively, as foreign, life insurance, transportation, or utility. All other rankings refer to 500 largest industrial corporations.

SOURCE.—Rankings from *Fortune* (1965a, 1965b); principal activities from Standard and Poor's (1965).

doing the best they could, merely responding to day-to-day attacks upon them?" One indicator of this elite community is the degree of interlocking directorships among large corporations. "As a minimum inference, it must be said that such arrangements permit an interchange of views in a convenient and more or less formal way among those who share the interests of the corporate rich."

Interlocks among boards of directors is a major topic for research in itself. However, an illustration based on leading banks does give the reader a perspective on the kind of linkages that do occur and the economic resources involved. Listed below in table 1 is the board composi-

tion of the fifth-largest New York City bank in early 1965. The board represents leading corporations from many sectors of the national economy, creating the potential for a rather extensive and diverse communication network. In parentheses, alongside the name of each corporation, is its national rank. The sweep of interlocks is understated, actually, since only the primary affiliations of outside members of the bank board are shown.

Altogether, the boards of the seven largest New York City banks in 1965 include officials from fifty-one of the largest 500 industrial companies. There is a particularly heavy concentration from the fifty largest companies, with nineteen represented on the boards of at least one of the seven banks. The boards also have officers from some of the largest transportation, merchandising, and life insurance companies.⁵ Total employment in 1964 among the companies represented on these bank boards range from 400,000 to 1.65 million, with the median bank board representing the employers of 1.5 million.⁶

Major Contractors

Clearly a segment of American industry is deeply dependent on the military for survival. Attempts by the aircraft industry, for example, to diversify and reduce their dependency on the government have been unsuccessful for the most part (Weidenbaum 1963, pp. 79-83). Even more significant, major industrial corporations obtain a lion's share of the largest primary military contracts. Three-fifths of the fifty largest industrial corporations (as measured by sales in 1967) are among the 100 largest military contractors for the 1968 fiscal year (see table 2). Altogether, sixty-eight of the 100 biggest contractors were among the 500 largest industrial corporations in the United States. Moreover, the remaining thirty-two contractors include two leading utilities (ranking first and forty-third in assets among U.S. utilities) and four leading transportation companies (ranking among the leading fifty in operating revenues). In short, three-fourths of the largest military contractors are major corporations.

Implications

The results reported above, like those in a number of earlier studies, are suggestive of a close tie-up between the military and at least some industrial companies. But these reports are peripheral to an evaluation of

⁵ Among the fifty largest in each category, there are two utilities, three transportation, five merchandising, and six life-insurance companies directly linked with one or more of these banks.

⁶ Based on employment figures reported in *Fortune* (1965a, 1965b, 1966).

Military-Industrial Linkages

the two theoretical approaches. For pluralists and elitists do not differ on the question of whether there is a close tie-up between some industrial companies and the military, rather they differ on the *magnitude* of the interlock and its *causes*. In order to evaluate these approaches, it is necessary to examine the relative importance of military spending for large businesses. Pluralists view military-industrial relations as but one of many powerful influences on government policy; whereas the elitists see this as a dominant and pervasive influence caused by an inherent necessity for the survival of a capitalistic system.

TABLE 2
OVERLAP BETWEEN 100 LARGEST PRIMARY
MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND 500
LARGEST INDUSTRIAL CORPORATIONS,
1968

Rank of Industrial Corporation	Number among 100 Largest Contractors
1-50	29
51-100	11
101-150	5
151-200	7
201-250	3
251-300	4
301-350	5
351-400	1
401-450	1
451-500	2
Other*	6
Total	74

SOURCE.—One hundred largest military contractors in 1967-68 fiscal year from *Congressional Record* (U.S., Congress, Senate 1969). Largest 500 industrial corporations and other leading nonindustrial corporations obtained from *Fortune* (1968).

* Includes nonindustrial companies that are among the fifty largest commercial banks, life insurance companies, merchandising firms, transportation companies, and utilities.

DEPENDENCE OF INDUSTRY ON A WAR ECONOMY

Military Contracts

As indicated above in table 2, the very largest corporations obtain most of the major military contracts. However, the issue now is the importance of these contracts for such corporations. Both Weidenbaum (1965, pp. 113-14) and Lapp (1968, pp. 186-87) have demonstrated that the ratio of military contracts to total sales varies widely among leading contractors. In order to obtain some estimate of the role of military expenditures for large businesses generally, it is more appropriate to focus on

leading industrial companies in the the nation rather than on simply the leading contractors.

Among the fifty largest industrial companies, all with sales well over \$1 billion in 1967, primary military contracts vary greatly in significance (see table 3). Contracts obtained by General Dynamics, the largest military contractor in the 1968 fiscal year, were nearly equal to its total sales in 1967 (the ratio is .993). Another corporation has a contract-sales ratio of more than .75; one has a ratio of .60; and there are seven others with ratios exceeding .25. Twelve of the fifty largest industrial companies, on the other hand, have ratios of .04 or less—even though they are among the 100 largest military contractors. Military ties are very minor for an

TABLE 3
RATIO OF MILITARY CONTRACTS TO TOTAL
SALES AMONG 100 LARGEST INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATIONS, 1968

RATIO	NUMBER	
	50 Largest Corporations	50 Next Largest
.75 and above.....	2	0
.50-.74.....	1	2
.25-.49.....	7	4
.10-.24.....	1	5
.05-.09.....	6	24*
Under .05.....	33	15

SOURCE.—See table 2.

* Ratios for all twenty-four of these companies are estimated in terms of maximum possible values. Undoubtedly, most would have lower ratios if actual contract data were available (see text).

additional twenty-one companies that are not listed among the top 100 contractors. Even if we make the extreme assumption that the contracts received by these companies are only \$1,000 less in value than the one-hundredth-largest contractor, the ratio of military to total sales would be between .03 and .04 for eleven companies and .02 or less for ten companies. Altogether, then, thirty-three of the fifty largest industrial corporations have contract-sales ratios of .04 or less.

Among the fifty next largest industrial corporations, there are thirty-nine that are not on the list of 100 leading military contractors in 1968. Again making the extreme assumption that each of these holds contracts that are only \$1,000 less than the one-hundredth-largest military contractor, the ratios would be .04, .05, and .06 for, respectively, fifteen, nineteen, and five of these corporations (table 3).

It is clear that the majority of the largest industrial corporations derive only a small portion of their total business from primary military con-

tracts. Moreover, there are numerous merchandising companies that do not enjoy any direct benefits from military contracts. Among these companies, there are twenty-one with sales equal to at least the one-hundredth-largest industrial company (eight have sales greater than the fiftieth-largest industrial company). Undoubtedly, stores are located in communities that receive sizable military contracts, but military expenditures per se, as opposed to government spending in other sectors, is probably not particularly beneficial to major retailers.

Although the data reported above fail to support the notion that American industry is deeply dependent on a military economy, the results are hardly conclusive. First, they fail to take into account the indirect consequences of military spending for the nation's major corporations. Large corporations may supply many of the primary contractors and thus benefit from the demands created by military expenditures. Steel mills, for example, produce the armor plate used in tanks or needed for the hulls of war vessels. Further, there may be general indirect benefits that are based on the prosperity generated by military expenditures. If military spending pumps large amounts of money into the economy, then consumer and industrial demands may be of substantial benefit to all sectors of the economy, not merely the "munitions makers." Finally, military contracts may still be very important if they are unusually profitable or utilize plants and equipment that might otherwise be idle. For General Motors, the largest industrial corporation in the nation and the tenth-largest military contractor, the ratio of military contracts to total sales is only .031. However, the contracts do amount to nearly two-thirds of a billion dollars, a sum that can hardly be considered trivial.

In short, the data fail to support the hypothesis that large American businesses are deeply dependent on military spending. The results are inconclusive, however, because there may be substantial indirect benefits for a broad spectrum of American businesses that are not military contractors.

Regression Analysis

Regression analysis provides another method for estimating both the absolute and relative influence of military expenditures on *total* corporate income. The dependent variable, Y , is corporate income after taxes for each year between 1916 and 1965. Two independent variables are used: government expenditures in each year for "major national security" (X_1); government expenditures that are not for national security (X_2). Although the latter includes veterans benefits and other costs reflecting earlier military efforts as well as space explorations, X_1 essentially measures current military expenditures over which the government has some option, and X_2 reflects the nonmilitary expenditures of the government.

Overall, there is a high association between corporate income and the two facets of government expenditures; the coefficient of multiple determination $R^2_{y \cdot x_1 x_2}$ is .88. This is not altogether surprising, given inflationary trends through the period as well as the necessary relationships between corporate income and government expenditures. On the zero-order level, corporate income is more closely linked to nonmilitary expenditures than to military spending (see table 4). Even more significant, military


TABLE 4
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: CORPORATE INCOME
AS A FUNCTION OF FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT EXPENDITURES, 1916-65

Variable	<i>r</i>	<i>b</i>
YX_168	.30
YX_293	.77
X_1X_276	1.42
$YX_1 \cdot X_2$	-.08	-.02
$YX_2 \cdot X_1$82	.89

SOURCE.— X_1 based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960; 1965a, column Y358; 1965b, table 534); X_2 based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960; 1965a, column Y357 minus column Y358); Y based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960; 1965a, column Y283 minus columns Y288 + Y289); and 1962-1965 data based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1968, table 594).
NOTE.— X_1 = federal government expenditures for national security (in millions of dollars); X_2 = federal government expenditures not for national security (in millions of dollars); Y = net corporate income after taxes (in thousands of dollars).

expenditures have less impact on corporate income than does an equivalent amount spent by the government on nonmilitary items (compare b_{yx_1} with b_{yx_2}). Both the correlation and regression of corporate income on military expenditures are virtually nil after nonmilitary spending is taken into account. By contrast, the partial correlation and regression for income on nonmilitary expenditures remain very high, .82 and .89, respectively.

Following the procedures described by Blalock (1961, 1964) and Fendrich (1967), the zero-order and partial correlations fit two models. The first one shown below is supportive of Mills, whereas the second model is not. Both models suggest that: $r_{yx_1 \cdot x_2}$ be approximately zero; that r_{yx_2} be lower than either r_{yx_1} or $r_{x_1 x_2}$; and that r_{yx_1} be approximately equal to the cross product of the other two correlations. All of these conditions are met. Without additional variables, it is impossible to distinguish between them.



Even under the first causal model, however, efforts to increase corporate income would be directed towards raising nonmilitary spending rather than the military budget. First, it is necessary to recognize that the two facets of government spending operate somewhat independently of each other (r^2 is .58). This means that there are other factors influencing nonmilitary spending. Since the regression coefficients indicate that a unit change in nonmilitary spending will increase corporate income far more than will an equivalent military expenditure, the first model would still suggest that nonmilitary spending receive preference by those seeking to raise corporate income. In short, during the past fifty years a dollar spent on the military appears to have generated far less corporate income than a dollar spent by the government in other realms.

Although the results fail to support the contention that corporate income is deeply dependent on military expenditures, again the analysis is not conclusive. For one, the relationship between government spending and corporate income involves some feedback, a complexity not found in the models reported above. In addition, other lag combinations could be used besides the one where corporate income trails government expenditures by a half year. Moreover, it is entirely possible that the political limits on nonmilitary spending are much greater than for military spending. If a shift from the military budget to nonmilitary needs interferes with private enterprise, then the military option might be encouraged. Finally, elitists can argue that military spending provides an umbrella for foreign investments. Such expenditures are therefore necessary, the argument would run, even if a greater immediate return is possible from a budgetary shift to nonmilitary spending.

Input-Output Analysis

An additional method for determining both the indirect and direct consequences of military spending for various sectors of the economy is provided by input-output economics. For each specific industry, this quantitative tool in economics considers the role of every supplier and every market, yielding an interindustry matrix of economic supply and demand. Dealing with the production of automobiles, for example, this method indicates the amount of rubber, steel, glass, copper, aluminum, etc., required and then, in turn, the supplies needed by the producers of these products, say sulfur for rubber, and so on.

Leontief and his associates (1966, pp. 184-222) investigated the role of military expenditures through this perspective. A 20 percent cut in armament expenditures accompanied by a compensating increase in nonmilitary expenditures would mean a reduction in total output and employment in only ten of the nation's fifty-six industrial sectors (Leontief et al. 1966, pp. 194-97). Among the ten industries with declines, five

would suffer percentage losses exceeding the percentage gain enjoyed by any single one of the remaining industries. These five industries are: aircraft (−16 percent), ordinance (−15 percent), research and development (−13 percent), electronics equipment (−5 percent), and nonferrous metals (−2.2 percent). The sector with the greatest increase, agricultural services, stands to gain only 2.1 percent.

These results, although basically an exercise in economics, have profound sociological implications for the pluralism-elitism controversy. They mean that the economic consequences of a substantial step toward disarmament are lopsided; most industries would gain, but the percentage of business lost in each of five industries (particularly the first three named above) would be far greater than the percentage gained in any single sector. Although the economy as a whole is not harmed by such military cutbacks, the small number of industries with a substantial vested interest in military spending would suffer far more than other industries would gain. This means that the industries benefiting from military expenditures are more narrowly concentrated than are the economic interests that stand to gain through disarmament. The implications of these conclusions are considered in greater detail later.

An even more elaborate application of input-output analysis by Kokat (1967, pp. 805–19), based on the assumption of a 50 percent cut in the defense budget, also leads to the conclusion that a shift to non-defense expenditures would have an expansionary impact on the majority of industries. If there are compensating increases within either the private or public sectors, only a very limited number of industries would suffer from such a severe cutback in military expenditures.

Although input-output analysis fails to support the hypothesis that military spending is a prerequisite to corporate prosperity, an alternative interpretation is possible that is consistent with elitist theory. Despite the results reported above, an elitist might argue, shift to peacetime consumption would be resisted if the transitional costs were very high in comparison with the gains that might ensue. Retooling, new marketing procedures, investment in specialized plants and equipment, greater competition, and other costs might well outweigh the small benefits in sales and employment that most sectors of industry would enjoy through a shift from military to nonmilitary expenditures. Moreover, an abrupt cutback in military spending would have serious social and economic consequences in a number of communities. Large cities such as Fort Worth and Seattle, as well as some industries, would be particularly affected by drastic changes in military policies (Halverson 1969; Ames 1969).

HISTORICAL TRENDS

Rather than restrict the issue to elitism versus pluralism, at this point one could argue that neither theory provides an adequate interpretation of the available data. Although reinterpretation consistent with the elitist perspective is possible, the data above suggest that a high level of military spending is not vital to the prosperity of either the nation or its largest businesses. On the other hand, given the findings of Russett (1969*a*, 1969*b*) that a wide variety of consumer and other public civilian activities suffer when there are substantial military expenditures, the pluralist perspective is not entirely satisfactory. For, if more interest groups would benefit from alternative government-spending policies, then how can pluralist theory explain the maintenance of such a substantial military commitment?

Since it is almost inevitable that any valid macrosocietal theory have implications for social change, a historical perspective provides additional clues to the theoretical issues at hand. The historical trends for both government spending, generally, and military spending, in particular, fail to fit neatly into either the pluralistic or the elitist interpretations.

The percentage of federal expenditures devoted to the armed forces has fluctuated considerably during the nation's history, ranging from about 10 percent during the Great Depression to over 90 percent during the Civil War (fig. 1). There is no evidence that military spending currently occupies an unusually large proportion of the total federal budget; rates during the 1960s are no higher than those in the 1830s and 1840s. The United States, compared with other nations, spends a relatively large part of its gross national product (GNP) on the military (see Benoit and Boulding 1963, pp. 301-6), but the current percentage is by no means uniquely high when compared with the nation's past record. In this regard, there is no support for the thesis that the role of the military in the government has expanded in recent decades (Mills 1959).

On the other hand, there is some evidence that military spending after the Second World War failed to drop as sharply as it had after previous wars. The War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and World War I were followed by periods of very low levels of military spending—even when compared with the period preceding the war. By contrast, military expenditures after World War II never declined to the levels found in the 1930s. This feature is compatible with the elitist perspective which emphasizes the change in military-industrial relations that occurred in recent decades.

Although the proportion of government expenditures devoted to the military shows no clear-cut temporal trend, a historical analysis does reveal that the role of government in the national economy has con-




FIG. 1.—Percentage of the federal budget for the military, 1790–1969. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960, columns Y350 and Y358; 1965a, columns Y350 and Y358a; 1965b, table 534; 1968, tables 538 and 544), based on expenditures for the “armed services” before 1900 and for “major national security” or “national defense” after 1900. There are some minor inconsistencies among sources.

sistently increased through the years. From the postbellum period until the First World War, government expenditures ranged between 2 and 3 percent of the GNP (fig. 2). After a sharp increase during World War I, the percentage remained above earlier peacetime levels. The federal budget increased to 10 percent of the GNP during the 1930s and reached even higher levels after the emergencies created by World War II had ended. Current government expenditures are about 15 percent of the GNP.

Figures 1 and 2 suggest that changes in the role of the military in the national economy are to be seen largely as a consequence of changes in the role of government in the economy. Consumption of an increasing portion of the total national output by the federal government means that both its nonmilitary and military expenditures are of growing significance to the total economy. Therefore, although the elitists are correct in arguing that military spending amounts to an expanding part of national productivity, the fact remains that the federal government's impact on many other sectors of the society is also growing. In the case of research, for example, the government plays an exceedingly important role (Barber 1968, p. 225). Likewise, there is some evidence of an "education-industrial complex" that operates with considerable effectiveness in influencing federal expenditures for education (Miller 1970). The government's ability to command an increasing portion of national productivity through taxes and other revenues means that a focus solely on the changing military-industrial relations could lead to a very misleading conclusion.

In short, since this brief review of historical trends fails to consistently support either the elitist or the pluralist approaches, it appears all the more reasonable to consider another perspective. Suggested below is an alternative interpretation of military-industrial relations based on what might be called the mechanism of compensating strategy.

AN ALTERNATE PERSPECTIVE

A high level of military expenditures is not necessarily due to a broad set of intense vested interests in such a policy. To be sure, there are both industries and entire communities that are deeply dependent on military expenditures. Moreover, once a pattern of military consumption is established, a shift to nonmilitary spending would be costly for some industries and regions that were not initially dependent on military spending. Nevertheless, when compared with the consequences of alternate government policies, most sectors of American industry gain very little from a high level of military expenditures.

On the other hand, the absence of widely shared direct benefits from military spending need not be taken as evidence that a small segment of




FIG. 2.—Expenditures of the federal government as a percentage of the GNP, 1869–1967. Sources: In addition, to those listed under fig. 1 U.S. Bureau of the Census (1960; 1965a, column F1; 1968, table 454).

American industry is dominant. Given the different economic and organizational resources that various segments possess, obviously interest groups in the society do not have equal power. Compare, for example, the resources available to the urban poor with those available to the petroleum industry. Nevertheless, policies detrimental to the numerical majority will occur even if a smaller group does not dominate the entire political system. Further, a process of decision making may be postulated in which the political system's output can fail to reflect the interests of the majority without this necessarily meaning that a power elite controls the government. Even if interest groups were alike in organization, wealth, and other competitive resources, under certain conditions a "compensating" strategy could be pursued such that political decisions would not invariably reflect the direct interests of the majority.

In order to specify the conditions necessary for a compensating power system to operate, two additional characteristics of interest groups should be noted. First, populations within advanced industrial societies are atomized into a highly diverse set of groups, with interests that are neither fully harmonious with one another nor fully competitive. Not only does an expanding division of labor subdivide a nation into increasingly specialized needs and vested interests, as Durkheim noted, but there is also an increased territorial division of labor such that spatial subunits of a nation also develop distinctive concerns. A second key element involves recognition of the fact that interest groups differ more than in terms of whether they are for or against a specific proposal. Rather they also differ in the *degree* of importance that each issue holds. What this means is that groups vary widely in how far they are prepared to go to achieve a specific end.

Accordingly, an advanced industrial society, regardless of its political ideology, must be viewed as one in which a wide variety of interest groups are each attempting to balance an array of potential gains and losses in order to generate the maximum net gain. Advantages that might accrue from opposing another segment are not necessarily pursued if even larger gains are possible through the expenditure of an equivalent amount of political capital in some other government domain. In other words, if interest groups are not by themselves able to obtain the political outcomes they desire, then it is necessary for them to form alliances and coalitions with other interest groups. Such combinations mean that each interest group sacrifices some issues in order to obtain the greatest net rewards. As a consequence, a political body's decision with respect to a particular issue may reflect the intense concern of a minority of interests coupled with the support obtained from other segments whose major interests are found elsewhere.

Four conditions are necessary for a "compensating" power situation to

operate. First, power must be an exhaustible commodity such that each interest group has limited political influence. Second, the interests of the population must be diverse enough so that a given proposal will not have an equal impact on all segments. Third, governmental actions that favor a particular interest group must not eliminate the disadvantaged majority's potential for other gains. In the case at hand, it means that funds are available for more than the military budget or that nonbudgetary legislation can be passed that will yield sufficient gains for other segments of the population. Fourth, legislation beneficial to a specific interest must not at the same time create too great a loss for the majority of other interests. Otherwise, a concerted effort to combat the legislation will provide a net gain to the majority that is even greater than would occur under their use of a compensating strategy.

When these conditions are met, it follows that a given group will not attempt to exert its influence on all issues to the same degree, but rather will concentrate on those that generate the greatest net gain. To obtain passage of particularly beneficial legislation, an interest group may in turn support other proposals that, by themselves, create small losses (see Coleman 1964). The third and fourth conditions are suggested by the controversy over military spending during the Vietnam war. The "guns and butter" policy first meant that other sectors of the population could pursue compensating strategies, such as are required by the third condition. On the other hand, the monetary and domestic crises generated by this series of compensating gains, coupled with the unpopularity of the war, make it increasingly hard to meet the last condition. That is, the potential net gains that would be achieved by the vast majority of the population through a decline in military spending begins to approach or exceed the gains that many segments obtain through a compensating strategy.

According to the notion of compensating strategies, military spending can be explained by a high level of interest on the part of one segment of American business accompanied by a relative lack of concern on the part of other segments of industry. The majority of industries disregard the small losses they incur from defense spending and turn their attention to other aspects of government policy that affect them more directly. Defense spending will influence the profits of dairy farmers, for example, but so too will other government policies such as price supports, marketing restrictions, exports and imports on dairy products, grading practices, trucking costs, and so forth. Accordingly, the area of government action with the most substantial direct impact on the goals of the dairy industry is probably not the military.

Indeed, barring a major war emergency, there are other facets of federal activity that are far more crucial to the interests of many industrial

segments. The relevance of the federal government is hardly restricted to the military budget; decisions affecting taxes, antitrust laws, foreign markets, imports, minimum-wage laws, and a wide variety of other government regulations are extremely important to business. These facets of government policy often have far greater short-term consequences for a specific industry than do military expenditures. The tobacco companies, for example, stand to lose far more from restrictions on cigarette advertising than they are likely to gain in the event of disarmament.⁷ The petroleum industry would also enjoy a small gain if there was a compensated cutback in military expenditures; however, federal budgetary decisions with regard to their special depletion tax advantages are far more significant. The largest gain would be enjoyed by agricultural services, but obviously agriculture is influenced by many other areas of government legislation and control.

Senate Committees

This propensity for each segment of the society to pursue its areas of greatest direct interest is illustrated by the states represented on various congressional committees. Although residents of all states are in some manner affected by the policies of any committee, it is clear that political efforts emphasize those areas with the greatest potential returns. Hence, each state tends to be represented on committees affecting those facets of the legislative process that are of greatest importance to the state. The House Agriculture Subcommittee on Tobacco, for example, is loaded with legislators from tobacco-producing states; six of the seven members come from Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Kentucky.

Table 5 illustrates the association between special interests and membership among several Senate committees. A crude index of vested interest is developed for each committee. States ranking above the national average on this indicator are classified as states with a special *primary* interest in the committee's work; states below the national average are classified as having a *secondary* interest. The index of vested interest for the Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee, for example, is the percentage of the 1960 labor force in agricultural and related industries. There are thirty states with a higher percentage than the national figure of 6.7 and twenty states with a lower percentage. These thirty states supply all thirteen members of the Senate's Agriculture Committee.

Although the residents of all states are affected by the prices for food and other agricultural products, the Agriculture Committee is almost entirely in the hands of southern and midwest senators from states with a particularly high vested interest in this domain. Such a pattern is con-

⁷ A gain of 1.76 percent under the conditions described by Leontief et al. (1966).

sistent with the proposition that an unequal distribution of potential gains and losses will generate different political thrusts for various interest groups.

Other committees also consist of senators from states with the greatest stake in their activities. The Indian Affairs Subcommittee consists entirely of senators from states with a high proportion of Indians. The Minerals and Fuels Committee is loaded with senators from states with relatively large segments of the labor force engaged in these extractive industries. Merchant Marine draws senators from coastal states. States with large metropolitan populations are overrepresented on the Housing

TABLE 5
VESTED INTERESTS OF STATES AND THE MEMBERSHIP
OF SENATE COMMITTEES, 91ST CONGRESS, 1969-1970

COMMITTEE	ALL STATES		STATES ON THE COMMITTEE	
	Primary Interest*	Secondary Interest	Primary Interest*	Secondary Interest
Agriculture and Forestry.....	30	20	13	0
Indian Affairs.....	17	33	10	0
Minerals, Materials, and Fuels....	20	30	8	1
Merchant Marine.....	30	20	9	1
Housing and Urban Affairs.....	20	30	7	8
Labor.....	15	33	7	5
Armed Services.....	25	23	14	3
International Organization and Disarmament.....	23	25	5	2

NOTE.—Committee membership based on *Congressional Index* (no date).

* Primary interests of the states in various committees based on the following criteria: *Agriculture and Minerals*—states whose labor force in 1960 exceeds the United States percentage in the agriculture and mining industries, respectively; *Indian Affairs*—states in which the Indian percentage of the population exceeds that for the total United States; *Merchant Marine*—states contiguous to an ocean, the Gulf, or the Great Lakes; *Housing and Urban Affairs*—states exceeding the national percentage of residents who reside in standard metropolitan statistical areas; *Labor*—states exceeding the national percentage of population in the AFL-CIO (data available for forty-eight states); *Armed Services*—states that would suffer a net loss in output and employment after compensated out in armament expenditures (Leontief et al. 1966, p. 197) (data available for forty-eight states); *International Organization*—same as above, except states gaining in output and employment (data available for forty-eight states).

and Urban Affairs Subcommittee, just as the Labor Subcommittee draws senators from states relatively high in union membership.

In this context, the composition of the Senate Armed Services Committee is not entirely surprising. The committee is loaded with senators from the states that would suffer a net loss if there was a compensated 20 percent cut in armament expenditures (based on the input-output analysis reported by Leontief et al. 1966, table 10-2). Only three of the seventeen members of this committee are from the twenty-three states that would enjoy a net gain. On the other hand, the small Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs is disproport-

tionately composed of senators from states that stand to gain through a military cutback.

Obviously other forces influence committee assignments in the Senate. Some committees are attractive simply because they may catapult members into the national limelight, for example, Foreign Affairs. Budgetary and procedural committees are extremely powerful, covering a wide range of activities, although it is difficult to link them with specific vested interests. In addition, some assignments are influenced by tradition and seniority. Moreover, this brief examination does not cover the complex exchange and trade networks that may exist between different congressional blocs.

Nevertheless, the results reported above do serve to illustrate the selective pursuit of vested interests. The fact that all activities of the Congress are of consequence in some direct or indirect way to every resident and every organization does not prevent each segment of the society from emphasizing those areas where maximum net gains may be obtained. In this regard, the composition of the Senate's Armed Services Committee may be viewed as but another manifestation of this organizational principle.

DISCUSSION

No single empirical study can determine the nature of military-industrial relations, to say nothing of resolving the elitist-pluralist controversy in which it is enmeshed. However, the data are suggestive both about the empirical question and the theoretical restatement that may be necessary.

In terms of the empirical facets of the study, several elements of the elitist position are supported. Some major corporations are deeply dependent on armament contracts; and the decline after World War II in the proportion of government spending on the military is less than would be expected from the patterns after earlier wars. Moreover, the federal government is a growing factor in the national economy, and hence its expenditures for the military are of increasing importance to the business world. There is no reason to doubt the existence of a military-industrial complex if by that phrase is meant an intense dependency on military contracts among some very large corporations.

On the other hand, there is no evidence to support the contention that the general success of large businesses in the nation depends on substantial expenditures for the military. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate that most would benefit from alternative government spending or from equivalent expenditures in the private sectors of the economy. For the majority of the largest corporations, military contracts at most amount

to a very small portion of their total business. Moreover, both the regression and input-output analyses suggest that corporate prosperity would be increased in the absence of military spending.

To be sure, a substantial and sudden drop in military expenditures would create difficulties for a few sectors of the economy and certain cities and regions that are deeply dependent on the military. Nevertheless, the consequences of disarmament should not be interpreted as the cause of its initial buildup. Cities do not first grow and then develop military industries that support them, rather the growth of cities may reflect the expansion of their economic base. Moreover, the bulk of American industry would gain under alternative spending policies.

If these inferences about military-industrial relations are valid, then both of the major current theories provide inadequate perspectives on the nature of societal power. Crucial to the reconceptualization suggested earlier is recognition of the fact that each of the diverse interest groups may, under some circumstances, take stands that are counter to their interests. This will occur when four necessary conditions are met such that a "compensating" strategy is possible. If each group attempts to generate the greatest *net* gain for itself, then a given policy need not be the product of simply the majority of interests, nor need it mean that a small set of interests is dominant. Rather, the policy may mean that the losses to a majority of interests are small, whereas the gains to some sectors are substantial.

From this perspective, military spending is but one among many sets of vested interests. To be sure, this domain could reach the point where it dominates the entire economic and social life of the nation. However, the results suggest that military expenditures are not, currently, a vital and necessary prerequisite to general corporate prosperity. Using the hypothesis of compensating strategies, the high level of military expenditures need not be interpreted as the product of a common vested interest in such spending among major businesses. Rather, extensive military spending may be viewed as reflecting the operations of an important and powerful interest group in a setting where other legislative issues have an even greater direct bearing on the prosperity of the remainder of economic segments. In the same fashion, senators tend to concentrate on areas of greatest direct benefit to their states despite the fact that all legislation is in some way relevant to all states.

Admittedly, this position must be treated as an alternative hypothesis since the results reported earlier may be reinterpreted so as to be consistent with either the pluralist or elitist schools. For example, the latter may claim that large businesses will support military expenditures, even when not directly beneficial, in order to provide a military umbrella for overseas investment. The hypothesis developed here of a "compensat-

ing" strategy and its application must be viewed as an initial effort to take into account some of the difficulties that are faced by an unyielding advocacy of either the pluralist or elitist perspectives.

Unless one is prepared to evaluate existing theories in terms of the results obtained from studies of the empirical reality, a basic issue such as the structure of power in the nation will forever remain beyond the purview of sociology. Either, we shall continue to be sociologists who subject the topic only to polemics, speculation, anecdotal arguments, and the use of models that would be rejected as "stereotypes" if analogous reasoning were applied to other facets of the social world in which we live.

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Class and Marriage in Africa and Eurasia¹

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The concepts of class, caste, and estate, derived as they are from Eurasian models, are not wholly satisfactory when applied to Africa. Homogamy and in-marriage are not characteristic of the social strata in African states, which tend to encourage marriage between groups of different status, hence these groups tend not to develop in isolation with distinctive modes of life. Out-marriage and bridewealth in Africa stand in contrast to in-marriage and dowry in Eurasia. It is suggested that the more intensive form of agriculture in the latter area encouraged the preservation of familial status by the transmission, *inter alia*, of property to females (e.g., the dowry) as well as males, a procedure which strongly encourages the marriage of like with like. In Africa, out-marriage strengthens the social ties and cultural similarities within a society. As a consequence, "class conflict" was less significant in the political system, although the situation is now changing in the "modern" sector.

In this paper I try to answer a question about West Africa raised a hundred years ago by Richard Burton in the description of his *Mission to Gelele*, king of the state of Dahomey. "Truely it is said that whilst the poor man in the North is the son of a pauper, the poor man in the Tropics is the son of a prince" (1864, pp. 40-41). It is a problem that was taken up fifty years later in another form by the Gold Coast lawyer from Cape Coast, John Mensah Sarbah, when he wrote that "in the African social system the formation of a pauper class is unknown, nor is there antagonism of class against class" (Redwar 1909, p. vi). And it is a problem that has been central to current controversies between Marxist-Leninists, on the one hand, and African socialists, on the other, about the nature of the systems of stratification in that continent (Grundy 1964).

Each of these statements involves some contrast, implicit or explicit, between the class structure of African and Eurasian states, especially if one understands the north (in Burton's characteristic aphorism) to mean Eurasia and the south, Africa. It is the implications for the comparative analysis of stratification, or more specifically for status groups, that I want to pursue by considering the relationship between class and marriage.

¹ This paper was first read to the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, in May 1969. I am grateful to the members of that department both for their invitation and for their comments. The theme is one that has been touched upon by other writers on Africa and Eurasia, too numerous to mention. I am particularly indebted to L. A. Fallers, M. Gluckman, W. J. Goode, E. R. Leach, E. Peters, and N. O. Yalman for conversations and clarifications.

CLASS

In all the major continents of the world, the more technologically advanced societies are marked by their unequal distribution of power and status. It is this power bank, Parsons suggests, that, among other things, provides the mechanism for the mobilization of resources in the interest of the collective action needed for the running of complex societies (Parsons 1964, p. 51). The terms we use to analyze the major groups in this wide range of stratified systems, in whatever part of the world they are found, derive directly from the Eurasian experience. Three main concepts are employed: class, as typified by the modern Western world; caste, characteristic of India; and the estate (or *stände*) of feudal Europe. In sociological discussions the major difference between class and caste turns upon the openness or closure of a series of horizontally juxtaposed groups or strata, that is, upon whether or not mobility is allowed between them.²

In visual terms, such systems are often diagrammed as a kind of layer cake, one element spread on top of the next like a series of deposits in a well-conducted archaeological dig, the different units being arranged in a single hierarchy in which each group is defined as being above, below, or in between. Or alternatively, to use another culinary metaphor, as a jam sandwich, with most of the jam at the top.

I am concerned with these models, verbal and visual, because they may lead us to neglect certain basic differences between such groups as they are found in the major societies of Eurasia (which are in some ways closer together than the categorization allows) and in the state systems of Africa (which in certain respects stand opposed both to class and caste). This is not simply a matter of setting right the historical record. A good deal more is at stake. From the standpoint of social theory, the adoption of a particular model affects the categories and measures of sociological inquiry. From the standpoint of social practice, it affects (or could affect) social policy in developing and developed nations alike. At the very least, it influences one's understanding of the role of the new elites.³

First of all, analytic categories of this degree of abstraction are of limited use for many, possibly most, scientific purposes. The very fact that they are drained of content, of "culture," to such an extent has obscured the important differences. For example, the term "feudal" has frequently been applied both to medieval Europe and to precolonial

² Other writers have stressed the cultural factors which they suggest make caste specific to Hindu India (e.g., Leach 1960).

³ See, e.g., Folsom's comment on the statement Bing made on p. 62 of his autobiographical account of the Nkrumah regime: "It is equally nonsensical to include members of the National Liberation Council among the aristocratic class, whatever that means in the Ghanaian context" (Folsom 1969, p. 37).

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Africa, giving insufficient attention to differences in the economy as well as other spheres.⁴

But, in respect to status groups, there are more specific reasons why these general concepts have given rise to misunderstanding. Clearly, precolonial African states had no caste system (though some had castes); neither did they have classes in the modern European sense, if mobility is a central feature.⁵ How is their type of status group best described? In his excellent account of the Nupe of Nigeria, Nadel concludes that this state is above all a class system (1942, pp. 127-35). However, his study, which is significantly entitled *A Black Byzantium*, is replete with feudal comparisons, implicit as well as explicit. This would suggest that the model of *stände* might be more appropriate. Many other authors have pursued this feudal analogy. But, here too, there is the built-in assumption that these units were of a type found in Europe at an earlier date. I want to suggest that even if we are forced to use such terms because of the poverty of our analytic vocabulary and a natural reluctance to proliferate neologisms, we should bear in mind the basic differences between status groups in the two continental areas and beware of general statements based (often unconsciously) upon Eurasian experience alone.

Let us examine a particular case where this difference has been overlooked. In most discussions, classes, castes, and estates are seen as having certain basic features in common. One widespread idea is that the social distance between classes is maintained by various blocks in the system of intergroup communication, that is, by restrictions upon marrying out, upon eating together, and upon other forms of social intercourse. While these restrictions do not always have the obligatory character that is found in caste systems, and while formal freedom often exists, they are still effective in maintaining and building barriers between the status groups in a particular society.

Clearly the most effective such barrier is that on intermarriage, since such a tie would bring the two groups into close conjugal, affinal, and other social relationships. It is therefore upon the marital arrangements between the different strata that I want to concentrate first.

MARRIAGE

In sociological writings, there is a widely held belief that all status groups discourage intermarriage. This idea exists even among those writers who display an intelligent appreciation of cross-cultural analysis. In his work on social stratification, Bernard Barber claims that "all societies tend to disapprove not only of all marriage between people from different

⁴ For a discussion, see J. Goody (1963, 1969a).

⁵ See the discussion by Pauvert 1955.

social classes but also of all social relations between them that could lead to marriage" (1957, p. 123). Even in a relatively open-class society like the United States, social class endogamy is the rule. According to Hollingshead, 83 percent of all New Haven marriages were between people who had been living in neighborhoods of the same or adjacent social class position (1950, p. 625).⁶

Some years earlier, Kingsley Davis presented a theoretical paper discussing why this should be. He maintained that "a cardinal principle of every stratified social order is that the majority of those marrying shall marry equals"; endogamy, or at least preferential in-marriage, is the rule of class, caste, or *stände*. The reason, he claims, is that marriage implies equality. "If some persons are 'untouchable,' they must also be unmarriedable, and if food which they cook is 'uneatable,' they must also be 'unusable' in the kitchen." He goes on to say that "a wife reared in a social stratum widely different from her husband's is apt to inculcate ideas and behaviour incompatible with the position the children will inherit from their father, thus creating a hiatus between their status and their role" (1941, pp. 337-38). In other words, intermarriage would make it impossible to maintain extensive differences in behavior between individuals and groups, since it would lead to a merging of the subcultures that distinguish them.

In another contribution to the subject published in the same year, Robert Merton stresses the same point, though in a somewhat wider social context. "Intermarriage between persons of radically different social status thus conflicts with the existing organization of cliques and friendship groups involving the spouses and their kin. Rules of avoidance or social distance and rules of accessibility are brought into open conflict" (1964, p. 142). Merton's discussion deals mainly with ethnic caste, since he is trying to account for the predominance, among black-white marriages in the United States, of unions between male blacks and female whites. But the wider concern is with the close relationship between marriage policy and stratification.

As far as this situation goes, the general argument is a sound one. But it is not in fact the case that all stratified systems demand a high degree of in-marriage. Status endogamy and related forms of in-marriage are certainly characteristic of the major Eurasian societies. In Africa, on the other hand, endogamy is rarely found except in ethnic situations, in particular those where ruling groups of northern origin have established themselves over black agriculturalists, as happened in South Africa, Ethiopia, the East African coast, certain Interlacustrine states, and on

⁶ On homogamy in contemporary France, see Girard (1964) who writes, "L'homogamie apparaît en quelque sorte comme une corollaire de la conscience de groupe" (p. 31). This monograph also includes a useful bibliography on the subject.

the Saharan fringes (e.g., in Timbuktu). In the major states of West Africa, ruling groups were rarely if ever endogamous. Indeed, where the ruling dynasty consisted of an exogamous clan or lineage (i.e., where there is a "corporate" claim to chiefship), both male and female members were obliged to take their spouses from outside the ruling estate; conubium was not merely formally open, as in a class system, but obligatorily so. However, even where the ruling estate does not consist of a single exogamous clan, intermarriage is widespread. Take the kingdom of Gonja in northern Ghana.⁷ Originally a conquest state established by Mande horsemen in the seventeenth century, it comprises four major sociopolitical categories, the ruling Gbanya (who claim agnatic descent from the leader of the conquest), the Muslims (who mainly descend from those attached to the ruling house), the commoners (largely the descendants of conquered autochthones and specialist service groups), and finally the slaves (who were constantly absorbed into the commoner estate and who were continually recruited by raiding and purchase). In addition there was a sizable body of strangers whose activities centered upon the great trading town of Salaga, where forest products were exchanged for northern livestock, minerals, and manufactures. Examination of spouses' estates in 515 Gonja marriages⁸ shows that men of all groups take a large proportion of wives from estates other than their own. This is very pronounced among Muslim men (two-thirds of whose marriages are outside the estate) and for men of the ruling group (four-fifths of whose marriages are outside). Even one-quarter of the men from the numerically dominant commoner estate married women from other estates. Much the same picture emerges from a study of the marriages of the previous generation, indicating that the situation we find in this hierarchical society is not a new one. Indeed, things were probably like this from the beginning. It was presumably because of intermarriage that, as so often occurs in Africa, the ruling estate lost its original language and adopted the speech of one of the groups it had conquered. It remains true today that, while marriages of alliance are sometimes made between friends in the ruling group, many royals express a preference for the daughters of commoners, who are said to be less work shy and more faithful than their own sisters. In the nearby kingdom of Bariba, in north Dahomey, similar preferences for "low" marriage were openly expressed by male members of the ruling group,⁹ and it was said that the princesses of the matrilineal Ashanti, through whom royal blood and claims to office were transmitted, preferred the lighter-skinned males

⁷ For further information on this kingdom, see E. N. Goody (1962, 1969) and J. Goody (1967, 1968, 1969c).

⁸ A study of these marriages is being prepared by Dr. Esther Goody.

⁹ According to Lombard (see Cornevin 1962, pp. 163-64).

from the north, men who could only have been strangers or slaves. Indeed, so little objection was there to "low" marriage in the area that a Gonja prince once remarked to me that "all our mothers were slaves."

These systems of effectively open conubium, which are widespread in Africa, stand out in sharp opposition to the marriage arrangements of the major states in Eurasia, whether they are stratified by caste or by class. In these societies, like tends to marry like, or better. Fathers try to arrange the marriage of their daughters to men of equal or superior standing (i.e., hypergamy), but as a marriage policy, hypogamy is firmly discouraged and rarely promoted.¹⁰ The result, as Tylor pointed out, is the isolation of groups.¹¹

In Africa, the opposite is true. The different status groups are bound together by a network of intermarriages which has the profound implications for the social system that Tylor, Davis, and others suggested. In order to indicate the effects on culture, and upon social integration, I take the apparently trivial example of cooking, since its association with sex and marriage is close.

• COOKING

Given the practice of heterogamy (or open conubium), it is clearly difficult to maintain or institutionalize class differences, that is, internal differences of culture distinct from those based upon expenditure alone. When husbands and wives come from different groups, the women can hardly be expected to raise children in the ways of their affines rather than their own—unless their role is largely replaced by domestic servants of one kind or another. If societies are polygynous as well as heterogamous, the situation becomes yet more complex. The women living in a common household will be of different origins and their ways of acting are likely to move toward a common mean. Indeed, there is some evidence for the emergence of new norms out of this kind of mutual accommodation in the multiracial dwelling groups of lower-status migrants in West African cities, and this process is certainly reflected in their tendency to adopt a standardized repertoire of recipes.¹² Under circumstances such as these—the large heterogeneous dwelling, where a favorable climate allows women and children to work mainly in the open

¹⁰ Though, as Merton has pointed out, in black-white marriages in the United States caste hypogamy may be crosscut by class hypergamy, as when upper black male marries lower white female.

¹¹ Hiller (1933, p. 24) uses *isolation device* to denote arrangements and symbols which mark off in-groups from out-groups. Merton distinguishes between the *isolation devices* employed by subordinate groups and the *exclusion devices* employed by dominant groups.

¹² These observations were made by Dr. Enid Schildkrout in the course of her intensive investigation of urban processes in Kumasi.

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common space of the courtyard rather than be confined to the closed private space of the room—the pressures are likely to be toward cultural homogeneity and political identification.

Contrast the Eurasian situation: The difference between the centralized societies of Africa and Eurasia are highlighted in the household economy. While Eurasia had a *haute cuisine* as well as a lower, *basse cuisine*, Africa had neither; its cooking was demotic. Or rather, what cultural differentiation existed did so in those societies like Ruanda, where the strata were in-marrying and did not mix at the domestic level. Otherwise it was largely a matter of quantitative rather than qualitative differences.

There is, of course, a danger in drawing too stark a contrast. One of the great drawbacks of contemporary structural analysis is its devotion to crude oppositions rather than more subtle measurements. Clearly, in the mercantile and warrior states of West Africa, ways of acting depended upon one's social status. Burton wrote of the king in Dahomey that he would not allow the peasants to cultivate certain cash crops around the port of Whydah; a chief could not alter his house without the king's permission; and so on (1864, pp. i, 180–81). But such distinctions did not lie in the traditional patterns of culture; they tended to be attached to specific roles rather than to general classes and to derive from the authority of the king rather than from internal differentiation. Moreover, intermarriage prevented too great a separation, too complete an isolation, to develop between the strata. There was broad homogeneity in marriage, cooking, and other aspects of culture, even though the strata had differential access to political office.

IMPLICATIONS AND EXPLANATION

I have suggested that the usual way of looking at status groups in hierarchical societies takes account of too few important variables. As distinct from Eurasian societies, most African states do not discourage marriage between status groups. On the contrary, they encourage such arrangements. The consequences are clear: Groups tend to merge culturally even though they are politically distinct, and this is a fact of considerable political significance.

But why do Eurasian societies tend to isolate their classes and African societies to integrate theirs? What are the preconditions and the implications of these differences?¹³

In offering an explanation I am dealing with a trend, though one that has statistical support at a number of points (J. Goody 1969b). I am not claiming to explain all the phenomena in question, only a significant

¹³ A less impressionistic method of approach to this problem is tried out in Goody, Irvine, and Tahany (forthcoming).

part of them; where numerical material is available, the extent of that part is shown by the coefficient of association. And by drawing attention to the role of certain economic variables in Eurasian societies, I do not intend to reduce class and caste to epiphenomena of the economy. Religious and other aspects of such hierarchies exist in their own right.¹⁴ But I am pointing to what I consider to be the necessary preconditions for the development of certain major aspects of these institutions and to the social implications of this fact.¹⁵

It is important to remember that the in-marrying tendency of European and Asian societies was not simply a feature of the major social categories known as castes or classes. Bloch insists that the marriages of like to like (or to above) occurred at all levels and for all roles. A serf was not allowed to marry outside the group of serfs dependent on the same lord (1966, p. 88). Duby quotes a medieval source as stating: "Les hommes de la terre de Saint-Pierre ne prendront pas des femmes étrangères, tant qu'ils pourront trouver dans la cour des femmes qu'ils puissent épouser. Qu'il en soit de même pour les femmes" (1962, p. 451). The "small world of seigneurial sergeants," writes Bloch, developed a "class solidarity" by inheritance and by in-marriage. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, "the sons and daughters of bailiffs preferred to choose their marriage partners from among their opposite numbers on other *seigneuries*. When people are concerned to marry 'within their own circle,' there is tangible proof that the 'circle' is on its way to becoming a class" (1966, p. 192). In the towns the same tendency occurred among merchants' daughters, even when they were orphans. A fourteenth-century record from London shows fifty-three out of sixty-three such girls (84 percent) marrying merchants. Of the other ten, five were married to gentlemen and five to citizens of lesser companies. A yet higher proportion of widows remarried in their own sphere (Thrupp 1948, p. 26). As for the great landed families, the position here is well known from the recent work of Holmes (1957) for the medieval period, of Stone (1960-61, 1967) for Tudor and Stuart England, and Habbakuk (1950) for the eighteenth century. Habbakuk describes the attempts of the gentry to secure proper marriages for their daughters: "The marriages between landed families in the eighteenth century were more like treaties of alliance between sovereign states than love matches; they involved hard bargaining in which the size of the bride's fortune was carefully matched against the income which the bridegroom's father

¹⁴ For a recent historical review, see Mousnier 1969.

¹⁵ I.e., development rather than current distribution. Monogamy may have arisen under specific socioeconomic conditions but an explanation of its present distribution cannot disregard the proselytizing activities of Christian missionaries. Such considerations mean that our correlations are bound to be less than perfect.

was prepared to settle on him" (1955, p. 158). Similar kinds of arrangements were made at the marriages of modern Irish peasants (Arensberg and Kimball 1940), Greek villagers (Friedl 1962), and in Indian castes (Kapadia 1966, p. 137). In all these cases, it is not simply a question of the absence of marriage between the groups (though this fact is of great significance in caste systems) but of matching like for like, or getting an even better bargain. And the usual mechanism by which this matching is achieved is the matching of property, often by means of the dowry, whereby a woman acquired her portion upon marriage (or a jointure upon widowhood) rather than at the death of her father or mother. Dowry systems, and indeed the whole process by which property is passed to the offspring of both sexes by what I have called diverging devolution, is characteristic of the centralized societies of Eurasia (J. Goody 1962, pp. 307-20; 1969b), those very societies that are also marked by the tendency to marry-in.

The contrast between Eurasia and Africa in terms of openness of marriage (in-marriage and out-marriage) is paralleled by a contrast in marriage transactions (dowry and bridewealth). In Africa there is no dowry, except in areas directly influenced by Mediterranean practice, nor is there any transmission of property between males and females, either at death or at marriage. What then is the connection between Eurasia, dowry, and in-marriage, on the one hand, and Africa, bridewealth, and out-marriage, on the other? If we see in-marriage and dowry as methods of preserving differences of property and status in contrast to bridewealth and out-marriage which diffuse them, why then should these features be associated with Eurasia rather than Africa?

In explaining the difference, I want to begin by recalling Bloch's account of *French Rural History* (1966) where he traces the social developments associated with the use of the plough and the rise of an increasingly intensive agriculture in Europe. In another outstanding study, Homans (1941) also relates differences in social structure to differences in agricultural practice.

It is reasonable to look for such differences in the present case. As distinct from the major societies of Eurasia, African states have simple systems of farming, since the continent lacks the plough, the wheel, and often a good soil. Frequently the exploitation of the land takes the form of shifting agriculture. Where population densities increase land may be more permanently cultivated, as in the Fra-fra region of northern Ghana, but productivity still remains at a low level. In this particular area, Llyn (1942) found the average area farmed per man was 2.49 acres (0.66 per person). While the cereal grown in the small fertilized plot around the compound yielded 2,000 pounds per acre, the yield of unmanured land dropped to one-tenth of this amount. On these yields he

claimed it was difficult for a family to subsist without exchanging their livestock for the grain from less-crowded areas (1942, pp. 78-83). The west of Ghana's Upper Region is less populated than this central part. In that area, three groups cultivated the following average acreages per person: LoWiile 0.9; LoDagaba 1.5; Dagaba 1.8. The rough acreage for an elementary family (i.e., per man) was therefore 3.6; 5; and 6.2 acres, respectively. Internal variation within these groups was small. Of the three, the Dagaba had access to as much bushland as they could farm (J. Goody 1956, p. 30; 1958, p. 64); their acreage probably represents about the limit a man could cultivate by the hoe under these conditions. Consequently farmers could produce relatively little by way of surplus, at least in terms of cereal.¹⁶ While a chief could employ the labor of free-men or slaves to work the land, it would bring him a very small reward when compared with the situation that existed in medieval England and in other parts of Eurasia under plough cultivation. Figures are difficult to come by for medieval Europe, but the details of the Glastonbury Manors are sufficiently precise to make a limited point. Here 260 holdings were half a virgate (30 acres) or more and 350 were of 5 acres or less (Postan 1950, p. 242). In comparing these acreages we must make allowances for differences in the farming system, since in the medieval case fallow land is included in the measurement of the holding. On the other hand, we must remember that the virgate was only a quarter of the acreage a family could, in theory, farm in one year, namely, a hide. What is remarkable if viewed from the African standpoint is not so much the overlap between the larger farms under hoe cultivation and the smaller farms under plough, but the immensely greater *potential* of plough farming and the massive inequalities of holdings in land which it allowed.

The figures I have given are for western Europe, but elsewhere, too, the animal-drawn plow meant a very significant leap forward in productive capacity. Its critical role has been discussed by many writers. Generalists like Childe (1954) and McNeill (1963) have stressed its role in the growth of human civilization; more specifically, Hole and Flannery (1967) have argued for a close relationship between the nature of the productive system and the character of the social organization. Leach (1947, pp. 239 ff.) has examined the difference between Shan and Kachin in terms of the contrast between plough and shifting agriculture. The position in Africa, whether in the savannas or the forest, is somewhat different. But the increase in land a man can bring under cultivation by the use of the plough is apparent in reports from northern Nigeria. Grove noted that in the Dan Yusufu district the average holding of a hoe

¹⁶ The situation is somewhat different with forest crops such as bananas and taro, and with intermediary crops such as yams.

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work unit was about 8 acres, whereas a mixed farmer using a plough "requires at least 20 acres of land if he is to make full use of his pair of working cattle" (1957, pp. 40-41). The fact that the amount of good farmland is limited means that only relatively few can adopt this new technique, giving rise to considerable differences in the holding of land. More recently Anthony and Johnston have shown the mean acreage cultivated by plough farmers in this same area was three times as great as that of hoe farmers (1968, p. 47), though the former also had somewhat larger families.

The increase in productivity that the plough allows has two implications for stratification: It enables a ruling group to develop a much greater standard of living out of the agricultural surplus (to which, of course, it makes some contribution by way of investment in machinery and protection from interference), but it also means that the producers themselves are ranked on the basis of their command of the means of production, that is, their differential access to land and equipment. Good land for ploughing is now short; not everyone can have as much as he wants. And here we have the basis for the difference between richer and poorer peasants, indeed even landed and landless peasants, that characterizes Eurasian village life.

Contrast this kulak situation with the very different rural system described by Burton in one of the most centralized, the most highly organized states in Africa, Dahomey: "Not a tenth of the land is cultivated; the fallow system is universal, and when a man wants fresh ground he merely brings a little dash to the caboceer" (1864, p. 40). Under these conditions, the whole system of stratification, national as well as local, must be very different from the kind of regime where the ruling group has effective control of usufructuary as well as allodial rights. If there is a plentiful supply of land, no man need bend his knee to a lord simply in order to get a living. It is critical to my thesis that in Africa there were no landlord-tenant relationships, nor any institution one can legitimately call "serfdom" or "peonage." Slavery was widespread, though the payoff was limited. Clientship also existed, but the rewards for voluntary subjection were either in cattle (as in Ruanda) or in political rights over land, that is, the right to collect tax. But it was taxes over trade goods rather than rent or tribute from agricultural produce that contributed to the economy of the ruling class (what Marx called "state feudal land ownership"), though income from raiding was often the most important single source of wealth.

Relations between man and man were rarely based on differences in landholding, either on the state or community level. Indeed, at the community level, land tended to be owned corporately by a lineage group, though exploited by much smaller family units: The lineage might hold

fallow land in reserve to be distributed among its members according to need rather than by next-of-kin inheritance (e.g., J. Goody 1956, pp. 34 ff.). While there were differences between rich and poor farmers, these tended to be based upon the strength of one's arm or the number of one's sons, rather than upon the inheritance of landed property. Broadly speaking, poverty was related to labor rather than capital. Indeed many groups conceptualize differences of wealth in terms of strength rather than accumulation. Among the LoDagaa of northern Ghana a poor man is a weak one (*nibaalo*) and a rich man is a strong one (*gandaa, nikpiung*), though the phrase "chief of money" or "cowries" (*libie na*) is also used.

Since the social status and living standard of the family groups that exploited the land were little affected by the transmission of the means of production, there was less pressure either to individualize those rights or to channel them to one's offspring. In the centralized states, what counted was the transmission of rights to hold office, where relationship to a particular group (e.g., the ruling Gbanya in Gonja) was often as important as a relationship to a particular person. As far as marriage was concerned, one's daughters were going to get a roughly similar deal (similar to what they had experienced at home) wherever they married, so that selection of mates by property control was less significant. Because of the absence of the plough and other capital investment in land one man's holding was much like another. An individual did not have to pursue a policy of marrying people of the same socioeconomic class in order to retain differential status because the differences (other than political ones) were not that great. The relative cultural homogeneity we have observed went hand in hand with the relative economic homogeneity.

Contrast the marriage situation in Europe. To maintain the socioeconomic standing of his sons and daughters, a man had to provide them both with part of his property, that is, he had to practice diverging devolution. In the case of a girl, her portion enabled her to acquire a husband who would, in the well-worn phrase, "maintain her in the standard of life to which she was accustomed"; it also enabled her to support herself in her widowhood through the medium of the dower. It is clear that such a system of property distribution, which involves the establishment of some type of conjugal fund, is difficult to operate unless marriage (marriage with property) is monogamous, and it is highly significant that monogamy is firmly associated with this Eurasian mode of transmitting property (J. Goody 1969b, p. 63).

I have tried to associate certain kinds of marriage arrangements (namely in-marriage)—which have a fundamental significance for contemporary as well as preindustrial social structure—with specific ways of passing property between the generations (diverging devolution) and,

in turn, to link this with the higher productivity (and scarcer resources) that arise in more advanced systems of agriculture. The contrast is one between Eurasia and Africa, but there is an intermediary area that provides a test of the hypothesis: Ethiopia.

ETHIOPIA

The nature of the marriage transaction and the relationship to land tenure are well illustrated in this country, which is African physically but not socially.

As the Amhara had the plough,¹⁷ land had a considerable economic value. In his account of the area around Dabra Berhan, Workneh shows how the differences in the standard of living are related to the ownership of land. While most farmers are poor and "own only very small pieces of land," there are "great differences in the amounts of land possessed. Some farmers have many pieces of land for farming while others have only two or three *massa*, an area which may not exceed 30,000 square metres," that is, about 7.5 acres (1961, p. 82).

His account suggests how these differences in landholdings are related to marriage. Sex plays "a great part in determining the ownership of land and, in consequence, the standard of living and the type of education people get. . . . [M]ale children get a greater share of the land than female children" (1961, p. 85). In most of Africa a daughter gets no property at all from her father (who controls the productive surplus); here at least she gets a substantial share, even though, according to the author, a woman's descendants are poorer than the descendants of sons. At this point, he seems to disregard a woman's paternal heritage. Her status is maintained if she marries well, for then her daughter will in turn be well provided for by the husband. It is perhaps for this reason that "parents spend more money and care on their daughters than on their sons. During childhood the girls are well dressed while the boys only get enough clothes to protect themselves from the bitter weather." The money a parent spends on a girl clearly affects her ability to attract a husband of the proper socioeconomic standing, although "even after marriage their parents face many difficulties and spend much money in supporting their daughters whenever they quarrel with their husbands."

¹⁷ Other mechanical devices used in Europe were not encouraged. Indeed they were often actively discouraged. In 1844 Harris recorded the fact that two Greeks had built a water mill for the king, but it was not used because of opposition from the priests. A generation later, a French traveler reported that the king's confessor called the mill the work of the demon and ordered it to be burned in order to destroy the spirit responsible. He excommunicated not only the builders but also anyone who had brought grain to it for milling or had eaten bread produced from its flour (Pankhurst 1961a, p. 31).

Amhara society is differentiated not only in landholding and in standard of living but also culturally. Rich farmers have different attitudes toward education and religion than the poor, generally being more conservative. But the village community is only one level of Amharic life. Above it is a massive secular and religious hierarchy, which is again highly differentiated in terms of landholding, standard of living, and behavior. "The social hierarchy in traditional Ethiopia," writes Pankhurst, "was very clearly defined and left its mark on many facets of everyday life. It could be seen in class relations, in the use of different forms of speech in addressing or referring to persons of different rank, in different ways of dressing in the presence of superiors, equals and inferiors, in a series of prohibitions designed to exclude the lower orders from certain privileges in one way or another associated with status, and in the existence of so-called depressed classes" (1961a, p. 7). These features of the social structure were associated with extreme respect and reticence of the inferior toward the superior and with a large number of sumptuary laws about the wearing of colored dresses and gold jewelry, the use of umbrellas, as well as more specifically economic privileges like the noble's monopoly of brewing honey wine (*tej*) and the prohibition upon anyone killing a cow "without leave from the lord of the country" (Alvarez 1881, pp. 408-9). "In the time of our fathers and grandfathers," the Tigre nobles declared when giving judgment in a case of this kind, "persons found with *tej* in their houses were deprived of their land, persons discovered sleeping on leather beds had their riches taken away from them" (Pankhurst 1961a; see also Pankhurst 1961b; Levine 1965).

Differences between statuses and restrictions upon the behavior of social groups occurred in other centralized states in Africa, particularly where their economies were based upon the coastal trade or upon military supremacy. My argument is not that such restrictions were absent but that, despite these rules, the African hierarchy, whether of persons or groups, was less highly differentiated in a qualitative sense, even though the number of steps in that hierarchy might be the same as in Eurasia. One reason was the limited amount that upper-status groups were able to remove from the system of agricultural production and the consequent restrictions on the development of economically based subcultures.

CONCLUSION

I have already pointed to some conclusions in the course of my argument. To summarize them again would be to run the danger of further simplifying what is already a highly generalized discussion. But the argument does throw some light on my opening query and to this I return. The accepted typology of hierarchical systems of status groups appears to

be too abstract and too Eurasian to account for the facts at our command, especially those about Africa where the social groupings in a politically differentiated society are not necessarily in-marrying groups, though many sociologists have seen these as a universal feature of stratified systems. A realization of this fact will make general statements less general but more valid. However, I am not simply concerned with social theory in the abstract, nor yet with social history in a more concrete sense, but also with understanding the modern situation (though I would argue that the dichotomy between modern and traditional does not take us very far). The realization that marriage policy is a variable has important implications for the relationship within and between societies; where integration is desired, exogamy or at least "preferential out-marriage" (the mixed marriage, in fact) is clearly the most effective way of achieving that end. But here I am primarily concerned with the implications for African societies. There has been a lot of discussion by politicians as well as sociologists as to the role of classes in the emergent political systems of Africa, much of it dogmatic, ideological, and uninspired. Broadly speaking, African politicians, especially those advocating African socialism, have argued against the existence of a class system in traditional society. For Nkrumah, at least before 1964, Africa was classless; so too for Senghor, Touré, and Nyerere, the last of whom wrote: "I doubt if the equivalent for the word 'class' exists in an indigenous African language; for language describes the ideas of those who speak it, and the idea of 'class' and 'caste' was non-existent in African society" (1962; 1968, p. ii). In making such statements, the writers did not mean that there were no status groups in the earlier period, nor that classes (in the European sense) were not now emerging under present conditions. But while European Marxists and non-Marxists alike were attempting to fit Africa into their own developmental schema, these Africans claimed there was an important difference in the socioeconomic structure, though they were unable to state clearly what this was. Looking at this whole problem, Grundy has suggested that "the denial of social classes is a device utilised by ruling elites to bolster their regimes" (1964, p. 392). As far as the emergent sector goes, this statement undoubtedly holds some truth; our current terminology enables new elites to enjoy high office and high living if their superior position is not stigmatized as "class." But there is more to the question than this. As I have tried to show, the traditional system of status groups in African states did in fact differ in certain major respects from the Eurasian model. African politicians hint at this when they speak of the socialist or communal aspects of land tenure. The Soviet Africanist, I. Potekhin, touched upon the same point when he abandoned his earlier view that Africa displayed a "patriarchal type of feudalism" and realized that "in the great

majority of African countries the class differentiation of the peasantry is still insignificant" (1963, p. 39). But much obscurity still remains because the analysis has not been pushed far enough, and neither sociologists nor politicians have tried to answer the crucial question of why such differences existed. When they think about it, some writers (e.g., Abraham 1962) resort to unsatisfactory types of explanations (because they are circular) which are phrased in terms of the African personality or pan-African culture. Or, like Marx and Weber, they introduce a series of further subdivisions in their types of (for example) feudal or traditional societies, which, if more useful, is still somewhat limiting, since it drowns the attempt to discover correlations in a flood of descriptive categorizations.

There is one other concrete aspect of the change connected with the new political, economic, and educational systems in Africa that has received little attention and which is seen particularly clearly when we take up the contrast with Europe. When there is a change in the relative political and economic position of a Eurasian aristocracy, whether because of conquest, democracy, industrialization, or the rise of new skills, the families involved still have their land and other possessions on which to fall back—providing that the change stops short of complete dispossession. This property gives them a lever on the new dispensation and helps them preserve a privileged position, even if this has been modified by events. Many European writers have tended to see African chiefships in just such a "feudal" mode and ask the same sort of question about the relation between traditional and modern elites as would be appropriate for the post-Reformation period in Europe. As a result, they are anxious to perceive and describe the situation in terms of class conflict. But, except in exceptional cases, African chiefs were sustained by temporary political dominion rather than by persisting economic power (if we can make a crude distinction), and so could put up little resistance to the changes brought about first by colonial rule and then by independent governments. In any case, chiefs are now a set of individuals, an interest group, rather than a class in the socioeconomic sense. Their kin share in their preeminence only to a limited extent and easily fit into the modern system, for they have little to gain from sticking to the old. In such a situation, the system of elites and of stratification generally is likely to be much more fluid than in Eurasia, and the educational ladder is likely to receive more emphasis as the road to success. "Africa's golden road," to use Kwesi Armah's less-than-fortunate phrase, lies in the fluidity of its system of stratification, which in turn is related to patterns of marriage and of agricultural production. It is critical to note that in all the postindependence upheaval that has taken place on that continent, little violence has been directed toward superior strata, apart

from the colonial rulers themselves. The peasants have revolted against indigenous rulers in two places, Ruanda and Zanzibar, exactly those places where the marriage system stresses the isolation of the political elite. In other parts, the stress on open concubinage has tended to produce considerable vertical homogeneity within any area, though this in turn has perhaps increased the differentiation between tribes. Thus the greater fluidity of status is counterbalanced by greater rigidity of tribe; the political results of one are as apparent as the other.

The immediate reason lies in the marriage system. Beyond that lies the basic differences in the nature of agricultural production. Under Eurasian conditions, there is a tendency toward close rather than distant marriages, toward in-marriage and endogamy rather than out-marriage and exogamy. In Africa, on the other hand, the ownership of land was not the main key to economic achievement. The agricultural output of work groups varied within fairly confined limits and in this respect the society was relatively homogeneous. Marriage policy was therefore less firmly directed toward the matching of like with like.

Tylor pointed out that exogamy created ties between groups, thus increasing interaction, whereas endogamy was a policy of isolation. When differences in landholding are a major factor in the social hierarchy and when property is conveyed through marriage and inheritance, a premium is placed upon in-marriage rather than out-marriage, upon endogamy rather than exogamy. This is particularly the case where, to preserve the standing of daughters as well as sons, property is distributed bilaterally (that is, to both sexes) by the process of diverging devolution. This policy of isolation leads to variations of behavior within the culture which tend to crystallize out in gentry subcultures or in differences between richer peasants, poorer peasants, and those with no land at all, a rural proletariat.

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Formal Education and Individual Modernity in an African Society¹

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The theoretical proposition that formal Western education exerts a modernizing influence on youth in traditional, non-Western societies is tested using structured interview data from a probability area sample of 591 seventeen-year-old males in Kano, Nigeria. Cross-tabular analysis provides evidence of clear and consistent educational influence on modern value orientations which is largely independent of selectivity factors and alternative modernizing forces. The effects are found to be quite uniform across different categories of youth, but variable across different value orientations. There is also limited evidence that school curriculum may be more important than organizational aspects of schools in shaping modern perspectives.

INTRODUCTION

Formal schooling has now come to be regarded as essential not only for equipping the individual to earn a living but also for equipping Africa's people for nationhood. [BUSIA 1962, p. 80]

The importance of education for national and individual development has long been recognized by civic leaders and social scientists alike. But whereas civic leaders are inclined to see education as primarily functional in the production of skilled manpower to fill technical and administrative positions in society, social scientists are more apt to stress the role of education in "working to change the balance of different attitudes and values in the population" (Clark 1962, p. 70). This latter function would seem to be particularly important in schools in modernizing societies where, as Anderson (1966, p. 70) notes, "children develop new conceptions of what kind of person they are. They adopt new rules for their conduct and acquire loyalties to new ideas and new groups."

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The expectation that formal schooling leads to new orientations is based in large part on the general theoretical argument that "men's environment, as expressed in the institutional patterns they adopt or have introduced to them, shapes their experience, and through this their perceptions, attitudes and values, in standardized ways which are manifest from country to country, despite the countervailing randomizing influence of traditional cultural patterns" (Inkeles 1960, p. 2).

In applying this general sociological proposition to the question of Western education in traditional societies in Africa or elsewhere, it is hypothesized that formal schooling shapes experiences of youth and, in turn, leads toward standardized changes in their value orientations in a direction congruent with the dominant value emphasis of the educational environment. More specifically, formal Western education is expected to have a modernizing influence on perspectives, that is, to foster values and beliefs such as independence from family and other traditional authority, belief in science and in man's ability to control his fate, and orientation to the future (Inkeles 1966, 1969; Moore 1963, pp. 110-11; Hanson 1964; Turner 1955; Frazier 1955a, 1955b).²

On the other hand, there are obviously limits to the influence of formal schooling. In "traditionalistic" societies (Hoselitz 1961) which seek to preserve their cultural heritage, education may have little or no effect in changing an individual's perspectives. Or education may have only superficial and temporary effects; overt behavior may change, but basic beliefs and values acquired during childhood and reinforced in the home and community may continue to prevail. Moreover, even if value-orientation differences are found between more and less educated individuals, the differences may not be due to educational effects but, rather, to selective recruitment or retention of individuals with different orientations at the outset, or to the influence of alternative modernizing forces which may be correlated with education, for example, urban experience, mass-media exposure, voluntary association membership, and factory experience (Inkeles 1966). Also, the impact of educational experience may be affected by a number of other personal and social background factors, such as ethnic affiliation, family socioeconomic status, religion, intelligence, age, and sex.

These caveats call into question the theoretical expectation that formal Western education has a modernizing effect on values and beliefs of individuals. To what extent and in what way does formal schooling shape the value orientations of individuals in nonindustrial, non-Western society? Closely related are questions concerning the social backgrounds of those who are more affected or less affected by education, the kinds of

² We refer to these value orientations as "modern" but recognize their similarity to those sometimes identified as "achievement," "Western," or "American" (e.g., Kahl 1965; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961, pp. 24 ff.; Nisbet 1969, pp. 191, 285).

value orientations that are most affected, and the aspects of the educational system that are most important in producing the changes—formal organization, curriculum, or other aspects.

These are particularly critical questions in modernizing societies where educational expansion competes with other development programs for scarce resources. They are also important questions in social psychological studies of modernization which are concerned with the nature and determinants of individual change associated with socioeconomic development. However, as Moore (1963, p. 111) points out, systematic empirical evidence regarding the effects of formal education on value orientations is generally lacking.³

The present study represents a preliminary investigation of these matters based on structured interview data from 591 young men in Kano City, Nigeria. The research objectives are (1) to establish whether a positive association exists between formal schooling and individual modernity that is independent of other modernizing forces and selectivity factors, and, if an association exists, (2) to specify those personal and social background characteristics of youth and those value orientations which are most resistant and most vulnerable to modernizing influences of schooling, and (3) to explore whether curriculum or organization aspects of formal education systems are more important in producing the observed association.

SETTING, DATA, AND MEASURES

The Hausa society of northern Nigeria is a particularly appropriate setting for an investigation of the modernizing influence of formal education.⁴ It is predominantly an Islamic, nonindustrial society and, up to the 1967 military coup, had a religious and political leadership resting heavily upon a substructure of traditional authority dating back to the early 1800s. As such, it was one of the few societies in Africa to maintain an unbroken organizational tie with its past throughout the colonial period. The British administered the territory through a policy of "indirect rule," and European settlement and Christian mission activity were

³ Among the handful of studies with special relevance to African societies (Doob 1960; Jahoda 1961, 1962; Dawson 1967; Lord 1958; Ainsworth and Ainsworth 1962a, 1962b, 1962c; Omari 1960; Powdermaker 1956), only Doob, Jahoda, Dawson, and Lord include samples differing in educational levels, a distinction that is necessary in order to demonstrate the existence of an association. Furthermore, little or no attempt has been made to control for selective recruitment and retention in schools or for the effects of alternative modernizing forces or of other personal and social background factors.

⁴ Although there are many ethnic groups, languages, and cultural variations in the Hausa-Fulani areas of northern Nigeria, for convenience we follow the literature in referring simply to Hausa society.

effectively discouraged. As a result, Hausaland has remained one of the most traditional societies of Africa today, and its people take great pride in their cultural heritage.⁵

Kano, Nigeria, the research site for the present investigation, is an urban center located in the heart of Hausaland and consists of more than a quarter of a million inhabitants. The urban area is divided into three major sections: mud-walled Kano City (Birni), various migrant communities of northern and southern Nigerian immigrants (Waje),⁶ and the former European quarter (Nassarawa). Kano City (with a population of approximately 165,000) has a history dating back to the tenth century and is the seat of Native Authority government offices, the central market, and central mosque. It is comprised largely of Muslim Hausa and Fulani residents, many from long-established families, and it reflects much of the traditional character of Hausaland. The migrant and European sections are more modern by contrast and include areas of commerce and light industry. Because of its traditional character, Kano City provides a critical cultural context in which to test the impact of education on value orientations. If Western schooling exerts a clear modernizing influence here, an even greater influence would be expected in less traditional settings.

Data Collection

Data bearing on the issues raised above were collected through structured interviews from all seventeen-year-old males who could be located in a 15 percent probability area sample of Kano City quarters during the spring of 1965. The interviews were conducted by trained indigenous interviewers of slightly older age (eighteen to twenty-one) during the school holiday period when most students were home from school.⁷

⁵ For more comprehensive analyses of Hausa society, see Smith (1960, 1965).

⁶ These areas include Fagge, originally a camping site for Niger caravans in the nineteenth century but later a modern Hausa residential and commercial district; Sabon Gari, a dense residential and commercial area consisting mainly of Ibo, Yoruba, and other southern Nigerian immigrants; Tudun Wada and Gwagwara, both post-World War II settlements of northern Nigerian immigrants. For a more thorough description of these areas and their relation to Kano City and Nassarawa, see Paden (1970).

⁷ The survey instrument was developed after several months in the field. The items were translated into Hausa language by the Youth Officer of the Kano Social Welfare Department, a young, educated native of Kano, and were checked against retractions from Hausa to English by a local university student. The questionnaire was pretested on twelve young men residing in a rural village thirty miles from Kano and twelve young men residing in Tudun Wada, a satellite community adjacent to Kano and deemed somewhat more modern in outlook by local informants. An inspection of the responses of the two "known" pretest groups resulted in the alteration or elimination of various nondiscriminating items; however, a systematic and rigorous item analysis was not feasible.

Measurement Indexes

The independent variable, educational level, is measured by items asking respondents about the number of years they attended primary and secondary school. The information yields three broad categories: those who have no formal education (52.8 percent), those who have attended one to seven years of primary school (35.7 percent), and those who have gone beyond primary school to at least one year of secondary school (11.5 percent).

Development of an index of the dependent variable, modern value orientation, follows procedures employed by Kahl (1968) in his measurement of modernism. We began by examining previous literature in an effort to identify major theoretical dimensions of modern or Western values and beliefs that might be affected by schooling. From the writings of Weber (1947), Parsons (1951), Becker (1957), and Inkeles (1966) in particular come the concepts of "empiricism" or "belief in science," "secularism," and "receptivity to change," all of which capture the notion of rationalism, while the dimensions of "trust," "futurism," "independence from family," and "mastery" stem largely from the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and Kahl (1965).⁸ The dimensions of "openness to new ideas," "women's equality," and "ethnic equality" are suggested by various others (Smith and Inkeles 1966; Doob 1967; Hanson 1964; O'Connell 1965; Peshkin and Cohen 1967).

Questionnaire items tapping these ten selected value orientations were independently constructed or borrowed in direct or modified form from questionnaire materials used by Inkeles, Kahl, and others.⁹ The internal consistency of items within each of the postulated dimensions was analyzed separately by means of factor analysis, and items were eliminated if their loadings on the principal axis of the unrotated matrix were less than .30.¹⁰ Factor analysis of the remaining items was used as a basis for developing factor weighted composite scores of each dimension.

The dimension scores themselves were then factor analyzed in order to ascertain the extent to which they form a single syndrome of traditional versus modern value orientations.¹¹ Six of the original ten dimensions were found to have loadings above .30 on the principal axis: independence

⁸ Kahl (1965, p. 671) combines Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's "doing" and "control over nature" dimensions into a single dimension labeled "mastery."

⁹ This was done prior to the development and publication of modernity measures by these researchers.

¹⁰ The twenty-two items retained for the modernity measure and their respective loadings on the principal axis of the unrotated matrix are listed in abbreviated form in the Appendix.

¹¹ A composite measure avoids the necessity of repeating the analysis for each value dimension, and separate measures of each dimension enable investigation of the value

from family, ethnic equality, empiricism, mastery over nature, futurism, and receptivity to change (see table 1). A factor-weighted composite measure of psychological modernity was constructed from these dimensions.¹² For analysis purposes, the distribution was divided at the median into more modern and less modern halves, or "high" and "low" modernity.

We have also identified a number of alternative modernizing forces to be controlled in the analysis: urban experience, factory experience, mass-media exposure, voluntary association membership, and "modern" home

TABLE 1
LOADINGS OF TOP VALUE-ORIENTATION
SCORES ON PRINCIPAL AXIS OF
FACTOR ANALYSIS

Loading	Value Orientation
.71.....	Independence from family
.64.....	Ethnic equality
.60.....	Empiricism
.57.....	Mastery or efficacy
.47.....	Receptivity to change
.46.....	Future oriented

environment. The first two are largely controlled through sampling restrictions in the present research; all respondents resided in Kano City (with over 80 percent saying they had spent most of their lives in Kano or in other large urban areas), and only a handful had any factory experience.

Radio listening was chosen as an index of mass-media exposure because it does not require literacy and thus is not confused with education. Three categories of respondents were identified: those who listened to news on the radio daily (35.4 percent), a few times each week (38.9 percent), and rarely or never (25.7 percent).¹³ Voluntary association membership was

orientations which are more or less influenced by formal education. In other words, the measurement procedures are geared to the present research purposes; alternative measurements may be more appropriate for other analytical purposes.

¹² Kuder-Richardson internal consistency reliability coefficients (Guilford 1965, pp. 458-60) were computed both for the twenty-two items ($r_{tt} = .88$) and for the six dimensions ($r_{tt} = .90$) included in the measure. The inferred average interitem correlation (suggested by Guilford 1965, p. 463, as an index of reliability independent of test length) is .25, which is high by conventional standards (Morrison, Campbell, and Wolins 1967). A separate factor analysis of the six dimensions produced a unitary factor structure controlling 34 percent of the variance.

¹³ The lower two mass-media categories are combined in the subsequent analysis of partials because of insufficient educational distribution among respondents who "listen rarely or never." Out of the 152 males in this category, only five had some secondary education.

measured in terms of youth club membership because these were virtually the only voluntary associations available to youth in Kano. Thirty percent of the respondents indicated they were members.

The problem of measuring the degree of modernism of home environment is especially difficult in the present study. Parents or other family members of the respondents were not personally interviewed, and direct assessment of their orientations is impossible. Furthermore, strong norms of deference toward elders and sensitive relations between children (especially firstborn) and their parents make it awkward for respondents to answer questions about their parents.

Rather than rely on a single measure, several items are employed as implicit and indirect indexes of parental modernity. The first of these is concerned with whether a respondent's father belongs to one of the Islamic brotherhoods; a respondent whose father is "free," or not involved with either of the two major brotherhoods, is expected to be more secularized with respect to the pervasive Muslim culture, that is, to come from a more modern home environment. Data on father's English literacy, level of schooling, and occupation are also taken as indirect indexes of the modernity of home environments.¹⁴ A respondent whose father is literate in English, has had some formal Western schooling, or is employed in a more "modern" occupation—civil service, professional, other white-collar, or skilled labor, as opposed to religious, trading, craft, or farming—is expected to have a more modern home environment.

Finally, several personal background factors were identified as relevant in testing and specifying the relationship between education and psychological modernity. Ethnic affiliation, socioeconomic status, and intelligence are among the most obvious and important ones, aside from age, sex, and religion, which are held constant through sampling. The first, ethnic affiliation, is measured separately by father's and mother's ethnic group, since interethnic parentage is found among almost one-fourth of the respondents.

Social status is an extremely complex phenomenon in Hausa society (Smith 1959, 1961), and we prefer to use a variety of status indexes rather than rely on a single index or composite score. In addition to father's education, literacy, and occupational status, which are introduced above as indirect indexes of parental modernity but which may also be seen as socioeconomic indexes, social status is measured by respondent's estimates of father's income and family prestige.

¹⁴ The father's education index presumes confirmation of the hypothesis that level of schooling is positively associated with psychological modernity. If confirmed, then it is meaningful to investigate the independent determinancy of respondents' schooling by controlling for parental modernity as measured by father's education. If the hypothesis is false and level of schooling is not associated with modernity, no further controlled analysis will be necessary.

Finally, a "general intelligence" measure is based on respondent scores on an abridged nonverbal test of concept formation developed by the American Institutes for Research (Schwarz 1964, test no. 1, "Similarities"). This test was standardized in Nigeria and was designed as an intelligence test for examinees with minimum education. Although the validity and reliability of the intelligence data may be questioned, especially for nonliterate respondents, the resulting test scores should at least be useful for drawing a broad outline of ability differences for control purposes.

RESULTS

The central proposition of this study is that formal Western education leads to the modernization of perspectives in traditional, nonindustrial societies. It is hypothesized that level of education is positively associated

TABLE 2
LEVEL OF WESTERN EDUCATION AND
INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY

WESTERN EDUCATION LEVEL	INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY		N
	High (%)	Low (%)	
Some secondary education...	83.8	16.2	68
Some primary education....	55.5	44.5	211
No education.....	37.8	62.2	312
Total.....	49.4	50.6	591

NOTE.— $\gamma = .48$ and is significant (one-tailed test) at the .001 level.

with modern value orientations and that this relationship is not the result of selectivity processes or of alternative modernizing forces and background factors.

Cross-tabulation of educational level with "high" and "low" individual modernity for respondents in the study is presented in table 2. The evidence indicates a strong positive association between the two variables at a statistically significant level. More than four out of five (83.8 percent) of the respondents with some secondary education score in the upper half of the modernization scale, while less than two out of five (37.8 percent) of those with no formal education do so. The difference in percentages is stronger between respondents with primary and those with secondary education than between respondents with primary and those with no education. In short, the prediction of a positive relation

between Western schooling and psychological modernity is supported by the initial findings.¹⁵

Selectivity

A serious alternative explanation which may account for these findings is that educational recruitment and retention selectively favor persons with more modern outlooks. That is, those who are more modern in their values and beliefs from the outset are more likely to begin and continue schooling.

The only truly adequate way to test this alternative explanation would be with panel data which would take a cohort of individuals as preschoolers and trace their value-orientation changes during the ensuing years. In the absence of such data, substitute methods must be employed to gain indirect evidence in support of one interpretation or the other.

In the present study, for example, we will examine modernity percentages by number of years of schooling. If selectivity factors are responsible for the observed association, it is reasonable to expect that differences in the percentage of "more modern" respondents would be most pronounced at the *beginning* of primary or secondary school rather than *during* primary or secondary school. This is because the major decisions by youth, parents, and school officials regarding school entrance and termination are made prior to beginning primary or secondary school; once admitted, most students continue until the end of the course, especially students at the secondary level. The restricted number of secondary-school openings makes admittance extremely difficult, and the drop-out rate is virtually nil.¹⁶

On the other hand, if schooling fosters modern perspectives, as predicted, then we would expect evidence of a steady increment in the proportion of "more modern" respondents with each increasing year of schooling, and there should be no unusually sharp percentage increases at the beginning of the major educational levels.

Examination of the relevant evidence in table 3 reveals a rather steady increase in the percentage of "more modern" respondents with increasing

¹⁵ The association between education and modernity persists and, in fact, is slightly strengthened ($\gamma = .50$) when the influence of acquiescent response set is controlled by removing respondents identified as potentially acquiescent in their responses to Likert-type agree-disagree items. The index of acquiescent response pattern used in this check is described elsewhere (Armer 1970).

¹⁶ Students are not failed or dismissed from secondary schools (although they can be transferred for cause during the second and fourth years), and only very unusual personal circumstances would normally lead a boy to give up his stipend and terminate his schooling (see University of Wisconsin 1963, pp. 45, 70). In our sample, only two out of fifty-eight boys who were enrolled in secondary schools planned not to continue further education. Both had "high" modernity scores.

years of education.¹⁷ The increases immediately preceding primary and secondary school are similar to the increases from year to year within school levels. In short, the evidence tends to support the argument that educational experience has an influence on the value orientations of the Kano respondents. Of course, with the present data, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that selectivity factors may account for some of the association.

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF "HIGH" INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY BY YEARS
OF FORMAL WESTERN EDUCATION

	WESTERN EDUCATION LEVEL									TOTAL	
	No Education	Primary Education					Secondary Education				
		0	1-3	4-5	6	7	1	2	3		4+
High individual modernity...	37.8	42.0	56.9	57.7	64.7	75.0	80.0	90.9	94.1	49.4	
N.....	(312)	(50)	(58)	(52)	(51)	(20)	(20)	(11)	(17)	(591)	

NOTE.— $\gamma = .45$ and is significant (one-tailed test) at the .001 level.

Alternative Modernizing Forces

We have also noted the need to control for other commonly mentioned modernizing forces in testing the association between formal schooling and individual modernity. The relationships between educational level and individual modernity, while partialing on mass-media exposure and voluntary association membership, and the four parental modernity indexes are presented in table 4. To facilitate reading the table, only percentages of "high" modernity scores are reported.

Among the forty-two respondents who "listen to radio news daily," 85.7 percent of those with some secondary education have modern value orientations, compared with only 55.3 percent of those with primary schooling and 46.6 percent of those who have not had any formal education. Clearly, the relationship between level of education and individual modernity persists among the respondents who have daily exposure to radio news, and it also persists among those who have less than daily

¹⁷ It is necessary to combine the first through third and the fourth through fifth primary-school years in order to achieve large enough sample sizes to compute reliable percentages. Primary schooling is normally seven years in length, although a handful of students repeat grades and a few are able to skip the seventh year if they pass the Common Entrance Examination for secondary school. Secondary-school courses generally continue for five years. At the time of the present study, the seventeen-year-old respondents in our sample were normally at the third or fourth year of secondary school if they had begun school at age seven and had continued their education steadily without interruption. However, many students start school late or fail their entrance examinations for one or more years. This probably accounts for the smaller numbers of respondents in our sample in the later years of secondary school.

exposure. Moreover, a positive association between education and individual modernity is also found within both categories of respondents on the index of voluntary association membership and within each of the categories on the four parental modernity indexes. In the case of respondents whose fathers are literate or are in modern occupations, the number of respondents who have had no formal education is too small to compute reliable percentages, but the differences in modernity percentages continue to appear between primary- and secondary-education levels.

In sum, the evidence indicates that the association of formal schooling and modernization is largely independent of these alternative modernizing forces and cannot be readily explained or interpreted by any of them. Also, it is clear that combining the items into a composite index would

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE "HIGH" INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION,
CONTROLLING INDEXES OF ALTERNATIVE MODERNIZING FORCES

PARENTAL MODERNITY INDEXES	LEVEL OF WESTERN EDUCATION			γ^*
	Some Secondary	Some Primary	No Education	
Mass-media exposure:				
Listens to radio news daily.....	85.7 (42)†	55.3 (94)	46.6 (73)	.44 ...
Listens few times, rarely, or never	80.8 (26)	55.6 (117)	35.1 (239)	.48 ...
Voluntary association membership:				
Member of a youth club.....	89.1 (46)	56.0 (84)	46.9 (49)	.52 ...
Not a member.....	72.7 (22)	55.1 (127)	36.1 (263)	.41 ...
Father's Islamic brotherhood:				
Belongs to a brotherhood.....	84.8 (33)	49.7 (143)	32.9 (228)	.47 ...
"Free" or no brotherhood.....	82.4 (34)	67.2 (67)	51.8 (83)	.41 ...
Father's English literacy:				
Yes, literate.....	94.1 (34)	60.6 (71)	... (18)	.59 ...
No, illiterate.....	73.5 (34)	53.2 (139)	36.5 (282)	.40 ...
Father's formal education:				
Some primary school or higher...	87.2 (39)	57.4 (101)	43.8 (48)	.51 ...
No education.....	79.3 (29)	53.6 (110)	36.1 (264)	.43 ...
Father's occupation:				
"Modern" occupations.....	89.2 (37)	61.8 (55)	... (13)	.45 ...
"Traditional" occupations.....	77.4 (31)	53.2 (156)	36.5 (299)	.41 ...

* All γ significant (one-tailed test) at the .001 level.

† Numbers of respondents are in parentheses.

not alter the pattern of results. The findings add further support to the proposition that formal Western education does indeed have a strong, direct, and independent resocializing influence on value orientations of the Kano respondents.

Personal Background Factors

We have also suggested several other factors which may have a bearing on the observed relationship. The variables of ethnic affiliation, social status, and intelligence are viewed less as alternative modernizing forces than as potential conditioning variables, that is, as factors which may specify categories of youth that are more susceptible or more resistant to educational influences.¹⁸

The results of partialing on the ethnic, social status, and intelligence measures are reported in table 5. The results of partialing on alternative modernizing forces in table 4 may be reexamined concurrently, with an eye to specifying conditions under which the association appears strengthened or weakened.

The data in table 5 reveal a clear association between "high" modernity and educational level for each of the subsamples defined by the personal background variables. For example, among respondents with Fulani fathers, "high" modernity increases from 43.9 percent of those with no education, to 68.9 percent of those with primary schooling, and finally to 81.4 percent of those with secondary schooling. Although the Fulani are much more likely to attend school and to hold modern value orientations than respondents of other ethnic groups, the strong association between these two variables cannot be explained by ethnic differences.

The same general pattern of results and conclusions is indicated for Hausa respondents and for the various subsamples with respect to mother's ethnic affiliation, family economic status, subjective family prestige, and measured "general intelligence." For each category there exists a substantial monotonic increase in percentage of "high" modernity by level of formal schooling. The pattern was also found in table 4 with respect to father's English literacy, father's education, and father's occupation.

By using the association between formal education and modernity for the total sample as a standard of comparison, the results in table 5 may be examined to see whether the association is substantially stronger or weaker for the particular categories of respondents. In general, a pattern

¹⁸ Of course, it is also possible that one or another of these variables may help interpret or explain the association, but we are introducing them as potential specification variables. The terms "specify," "interpret," and "explain" are used in the sense defined by Lazarsfeld (1955).

of slight specification occurs with all the control variables in table 5. The statistical association is slightly stronger for respondents with Fulani parents, higher social status, and higher intelligence, and it is slightly weaker for respondents with Hausa parents, lower social status, and lower intelligence. The greatest reduction in association occurs for lower-intelligence respondents, among whom only eleven have any secondary schooling, and the percentage difference in modernity between respondents in the lower two education levels is only 11.7 percent compared with 17.7 percent for the total sample.

In no case is the difference in degree of association striking, and in no category does the association fail to persist at substantial and statistically significant levels. The same pattern of results is indicated in a re-examination of table 4, except that there is no strengthening of the

TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE "HIGH" INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION,
CONTROLLING FOR PERSONAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

PERSONAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES	LEVEL OF WESTERN EDUCATION			γ^*
	Some Secondary	Some Primary	No Education	
Total sample.....	83.8 (68)†	55.5 (211)	37.8 (312)	.48 ...
Father's ethnic group:‡				
Fulani.....	81.4 (43)	68.9 (61)	43.9 (57)	.51 ...
Hausa.....	... (16)	52.0 (123)	37.1 (224)	.41 ...
Mother's ethnic group:‡				
Fulani.....	79.5 (44)	61.5 (65)	39.1 (69)	.52 ...
Hausa.....	90.9 (22)	54.0 (124)	38.4 (224)	.43 ...
Father's income:				
High (£10/month or more).....	89.1 (46)	50.4 (117)	37.2 (94)	.54 ...
Low (less than £10/month).....	... (18)	64.0 (75)	42.7 (157)	.42 ...
Subjective family prestige:				
Very or fairly high.....	85.0 (40)	58.6 (116)	35.8 (123)	.55 ...
Average or below.....	82.1 (28)	51.6 (95)	39.4 (188)	.40 ...
Measured "general intelligence":				
Higher.....	84.2 (57)	62.8 (113)	43.4 (99)	.51 ...
Lower.....	... (11)	46.9 (98)	35.2 (213)	.32 ...

* All γ significant (one-tailed test) at the .001 level.

† Numbers of respondents are in parentheses.

‡ Respondents with mothers and fathers belonging to other ethnic groups, e.g. Kanuri, are eliminated for this partial analysis. There are sixty-seven respondents with fathers who are not Hausa or Fulani and forty-three whose mothers are neither Hausa nor Fulani.

association among subsamples when partialing is done on mass-media exposure, father's Islamic brotherhood membership, and father's occupation. In each of these cases, the magnitude of association remains the same or is slightly lower than for the total sample.

The general conclusion apparent from these results is that the association of formal Western education and individual modernity is not highly specific to certain categories of youth but, rather, tends to be comparable in strength for all, regardless of background differences. To the extent that a tendency exists, it is toward a stronger association among Fulani, higher-status, more intelligent respondents with literate, more educated fathers. Among youth with these characteristics, the data suggest that schooling may have a slightly greater modernizing influence.

Value-Orientation Dimensions

We have also raised the question of whether certain value orientations are more vulnerable or resistant to educational influence on the perspectives of youth in Hausa society. At the outset, we identified ten dimensions suggested in the literature as potentially influenced by formal Western education. Six which were strongly associated in a common factor were combined and used as a summary measure of individual modernity in the preceding analysis. But there is no reason to assume that these six are associated to the same degree or in the same way with formal education, nor is there reason to assume that the remaining dimensions are not also associated with education.

Table 6 reports the association of education with each of the ten value orientations ordered from top to bottom in terms of their loadings on the principal axis of our original factor analysis of psychological modernity. The distribution of scores on each dimension has been divided as closely as possible to the median, and percentages in the table indicate proportions of respondents at each educational level who score in the upper half (or "more modern" side) of the distribution.

It will be noted that most, but not all, of the dimensions are clearly and positively associated with formal education. In particular, independence from family is very strongly associated; 85 percent of the respondents with secondary education indicate independence, compared with 41 percent of those with no education. Education is also strongly associated with the dimensions of empiricism and futurism and, to a moderate extent, with the dimensions of ethnic equality, mastery, openness to new ideas and experiences, and interpersonal trust. On the other hand, receptivity to change, secularism, and women's equality are not strongly associated with education, and there is even a reversal in the percentages of secular orientations by level of schooling. In sum, there

are substantial variations in the magnitude and pattern of associations between formal education and the separate value orientations.

Curriculum versus Social Organization

We have been using the phrase "formal Western education" in much of the preceding discussion and analysis because both formal social organization characteristics and Western curriculum factors have been suggested as responsible for modernizing the perspectives of young people who attend school. Inkeles (1966, p. 147; 1969, p. 213) calls special

TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WITH HIGH SCORES ON TEN VALUE
ORIENTATIONS, BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

VALUE-ORIENTATION DIMENSIONS	LEVEL OF WESTERN EDUCATION			γ	SIG- NIFICANCE
	Some Secondary	Some Primary	No Education		
Independence from family . . .	85.3	58.3	41.0	.47	***
Ethnic equality	79.4	44.5	43.3	.26	***
Empiricism	67.6	51.7	31.4	.45	***
Mastery or efficacy	69.1	52.1	43.9	.26	***
Futurism	64.7	51.7	35.3	.37	***
Receptivity to change	51.5	47.4	44.2	.08	N.S.
Secularism	65.2	41.7	51.8	.01	N.S.
Openness to ideas and experi- ences	58.8	46.9	38.1	.23	***
Women's equality	57.4	49.8	44.9	.14	*
Interpersonal trust	60.3	57.3	46.2	.21	**
N	(68)	(211)	(312)

* Significant at .05 level (one-tailed test).

** Significant at .01 level (one-tailed test).

*** Significant at .001 level (one-tailed test).

attention to the former, although he does not ignore the facilitating effects of "modern curriculums," and Moore (1963, p. 110-11) likewise notes "significant characteristics of formal structure" of the "modern secular school" which provide "the possible environment for learning certain rather important attitudinal orientations for a changing social structure" (see Dreeben 1968 for an elaboration of this thesis).

It is not possible to tell from the preceding findings whether the effects of education on perspectives are due primarily to the Western curriculum or to the structural characteristics of the formal educational system, or to other factors.¹⁹ A preliminary effort to investigate this issue can be made in the present study by using the following line of reasoning. If structural effects are more important than curriculum effects, then mod-

¹⁹ Among other factors which may play an important role is the social composition of schools. We lack appropriate data to investigate this matter in the present research.

ernization of perspectives should also tend to result from formal educational systems with nonmodern, non-Western curriculums; on the other hand, if curriculum effects are more important, then we would expect differences in the modernization of perspectives in Western and non-Western formal educational systems.

The Muslim Koranic schools in Kano are an example of such a non-Western system. In these schools, the first four to six years normally consist of learning to read and write Arabic script and memorizing consecutive passages of the Koran. After a student has gone through the Koran in this fashion, he is "graduated" and starts again at the beginning, this time receiving fuller instruction from the *mallam* (Koranic teacher) on the meaning of passages and other religious knowledge.

Actually, Koranic schools vary considerably in level of organization, ranging from a handful of students at the feet of a *mallam* to classroom situations with students grouped according to level of instruction. In general, however, the formal organizational characteristics of Koranic schools are similar to institutionalized characteristics of other formal educational systems: for example, they involve a "graded curriculum and more or less orderly sequence of studies" (Moore 1963, p. 110), separation from home, regular hours of instruction, continuous testing and evaluation of individual performance, and objective and universal standards of progress (see Tukur 1963 for details).

Of course, these characteristics are not handled in exactly the same way as in Western schools, because of curriculum and cultural differences, but they are conceptually equivalent. If such organizational characteristics serve as models "of rationality, of the importance of technical competence, of the rule of objective standards of performance, and of the principle of distributive justice reflected in the grading system" (Inkeles 1966, p. 147) in Western schools, they should promote similar value orientations in Koranic schools.

On the other hand, if curricular, rather than organizational, features of educational systems are more important in shaping perspectives, the effects of Koranic education with its nonmodern curriculum may be quite different from the effects of Western education. We call the Koranic school curriculums nonmodern rather than traditional because, as Tukur (1963) stresses, they are not necessarily opposed to modern orientations, especially in the first several years, which emphasize Arabic reading, writing, and rote memorization. Thus, to the extent that curriculum effects are important in producing modernity, little or no change in modernity would be expected to result from Koranic education, but to the extent that organizational effects are important, modernity should be positively associated with level of Koranic education as with other formal educational systems.

Evidence regarding modernity levels associated with Koranic education is presented in table 7. The results show a slight tendency for individual modernity to be *negatively* associated with more years of Koranic education rather than positively associated, as would be expected if formal organization characteristics of the educational system were primarily responsible for the modernization of perspectives.

A further test of curriculum effects may be made by comparing the degree of modernity among students in different types of secondary schools instituted by the British in Hausa society: (1) secondary grammar schools, with standard academic curriculums corresponding to Brit-

TABLE 7

YEARS OF KORANIC EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY

KORANIC SCHOOLING	INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY		N	YULE'S Q
	High	Low		
Less than six years.....	53.3	46.7	347	.19*
Six years or more.....	43.9	56.1	244	...

* Significant at .05 level (one-tailed test).

TABLE 8

TYPE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTENDED AND INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY

TYPE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL	INDIVIDUAL MODERNITY		N	Y
	High	Low		
Secondary grammar school.....	96.7	3.3	30	.68*
Teacher-training "college".....	79.2	20.8	24	...
Other (craft and technical, clerical, etc.).....	64.3	35.7	14	...

* Significant at .001 level (one-tailed test).

ish grammar schools; (2) teacher-training "colleges," with curriculums designed to produce primary-school teachers; and (3) other schools, including craft and technical schools, clerical schools, and various Ministry training schools in agriculture, hygiene, and veterinary medicine. The social organization of these secondary schools is virtually identical, but the curricular emphases range from classical academic education to locally relevant applied training. Evidence of equally high rates of modernity among respondents with different kinds of secondary-school experience would suggest the importance of formal organization effects, while modernity differences would suggest curriculum or other effects (see table 8).

The results in table 8 tend to reinforce the previous emphasis on the

importance of modern curriculums or other factors besides organizational characteristics of the schools. Substantial differences in proportions of more modern respondents are observed among those experiencing different kinds of secondary schooling; 96.7 percent of those with secondary grammar school education score "high" on modernity, compared with approximately 79.2 percent of those with teacher-training experience and 64.3 percent of those with other types of secondary-level education.

Of course, this evidence is far from definitive because of the possibility of selective recruitment to different types of schools.²⁰ But, taken in combination with the previous results, these data offer consistent, preliminary support for the suggestion that the curriculum may be more effective in producing differences in psychological modernity than is the formal organization of the school. That is, without our denying the probable effects of both (and other factors), the more important modernizing factor of formal Western education may be not that it is *formal* but that it is *Western*.

DISCUSSION

The findings in this study clearly and consistently support the view that Western education does, indeed, have a definite effect on value orientations of youth that is largely independent of the test factors mentioned and is not specific to particular sample subpopulations. The results also call attention to the importance of school-curriculum differences in determining the nature of value-orientation change, and they suggest a less important role for the formal organization of the school.

These findings are particularly relevant to the theoretical argument, stated so well by Inkeles, that the institutions to which men are exposed shape their experiences and, in turn, their values, beliefs, and perceptions, despite differences in cultural background. This theoretical position is certainly supported by the findings of the present study, but there is a danger in assuming that institutions going by the same name have the same effects. Formal educational institutions may have much in common,

²⁰ Since the evidence in table 5 indicates that intelligence is associated with modernity and since a major factor in selecting students for different types of secondary schools is examination results (which presumably reflect measured intelligence), intelligence level is among the most likely background factors that may account for the observed differences in modernity percentage by type of secondary schooling in table 8. However, when we examine just the secondary-school-educated respondents with high intelligence, the association persists: high modernity is found among all twenty-six (100 percent) of those with secondary grammar schooling, sixteen out of twenty-one (76 percent) of those with teacher-training schooling, and six out of ten (60 percent) of those with other types of secondary schooling ($\gamma = .82$, significant at .001 level). Limitations of sample size reduce the reliability of these percentages and preclude testing the influence of other background differences on the association between type of schooling and modernity.

but they also can have much that is not held in common, particularly in the curriculum area. And it may be in areas of diversity such as this that the greatest influence is exerted on experiences of individuals and in turn on their beliefs, values, and perceptions. It is tempting to view formal educational influences as necessarily converging to produce a common set of attitudinal characteristics, and there may in fact be such convergences resulting from schooling in many areas of the world, but our evidence suggests that convergence is not necessary, that differences in perspectives can be fostered by different formal educational systems; and that caution should be exercised in generalizing about the value-transition effects of unspecified formal educational systems.

With respect to Kano City, the evidence suggests that education has a definite influence on value orientations and that education successfully leads to modernization of perspectives in certain areas (e.g., independence from family, empiricism, futurism) while it has little or irregular effect on other perspectives (e.g., secularism, women's equality, receptivity to change). Reasons for these associations can readily be suggested on a post hoc basis, but we do so only with full acknowledgment that the justifications are conjectural. Our main contention, stemming from the findings presented above, is that independence, empiricism, and futurism are probably among the dimensions most clearly embedded in the implicit and explicit curricular content of Western schools, as well as in their formal organization, as suggested by Inkeles, Moore, and others. Conversely, schools take care not to challenge religious beliefs; in fact, religious instruction has been incorporated into the school curriculum by Nigerian authorities. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that religious beliefs (including belief in women's inferior status) are not clearly associated with educational experience in Kano.

The low association of educational level and receptivity to change may be partially a function of the feeling among many of the less educated respondents that changes (either traditional or modern) are needed to improve their living conditions and future prospects, while many of the primary- and secondary-educated respondents may be satisfied with their life circumstances and may be opposed to change, especially change in a traditional direction which would perhaps not be in their interest.

It cannot be claimed that all possible alternative determinants of individual modernity have been tested in the present study, nor can the possibilities be disregarded that selectivity factors may account for some of the association between education and modernity and that the association may not hold for different samples or in different settings. But all efforts to test these alternative interpretations and qualifications failed

to produce evidence contrary to the major thesis. Indeed, one of the most striking and unusual aspects of the results is the consistent pattern of replication throughout the numerous tests and checks. In short, the evidence provides strong support for the proposition that education affects value orientations of youth in nonindustrial societies, and the effects may be even greater in less traditionalistic societies.

APPENDIX

ITEMS AND PRINCIPAL AXIS LOADINGS BY VALUE ORIENTATION

Loadings	Abbreviated Items*
1. Independence from Family	
.75.....	Should live near parents, even if means losing better place elsewhere. (A/D)†
.73.....	Is better to hire a relative, even if less qualified than a stranger. (A/D)
.51.....	I (greatly/slightly/do not) prefer work that is close to home.
2. Ethnic Equality	
.73.....	Boys should protect own tribe and let others look out for themselves. (A/D)
.71.....	Sports and friendships with other tribes are risky or impossible. (A/D)
.39.....	Outsiders bring more (harm/good) to this country.
.36.....	I (do not/slightly/greatly) prefer work with people of other tribes.
3. Empiricism	
.64.....	(Prayer/medical care) is most important in recovery from illness.
.61.....	There (should not/should) be scientific study of such things as human birth and plant life.
.60.....	Certain diseases only Hausa practitioner can cure. (A/D)
4. Mastery or Efficacy	
.69.....	Man (should not/should) strive for more food and possessions, even if he has enough to get by.
.62.....	Man who plans has as many difficulties as man who does not. (A/D)
.47.....	I (greatly/slightly/do not) prefer work that is easy.
.42.....	A man's success (is predetermined/depends upon ambition and hard work).
5. Futurism	
.75.....	Should dedicate self to (conserve customs/assure good future).
.65.....	Things of the (past/present/future) should be of greatest concern to us.
.39.....	I prefer to plan ahead on (few/most) matters.
.38.....	I (do not/slightly/greatly) prefer work that promises future advancement.

* All items are stated here in the same direction from traditional to modern choices. Sixteen of the items have been reversed from the way they are stated in the questionnaire for factor-analysis purposes.

† A/D refers to agree-disagree-type questions. All others are multiple-choice or polar choice.

APPENDIX—Continued

Loadings	Abbreviated Items*
6. Receptivity to Change	
.72.....	Is never wise to change rapidly in government or economy. (A/D)
.68.....	People are content with present way of life and do not want changes. (A/D)
.37.....	If you change things much, you usually make them worse. (A/D)
.34.....	The amount of change in way of life should be (slower/faster).
7. Secularism	
.65.....	Should give alms to poor because (fear of God/compassionate).
.60.....	Should follow (religious men and sacred books/own conscience).
.48.....	(Need not be/should be) respectful of other religions.
.42.....	A boy (cannot/can) be truly good without any religion.
.34.....	Heaven is for (own religion only/good people of other religions also).
8. Openness to Ideas and Experiences	
.64.....	Is all right for people to criticize sacred social matters. (A/D)
.59.....	Is best to seek new and different experiences rather than familiar. (A/D)
.58.....	I (do not/slightly/greatly) prefer work that offers new experiences.
.30.....	Persons should (always/sometimes/never) be allowed to express minority ideas.
9. Women's Equality	
.80.....	Girls (should not/should) have educational opportunity.
.67.....	Women (cannot/can) be trusted as much as men.
.61.....	Girls' freedoms should be (not changed/increased).
10. Interpersonal Trust	
.69.....	(Most/few) people are deceptive and dishonest.
.64.....	If you trust and show respect, people (will not/will) treat you fairly.
.46.....	Most people are honest through fear of being caught. (A/D)

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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY AND BLACK AMERICANS

American Sociology and Black Assimilation: Conflicting Perspectives¹

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The theme of the eventual assimilation of the racial and ethnic minorities of the United States has been a recurrent preoccupation of American sociology. This paper examines some of the major arguments which have appeared in the sociological literature in support of the view that the outcome of race relations in the United States will be the assimilation of the Negro into American mainstream culture. The affinity of sociological with liberal views of the racial question is noted, and it is concluded that a perspective which takes account of the social forces generating ethnicity as well as those favoring assimilation is necessary for an accurate and relevant analysis of the role of ethnic and racial groups in American life.

INTRODUCTION

The failure of sociologists to anticipate and direct their research attention to new developments in American race relations during the 1960s has been acknowledged by Hughes (1963) and Pettigrew and Back (1967, pp. 714-16). Rossi (1964, pp. 125-26) noted that "it is sadly ironic that as the pace of change in race relations stepped up in the past four years, the volume of social science research has declined during the same period." With the exception of projects sponsored by the federal government—most notably, the so-called Coleman and Moynihan reports (Coleman 1966; Rainwater and Yancey 1967)—significant in terms of their potential impact on national policy but resting on the theoretical foundations of an earlier period of basic research (Tumin 1968, pp. 118-

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19), the picture Rossi sketched remains relatively unchanged; his call for research into the black movements, the political aspects of racial change, and the role of ethnicity in American life has been met by only a handful of sociologists. Despite two recent studies by Bell (1968) and Levy (1968), the civil rights movement of the early sixties remains largely uncharted by sociologists. Similarly, the black-power and nationalist movements which succeeded it, as distinct from the earlier Muslim movement (about which there are able accounts by Lincoln [1961] and Essien-Udom [1962]), remain virtually *terra incognita* within the sociological profession.

As an explanation for this failure, Hughes suggests that the concern with professionalism among sociologists has impaired their capacity to empathize with the movements of lower strata; Pettigrew and Back (1967, p. 706) refer to the timidity of foundations, the obstacles placed in the way of race-relations research by diehard white segregationists, and "a sociological bias in race relations toward studying the static and segregation-making elements." It is the thesis of this paper that the failure can be attributed in part to the theoretical framework through which most American sociologists have viewed race relations in the United States. This framework, it is believed, rests essentially on the image of American society which has been set forth by American liberalism, wherein the minority problem is defined in the narrow sense of providing adequate, if not equal, opportunity for members of minority groups to ascend as individuals into the mainstream culture. America, in this view, is the land of opportunity through competitive struggle in the marketplace; it can, and will, provide opportunities for all to gain just rewards for their individual merit. (American liberalism differs with American conservatism largely over the issue of whether the opportunities already present are adequate and takes its reformist cast from its recognition that they are not.)

Sociologists, by and large, have accepted this image of Horatio Alger in the Melting Pot as the ideal definition of American society. Although they have repeatedly documented the discrepancy between social reality and cultural myth in America, they have also taken the view that the incorporation of America's ethnic and racial groups into the mainstream culture is virtually inevitable. (Similar tendencies can be discerned in the field of social stratification, according to Pease, Form, and Rytina 1970.) Successful assimilation, moreover, has been viewed as synonymous with equality of opportunity and upward mobility for the members of minority groups; "opportunity," in this system, is the opportunity to discard one's ethnicity and to partake fully in the "American Way of Life"; in

this sense, assimilation is viewed as the embodiment of the democratic ethos.

The convergence of liberal and sociological thought in the area of race relations is striking and raises serious questions about the "value-free" character of sociological inquiry in this area.² This is particularly the case since the equation of assimilationist with democratic values in minority-majority relations is by no means universal even within Western culture (Schermerhorn 1959). The right of national self-determination has played a significant role in the liberal-democratic movement in Europe, and as Myrdal (1944, p. 50) noted, "the minority peoples of the United States are fighting for status in the larger society; the minorities of Europe are mainly fighting for independence from it."

Equally remarkable, perhaps, is the fact that assimilationist values, with their connotations of elitism and a monocultural society, have come under as little attack as they have from either liberal or radical social criticism in the United States. The philosophy of democratic cultural pluralism has had, in fact, able spokesmen in America, most notably during the period of World War I (Bourne 1964) and the twenties (Kallen 1924), but the issue of ethnic pluralism has not been a central preoccupation of the American Left until the recent emergence of the black-power movement. This can be traced, perhaps, to the ascendancy in the thirties of Marxian modes of thought in Left circles and the resulting preoccupation with economic and political questions, on one hand, and working-class solidarity, on the other.

The aim of this paper is to examine some of the major arguments which have appeared in the sociological literature in support of the view that the outcome of race relations in the United States will be the integration or assimilation³ of the Negro into the American mainstream. The widespread and uncritical acceptance of these arguments by sociologists, it is believed, has contributed heavily to the void in race-relations research

² Horton (1966) has stated that "the liberal tendency of American sociology . . . is particularly marked in the sociological analysis of the Negro question. . . . The liberal fate of minorities, including Negroes, is basically containment through socialization to dominant values" (pp. 707-8). He goes on to argue that "contemporary liberalism . . . is a variant of conservative order theory" (p. 707).

³ The terms "integration" and "assimilation" are not necessarily synonymous. Integration, especially as it was used in the fifties, can have the limited meaning of "desegregation" (particularly *de jure*) and, sociologically, need not be followed by assimilation in the usual sense of cultural merger. Most sociologists have seemingly assumed, however, that desegregation would be followed by the gradual movement of blacks into mainstream American culture, and that racial characteristics would gradually lose their significance as determinants of social status and identity, and it is this assumption which is called into question here (see also Gordon 1964, pp. 246-47). The tendency for sociologists to use the two terms interchangeably is apparent in the writings of Hauser (1966a, 1966b).

which has been noted above, as well as to the tendency to regard black-nationalist movements as "extremist" (Glazer and Moynihan 1963, p. 78), "escapist" (Morsell 1961, p. 6), and essentially deviant-pathological phenomena.⁴ It will be pointed out that some of the components of a revised perspective on American race relations can already be found within the sociological literature and that a new perspective will include (1) abandoning the idea that racial assimilation in the form of gradual absorption of black Americans into the middle-American mainstream is necessarily either inevitable or desirable from the standpoint of democratic values, (2) a recognition that forces producing ethnicity as well as forces favoring assimilation are operative in American society today and that a realistic analysis of the ethnic and racial situation will take both into account, (3) a more balanced view of "black pluralism" (Killian 1968, p. 135) than has thus far appeared in the work of most sociologists. In short, it is argued that a rethinking of the theory of eventual assimilation will open up prospects for a more pertinent and realistic assessment of minority problems, particularly race problems, in the United States.

The arguments favoring eventual assimilation will be grouped under two headings: (1) those which rest on assertions about the nature of the dominant white American society, (2) those which rest on assertions about the nature of minority groups and experience within this society.

ARGUMENTS FROM THE NATURE OF THE DOMINANT WHITE SOCIETY

Central to the view of those sociologists who have taken the position that racial assimilation is the key to the American racial problem are certain beliefs about the nature of modern society in general, and American society in particular, which imply that prejudice, discrimination, and racist institutions are incompatible with the major features of modern social organization and hence will eventually "wither away." These assertions have taken various forms, but the common thread running through them has had several consequences: (1) the liberal optimism of most sociologists with respect to the possibility of peaceful and orderly change in the direction of racial integration;⁵ (2) the belief that the major

⁴ For a different view, see Gregor (1963, p. 431), who writes that "Negro proletarian radicalism has stood, largely mute, beyond the pale of American intellectual life." An effective rationale for the study of such movements has been made by Record (1956).

⁵ Even in the sixties, after the appearance of solidly organized white resistance in the South (Vander Zanden 1959a, 1959b, 1965) sociologists gave voice to this optimism in uninhibited terms. Rose, for example, wrote (1965, p. 7) "there could be no doubt that the races were moving rapidly toward equality and desegregation by 1964. . . . The change had been so rapid . . . that this author ventures to predict—if current trends continue—the end of all legal segregation and discrimination to a mere shadow in two decades. These changes would not mean that there would be equality between

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locus of institutional racism lay in the South, as a kind of underdeveloped area, the modernization of which would remove most of the institutional supports of racism; (3) the belief that the vestigial remains of racism in the urbanized and industrialized North would disappear as the educational, economic, and occupational status of both blacks and whites improved in the direction of greater affluence and security for all. Clearly, this perspective ill equipped sociologists for the racial crises of the sixties, a period of rapid economic growth and high prosperity which nonetheless witnessed heightened racial tension, urban ghetto violence on an unprecedented scale, and marked racial polarization (National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders 1968).⁶

Robert E. Park and the Race Relations Cycle

In 1926, one of the most famous and influential statements of the theory of eventual assimilation was made by Robert E. Park (1950, pp. 149-50): "In the relations of races there is a cycle which tends everywhere to repeat itself. . . . The race relations cycle which takes the form . . . of contacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation, is apparently progressive and irreversible. . . . Racial barriers may slacken the tempo of the movement, but cannot change its direction. . . . The forces which have brought about the existing interpenetration of peoples are so

the races within this time . . . but the dynamic social forces creating inequality will, if the present trends continue, be practically eliminated in three decades."

⁶ The emergence of the black movement in the sixties and the racial crises which followed forced sociologists to acknowledge, ex post facto, the resistance of American society to racial integration. They were quick to apply the retrospective wisdom that social change entails strain and conflict and that racial conflict may have positive functions (Himes 1966). Mounting black pressure was accounted for, again ex post facto, by an application of reference-group theory in the form of the notion of "relative deprivation" (Pettigrew and Back 1967, pp. 694-96). It should be noted that insofar as this theory assumes that the black movement is the product of actual *gains* made by blacks since World War II, it is open to question since the extent of black gains, especially vis-à-vis whites, in this period is not clear. On the negative side, for example, residential segregation increased in American cities between 1930 and 1960 (Hauser 1966b, pp. 76-77), and there was virtually no change in the ratio of nonwhite to white family income between 1947 and 1964 (Fein 1966, p. 122). Moynihan points out (1966, p. 189) that the acknowledged growth of the black middle class may not be accompanied by improvement in the condition of the black lower-class majority and, in *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, claims that the black family is in a state of decline (Rainwater and Yancey 1967). Wright (1967), citing comparative data from the U.S. Census, disputes the notion of the rapid socioeconomic advance of the Negro since World War II. Finally, Wilhelm and Powell (1964) find the roots of the black movement not in Negro advance, but *retrogression*: "With the onset of automation, the Negro is moving out of his historical state of oppression into uselessness. . . . He is being removed from economic participation in white society"; and his nascent nationalism constitutes a "quest for identity" (pp. 3-6). In short, the theory of relative deprivation as an account of black unrest has yet to be adequately tested.

vast and irresistible that the resulting changes assume the character of a cosmic process." The universality and inevitability of this "cosmic process" along with other formulations of race-relations cycle theories have long since been questioned by many sociologists,⁷ but the acceptance of some form of melting-pot theory as descriptive of American society has been strongly maintained nonetheless.⁸

An ambiguity with respect to Park's (1950) views on the eventual assimilation of the American Negro should be noted. In 1913, for example, he wrote:

Under conditions of secondary contact, that is to say, conditions of individual liberty and individual competition, characteristic of modern civilization, depressed racial groups *tend to assume the form of nationalities* [italics mine]. A nationality, in this narrower sense, may be defined as the racial group which has attained self-consciousness, no matter whether it has at the same time gained political independence or not. . . . The fundamental significance of the nationality movement must be sought in the effort of subject races to substitute, for those supplied to them by aliens, models based on their racial individuality and embodying sentiments and ideals which spring naturally out of their own lives. . . . In the South . . . the races seem to be tending in the direction of a bi-racial society, in which the Negro is gradually gaining a limited autonomy. [Pp. 219-20]

Frazier (1947, p. 269) noted that even up to "about 1930, Park's sociological theory in regard to race relations did not go beyond the thesis of a bi-racial organization." Hence, if Park believed in the eventual assimilation of races in the United States, his attention as an observer in the contemporary situation was strongly focused on the emergence of a black "national consciousness." Insofar as he regarded the growth of such a consciousness as a stage in the process leading to eventual assimilation, however, his cycle theory can be regarded as one of the more potent influences in the direction of viewing assimilation as a natural and inevitable process in the evolution of modern society.⁹

⁷ Berry (1958, pp. 128-49) provides a useful and critical survey of Park and others' cycle theories. Etzioni (1959) presents a systematic critique of Park's views in the context of his review of Wirth's *The Ghetto* (1928). He points out that there is no a priori reason for regarding assimilation as the inevitable outcome of culture contact, and that Park's theory, because it fails to specify the temporal span of and conditions producing each phase, can accommodate any observation and hence is untestable.

⁸ For a statement of the theory of the "triple melting pot," which presents the case for the disappearance of the ethnicity of the white immigrant groups within the wider structure of American religious pluralism (itself compromised by the ecumenical movement and a shared commitment to the "American Way of Life" as a quasi-religious ideal), see Herberg (1955, particularly chap. 2).

⁹ The fact that an earlier generation of American sociologists did not regard the assimilation of the American Negro as anything like an immediate prospect and viewed the emergence of a sense of collective unity as an outcome of the Negro's status in American society is apparent in E. B. Reuter's *The American Race Problem* (1927). In chap. 16, Reuter traces the history of, and analyzes the "growth of race con-

An American Dilemma

If Gunnar Myrdal (1944) was critical of the "do-nothing (*laissez faire*)" presuppositions which he detected in the work of American sociologists (including Park) and the subsequent tendency of the latter to "ignore practically all possibilities of modifying—by conscious effort—the social effects of the natural forces" (p. 1050), his classic opus remained very much within the assimilationist tradition. The author of *An American Dilemma* wrote that "we assume it is to the advantage of American Negroes as individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant white Americans" (p. 929).¹⁰

Myrdal discerns no structural impediment in American society to the realization of an assimilationist program: the race problem is a moral problem "in the heart of the American" (p. xlvii); and "America is free to choose whether the Negro shall remain her liability or become her opportunity" (p. 1022). This decidedly nonsociological approach to the problem is justified, according to Myrdal, because "there is evidently a strong unity in this nation and a basic homogeneity and stability in its valuations. Americans . . . have something in common: a social ethos, a political creed. It is difficult to avoid the judgment that this "American Creed" is the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation" (p. 1). Furthermore, "the conquering of color caste in America is America's own innermost desire. . . . The main trend in its history is the gradual realization of the American Creed" (p. 1021).¹¹ The creed is carried, Myrdal believed, by the "huge institutional structures" of the society, through which "a constant pressure is brought to bear on race prejudice, counteracting the natural tendency for it to spread and become more intense. . . . The ideals thereby gain fortifications of power and influence in society. This is a theory of social self-healing that applies to the type of society we call democracy" (p. 80).

Despite his hortatory tone and his call for national planning, social legislation, and social engineering on the part of an enlightened leader-

sciousness," and concludes that "the continued growth of a Negro nationalistic spirit in America is perhaps inevitable" (p. 429).

¹⁰ It is to the credit of Myrdal that he recognized that this assumption was indeed a "value premise" (p. 929) and not the statement of a "natural force" or an "inevitable social process." This distinction frequently is blurred in the sociological literature, as, for example, when Herberg (1955, p. 23) writes that the "perpetuation or ethnic differences is altogether out of line with the logic of American reality." This "logic" would seem to amount to little more than the power of an entrenched social myth.

¹¹ For a critique of Myrdal's view that the "strain toward consistency" produced by the psychological and moral discomforts of the dilemma is a major motive force in the direction of realization of the American creed, see Medalia (1962).

ship, however, Myrdal had relatively few concrete suggestions for policy with respect to the race problem beyond his faith in the power of concerted educational effort (pp. 48-49) to break down the already-crumbling walls of the "caste beliefs and valuations" which he believed lay at the heart of white racism.¹² The race problem would be solved simply by moving the society further in the course on which it was already set—that of welfare capitalism—which would require no major reorganization of its economic and political institutions. In the process, the South, as the major locus of the racial problem and "itself a minority and a national problem" (p. 1010), would take its place in the mainstream of the American polity.¹³

At the level of social determinants, Myrdal suggested that the forces of modernization in the South—industrialization, urbanization, the spread of literacy—were themselves powerful mechanisms for the elimination of racism in America. This theme frequently recurs in the post-Myrdal writings on race, and is especially emphasized by Arnold Rose (1956, p. 75): "The conditions which led to the development of the caste system in the nineteenth century are no longer with us. . . . New forces have arisen which make the caste system increasingly less desirable and useful to the dominant white group in the South or any other section of the country: These include industrialization, automation, the leadership of the United States in the free Western world, rising educational levels among both whites and Negroes. . . . These changes . . . *have made a mere hollow shell of tradition*" (italics mine).¹⁴

¹² In his emphasis on beliefs and attitudes, Myrdal's analysis had an affinity with the social psychological interpretation of race relations which has been so pronounced in American social science. Blumer (1958b) refers to this interpretation as the "prejudice-discrimination axis" and characterizes it as follows: "It rests on a belief that the nature of relations between racial groups results from the feelings and attitudes which these groups have toward each other. . . . It follows that in order to comprehend and solve problems of race relations it is necessary to study and ascertain the nature of prejudice" (p. 420). It is probable that the search for the determinants of prejudice and discrimination in attitudinal sets, personality structure, or role-specific behavior has inhibited the development of a social structural perspective on race relations in American sociology. The work of Lohman and Reitzes (1952, 1954) offered some corrective, but the lead they offered has not been followed.

¹³ Ralph Ellison (1966, pp. 298-99) writes that "*An American Dilemma* . . . sponsored by a leading capitalist group . . . is the blueprint for a more effective exploitation of the South's natural, industrial, and human resources. . . . In the positive sense, it is the key to a more democratic and fruitful usage of the South's natural and human resources; and in the negative, it is the plan for a more efficient and subtle manipulation of black and white relations—especially in the South."

¹⁴ Similar statements can be found in Simpson and Yinger (1954, 1953, 1959) and Rose (1965). The hypothesis that urbanization constitutes a major impetus to racial integration and equalization has been challenged on theoretical grounds by Killian and Grigg (1966) and Howard and Brent (1966); Blalock (1959) found little support for it in an analysis of Southern census data and comments that "urbanization in the South has at least in part taken a form which is compatible to that developed in

Hence, the belief that racism is incompatible with the major features of modern social organization has roots which go far deeper than Myrdal's liberal optimism and ethical-philosophical idealism. It is, in fact, rooted in what is perhaps the major theme of modern sociological theory—the shift, in Cooley's terms, from "primary" to "secondary" relations as the basis of social order.

The Sociological Tradition

In the course of their presentation of the case for the inevitability of desegregation, Simpson and Yinger (1959, p. 389) note that "in the approach to desegregation that we are taking, one can perceive a major recurring theme of sociological theory. Here is Sir Henry Maine's idea of the shift from status to contract. Here is an illustration of the perceptiveness of Simmel's work . . . concerning the influence of a money economy. Here is much of Toennies and Weber and Durkheim. Parsons and others who use the structural-functional approach have caught this fundamental orientation in such a way as to make it more readily applicable to such . . . problems as the one with which we are concerned."¹⁵

Thus, it is no surprise that Parsons (1966, p. 739) states that the major theoretical reason for asserting that conditions are ripe in America for the full "inclusion" of the Negro is that "the universalistic norms of the society have applied more and more widely. This has been true of all the main bases of particularistic solidarity, ethnicity, religion, regionalism, state's rights, and class. . . . Today, more than ever before, we are witnessing an acceleration in the emancipation of individuals of all categories from these diffuse particularistic solidarities." Whether phrased in terms of the Parsonian pattern variables, the older formulations of Durkheim, Cooley, or Toennies, or Myrdal's American creed, it is clear that this tradition of sociological theory views ethnicity as a survival of primary, quasi-tribal loyalties, which can have only a dysfunctional place in the achievement-oriented, rationalized, and impersonal social relationships of the modern, industrial-bureaucratic order.

That the tenets of this theoretical tradition necessarily imply the inevitable disappearance of "particularistic solidarities," however, has been put to a major theoretical test in the recent work of Van den Berghe

certain colonial territories. . . . It is . . . entirely possible that as the South continues to urbanize, at least in the early stages . . . non-whites may remain in the most unskilled positions. . . . A constant or even an increasing gap may be maintained" (pp. 147-48).

¹⁵ Greeley (1964), a proponent of the view that the ethnic group, which he defines as a "semi-gemeinschaft collectivity" (p. 108), remains a significant element in modern social structure, suggests that the *gemeinschaft-gesellschaft* tradition poses a "danger that sociologists, impressed with the tremendous increase in *gesellschaft*, would rule out the possibility of the survival of *gemeinschaft*, at least beyond the level of the nuclear family" (p. 107).

(1967). Rather than assuming, with the Myrdal-Parsons school, that race relations *per se* tend to disappear in gesellschaftlike societies, he asserts that they merely shift their form from "paternalistic" to "competitive." In the latter case, there is declining contact between racial castes, segmentation into ghettos, and economic competition between racial groups. Although Van den Berghe (1967) asserts that racial cleavages in competitive societies "constitute one of the major sources of strain and disequilibrium in such systems" (p. 30), he makes no judgment as to their ultimate disappearance and states that a possible outcome is the "Herrenvolk democracy . . . in which the exercise of power and suffrage is restricted, *de facto* and often *de jure*, to the dominant group" (p. 29).

Van den Berghe's formulation is one of the few attempts in the literature to link the persistence of racial cleavages in competitive modern societies to the essential structure of such societies, and thus represents a major theoretical departure from the tradition discussed in this section. It is a departure which permits the description of America as a "socially pluralistic" society along racial lines despite its *cultural* homogeneity (pp. 34-36), which views racial cleavage and conflict as inherent in the nature of competitive society (pp. 30-31) and sees racism¹⁶ as central to, rather than a "hollow shell" within, the Western cultural tradition (pp. 11-18). As such, it provides a perspective for the analysis of racial consciousness and conflict which is lacking in the orthodox Myrdal-Parsons schema.

White Gains and White Resistance

Mounting white resistance, North and South, to the black movement in the sixties forced sociologists to reassess the role of racism in the American social fabric, and, in doing so, they have introduced (or reapplied) concepts which echo Van den Berghe's theoretical analysis. Killian (1968), for example, in *The Impossible Revolution?* writes that "the theme of white supremacy has always been an integral and pervasive feature of the American system" (p. 16)¹⁷ and adds, "it is the challenge to white

¹⁶ Van den Berghe defines racism as "any set of beliefs that organic, genetically transmitted differences are intrinsically associated with the presence or absence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics" (p. 11).

¹⁷ Westie (1965, pp. 537-38) also notes that "a wealth of sociological evidence suggests that in many social situations in America, it is not the person who behaves in a prejudiced manner who is deviant, but rather, the non-prejudiced person who refuses to discriminate. . . . People with no dilemma in Myrdal's sense seem to experience another type of dilemma; a conflict between their endorsement of democratic action and yet another normative system, which exists in the majority of American local communities; the system which says that one ought to be prejudiced and ought to discriminate."

dominance that will require the greatest adjustment in the social order and that provides the greatest revolutionary potential" (p. 22). By virtue of his exclusion from a "white man's country" (p. 26), the black, says Killian, is "in the process of becoming an ethnic group" (p. 137), a development which is a radical challenge to the assimilationist ideal in America and which, hence, is fraught with the potential for a revolutionary confrontation.

The notion that specifiable "gains" accrue to whites by virtue of the subordination of blacks was introduced by Dollard (1937) and suggests that white resistance to racial change rests on something more than cultural lag or Myrdalian moral schizophrenia. As such, it is a valuable corrective to the notion that racism is "dysfunctional" or "deviant" within the wider culture. Heer (1959) and Glenn (1963, 1965, 1966) have offered both theoretical and empirical support for this notion, and Glenn writes: "Negro-white antagonism in the United States is and will long remain a matter of realistic conflict. Negroes cannot advance without the loss of traditional white benefits and it is unlikely that most of the whites who benefit . . . will willingly allow Negro advancement. This is not to say that race prejudice and social discrimination are strictly or even largely an expression of economic rationality [1966, p. 178] . . . nor should the many known and possible dysfunctions of discrimination be overlooked. However . . . the tradition of discrimination against Negroes apparently receives continuous reinforcement from the present self-interests of the majority" (1963, pp. 447-48). To the extent, however, that the theory of white gains conceives of white resistance in terms of benefits to individuals, or categories of individuals, it tends to find its place within a social psychological rather than a social structural perspective. Hence, there is not, as yet, a systematic exploration by American sociologists of the possibly latent and positive functions of racism in sustaining the "equilibrium" of the American social system.

Summary

Two perspectives on the features of modern society as they bear on the question of racial assimilation have been presented here. The first, which has occupied the place of a conventional orthodoxy in American sociology since World War II, takes the position that racism is a carry-over from the past which is bound to wither and decay and that, as a consequence, the gradual assimilation of the races can be expected. In the sense that the American creed is viewed as normatively constituent of American society, this perspective suggests a consensus model of racial change and relegates the stresses and strains of the process to a secondary place, as a kind of by-product of inevitable and healthful social trends—the rear-

guard response of a dying tradition. The second perspective suggests that racism is integral in American society, that it is central to the culture and interests of the white majority, and that its breakdown will only occur through a protracted process of social conflict and at least some degree of restructuring of the existing institutional arrangements of the society. The gradual emergence of the elements of such a perspective can be noted in the sociological literature in the sixties, although there is little doubt that the first perspective continues to hold sway as a kind of official orthodoxy within the sociological establishment (see, e.g., Parsons 1966, Hauser 1966a, and Pettigrew 1969). An earlier prototype of the second perspective has been present in the Marxian analysis of the race problem.¹⁸

The affinity of these two perspectives with liberal and radical ideological stances, respectively, on the race problem is apparent (Horton 1966). Our purpose here, however, is neither to claim more abstract-truth value for one or the other (although we believe that the credibility of the first has been seriously put to the test by the racial events of the sixties) nor to condemn both on grounds of their ideological "contamination."¹⁹ Like many sociological theories, these perspectives are schema which serve to point to differing aspects of a complex and probably contradictory reality. What is problematic, we believe, is the overwhelming acceptance, until recently, of the assimilationist perspective among sociologists and the claim that it is supported by social science evidence (Pettigrew 1969) in a way in which the second perspective—which can be referred to as "pluralistic"—is not. In our view, neither the accumulated evidence of social science research nor developments in American race relations in the sixties can support this view. Moreover, the acceptance of the assimilationist perspective has played a large role in shaping the direction of empirical research on race relations²⁰ and in inhibiting the develop-

¹⁸ For an effective, if neglected, analysis of American race relations in the Marxian tradition, see Cox (1948). As noted above, Marxism failed to supply a corrective to the assimilationist bias of both American social science and American social criticism. In fact, the overall impact of Marxian thought has been to relegate ethnicity to the status of "false consciousness"; national and ethnic sensibility is viewed as an outgrowth of the culture of capitalism and as a stratagem of the bourgeoisie for dividing and weakening the working-class movement. For the orthodox Marxist, minorities and minority problems, as such, will disappear with the cessation of class oppression. The strengths of the Marxian interpretation of racism lie in its linking of this pattern to the total structure of the society of which it is a part and its insistence that the race problem has determinants in the economic institutions and the struggle for power and privilege in the society. The viable elements of the Marxian perspective can be retained even as the simplistic account of the race problem as a reflex of the class struggle has been, correctly, rejected.

¹⁹ We agree with Horton (1966, p. 713) when he writes that "the error of the sociologist is not that he thinks politically and liberally about his society, but that he is not aware of it."

²⁰ The main trends of this research prior to the 1960s have been thoroughly summarized in the invaluable papers of Drake (1957) and Blumer (1958b).

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ment of research efforts pertinent to the last decade. Beyond pointing to the ideologically liberal presuppositions which have permeated this perspective, the further specification of factors which can account for its acceptance is a problem in the sociology of knowledge, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

ARGUMENTS FROM THE NATURE OF AMERICAN MINORITY GROUPS

If sociologists who have favored the assimilation-integration perspective have taken a benign view of the capacity and willingness of American society to achieve racial assimilation, they have also supported their position through a common set of assumptions about American minorities in general and blacks in particular. These assumptions can be stated as follows: American minorities (especially blacks) desire assimilation into mainstream America. As far as the white ethnic immigrant groups are concerned, there have been no insuperable obstacles in either their socio-cultural characteristics or their ideologies which have prevented their assimilation; in this respect, their most relevant traits have been those which they shared with lower-class groups in American society as a consequence of their having entered the society at the lower rungs of the class hierarchy. They have shared the majority commitment to the American creed, and the rate of their assimilation is directly proportional to their access to the socializing agencies of the dominant culture. The conventional position on the assimilation of white ethnics was well stated by Warner and Srole (1945, p. 295) when they wrote: "The future of American ethnic groups seems to be quite limited; it is likely that they will be quickly absorbed. When this happens, one of the great epochs of American history will be ended, and another, that of race, will begin" (p. 295).

With the exception of the distinctiveness of his castelike position in the South and his unique visibility, the position of the Negro, it has been believed, is similar. In the words of Kristol (1966), "the Negro today is like the immigrant yesterday," and if his special history and status in American society have subjected him to unusually severe barriers to full participation, his absorption can be expected nonetheless. The remainder of this section will discuss some questions which arise concerning this view of black assimilation in the light of the recent reassessment by social scientists of the assimilation process and the nature of black culture in American society.

The Assimilation of White Ethnic Immigrants

If the assimilation of blacks is predicated on the analogy of their position with that of the white ethnic groups, serious problems arise if the assimilation of the latter has been, in fact, much less extensive than has been commonly supposed. Such is the conclusion of recent analyses of

ethnicity in American society. As early as fifteen years ago, Glazer (1954, p. 172) noted that a kind of ethnic consciousness, part "nostalgia" and part "ideology," was observable among the descendants of immigrant groups, which consciousness performs "some functions, and even valuable functions, in American life." Gordon (1964) distinguishes between structural assimilation (participation in the dominant society at the primary group level) and acculturation (acquisition of the culture of the dominant group). He argues that the latter process has been rapid on the part of minorities in American society, but that the former has not and will remain limited for the foreseeable future (except in the "intellectual sub-society"). In the sense that primary social participation for most people remains limited by ethnic boundaries, the United States, argues Gordon, can be described as structurally pluralistic along ethnic, racial, and religious lines. Glazer and Moynihan (1963) note the differential response and resistance of diverse minorities to Americanizing influences and state that the ethnic group is more than a survival of traditional immigrant culture; it is, they claim, a product of the impact of American life on such culture, a "new social form" (p. 16). They go beyond Gordon in emphasizing the ethnic influence in secondary (occupational, political) as well as primary spheres. Greeley (1969, p. 7) doubts that even the acculturation process has been as thorough as Gordon claims and has called for (1964) a reassessment of the ethnic group as a source of identity, interest-group formation, and subcultural differentiation in American society.

In view of the emphasis placed by these writers on ethnicity in contemporary American society, it is surprising, perhaps, that they have not explicitly addressed themselves to a reassessment of the assimilation-integration perspective as it applies to the black American. If the white minorities have legitimately preserved an ethnic identity, should not the blacks propose to do the same? In this connection, the views of these writers are squarely in the assimilationist tradition. Glazer and Moynihan (1963, p. 52), for example, write that "it is not possible for Negroes to view themselves as other ethnic groups viewed themselves . . . because the Negro is only an American, and nothing else. He has no values and culture to guard and protect." In a similar vein, Gordon (1964, p. 114) writes of the black community that "dual social structures are created solely by the dynamics of prejudice and discrimination rather than being reinforced by ideological commitment of the minority itself." Both these studies, in short, are concerned with the survival or transformation of *prior* ethnic identities in America rather than with the generation of *new* ones, or, in Singer's (1962) terms, "ethnogenesis." Moreover, they fail to raise the question of what the meaning and content of racial assimilation can be in a society which remains ethnically plural. In the words of

Harold Cruse (1967, p. 9), "Although the three main power groups—Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—neither want nor need to become integrated with each other, the existence of a great body of homogenized, inter-assimilated white Americans is the premise for racial integration. Thus, the Negro integrationist runs afoul of reality in pursuit of an illusion, the 'open society'—a false front that hides several doors to several different worlds of hyphenated Americans."

The Problem of Black Culture

If the American Negro has been considered "100 percent American" by sociologists, the divergence of his culture from the middle-class norm has at the same time been heavily examined and documented. The prevailing sociological view was stated by Myrdal (1944, p. 928): "American Negro culture is not something independent of general American culture. It is a distorted development, or a pathological condition of the general American culture." The view that the race problem is a white man's problem here becomes coupled with the view that the black has been unable to create an authentic subculture in America, owing to his oppression and powerlessness, and, hence, that his condition is to be diagnosed as one of a pervasive social pathology.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the reassessment of this perspective which is currently under way in the social sciences, but two observations can be made. First, this reassessment, no doubt stimulated by the efforts of black intellectuals (e.g., Ellison 1966; Cruse 1967) to question the "social pathology" interpretation of black culture, has been mainly evident in the work of the so-called urban anthropologists rather than that of sociologists. Their application of ethnographic techniques to the study of the culture of the black ghetto contrasts with the usual practice of sociologists of compiling statistical indexes of social disorganization. Particularly notable in this respect have been the works of Keil (1966) and Hannerz (1969), as well as the theoretical attack mounted by Valentine (1968) on the theory of the "culture of poverty." Recent essays by Blauner (1969) and McCarthy and Yancey (this issue, pp. 648-72) make an overdue shift of sociological attention in this direction. Ellison's (1966, p. 302) comment that "in Negro culture, there is much of value for America as a whole. What is needed are Negroes to take it and create of it the uncreated consciousness of their race" might well serve as a major leitmotiv of this reassessment on the part of both the scholarly and the black communities.

Second, the sociological emphasis on the pathologies of the black community produced a tendency among sociologists in the sixties to view the major barriers to racial integration as residing in the sociocultural char-

acteristics of the black minority itself rather than in the racism of the dominant society. Whether phrased in the form of demographic characteristics (Hauser 1966b)²¹ or the social disorganization which is believed to spring, in part, from these and, in part, from the "heritage" of prejudice and discrimination (rather than from the current institutional functioning of the society itself), these views have harmonized nicely with the benign orthodox analysis of American society outlined earlier. They have led to considerably less optimistic prognoses for the rapid assimilation of the Negro than were characteristic of the fifties (e.g., Broom and Glenn 1965, pp. 187-91) and have led to charges, especially on the part of black activists, that social scientists were simply providing a new apologia for the racial status quo in America. In any case, the view that black culture contains positive elements that can form the basis of a black ethnic consciousness which can and should be preserved is a challenge of major dimensions to the orthodox sociological image of the black community and black culture in America.

• Note on the Caste Hypothesis

Through the work of Dollard (1937), Davis, Gardner, and Gardner (1941), and Warner (1936), the concept of caste became, during the forties, an almost standard tool for the analysis of American race relations. The caste hypothesis acknowledged that the race problem could not be regarded as merely another instance of the minorities problem in the United States, owing to the unique position of the Negro in the overall system of stratification. Moreover, at least in the statement of Warner, the caste hypothesis viewed racial development (especially in the South) as tending toward "parallelism" (Warner 1936, p. 235), or, in Park's terms, a "biracial society." Within the conventional sociological literature, then, there has been available a conceptual framework which was not assimilationist in its premises but which has not been adequate to account for or foresee the racial crisis of the past decade.

Several reasons for the failure of the caste hypothesis in this respect can be noted. First, it described a system of racial accommodation in which the permanent status subordination of the black caste was believed to lie in a system of folkways and mores which both castes accepted as inevitable and unalterable. Hence, it was attacked by both Myrdal (1944) and Cox (1948) for failing to take into account the dynamic forces which were altering the traditional Southern pattern of "race etiquette," for exaggerating the extent of black compliance with this system, and

²¹ The hypothesis that there is a direct correlation between economic discrimination and Negro population increase has been put to empirical test by Blalock (1956) and Glenn (1963), whose data do not clearly support it.

for neglecting the role of force and violence in maintaining it. Second, the thesis of a biracial society was incompatible with the liberal-assimilationist ethos and (if only implicitly) was rejected by those sociologists who shared this ethos and feared the possibility—which Warner, in his 1936 statement, neglected—of the interracial conflict which was latent in a structure of caste parallelism. Finally, the caste concept was applied, even by the Warner school, largely to the South; hence it was compatible with the view of the Northern Negro as the “new immigrant” whose problems, in their essentials, were no different from those of the earlier white immigrants whose assimilation was proceeding apace.

An urgent need in the current analysis of American race relations is a conceptual framework which recognizes, as the caste hypothesis does, the unique status of the black in America but which views this status, as the caste hypothesis does not, as a dynamic force with the potential for transforming the black community and black personality in the direction of becoming a major-change agency in American society. Singer's (1962, p. 423) concept of “ethnogenesis . . . the process whereby a people, that is, an ethnic group, comes into existence” remains the major effort along these lines in American sociology.

CONCLUSION

Three major conclusions emerge from this survey of the role of the assimilation-integration perspective in the study of American race relations:

1. The belief that racial assimilation constitutes the only democratic solution to the race problem in the United States should be relinquished by sociologists. Beyond committing them to a value premise which compromises their claim to value neutrality, the assimilationist strategy overlooks the functions which ethnic pluralism may perform in a democratic society. Suggestions as to these functions are found in the writings of Gordon (1964, pp. 239–41), Greeley (1964; 1969, pp. 23–30), and Etzioni (1959, pp. 260–62). The application of this perspective to the racial problem should result in the recognition that the black power and black nationalist movements, to the extent that they aim at the creation of a unified and coherent black community which generates a sense of common peoplehood and interest, are necessarily contrary neither to the experience of other American minorities nor to the interests of black people. The potential for racial divisiveness—and in the extreme case, revolutionary confrontation—which resides in such movements should also be recognized, but the source of this “pathological” potential should be seen as resting primarily within the racism of the wider society rather than in the “extremist” response to it on the part of the victimized minority.

2. To abandon the idea that ethnicity is a dysfunctional survival from a prior stage of social development will make it possible for sociologists to reaffirm that minority-majority relations are in fact group relations (Blumer 1958a) and not merely relations between prejudiced and victimized individuals. As such, they are implicated in the struggle for power and privilege in the society, and the theory of collective behavior and political sociology may be more pertinent to understanding them than the theory of social mobility and assimilation. Although general theories of minority-majority relations incorporating notions of power and conflict can be found in the writings of sociologists (e.g., Schermerhorn 1964; Lieberman 1961), it is only recently, in the work of Killian (1968) and Oppenheimer (1969), that such perspectives have found their way into sociologists' analyses of the American racial situation.

3. To abandon the notion that assimilation is a self-completing process will make it possible to study the forces (especially at the level of cultural and social structure) which facilitate or hinder assimilation or, conversely, the forces which generate the sense of ethnic and racial identity even within the homogenizing confines of modern society. On the basis of an assessment of such forces, it is certainly within the province of sociological analysis to point to the possibilities of conscious intervention in the social process (by either the majority or the minority group) to achieve given ends and to weigh the costs and consequences of various policy alternatives. These functions of sociological analysis, however, should be informed by an awareness that *any* form of intervention will take place in a political context—that intervention itself is in fact a political act—and that the likelihood of its success will be conditioned by the configuration of political forces in the society at large. Without this awareness—which is nothing more than an awareness of the total societal context within which a given minority problem has its meaning—sociological analysis runs a very real risk of spinning surrealistic fantasies about a world which is tacitly believed to be the best of all possible worlds. Whether the call of sociologists for racial assimilation in American society as it is currently organized will fall victim to such a judgment remains to be seen.

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Uncle Tom and Mr. Charlie: Metaphysical Pathos in the Study of Racism and Personal Disorganization¹

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The commonly held hypothesis that Negro Americans are very likely to experience "crisis of identity" and exhibit low self-esteem is questioned. After a brief description of the prevailing view, several major theoretical statements explaining the assumed state of affairs are presented. The third section reviews a variety of empirical evidence revealing considerable ambiguity over, if not directly challenging, currently held assumptions. The concluding section presents a series of alternative perspectives which suggest hypotheses which conflict with those derived from the traditional position.

This essay presents a critical examination of the vast literature concerning the psychological state of the Negro American. The basic hypothesis that Negro Americans are very likely to experience "crisis of identity" and exhibit negative self-esteem will be questioned. After a brief description of the prevailing view of the psychological state of the Negro American, we will review the major theoretical statements explaining the assumed low self-esteem and crisis of identity experienced by black Americans. The third section of the essay reviews empirical research revealing a considerable amount of ambiguity over, if not directly challenging, currently held assumptions. In the concluding section we will present a series of alternative propositions which we will suggest should be considered in light of the ambiguous data presented in section three.

PROVIDING SCIENTIFIC CREDIBILITY FOR A STEREOTYPE

The assumption that the Negro American suffers debilitating effects from the psychological stresses that result from his caste position in American society finds wide support in both the popular and the scholarly literature. Other terms are employed as substitutes for self-esteem and crisis of identity but few authors challenge the thesis. For instance, Kenneth Clark (1965) says: "The effective use of the potential power of

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the Negro masses and the ability of Negro leaders to discipline and mobilize that power for constructive social change may well be determined by the ability of a critical mass of Negroes to control their ambivalence toward themselves and to develop the capacity for genuine and sustained respect for those Negroes who are worthy of confidence and respect" (p. 197). He is clearly comparing what might be with the actual state of affairs. Negro political mobilization is seen as inhibited by ambivalence toward self.

Silberman (1964), in his widely known work, *Crisis in Black and White*, states the position in this manner: "The Negroes' demand for recognition is a crucial part of the struggle to overcome the devastation that the past three hundred fifty years have wrought on Negro personality. The apathy, the aimlessness, the lack of interest in education that characterize the Negro lower classes, and the crisis of identity that afflicts Negroes of all classes, stem from their sense of dependence and powerlessness—their conviction that 'Mr. Charlie' controls everything, Negro leaders included, and that he has the cards stacked so that Negroes can never win" (p. 198).

In *The Negro in America*, Rose (1948) attributes not only problems of self-esteem of the Negro American to majority pressures, but also the totality of the deviation of the black community from middle-class white standards to majority prejudice and discrimination. He says, "The instability of the Negro family, the inadequacy of educational facilities for Negroes, the emotionalism in the Negro church, the insufficiency and unwholesomeness of Negro recreational activity, the excess of Negro sociable organizations, the narrowness of interest of the average Negro, the provincialism of his political thinking, the high Negro crime rate, the cultivation of the arts to the neglect of other fields, superstition, personality difficulties, and other 'characteristic' traits are mainly forms of social ill-health, which, for the most part, are created by caste pressures" (p. 294).

Pettigrew's review of the literature on Negro American psychology reaches similar conclusions. He (1964) writes: "The personality consequences of this situation can be devastating—confusion of self-identity, lowered self-esteem, perception of the world as a hostile place, and serious sex-role conflicts" (p. 25), but cautions that all Negroes in the United States do not respond to the caste situation in the same manner. He outlines three major responses to oppression: moving toward, moving against, and moving away from the oppressor (p. 27). It is revealing that Pettigrew's review of this literature suggests that for each alternative response, psychopathological behavior of one form or another is evident (pp. 27-48).

Few authors challenge this general thesis, though one does encounter

a few tentative challenges. Coles (1964) questions the generalizability of the assumptions when he writes, "Though in no way do I deny what Kardiner and Ovesey have called 'the mark of oppression,' it remains equally true that alongside suffering I have encountered a resilience and an incredible capacity for survival" (p. 348).

Erikson (1966), discussing the application of the concept of identity to race relations, issues less than a strong challenge when he writes:

Again, the literature abounds in descriptions of how the Negro, instead, found escape into musical or spiritual worlds, or expressed his rebellion in compromises of behavior now viewed as mocking caricatures, such as obstinate meekness, exaggerated child likeness, or superficial submissiveness. And yet, is "the Negro" not often all too summarily and all too exclusively discussed in such a way that his negative identity is defined *only* in terms of his defensive adjustments to the dominant white majority? Do we (and can we) know enough about the relationship of positive and negative elements *within* the Negro personality and *within* the Negro community? This alone would reveal how negative is negative and how positive, positive. [P. 155]

For the most part, however, there is a rather clear consensus: the black man's life and personality are disorganized as a result of white prejudice and discrimination.

In their various attempts to demonstrate the negative consequences of caste victimization, social scientists have, in their description of the Negro American, unwittingly provided scientific credibility for many white-held stereotypes of the Negro. There have been, no doubt, important political and ideological reasons for such a position, and as Rainwater (1966) has noted, social research has attempted to "demonstrate that responsibility for the disadvantages Negroes suffer lies squarely upon the white caste which derives economic, prestige, and psychic benefits from operation of the system" (p. 174).

Indeed, the argument that psychological disabilities result from prejudice and discrimination did play an important part in the evidence presented to the U.S. Supreme Court preceding the 1954 school desegregation decision. It is our contention, however, that such a view has found wide support as much because it complemented political strategy as because it was based upon solid evidence. If the description is a distortion of the social facts, as we argue, then it has probably had the negative consequence of reinforcing the syndrome which it suggests exists.

EXPLANATIONS OF A STEREOTYPE

While there is general agreement about the psychological state of the Negro, there is some underlying debate as to whether the negative self-

esteem of the Negro stems principally from being placed in the role of "Negro," as Pettigrew (1964) emphasizes, or whether it derives principally from the negative evaluation of others that in turn leads to a development of a "Negro role," as Kardiner and Ovesey (1951) suggest. Nevertheless, the broad theoretical perspective developed by Cooley, Mead, and Sullivan has been the major rationale buttressing many of the explanations of lower self-esteem and identity crisis. A third frequently occurring mode of explanation, sometimes difficult to separate from the first two, is that of the interaction of caste and class. We will discuss the three perspectives in order.

The Consequences of Uncle Tom

The application of the first perspective has been relatively straightforward. Since his arrival in the United States, the Negro has been a member of a powerless minority. The powerful white majority demanded that the Negro play the Uncle Tom role, characterized by obsequiousness. At times such a role was necessary for physical survival, and it normally produced more of what little could be gained from the white oppressor. But this behavior was for white consumption only. Among other Negroes another "truer" role was manifest. Such disparate behavior, however, according to this perspective, creates problems resulting in confusion and a crisis of identity. It may also produce self-hatred among some Negroes who attempt unsuccessfully to resist the Uncle Tom role.

Stanley Elkins (1959), in drawing the analogy between the concentration camp and American slavery, presents a clear use of the role-personality perspective. He notes that the expectations of the pervasive and dependent roles of the prisoner and the slave were exacting. Within these narrow boundaries developed the role of the childlike "Sambo" among American slaves which did not exist in Latin America or in Africa. Elkins suggests that while such a role was perhaps difficult for the arriving slaves to learn, before Emancipation the Sambo role was fully institutionalized. With Emancipation the move from "slave" to "accommodating Negro" under Jim Crow apparently was not a difficult transition.

John Dollard's (1937) description of the accommodated Southern Negro is similar to Elkins's description of Sambo. Dollard writes: "If the reader has ever seen Stepin Fetchit in the movies, he can picture this type of character. Fetchit always plays the part of a well-accommodated lower-class Negro, whining, vacillating, shambling, stupid, and moved by very simple cravings" (p. 257). Although Dollard's research was carried out in the 1930s, such a view remains viable. For example,

Pettigrew (1964) notes that "being a Negro in America is less of a racial identity than a necessity to adopt a subordinate social role. The effects of this 'Negro role' are profound and lasting. Evaluating himself by the way others react to him, the Negro may grow into the servile role; in time the person and the role become indistinguishable. The personality consequences of the situation can be devastating—confusion of self-identity, lower self-esteem, perception of the world as a hostile place, and serious sex-role conflicts" (p. 25).²

Dollard (1937) takes issue with a simple correspondence between the Negro's role and personality by pointing out that the role the Negro reveals to whites should not be taken as his only or "real" self. The Uncle Tom role is but a facade used to manipulate the oppressor and reveals little of the "true self" of the oppressed (see also Elkins 1959; Odum 1910).

It is problematic whether such an adaptation has positive or negative consequences for personality organization. Bettelheim's (1943) research in concentration camps indicates that in extreme situations there are negative personality consequences. Dollard's (1937) description of the accommodating Negro suggests that accommodation is fraught with dangers for the personalities engaged in it: "Accommodation involves the renunciation of protest or aggression against the undesirable conditions of life, and the organization of the character so that protest does not appear, but acceptance does. It may come to pass in the end that the unwelcomed force is idealized, that one identifies with it and takes it into the personality; it sometimes even happens that what is at first resented and feared is finally loved" (p. 255).

Pettigrew (1964) reasons similarly concerning the effects of maintaining such a dual identity when he says, "Negroes may handle tense interracial situations by attempting to separate their true selves from their role as 'Negro.' Allport points out that this mechanism actually involves a mild dissociation; one is 'himself' with other Negroes but transforms his behavior to meet the expectations of prejudiced whites. Some such dissociation occurs in the acting out of many social roles, but

² The straightforward connection between the structural position of Southern Negroes and the role of "accommodating Negro" is, Dollard suggests, more problematic than that suggested by Pettigrew. Even in "Southerntown," where there were relatively few alternatives available for the Negro, Dollard found variation in the degree to which accommodation was accepted. Lower-class Negroes and those with less education, that is, those who had "least access to a divergent conception of the Negro's place in American society," were more likely to accept accommodation (1937, p. 256). Conversely, the more cosmopolitan Negroes—those not limited to white Southerners as a source of identity and esteem—who had been exposed to alternative conceptions of "the Negro" were less likely to accept the role and identity provided by Southern whites.

the intensity of racial role-playing renders this type of dissociation especially dangerous. Carried to extremes, it culminates in mental disorder" (p. 29).

Thus it is suggested that the development of a public facade by the accommodating Negro does not result in a successful separation of self from role, but a confusion over what constitutes self and a lack of understanding and acceptance of self, since he is unable to effectively maintain a dual identity without impairment.

Self-Identity through Interaction

A second perspective, following the emphasis of Kardiner and Ovesey (1951), suggests that the crisis of identity and loss of self-esteem derive largely from the images of himself which the Negro receives from the white community: the self emerges through interaction with significant others. Developing self-identity and self-esteem depends not merely upon objective social characteristics, but also upon the judgment of these characteristics by relevant others.

Again, the application of this theoretical position to the situation of the Negro American has been straightforward. Observers have assumed that Negroes view whites as significant others: the views of whites, who believe in Negro inferiority and act upon such beliefs, directly affect Negro self-identity and self-esteem. "Consciously or unconsciously," writes Pettigrew, "Negroes accept, in part, these assertions of their inferiority" (p. 9). Beyond the subjective evaluations and images held by whites it is also argued that differences in schools, housing, employment, and income are used as criteria for self-evaluation and identity (Proshansky and Newton 1968).

Kardiner and Ovesey (1951) state: "This central problem of Negro adaptation is oriented to discrimination he suffers and the consequences of this discrimination for the self-referential aspects of his social orientation. In simple words, it means that his self-esteem suffers (which is self-referential) because he is constantly receiving an unpleasant image of himself from the behavior of others" (p. 302). They suggest that in order to maintain "internal balance and to protect himself from being overwhelmed by it [the Mark of Oppression] [the Negro] must initiate restitutive maneuvers in order to keep functioning—all quite automatic and unconscious" (p. 303). A major consequence of these defensive measures is the development of a social facade; the Uncle Tom role develops not because the Negro is placed in that role by whites, but rather as an adaptive strategy to protect the self from negative evaluations. In a word, the dual personality of the Negro is seen as a solution

to personality-identity problems rather than a cause as the first perspective suggests.³

Rainwater (1966), in a recent analysis of the lower-class Negro family, employs a similar theoretical perspective. Although he suggests a different locus of relevant evaluations, he arrives at similar conclusions. While Clark, Kardiner and Ovesey, and others have argued that the images Negroes receive from white society are the major determinant of low self-esteem, Rainwater suggests that white discrimination and prejudice are but the secondary cause of the Negroes' poor identity formation. A closer examination reveals that Negroes victimize Negroes. He writes: "In short, whites, by their greater power, create situations in which Negroes do the dirty work of caste victimization for them" (p. 175). Further, "at least in the urban North the initial development of racial identity in these terms has very little directly to do with relations with whites" (p. 204).

Rainwater views the family as the major source of identity. Out of the lower-class family, particularly the unstable one, he says, comes a "weak and debased person, who can expect only partial gratification by less than straight-forward means" (p. 206).

It is argued that through the socialization process, as it takes place within the unstable family and the lower-class neighborhood peer group, negative identities develop, since both parents and peers regularly present the individual with derogatory evaluations.⁴

The second perspective, then, stresses negative self-evaluation over "crisis of identity," though both perspectives agree on negative self-evaluation. The perspectives differ with respect to whether the Uncle Tom role is a cause or consequence of the assumed negative self-evaluation.

The Interaction of Caste and Class

While, in general, the literature reviewed here stresses the issues of *caste* over those of socioeconomic class, few authors have ignored the question of the degree to which caste is exacerbated and/or confounded by class (see Dollard 1937; Kardiner and Ovesey 1951; Davis and Dollard 1940; Rohrer and Edmonson 1960; Pettigrew 1964). Here we will review several

³ Kenneth Clark's thesis in *Dark Ghetto* (1965) is very similar to this position, though it stems from observation of Northern, urban, lower-class Negroes. Clark suggests similar personality consequences resulting from negative evaluation by others.

⁴ Rainwater's general thesis need not be limited to black families. Indeed, if it is the unstable family and the hostile world of the slum peer group that provide the significant others who in turn are the sources of such an identity, to the degree that these characterize other lower-class communities similar identities should be developed. In Rainwater's terms, "To a certain extent these same processes operate in white lower-class groups, but added for the Negro is the reality of blackness" (p. 204).

positions which stress the interaction of caste and class factors in explaining the negative self-image presumed to be prevalent in the Negro American community.

The first variant on this theme stresses the role of economic marginality which results from caste victimization. The two consequences of such marginality seen as most important are female-headed families and jobs which lack any measure of prestige, both of which are seen as producing, though by different processes, a negative view of the self.

The relatively high frequency of female-headed families among Negroes, sometimes termed *matrifocality*, is seen to be perpetuated by the marginal economic position of the Negro adult male. The occupations available to the unskilled Negro man normally lack the security and income necessary to maintain a household. Further, such jobs (as, for example, waiter, cook, orderly, dishwasher, etc.) are seen by some to carry a feminine connotation (Proshansky and Newton 1968). Despite the lack of job opportunities available, the Negro male is still under the general societal prescription that he fulfill his function as provider, so he must work if he is to be evaluated positively as a man and father. The marginal employment situation results in his inability to fulfill his role as male head of household, and is said to result in a serious loss of self-esteem. Proshansky and Newton (1968) summarize much of this literature with the statement that "his predicament may take the form of a 'self-fulfilling prophecy.' He is told that he is 'no good' and 'irresponsible' and to some extent he internalizes these judgments which in turn influence his actions. When he fails, no one is surprised" (p. 205). Erikson (1966), exploring this issue, suggests that, particularly in an industrial setting, such imbalance "may, indeed, become the gravest factor in personality disorganization" (p. 167).⁵ Finally, this pattern is said to produce even more dire consequences for his children if the male leaves the household unit. Pettigrew (1964) provides us with a relevant review of research indicating that the specific link between poverty and personality development takes place in the family. These studies suggest that children raised in broken families are more likely to be hedonistic, less accurate in predicting time, less socially responsible, less oriented toward achievement, more prone toward delinquency, and are likely to manifest problems of sex-role identity (pp. 17-19). Thus, the institutional ar-

⁵ The traditional literature suggests that Jim Crow was directed more at the Negro male rather than the Negro female. Black women are said to be allowed more freedom, suffer less discrimination, and are provided more opportunities than black men. As a consequence, Negro men are said to have lower self-esteem than Negro women. While this argument has no implications for racial differences in self-esteem among women, the arguments presented earlier hold for females as well as males. Given the cultural prescriptions relating employment to male authority and the male role, one expects to find a similar sexual difference among lower-class whites, that is, underemployed men should have lower self-esteem than their female counterparts.

rangements of slavery and Jim Crow are said to have been replaced by racial and economic marginality that now function as major forces which produce the loss of self-esteem and personality crisis of the adult male and the pathological character of the socialization process in female-headed households.

While the focus upon class factors in this literature normally means attention to the Negro's marginal economic circumstances, Frazier (1957) in his controversial classic, *Black Bourgeoisie*, attends to the peculiar situation of the middle-class Negro, thereby avoiding the implications of economic marginality. Frazier's study is consistent with the general tendency of this literature to characterize the Negro as pathological, no matter what his circumstances, by suggesting that the black bourgeoisie is ambivalent about identification with the "Negro masses" and responds by a flight into a world of "make believe" based upon emulation of the white middle class. "Since the world of make-believe cannot insulate the black bourgeoisie completely from the world of reality, the members of this class exhibit considerable confusion and conflict in their personalities" (p. 25). So Frazier rejects the argument that the marginal economic circumstances of the Negro American are responsible for his personality difficulties. Cultural marginality coupled with the unique situation of economic security among an oppressed people produce similar personality consequences.

SOME EVIDENCE

In this section we bring research evidence to bear upon the traditional arguments and hypotheses, but first several prefatory comments are in order. First, we must ask: very likely compared with whom? If we compare the self-hatred of any social grouping with an ideal personality state—as the neo-Freudians are fond of doing—we can do nothing more than find what we seek—a discrepancy. We hold with Campbell (1957) that any meaningful scientific evidence involves at least one formal comparison, and we do not believe that a comparison between an observed state of affairs and an ideal state of affairs meets the criteria of formal scientific comparison.

Let us very briefly examine some evidence which does not meet our criteria of formal comparison in order to demonstrate the dangers of accepting conclusions based upon such evidence. Kardiner and Ovesey, in their work, *The Mark of Oppression* (1951), draw generalizations concerning the effects of prejudice and discrimination from twenty-five intensive case studies of Negro Americans. The only obvious comparison being made by the authors is between the twenty-five subjects' assessed personality states and some ideal of personality structure. The authors

do, of course, make an informal comparison. Having treated a number of white patients in therapy, a racial comparison is implicit, but it is certainly not systematic. One of the many conclusions drawn from this evidence by the authors is that the social definition of blackness in American society is in some measure responsible for the self-hatred and lack of esteem within this sample. After intensive review of Kardiner and Ovesey's case-study material, Rohrer and Edmonson (1960) conclude that only seven of the cases examined exhibit self-hatred and consequent lack of self-esteem. Further, they note that five of these cases had undergone previous therapeutic experience. Whether or not the self-hatred evidenced by any of the subjects is a result of prejudice and discrimination must also remain in doubt in the absence of a formal comparison.

In addressing the hypothesis of black self-hatred with a formal comparison, a number of possibilities present themselves. One might compare self-hatred among black Americans with self-hatred among black Africans or black Europeans. The literature surveyed above would predict greater prevalence of self-hatred among black North Americans than among black South Americans or Africans, but the possibility also exists that Americans are more prone to self-hatred than Africans (Elkins 1959). The racial comparison within the United States appears most meaningful to us, however, so the following review will attend only to evidence which makes the racial comparison with regard to relevant variables.

We would prefer to have systematic evidence of the type outlined above on self-esteem, self-hatred, and ambiguous identity, but very little exists. Therefore, it becomes necessary to broaden the range of indicators which will be accepted as pertinent to the prevailing literature. We shall also accept anomie, mental disorder, suicide, and alcoholism as indicators of personal disorganization. Acceptance of such indicators involves a number of assumptions which may not be warranted. On the other hand, all appear to represent personal disorganization, and there is evidence that they possess at least some measure of common variance (see Rushing 1968; Vanderpool 1969).

Self-Esteem

There is extensive evidence suggesting that black children become aware of differences in skin color very early in their development. Negro children have been shown to prefer white dolls to brown dolls (Clark and Clark 1958; Goodman 1952) and to assign brown dolls to poorer housing and inferior roles (Radke and Trager 1950). Most of the authors who report this evidence are cautious in interpreting such findings, but reviewers of this literature have been rather free in concluding that this evidence suggests self-doubt, self-hate, and identity problems (see

Berelson and Steiner 1964). It is a rather long jump in our opinion, however, from racial awareness, preference for white dolls, and assignment of inferior roles to brown dolls to self-hatred on the part of such children. There are a number of plausible explanations for such findings which have nothing to do with self-hatred. Personality ratings accompanying one piece of research in this tradition demonstrate that the Negro children were more cheerful, more curious, more inclined toward leadership, kinder, and more sensitive (Goodman 1952)—hardly picturesque of rampant self-hatred. In our opinion the evidence embodied in this literature is open to various interpretations, especially since much of it does not make a racial comparison (see Greenwald and Oppenheim 1968). We do not argue that the interpretation commonly made is necessarily incorrect. It may be correct, but the evidence remains inconclusive.

Is there any evidence which is more directly to the point for black and white children? A series of studies carried out by Baughman and Dahlstrom (1968) provides evidence at variance with the conclusions commonly drawn from the research on Negro and white children. The results of interviews with Negro and white eighth graders in a rural Southern community are worth quoting:

When we turn to the self-concepts of these children, their interview statements about themselves are markedly positive. This is particularly true for the Negro children, a fact that is at variance with the widely accepted belief that the self-esteem of the Negro is inevitably damaged, even at an early age. The Negro children in our sample, for instance, much more frequently reported themselves as being popular with their peers than the white children did. Also, there was a tendency for more Negro than white children to say that they were *very* satisfied being the kind of person they were. In addition, significantly more Negro than white children described their home life as being happier than that of the average child. Clearly, if the self-concepts of these Negro children have been unduly damaged, this fact is not reflected in their interview statements about themselves, nor in the educational and vocational aspirations which they report for themselves (and which they seem optimistic about realizing). [P. 462]

Further, Morris Rosenberg (1965), summarizing ethnic groups' differences in self-esteem, concludes, "We see that Negroes, who are exposed to the most intense, humiliating, and crippling forms of discrimination in every institutional area, do not have particularly low self-esteem" (p. 57). This finding is particularly noteworthy since the Negroes in Rosenberg's sample represent the lowest socioeconomic status group, but are about average on his measure of self-esteem.

Two other studies which purport to measure self-concept of Negro and white youth based upon national samples of youth of high school age present evidence which is at variance with the traditional conception of racial differences in self-esteem. These studies are both concerned

with academic achievement. The measures of self-concept might better be termed "academic self-concept." Coleman et al. (1966) report that "responses to these questions [concerning academic self-concept] do not indicate differences between Negroes and whites" (p. 281). McDill, Meyers, and Rigsby (1966), examining a matched sample of Negro and white youth of high school age, demonstrate that Negroes display a higher average self-esteem score than the white sample.

Finally Rosenberg reports the use of his self-esteem scale in another context involving the racial comparison with adults. He reports that a colleague "found among attendants [in a mental hospital], who are the lowest ranking nursing personnel, Negroes had higher self-esteem than whites, according to our scale" (p. 63). In interpreting this evidence, he says, "In this middle Atlantic city, the job of attendant is a relatively good job for a Negro but a very poor position for a white. Self-esteem may be more a matter of one's position within one group than the rank of the group in relation to other groups" (p. 63).

It is interesting to note the impact of the traditional argument concerning race and self-esteem when one finds authors uncovering what is apparently negative evidence. Rosenberg is apparently surprised, while McDill et al. (1966) challenge the validity of the measure and resort to intellectual gymnastics in order to reinterpret negative evidence into the traditional argument: "High self-esteem on the part of Negroes is a defense mechanism against discrimination" (chap. 10, p. 16).

Mental Disorder

Much of the evidence addressed to racial differences in the personal pathologies is based upon data gathered by care agencies. Consequently, such evidence can only give us indications of incidence, while the traditional arguments predict differences in prevalence. Furthermore, in light of the systematic work demonstrating differential response with regard to race by the various agencies of the legal system in the United States (Pettigrew 1964), evidence based upon such official reactions to the so-called personal pathologies requires extreme caution.

Pettigrew (1964), in reviewing the state of knowledge on racial differences in mental disorders, concludes that the Negro psychosis incidence rate is higher than the comparable white rate. The only study cited by Pettigrew, however, which takes into account both public and private first admissions, demonstrates that the white incidence rate is higher (Jaco 1960). This suggests caution in the interpretation of data concerning racial differences in incidence rates for psychosis based only upon first admissions to public hospitals. Pettigrew concludes that neurosis incidence rates for first admissions to state hospitals demon-

strate that the white rate is higher than the Negro rate. He admits that both the survey and the admissions evidence support a view that for certain disorders the Negro incidence rate may be lower than the white rate (p. 77).

To avoid accepting incidence rates as indicators of prevalence, we might use sample survey techniques. There are problems, however, with adopting such a research strategy. Relatively few persons exhibit severe mental disorders. A study employing such a strategy, carried out by Pasamanick et al. (1964), attempted to estimate prevalence rates of psychoses, psychoneuroses, and psychophysiologic, autonomic, and visceral disorders based upon clinical evaluations of a subsample of a larger sample of the population of Baltimore. Though Pasamanick and his coinvestigators found that the nonwhite (almost totally Negro) prevalence rate for each of these diagnosed disorders was startlingly below the white rate, the total number of cases upon which the rates were based for all of the disorders was eighty-six. The total number of nonwhites so diagnosed, then, was a small proportion of this number, so the possibility remains strong that such rates are highly unreliable, especially for the nonwhite population.

A final research strategy which attempts to assess prevalence of mental disorder is the use of paper and pencil tests in sample surveys which have been previously validated on normal and diagnosed populations. Dohrenwend (1966), reviewing attempts to assess the prevalence of treated as well as untreated psychological disorders in this manner, reports eight studies which make a racial comparison, though without rigorous socioeconomic status controls. Four of the studies he reviews show higher rates of disorder for whites and four show higher rates of disorder for Negroes. Dohrenwend's own study, carried out in the Washington Heights section of New York City, does not demonstrate differences in psychological disorder between his Negro subsamples and his Jewish and Irish subsamples. With income controlled, the pattern of differences reported by Dohrenwend between his Negro and Irish samples is suggestive, though the differences are not large. For respondents who have a family income of \$5,000 a year or less, the Irish respondents are more likely to report symptoms of psychological disorder, while among respondents who have a family income of more than \$5,000 a year the Negro respondents are more likely to report such symptoms.

Again it is our opinion that this evidence here suggests rethinking, rather than acceptance, of the traditional arguments on racial differences in personal organization. Again we find attempts by authors investigating racial differences in psychological disorder attempting to explain away what appear to be negative findings. Dohrenwend appeals, though

in rather convincing fashion, to problems of measurement rather than accepting the evidence as he finds it.

Suicide

The nonwhite suicide rate in the United States is consistently far below the comparable white rate (Gibbs 1966; Labovitz 1968). This fact is normally explained as Pettigrew (1964) explains it: "Negro American aggression is more often turned outward in the form of homicide than inward as suicide" (p. 78). Such an explanation, in its most simple form, as stated here, seems no more than a description of a state of affairs once the proponent accepts the assumption that suicide and homicide are different forms of aggression stemming from the same causal conditions (see Henry and Short 1954).

We concede that many would regard including mention of racial differences in suicide rates here as somewhat tenuous, though there are a number of commentators on the etiology of suicide who argue that self-degradation is an important factor in explaining individual suicide (Kilpatrick 1968). Finally, there is some indication that individual suicide is related to a number of the other personal pathologies under discussion here (Rushing 1968).

The differences between the white and the nonwhite suicide rate hold up under sex, age, and socioeconomic status control (*Suicide in the United States*, 1967; Rushing 1968; Labovitz 1968).⁶ The pattern of differences with class controlled, however, is suggestive and deserves some note here. Two studies demonstrate that the differences between the white and nonwhite suicide rates are greater at the lower socioeconomic level than they are at the higher socioeconomic levels. That is, though affluent nonwhites are less likely than affluent whites to commit suicide, the difference at this socioeconomic level is less than the difference when both groups are poor. For instance, Maris (1969) demonstrates that for Cook County, Illinois, for the years 1959-63, among males, the higher the socioeconomic status level the smaller the difference in suicide rate between whites and nonwhites. Rushing (1969) presents standard mortality rates for suicide for 1950 among males in the United States, and his data show the same pattern.

Alienation and Anomia

Sociologists have developed a large body of empirical work with the concepts of alienation and anomia. This is not the place to engage in a discussion of the distinction between the concepts, but it is fair to say

⁶ A recent monograph by Hendin (1969) presents evidence indicating that in New York City the rate of nonwhite suicides is about equal to the white rate.

that, at least empirically, they have been shown to have some overlap and are in practice used somewhat interchangeably. There are a large number of measures which are highly relevant to the comparison we are interested in making here (Nettler 1957).

The evidence making a racial comparison on measures of anomia or alienation remains ambiguous. For instance, Middleton (1963) reports results for a small Florida community which reveal, controlling for years of education completed, that Negroes are more alienated than whites. Killian and Grigg (1962), on the other hand, report data for two southeastern communities, one with a population of 300,000 and one with a population of less than 3,000, which show no differences in anomia for the urban sample and large differences for the rural sample. Killian and Grigg used a composite measure of social position in making the comparisons, and where the differences obtained, Negroes were more likely to be alienated. Kornhauser, Mayer, and Sheppard (1956), in a study of the voting behavior of labor union members in Detroit, had occasion to examine racial differences in anomia. Though the data are not presented for the racial comparison, and no socioeconomic status control is introduced, they report that Negroes have high anomia ratings in just about the same proportion as do the whites. Finally, Brink and Harris (1966, p. 135) conclude, after discussing data from a number of recent national surveys making comparisons between poor blacks and whites, that "the net result is that low-income whites feel quite hopelessly caught up in the forgotten backwash of society." This evidence certainly casts some doubt upon the traditional assumptions with regard to racial differences in alienation.⁷

Alcoholism

Let us conclude our brief review of evidence concerning racial differences in the so-called personal pathologies with a brief mention of alcoholism. In an excellent review of the available work concerning such differences, Sterne (1967) concludes that the evidence reveals a higher rate of alcoholism among Negroes than among whites. As with mental illness rates, however, the bulk of this empirical work is based upon subjects who have come to the attention of care agencies, and Sterne shows that data drawn from official agencies are not altogether unanimous in demonstrating higher rates for Negroes. On the other hand, death rates from cirrhosis of the liver are much higher for whites (Rushing 1969). Again, this evidence lacks consistency with respect to a conclusion concerning the racial comparison.

⁷ This research makes premature such exchanges as that between Coleman (1964) and Gordon (1965) based upon assumed racial differences in alienation.

Finally, Rushing's (1969) data on alcoholism show that, with occupation controlled, the smallest differences between white and nonwhite males occur among the professional and managerial groups, while the white rate far exceeds the nonwhite rate in the lower prestige occupational categories.

Though we have ranged beyond direct measures of self-esteem, we believe that the evidence reviewed is pertinent to the central hypotheses of the traditional literature. It seems obvious to us that the evidence is highly ambiguous. Both defenders and attackers of the traditional view of the personal disorganization of the Negro American can find support in this body of evidence. The evidence is generally of less than desirable quality, which allows a proponent to dismiss negative evidence on methodological grounds in many instances.

DERIVING SOME ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

Since we are convinced that at best the traditional view is only partially supported by the existing evidence, and further that the effects of the black experience in its present and historical forms are far more complicated than has normally been assumed, we offer several counterhypotheses here. We feel that such an exercise is useful in that it suggests crucial tests: such counterhypotheses require for their dismissal evidence which more clearly supports the traditional hypotheses.

Following the work of Morris Rosenberg (1965) and Stanley Coopersmith (1967), we will view self-esteem as an evaluative attitude toward the self.

Coopersmith (1967) suggests that relative evaluations are important antecedents or determinants of self-esteem. He notes, in his summary of prior theoretical statements concerning self-esteem, four principal factors: "(1) The amount of *respectful, accepting and concerned treatment* that the individual receives from significant others in his life. (2) Our *history of successes* and the status and position we hold in the world. (3) Experiences are interpreted and modified in accord with the individual's *values and aspirations*. (4) The individual's *manner of responding to devaluation*" (p. 37). We suggest that these factors are the very assumptions employed by those authors reviewed in the second section of this paper. Indeed, it is Mead, Cooley, and Sullivan, among others, whom Coopersmith is summarizing (pp. 29-36). We propose such factors here as guidelines, as we discuss the position of the Negro in the United States. So, as is evident, we do not propose adopting a radically different theoretical approach to these issues. We will suggest that with only minor alterations such factors produce conflicting hypotheses concerning the self-esteem of the Negro American.

Respectful Treatment

The literature on Negro self-esteem has for the most part followed Kardiner and Ovesey's assumption that Negroes accept white definitions of themselves.

In contrast to this assumption, research by social psychologists indicates rather clearly that the sources of evaluation important for self-identity are individuals occupying social positions quite similar to ego (Pettigrew 1967). This suggests that Negroes, rather than using whites, would be most likely to use other Negroes as sources of identity and esteem, for a number of reasons; the reality of de facto segregation being one of the most important.⁸ Rainwater's (1966) research on lower-class Negroes complements the social psychological literature in his suggestion that it is the family and peer group that are the principal sources of self-identity. He suggests that it is the broken family and the expressive system of the corner peer group that are the principal causes of low self-esteem and crises of identity. He goes on to suggest that, except for the negative definition of black skin, the same processes of identity formation should take place among lower-class whites who are in similar social and economic positions. Disregarding the definition of black skin, and assuming different sources of relevant evaluation, the application of the self-through-interaction thesis leads to a different conclusion concerning the self-esteem of black Americans.

Therefore, to the degree that Negroes do not use biased white evaluators in developing a self-evaluation, the process of development of self-identity within the black community will parallel the developmental process in the

⁸ We have phrased the traditional arguments and our own in group terms. We have spoken and will speak of Negroes and whites, and have attended to evidence in the form of relevant group rates. We do not mean to imply that all Negroes, or whites for that matter, find themselves in similar social circumstances or respond to the same circumstances in exactly the same manner. We recognize, in fact we insist, that the variables under discussion *are* variables. Consequently, when we make the statement that Negroes are highly likely to use the evaluations of other Negroes as sources of identity and self-esteem, we would expect a great deal of variation here within the Negro subgroup depending upon the constellation of other variables such as region, class, relative size of Negro and white population within a geographic area, and the like. Consequently, we would predict very different sources of evaluation and consequences for self-esteem for the Negro living in a small North Dakota town working as a store clerk and his counterpart in Harlem. The same would be true for the black high school teacher, educated at a state university in the Northeast and teaching in the Northeast compared with the black individual educated at a predominantly black state university in the South and teaching at a predominantly black high school in the rural deep South. After comparing such group rates, of course, the burden of such an explanation rests upon demonstrating within group differences as the hypothesis, with respect to social group rates, is certainly consistent with a number of other explanations. While not denying within-group or between-community differences, we stress racial-group differences here in response to the phrasing of traditional arguments.

*white community, and to that degree, when social class is controlled, Negroes and whites should not differ in levels of self-esteem.*⁹

Success and Values

Coopersmith (1967) notes that self-evaluations stemming from one's experiences are judged as successes or failures depending on one's values and aspirations (p. 37). Consequently we cannot infer self-evaluation directly from an objective reading of success and failure; we must put such a history into a context of values and aspirations. This point only becomes relevant when it is not assumed that the American cultural structure can be characterized by one dominant set of values about which there is a high degree of consensus.

One can make a distinction between a group of authors who argue that American society is characterized by a set of common values and a second group who stress distinct subcultural value systems.

The first group of writers has assumed that society is integrated by a common system of values and that all members are more or less aware of and committed to these values. Parsons (1953), for example, assumes that a common value system underlies the system of stratification. He writes: "Stratification in its valuation aspect, then, is the ranking of units in a social system in accordance with the standards of the common value system" (p. 93). Merton's (1957) statement on anomie articulates this position with its assumption that most Americans are aware of and committed to a value system epitomized in the American Dream. Such a perspective allows one to make direct inferences regarding self-evaluation from an individual's objective successes and failures.

The second group of theorists has assumed that American society is composed of a number of autonomous and conflicting subcultures. Perhaps the strongest statement of this position was made by Miller (1958) who wrote concerning lower-class culture: "There is a substantial segment of present-day American society whose way of life, values, and characteristic patterns of behavior are the product of a distinctive cultural system which might be termed 'lower class'" (see also Davis 1946; Lewis 1961; Becker 1963). This perspective allows one to argue that the distinct values developed within the lower class can provide alternative criteria for success and contribute to positive self-evaluation, hence blunting middle-class definitions of failure and evaluations of such failure.

It should also be noted that the literature we have been questioning has assumed that the conflict which has characterized the relationship between white and black Americans has resulted in disorganization and

⁹ The degree to which blacks employ whites as significant others ought to vary directly with informal contact with whites. Though such contacts may be selective, it might be hypothesized that variation in contact is negatively related to self-esteem.

disintegration within the Negro community (Coser 1956; Williams 1947). We suggest, following the arguments of Lewin (1948), Myrdal (1944, pp. 1766-67), and more recently Himes (1966), that, on the contrary, racial conflict and isolation have resulted in a measure of cohesion and solidarity among Negro Americans. If conflict has had such consequences, then it should function to sharpen variant value systems. There is some evidence indicating that Negroes generally, and especially working- and lower-class Negroes, have developed life-styles that reflect relatively autonomous and cohesive subcultures (Keil 1966; Billingsley 1968; Valentine 1968; Hannerez 1969).

Following those who suggest that class is the crucial variable necessary to isolate such value subcultures, one would predict that the lower class would be least likely to accept the dominant definitions of success and worthiness. Recognizing the effects of racial conflict, however, suggests that lower-class whites should be more vulnerable to dominant definitions than lower-class blacks (see Dahrendorf 1959, pp. 189-93). Middle-class blacks should be more likely than lower-class blacks to accept the dominant value system. Following this line of reasoning, we suggest that middle-class whites should be most highly committed to the dominant value system and lower-class blacks should be least committed. We would suggest, then, that the possibilities for variant value subcultures would be greatest among the black lower class¹⁰ and smallest among the white middle class, with the white lower class and the black middle class falling somewhere between the two extremes.

If, in fact, success and failure are translated into self-evaluation within a context of values and aspirations, and variant subcultures provide alternative criteria of success and failure, then there are avenues to credible and high self-esteem that do not depend upon the dominant value configuration. *Lower-class blacks will manifest higher self-esteem than lower-class whites, and middle-class blacks will manifest lower self-esteem than middle-class whites.*

¹⁰ Though we are led to make this argument on theoretical grounds, we are somewhat skeptical of it on empirical grounds. The research on educational aspirations of black and white youth indicates that black adolescents are at least as likely and probably more likely to accept dominant definitions of educational success (see Proshansky and Newton 1968, pp. 196-202). On the other hand, viewing the above argument in developmental terms may mean that this evidence does not contradict the position. We have neglected to confront the developmental aspects of self-evaluation in discussing racial differences here. In so doing, we do not mean to imply that we do not recognize the crucial importance of such aspects in developing an explanation of racial differences in self-evaluation. The traditional literature, under review, stresses the factors affecting adult self-evaluation; so, too, have we. The more theoretical work on self-esteem, though, stresses the early adolescent period, suggesting development of a stable self-evaluation during this period. These two emphases conflict in their interpretation of the implications of the educational aspiration data for social differences in adult self-evaluation.

Responses to Evaluation

The subcultural explanation comes close to implying that members of subcultures are neither influenced by nor aspire to the values of the dominant culture. Recent literature describing the poor suggests that the required structural autonomy for the development of an autonomous subculture does not exist in an industrial-urban society. That is to say, it is unlikely for a group of people, no matter how limited their resources, to be totally unaware of and unaffected by the larger community.¹¹ By this view, both the black poor and the white poor encounter the criteria of worth expressed by more affluent Americans. Rather than asking how such negative evaluations harm individuals who are subject to them, we ask how one defends himself in the face of them.

Here we are following Merton (1957), who asks, "When are relatively slim life-chances taken by men as a normal and expectable state of affairs which they attribute to their own personal inadequacies and when are they seen as the result of an arbitrary social system of mobility, in which rewards are not proportioned to ability?" (p. 240).

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argue that persons who ascribe their failure to the social system attack the system and become alienated from it to some degree. "The individual who locates the source of his failure in his own inadequacy, on the other hand, feels pressure to change himself rather than the system. Suffering from a loss of self-esteem, he must either develop mechanisms that will protect him from these feelings of personal inadequacy or work toward eliminating them by developing greater personal competence. By implication, then, attributing failure to one's own faults reveals an attitude supporting the legitimacy of the existing norms" (p. 112). One response to failure results in negative self-evaluation or low self-esteem; the second results in a withdrawal of loyalty from conventional structures and has no apparent affect on self-esteem.¹² Under what structural conditions are persons who fail likely to respond to such failure by blaming the system rather than themselves? Cloward and Ohlin suggest two conditions: (1) When there is a "discrepancy between institutionally induced expectations (as distinct from aspirations) and possibility of achievement, which produces a sense of unjust deprivation." (2) When there are "highly visible barriers to the achievement of aspirations, which give rise to feelings of discrimination". (p. 113).

The position of the lower- and working-class Negro in America is ob-

¹¹ There may be some exceptions to this position for the United States as reflected in communities in isolated Appalachian areas.

¹² See Elton Jackson's (1962) interpretation of his data on status inconsistency, symptoms of stress, and political attitudes for a complementary position.

vously characterized by these conditions. Thus Myrdal (1944) noted several decades ago: "The standard explanation of Negro failures, and the only one publicly accepted, is to place the responsibility upon the caste system and whites who uphold it. . . . As the Negro protest is rising and is becoming popularized, the view becomes more and more widespread that white oppression and caste deprivation are to be blamed and not Negro inferiority" (p. 759). Traditionally, white prejudice and discrimination have been quite open and have become more subtle as the articulation of the system-blame position has become more widespread. On the other hand, lower-class whites possess a far less well-articulated view with which to reinterpret negative evaluations, and barriers to success for lower-class whites are less visible. Poor white reaction to governmental efforts made in response to black protest may be the beginnings of such a coherent view, however (see Brink and Harris 1966). The implications of such a view for self-evaluation of the individual black man are made explicit by Myrdal (1944), when he says, "It preserves self-respect and does not necessarily damage ambition" (p. 759).

The system-blame reinterpretation of failure and negative evaluation should not be as likely an option for the middle-class black, however. In spite of discrimination he has achieved some measure of success within the dominant value framework. Acceptance of the system-blame perspective should be more difficult since it suggests that he could not be successful if it held (see Rytina, Form, and Pease 1970). Consequently, we suggest that the system-blame explanation does not function as well in defending middle-class blacks from negative evaluation. We are again led to the proposition that *lower class blacks should exhibit higher self-esteem than lower-class whites, but middle-class blacks should exhibit lower self-esteem than middle-class whites.*

In this section we have developed three theoretical perspectives in contrast to the traditional view. As we have stated above, the burden of these views rests upon the explanation of within-group differences, as a number of arguments presented result in similar predictions of racial differences by class level. Given the ambiguity of the evidence reviewed, we believe that each of these perspectives ought to be subjected to empirical test.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Let us conclude by discussing for a moment the possible political implications of the alternative perspectives we have outlined above, since, we believe, political implications have always been relevant to the emphases in this literature. Both segregationists and black militants may find solace in these perspectives, which can be stated to support either

ideological position. The segregationist might say, "You see, segregation is good for them," implying that there are also positive consequences of segregation. The black militant will, no doubt, appreciate our analysis of the traditional literature as at best stereotyped, and commend our suggestion that poor blacks respond with strength to oppression.

In either case, the public policy implication of the alternative views of Negro self-esteem presented here stands in sharp contrast to the traditional hypotheses of Negro self-hatred and pathology. Valentine (1968) argues strongly and quite convincingly that academic poverty experts and liberal intellectuals in general view the cultural adaptations of the poor, especially the Negro poor, as pathological. The adaptations which the poor make to their circumstances are viewed from a middle-class perspective, which easily leads to characterization of these adaptations as unhealthy, destructive of human potential, and physically damaging (see also Rodman 1964). The political thrust of such "race" research, then, combined with what appears to be a rather consistent view of the poor as pathological, may account for the plausibility of the standard view of Negro self-hatred. It has been politically acceptable to denigrate the poor, especially the Negro poor, if the burden has been placed upon the white majority for the hypothesized state of affairs.

Yet, as the controversy surrounding the "Moynihan Report" clearly indicates, a description that suggests Negroes, or the poor in general, are pathological, even though plausible given the social and economic constraints under which they live, implicitly suggests that the problems that characterize these groups may be attacked, not only on the institutional level, but also on the individual and family level. Martin Luther King (1967), commenting on the pathologies normally associated with the Negro family, identifies the political ambiguities inherent in the traditional position. He writes: "As public awareness increases there will be dangers and opportunities. The opportunities will be to deal fully rather than haphazardly with the problem as a whole—to see it as a social catastrophe and to meet it as other disasters are met with an adequacy of resources. The dangers will be that the problem will be attributed to innate Negro weaknesses and used to justify neglect and rationalize oppression" (p. 404).

If empirical evidence supports an alternative description and explanation of racial differences in self-esteem, then institutional change rather than individual psychiatric or welfare services should be the primary focus of public policy aimed at amelioration of the consequences of racism.

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Intergroup Attitudes and Social Ascent among Negro Boys¹

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Over the years two conflicting appeals have been directed toward black youth: the achievement of racial equality through integration on the one hand, and black power or solidarity on the other. The first is consistent with an approach to social change that views personal achievement in terms of the individual's performance within a context providing opportunity; racial change is thus reflected in the aggregated accomplishments of individual Negroes. In the nationalist appeal, self-improvement is linked to group achievement through consciousness of white oppression, and occurs by means of dedicated involvement in a collective struggle. Though support for each cause is commonly assumed to be negatively related, no correlation was obtained in a high school sample of Negro boys. Cross-tabulation of attitudes toward black solidarity and racial integration generated four attitude groups: support for only integration (integrationist) or black solidarity (nationalist), and endorsement of both causes (pluralist) or neither (uncommitted). With some exceptions, hypothesized between-group differences were obtained on racial attitudes and experience, differential life opportunity, and individual competence.

A valued belief in the American experience defines the good life as a reward achieved by moral discipline, hard work, and ambition. The efficacy of this formula in status mobility is contingent on access to favorable life opportunities and on the evaluation of performance by universalistic-achievement standards. Racial subordination violates both of these conditions, and places individual ascent in a contingent relationship to group advancement. Through heightened race pride, sensitivity to white oppression, and awareness of the individual-group relationship, the black liberation movement has tended to increase the psychological validity of social ascent through ingroup commitment.

The individualist and collective modes of social ascent are incorporated within two contrasting approaches to social change: an emphasis on individual achievement as expressed in Weber's Protestant Ethic and McClelland's achievement motive and the revolutionary-collec-

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tivist approach outlined by Sorel and others.² Achievement theory stresses the development of motivation to excel through family socialization, freedom from binding group obligations or ties, and a willingness to take advantage of opportunities in areas away from home. Applied to majority-minority relations, this approach would view racial change as a consequence of the aggregated achievements of individual Negroes.

Revolutionary-collectivist theory, on the other hand, sets forth the rationale for commitment to a collectivity, a belief that the deprived, apathetic masses can only achieve a better life through involvement in a collective, revolutionary struggle. Participation in the movement is the primary agent of personal change. Thus psychological change among participants in the black liberation movement—toward a greater sense of a racial pride and efficacy—would constitute a major accomplishment in its own right and an important prerequisite for Negroes to achieve their goals. While both theories view the disciplined effort of individuals as an essential determinant of change, revolutionary theory joins this quality with subordination of self to a collective cause and authority. "It emphasizes selflessness, the strength in unity, the necessity to 'stand together or fall separately,' the enormous power that a single-minded body exhibits" (Coleman 1969, p. 296).

Two historically dominant strategies for racial change are posed by the achievement and revolutionary approaches: the attainment of racial equality through integration, as advocated by civil rights organizations, and the black nationalist strategy—mobilization of black people for the development of their economic resources, collective identity, and political power.³ Cruse observes that "American Negro history is basically a history of the conflict between integrationist and nationalist forces in politics, economics, and culture—between freedom and racial equality, on the one hand, and self-help, group solidarity, economic nationalism, and separatism, on the other" (1967, p. 564).

The integrationists have struggled to achieve a social situation wherein

² These two approaches are compared by James Coleman in a provocative essay on race relations and social change (1969). This paragraph and the next are heavily indebted to this source.

³ Despite much confusion regarding the aims and strategies of black power, the ideal of equality in pluralism and the following points have received moderate agreement. The movement aims to eliminate through collective means all forms of racial subordination or discrimination, in contrast to more restricted, reform objectives. Its basic strategy rests on the premise that black men must act in their own behalf in all institutional domains—stress is placed on economic, political, and cultural nationalism. Black solidarity and identity are promoted by developing a collective consciousness of racial oppression and by fostering self-discipline and self-respect through an understanding of the black man's historical, contemporary, and international experience. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see Carmichael and Hamilton (1967), Killian (1968), and Franklin (1969).

the life chances of the individual Negro are relatively independent from those of other members of the black community. The route to racial equality is charted through the accumulated achievements of individual Negroes. Throughout recent history this appeal has been made by Negro leaders from the upper strata, and the benefits of this approach have been greatest for this population. If integration weakens racial ties, some evidence suggests that desegregated schooling does increase the life chances of black children for educational and occupational attainment by fostering school success, interracial trust, and access to good jobs (Crain 1970). Accordingly, we assumed that commitment to racial integration and individualistic achievement would arise among black adolescents who view the social system as supportive of individual mobility through individual performance, who have acquired a sense of interracial trust through white friends, and who are relatively high on status origin, intellectual ability, and desire to achieve.

Whether committed to racial separation or not, nationalist organizations have devoted their main efforts to the cultural and communal development of black people, especially in the lower classes where there is little chance of, or interest in, meeting the prerequisites of racial integration. From the movement's beginnings to the present, various expressions of black nationalism have claimed that meaningful integration of the black man cannot be achieved by disavowing his racial group or from a position of inequality. The belief that black solidarity and racial equality can and should be achieved before energies are directed toward the attainment of racial integration is expressed in the rhetoric and programs of black power advocates. This position is well expressed by Ron Karenga, a militant leader of cultural nationalism from the Watts area of Los Angeles: "We're not for isolation but interdependence—but we can't become interdependent unless we have something to offer." Likewise, Nathan Wright concludes that "there can be no meaningful integration between unequals."⁴

Traditionally, black nationalism has acquired its support from young Negroes in the lower classes, a setting where individual life chances are most closely related to the relative group position of black people. Accordingly, commitment to this cause and to ascent through the status change of all Negroes should be most characteristic of adolescents who are keenly aware of the disjuncture between hopes and expected accomplishments. Anticipated failure in status achievement is attributed to an external barrier, white oppression, rather than to the self, as seems probable among individualistic youth, and their relations to white authority figures are likely to be conflicted. This view of the system—

⁴ The statements by Karenga and Wright are on pp. 164 and 116 in Barbour's *The Black Power Revolt* (1968).

unfavorable status prospects and white oppression—may stem from distrust or hostility associated with racial isolation and from “socially imposed” handicaps, such as low-status origin and reward deprivation in school.

In comparisons of the integrationist and nationalist approaches to racial change, it is commonly assumed that support for one implies opposition to the other. Negro movements have tended to embrace one or the other strategy, but other alternatives are available on the social-psychological level. The position of Negro youth relative to racial integration and the black community involves more than simply approach, avoidance, or aggressive responses to a particular group. Commitment to a cause does not clearly define one's relation to others. Out-group hostility, for instance, is not an inevitable correlate of ingroup identification. At minimum, decisions regarding one's relation to racial integration and the black community could result in one of four intergroup orientations: *uncommitted*—indifference toward the collective interests of black people and racial integration; *nationalist*—affirmation of only the collective interests of the black community; *integrationist*—support for only racial integration; and *pluralist*—support for both racial interests and integration.⁵ Our aim in this study is to identify these four intergroup orientations from attitudes toward racial integration and black solidarity in a sample of Negro boys of high school age, and to compare boys in each orientation group on selected social and psychological variables. These variables are grouped under interracial experience, life opportunity, and competence.

An ideological bridge between black solidarity and integration is provided by the pluralists, who favor both strategies. The differing views of the nationalists and pluralists on racial integration imply that racial isolation and separatist feeling would be concentrated among the former. A desire to become part of an interracial community requires

⁵ These perspectives are similar to three of the four minority-group orientations outlined by Louis Wirth in a sequential model based mainly on the experiences of European religious and ethnic groups: an initial pluralistic attitude is followed by assimilationist, secessionist, and militant strategy (1945; cf. Johnson 1966). Tolerance from the dominant group, as well as social and economic equality, is sought by a pluralistic minority in the belief that differing cultures can flourish harmoniously in the same society. Adequate subgroup differentiation in society to ensure perpetuation of the ethnic tradition and autonomy is the central goal of this minority. Desegregation which allows intergroup contact in secondary settings establishes social bonds and forces that eventually weaken communality and strengthen assimilationist sentiment. Slavery excluded equality in cultural pluralism as an initial alternative for black Americans, while assimilation was not an option for the masses. Revitalization of cultural individuality and pride in secessionist or separatist movements can be viewed as a response to the above conditions and their psychic costs. The militant orientation in Wirth's typology, which aspires to dominance over groups, is expressed by some nationalist groups, for example, as in the belief that black people will soon rule the world.

faith in the opportunity to do so, and thus we expected perceived racial barriers to individual achievement to be less prevalent among the pluralists than the nationalists. Such faith is nurtured by adequate family resources, individual competence, and rewarding experience with adult (predominantly white) authorities.

Support for racial integration implies confidence in one's ability and belief in a black person's chances in a predominantly white society, while effort toward the development of the black community is contingent on a willingness to cooperate with other Negroes. In the absence of these conditions, one might expect to find a noncommittal, survival ethic of individualism, such as that expressed by a nineteen-year-old boy in Harlem. When asked by a youth worker why he "didn't know" about conditions in his area, he replied: "As long as I can survive, I don't care about nobody else, man" (Clark 1965, p. 15). Compared with youth having other intergroup attitudes, we expected the uncommitted to be lowest on intelligence and sense of mastery, and most dependent on their family of orientation.

In summary, conditions which promote individualistic-achievement striving are also viewed as predictive of integrationist sentiment. Since individualism is nurtured by trust and the belief that rewards can be achieved by the self, we assumed that the integrationists would have greater interracial experience and be less handicapped by environmental and personal limitations to achievement than boys in the other groups. Racially linked barriers to this form of social ascent increase the importance of race for achievement, and the more the individual's future is linked to his racial group, the greater the likelihood of nationalistic sentiment among relatively competent boys (cf. Cloward and Ohlin 1960, p. 125). The nationalists are likely to differ from other youth on isolation from whites—social and emotional—and on degree of conflict with white authorities in school and community. Though race conscious, we assumed that the pluralists would have more rewarding interracial experiences and perceive greater opportunities than the nationalists. Last, an incompetent self—defined by low intelligence, fatalism, and family dependency—is viewed as the primary distinguishing attribute of the uncommitted.

THE SETTING AND SAMPLE

The Negro boys included in the study were of high school age and were drawn from a 1965 survey of approximately 4,000 students in the secondary schools of Richmond, California.⁶ The city's current racial

⁶ Approximately 17,000 students enrolled during the spring of 1965 in the eleven junior and senior high schools in Western Contra Costa County represent the population from which the sample was drawn. This population was stratified by race, sex, school,

composition is primarily a consequence of a large influx of Southern Negroes during World War II. The proportion of Negro residents increased from 1 percent in 1940 to 16 percent in 1950; approximately 30 percent of the city's residents were Negro in 1960. Most of the Negro population is concentrated in the western and southern flatlands of the city. Negro students comprise less than 11 percent of the students in two of the five high schools; no high school was more than half Negro. Numerous racial disturbances have occurred in the city since 1965, the most serious of which was two consecutive nights of rioting during the summer of 1968.

Most of the Negro parents are Southern born and low in socioeconomic status. Three-fourths were born in the South, and most spent part of their childhood in rural areas of this region. Twenty percent of the Negro adolescents were also born in the South. Compared with the white students, Negro youth were more likely to come from father-absent families (22 vs. 9.5 percent), and their fathers were generally employed in unskilled jobs, in contrast to a fourth of the white fathers.

Our first step in the analysis involves construction of the intergroup typology and a test of its construct validity on racial and interracial attitudes. This is followed by a comparison of the groups on measures indicating life opportunity (objective and perceived) and competence—family and personal resources, relations with white authorities, and views of the future in terms of anticipated barriers and status prospects.

and grade level. In order to obtain sufficient Negro students and boys for the analysis, disproportionate random samples were drawn within each race and sex substratum: 85 percent of the Negro boys; 60 percent of the Negro girls; 30 percent of the non-Negro boys; and 12 percent of the non-Negro girls. This procedure produced a stratified probability sample of 5,545 students. Completed questionnaires were obtained from approximately three-fourths of the students in the probability sample. Teachers administered the questionnaire in three parts, each of which took approximately fifty minutes; in most of the schools the sections were administered on three consecutive days. The sources of sample attrition included an inability to obtain parental permission (12 percent), absenteeism (7 percent), students who had transferred or dropped out even though listed on the roster (6 percent), and unusable answer sheets (1 percent). An analysis of sample bias resulting from this attrition disclosed small but consistent differences between the students who completed the questionnaire and those who did not; the former were slightly better students than the latter. When the proportion of the population in each substratum—race-sex categories by grade and school—is identical, sample statistics are direct unbiased estimates of population parameters. To achieve this end, the proportion responding in each of the four race-sex categories was calculated. Cases were then randomly duplicated in those substrata whose response rate dropped below that of their race-sex category and randomly discarded from those substrata whose rate exceeded that for the race-sex category. In the entire sample, only 193 cases were deleted and 171 randomly added. For the purposes of our analysis, a small number of Mexican-American and Oriental respondents were deleted from the sample.

THE INTERGROUP TYPOLOGY AND ITS CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

The proposed typology is based on the assumption that sentiment favoring the collective interests of the black community is relatively independent of attitudes toward racial integration. To test this assumption we constructed indices of both attitudes from items in the survey.

On black solidarity, the boys were presented with a list of strategies that have been proposed by some Negro groups to reach their goals and were asked how strongly they felt about each of them. Three of the strategies represent core principles of black power—black unity, power, and self-defense—and boys who approved of one were also likely to approve of the others.⁷ Approximately three out of five boys approved of each strategy.

Another tactic, exclusion of whites from the movement, has been stressed by some black-power advocates as necessary to ensure the development of black leadership. In support of this policy, Carmichael and Hamilton cite the experience of a white civil rights worker who observed that “too often we have found our relationships with the local community leaders disturbingly like the traditional white-black relationship of the Deep South” (1967, pp. 28–29). In our sample of Negro boys, the exclusion of whites from black organizations received very little support (only 12 percent), and this support was unrelated to approval of black solidarity as measured by the three-item index. In this respect at least, separatism is not reflected by sentiment favoring black solidarity.

A more direct test of the intergroup alternatives associated with variations in attitude toward black solidarity is provided by an index of integration sentiment constructed from two interrelated items on the preferred racial composition of schools and neighborhoods.⁸ Seventy percent of the boys strongly agreed that students of all races should attend school together and a third preferred to live in an integrated neighborhood. In line with our assumption regarding intergroup attitudes, these youth did not differ from boys who were against or indiffer-

⁷ These strategies were presented as follows: “Get all Negroes to take the same stand on racial issues”; “Black leadership of Negro organizations, but allow whites to be members”; and “Negroes should strike back if attacked.” The items were moderately intercorrelated (average $T_c = .21$) and were combined as follows in a summated index: strongly agree, 2; agree 1; and all other responses, 0. Scores ranged from 0 to 6. Although no data were available on militancy, a recent study by Dizard (1970) found a moderate relationship between attachment to black identity (natural hair style, etc.) and militancy.

⁸ The two items are: “All pupils should attend school together” (strongly agree, 2; agree, 1; other responses, 0); and “If you could choose, in what kind of neighborhood would you prefer to live?” (integrated, 2; most residents of another race, don’t know, and don’t care, 1; and all residents of the same race, 0). Scores range from 0 to 4. The two items were moderately intercorrelated ($T_c = .33$).

ent toward racial integration on degree of identification with the black community; the two attitudes were completely unrelated ($T_c = .01$).

It should be noted that neither residence in an integrated neighborhood nor attendance at a racially mixed school is a valued goal in black-power ideology, since each implies that fulfillment of the black person can only be achieved if he associates with whites. However, the right of residential choice, within the limits of personal resources, is a fundamental aspect of racial equality, and this right is demanded by Negro groups that vary widely on ideology. While boys who endorsed black solidarity were not less likely to favor racial integration than other youth, they were more inclined to oppose racial inequality manifested by exclusive white neighborhoods.⁹

Identification with black solidarity was defined by scores of 3 or more on the index; this represents approval of at least two of the three strategies—black leadership, unity, and self-defense. On the integration index, positive sentiment was defined by scores of 3 or more. According to a cross-tabulation of these indexes, 29 percent of the boys were classified as pluralists, 40 percent as integrationists, 15 percent as nationalists, and 16 percent as uncommitted.

If boys in the four groups hold views consistent with their attitudes toward black solidarity and integration, we should be able to predict their relative position on strategies for achieving racial change, racial-group preference, and interracial experience. Two strategies that are generally compatible with the ideology of black solidarity were included in the survey: the application of pressure to achieve residential desegregation in which the issue is open housing as a right of black people and not personal interest in neighborhood integration; and the improvement of living conditions in the black community. The pluralists' identification with the black community and integration suggests that they would be most likely to support both strategies. Since ingroup identification is commonly associated with intergroup distance and ethnocentrism, we expected the nationalists to rank above other boys in the sample on preference for Negroes over other racial groups, interracial distance, and support for the Black Muslims. Integrationist groups, such as the NAACP, are consistent with the ideology of boys who favor integration, regardless of attitude toward black solidarity. By their indifference toward black solidarity and integration, the uncommitted show relatively little interest in racial change and would therefore be least likely to favor any change strategy.

Two procedures were employed for determining the degree of inter-

⁹ Boys who agreed that whites should be required to "accept Negroes into the white community" were more likely to identify with black solidarity than to approve of racial integration as a personal goal ($T_c = .21$ vs. $.08$).

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group distance on the above variables and in all subsequent tabular analyses. To test the hypothesis that all groups are similar on percentage values for each indicator, we used a simple, one-way analysis of variance. On measures which vary significantly across the four groups, the relative distance between groups was determined by comparing differences between group percentages and ordering them according to size.

TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF FOUR INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS BY ATTITUDES
TOWARD CHANGE STRATEGIES, RACIAL PREFERENCE,
AND INTERRACIAL EXPERIENCE

ATTITUDE	PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO BOYS BY INTERGROUP ORIENTATION				SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE (F-RATIO)
	Uncom- mitted N = 46 ^a	Nation- alists N = 45	Integra- tionists N = 114	Plural- ists N = 81	
Change strategies:					
Favors desegregation and improvement of black community ^b	6	41	20	47	*
Racial preferences and inter- racial experience:					
Prefers own race ^c	30	48	17	26	*
Interracial contact ^d	46	43	63	57	N.S.
Likes white people.....	27	22	53	48	*

^a Minimal number of cases.

^b Percentage of boys in each group who strongly approve both of the following policy statements: "Require whites to accept Negroes into white community" and "Improving conditions in the black community."

^c Each percentage represents the proportion of boys who preferred their own race on at least one of the following items: "I would prefer my teachers to be —"; "Most likely to succeed in life"; and "Run pretty much everything in this school."

^d An index of interracial contact was constructed from the following three items: "How many of your friends are white?" (half or more was scored 2; only a few, 1; and none, 0); "Have you ever eaten at a table with a white?" (sometimes or more often, 1; never, 0); "Have you ever gone to a party where most of the people were white?" (sometimes or more often, 1; never, 0). The percentage of boys in each group who scored 3 or ϵ on the index is shown above.

* $p < .01$.

According to the data, strong approval of residential desegregation is most prevalent among the pluralists, followed by the nationalists, integrationists, and the uncommitted. Since comparable results were obtained on improving conditions in the black community, the percentage who approved of both strategies is shown in table 1. If we compare the two groups that favor integration, it is clear that identification with black solidarity makes a substantial difference on regard for the collective needs of black people. A majority of the integrationists shows relatively little concern for its racial group, and this is even more true of the uncommitted boys. As noted earlier, very few boys favored the exclusion of whites from Negro organizations, but this position is most popular among the nationalists (26 percent—not shown in the table).

Both interracial contact and especially acceptance of whites are correlated with support for racial integration and do not vary appreciably by identification with black solidarity. It should be noted that racial antipathy (dislike whites) was not prevalent in any of the groups, although this attitude was more commonly expressed by the nationalists (approximately 20 percent). The nationalists also stand out above other boys in the sample on ethnocentrism. They were most apt to cite their racial group as most likely to succeed in life, to claim that most student leaders in their school are Negroes, and to prefer a teacher of their own race (cf. Marx 1967, p. 114).

The nationalists did not differ significantly from the prointegration boys on support for the NAACP (at least two-thirds voiced strong approval) or on support of CORE, but they were more likely to support the Muslims (66 vs. 32 percent). Consistent with their relative indifference toward racial change, the uncommitted were least likely to favor all three groups; less than a third, for instance, strongly approved of CORE and the NAACP.

With few exceptions, differences between the four attitude groups are generally consistent with our expectations. The greatest distance on support for the two change strategies occurs between the uncommitted, on the one hand, and the pluralists and nationalists, on the other. Interracial experience and sentiment toward whites distinguish boys who favored integration from those who were indifferent or negative in attitude, but the difference on contact is not as large as one might expect. And on racial preference, intergroup distance is most pronounced between the nationalists and integrationists. Across all between-group comparisons, the differences are clearly a matter of degree. For instance, the nationalists do not prefer racial integration, but very few are racially exclusive and antiwhite in their attitudes. Preference for exclusively black organizations is the most direct measure of support for black separation, yet only a fourth of the nationalists expressed this attitude. At this point in the analysis, the nationalists are more accurately described as race conscious and indifferent to their participation in an integrated society than as explicit advocates of racial separation.

DIFFERENTIAL OPPORTUNITY AND COMPETENCE

The differential life opportunity of boys in the four groups is measured by indicators of status origin and prospects, including family status (cultural and economic) and emotional support; teachers' evaluations, satisfaction with school, and behavioral compliance; and future prospects. Intelligence-test scores are used as the primary index of intellectual competence. The following analysis is divided into three major

sections: family and personal resources, school experience, and achievement prospects. The concluding discussion provides an overview of the research, its implications and limitations.

Family and Personal Resources

The relation between race and restricted life chances is expressed in institutional structures and their deprivational consequences for personal competence and family resources. A wage system which fails to provide an adequate family income, underemployment, and joblessness minimizes the cultural and economic resources of many black families, and these deprivational conditions adversely affect intellectual development among the young. We assumed that belief in racial integration and individualistic achievement would be associated with the mastery experience provided by a high level of family and individual resources; that an incompetent self would produce indifference toward black solidarity and integration; and that an intermediate level of resources—neither high nor low—would enhance sensitivity to social barriers and the collective interests of black people, but not to the point of undermining faith in the desirability of integration. In view of the traditional popularity of black nationalism in the lower classes, we expected the nationalists to have a more deprived background than the pluralists.

Family deprivation and support.—Degree of family support or deprivation includes both objective and subjective aspects, such as father's occupational status and perceptions of parental emotional support. Boys who held each of the intergroup orientations were compared first on two relatively objective dimensions of family deprivation: *cultural*—child's birthplace in the South (most of the parents were born in this region) and low parental education (less than high school); and *economic*—father absent or in an unskilled or semiskilled job and a large family (at least four siblings living at home). Parents of boys who were born in the South were relatively low on educational attainment, and a large number of children was most common among low-status families.

The four groups are relatively similar on occupational status and father absence (table 2). Though contrary to our expectations, this result may reflect the spread of black consciousness to the middle class, as suggested by recent surveys (Campbell and Schuman 1968). Moreover, differences on cultural deprivation do not correspond to our expectations, for it is the pluralists who stand out in this respect. Thirty percent of these boys were born in the South (versus an average of 18 percent for the other groups), and their fathers were less likely to have a high school education (61 percent did not vs. 41 percent of the other boys). The disparity between father's education and occupational status among

the pluralists suggests that a number of their fathers achieved good jobs despite an educational handicap, and the data tend to bear this out. In the low-education category, the percentage of fathers who were employed in at least a skilled job was larger among the pluralists than among other boys (39 vs. 21 percent). This kind of parental experience may strengthen belief in the value of individual effort and also enhance the desirability of integration.

While the uncommitted were not more deprived in occupational status than other boys, they were more likely to have a large number of brothers and sisters. Aside from its economic burden, a large family

TABLE 2
INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS AND FAMILY DEPRIVATION

FAMILY DEPRIVATION	PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO BOYS BY INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS				SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE (<i>F</i> -RATIO)
	Uncom- mitted <i>N</i> = 43 ^a	Nation- alists <i>N</i> = 42	Integra- tionists <i>N</i> = 103	Plural- ists <i>N</i> = 77	
Cultural:					
Child born in the South— father has less than a high school education...	57	49	46	72	N.S.
Economic:					
Father's occupational status:					
Skilled or higher.....	33	37	38	40	N.S.
Skilled or unskilled.....	44	45	46	45	N.S.
Father absent (low status).....	23	18	16	15	N.S.
Four or more sibs in house- hold.....	62	44	34	33	*

^a Minimal number of cases.

* *p* < .01.

could produce indifference or apathy by minimizing the kind of parent-child interaction that stimulates intellectual growth and educational skills.

The family background of the nationalists is surprisingly similar to that of boys who only favored integration, but the former were less confident that their parents would stick by them if they got into trouble, a difference which is greatest in relation to father (table 3). There is no evidence, however, that this expectation is expressed in alienation from the family. Loyalty to parents is not significantly related to confidence in parental support and is most prevalent among the nationalists and uncommitted. Upon further examination of the data, familistic sentiment was found to be more highly related both to a perception of the larger environment as threatening and to low ability than to the perceived quality of

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generational relations. Moreover, fatalistic attitudes are associated with familistic sentiment, especially among the uncommitted, while a perception of others as untrustworthy, self-oriented, and morally expedient is most characteristic of the familistic nationalists.¹⁰ Regardless of deficiencies in family life, this definition of reality would tend to increase the emotional significance of home as a protective haven.

Competence: IQ and teacher evaluations.—Social knowledge and personal efficacy are commonly related to level of cognitive functioning; the brighter the child, the more he knows about his world and believes that he can influence others. Consistent with these trends, boys who identified with either or both racial integration and black solidarity were sub-

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS ON PARENTAL
SUPPORTIVENESS AND FAMILY TIES

PERCEIVED PARENTAL SUPPORTIVENESS AND FAMILY TIES	PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO BOYS BY INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS				SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE (F-RATIO)
	Uncommitted N = 47 ^a	Nationalists N = 46	Integrationists N = 115	Pluralists N = 83	
Parental emotional support: ^b					
Mother.....	53	41	57	65	N.S.
Father.....	38	28	48	49	N.S.
Familism:					
Main loyalty will be to parents even after I marry: agree.....	58	49	26	29	*

^a Minimal number of cases.

^b Percentage in each group who gave "certainly" as a response to, "Would your mother/father stick by you if you got into really bad trouble?"

* $p < .01$.

stantially higher on IQ than the uncommitted. The integrationists ranked highest in average percentile (eighth grade Henman-Nelson Test), followed by the pluralists, nationalists, and the uncommitted (\bar{X} 's = 33, 30, 28, and 21). The only comparison worth noting centers on the difference between the uncommitted and other youth in the sample; 56 percent of the former scored lower than the twentieth percentile, in contrast to 31 percent for the other groups. The less able boys were also found to be less confident of their ability to control their lives and were more strongly attached to parents than brighter youth.

One might expect teacher evaluations of school performance to cor-

¹⁰ This is reported in Elder (1970). Distrust toward others does not specifically refer to relationships among blacks, which means that we cannot compare intragroup trust across the four orientation groups. This is unfortunate since much has been made of this sentiment as a barrier to cooperation in the black community.

respond to variations in measured intelligence across the four orientation groups, although grades are only a partial reflection of scholastic skills. Conduct in the class affects the quality of teacher-student relations and the rewards assigned to students; other things being equal, a desirable student is not likely to be one who is restless and aggressive, attributes which are most likely to characterize black-conscious boys with nationalist attitudes. As a measure of teacher evaluation, we selected the average English grade received during 1964.

Two results from the intergroup comparisons are noteworthy: the relatively low English grades of the nationalists (\bar{X} 's = 46), when compared with their IQ and the grades of other boys in the sample, and the relatively similar grades of the pluralists and integrationists—the difference here was less than one point (\bar{X} = 57). Although the nationalists scored higher on IQ than the uncommitted, their grades in English were lower (\bar{X} 's = 46 vs. 51). A hostile or aggressive demeanor in the classroom, reinforced by the cultural bias of English grammar and literature, may well be an important element in the nationalists' difficulties with this subject. A common outlet for academic frustration is disruptive activity.

With the exception of cultural deprivation, intergroup distance (as measured by percentage differences) is greatest between the uncommitted and youth who favored racial integration (regardless of attitude toward black solidarity). This difference occurs primarily on family size, ties to parents, and IQ, as evident in tables 2 and 3. Overall, the nationalists are located between these groups on resources, and they most closely resemble the uncommitted on relations to family and test performance. The most striking finding in comparisons of the integrationists and pluralists is their similarity on most types of resources, especially economic status, family relations, and English grades. It is only on cultural status and, to a lesser extent, on IQ that the integrationists have an advantage in achievement prospects. Such prospects are least favorable for the uncommitted.

School Experience

Commitment to school is partially dependent on successful effort and the perceived value of this experience for achieving personal goals. On scholastic status alone, one would expect boys who favored integration to rank higher on this commitment than other boys in the sample, and the data generally confirm this difference. Two-thirds of the integrationists and half of the pluralists reported positive feelings toward school, as against 38 and 31 percent of the uncommitted and nationalists.

In addition to the frustration of academic problems, dislike for school

may stem from a belief that traditional course work is not consistent with the educational desires of black youth and their responsibility to the black community. One type of incongruence, which has particular relevance for the school problems of the nationalists, is produced by a disproportionate emphasis on preparing students for prestigious universities. Over two-fifths of all boys in the sample felt that teachers cared most about such students, which in effect meant an imbalance favoring white students, and this perception was shared by over half of the nationalists. A more direct indication of student preferences regarding formal education is provided by a question which asked what the most important benefit of school should be. Of the three alternatives—basic skills, ability to think clearly, and job training—only the latter is clearly at variance with the university preparatory emphasis, and it was chosen more often by the nationalists and pluralists (51 and 41 percent) than by youth in the other two groups (31 percent). Boys who preferred job training tended to dislike school ($T_c = .21$), regardless of intergroup attitude, but the greater vocational interests of the nationalists did not completely explain their dislike for school. Alienation from school remained most prevalent among the nationalists, even among boys who favored the other benefits of schooling.

Another plausible source of alienation from school is a strained, conflicted relationship with teachers. Racially biased treatment of students, especially in disciplinary action, is one of the more common complaints of black parents in the local community. When white and Negro students commit the same violation, it is expected that the latter will be treated more punitively by school authorities. Aside from its validity, this definition of the situation is supportive of race consciousness and solidarity. In fact, the nationalists and pluralists were most likely to regard teachers as biased toward whites, a belief also shared by at least a third of the integrationists and uncommitted (table 4). The data suggest that perceived acceptance and concern by teachers were slightly more common among the pluralists and integrationists than among boys in the other two groups, with authority conflict most evident among the nationalists. For these boys, removal from class and enforced silence in the classroom seem to reflect a general discontent with the content of schooling, since both conditions were most common among those who preferred job training as a benefit of school ($T_c = .23$). This preference was associated with school dissatisfaction among other boys in the sample, but such feelings were not as directly expressed in hostile or disruptive behavior. Removal from class was unrelated to a vocational preference among the uncommitted, integrationists, and pluralists.

The greater involvement of the nationalists in disciplinary action (they were also more likely than other boys to have been suspended from

school three or more times—44 vs. 19 percent) is part of a more general behavioral theme which includes athletic interests, fighting, and delinquency. On desired student identity, athletic star was most popular among the nationalists (52 vs. 36 percent), while neither this image nor any other identity—bright student, social leader, etc.—was chosen by as many as a third of the boys in the other groups. The nationalists were also more likely to report having purposively “beaten up” someone within the last year or so (60 vs. 40 percent), and they ranked highest on official encounters with law enforcement agencies, according to police records. Approximately half of all boys had been charged with a juvenile

TABLE 4
INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS AND TREATMENT BY TEACHERS

TREATMENT BY TEACHERS	PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO BOYS BY INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS				SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE (<i>F</i> -RATIO)
	Uncom- mitted <i>N</i> = 46*	Nation- alists <i>N</i> = 46	Integra- tionists <i>N</i> = 114	Plural- ists <i>N</i> = 84	
1. Teachers prefer whites over other racial groups (Negro, Oriental, etc.) . . .	38	51	34	47	N.S.
2. Most teachers care about how well I do	31	34	42	40	N.S.
3. Teachers like my friends . .	41	31	50	53	N.S.
4. Teachers just want quiet in the class	21	48	19	24	*
5. Sent out of class three or more times	21	44	17	18	*

* Minimal number of cases.

* $p < .01$.

offense, and nationalistic sentiment was more prevalent in this group than among the nondelinquents (38 vs. 10 percent). Juvenile offenses did not vary among the uncommitted, integrationists, and pluralists.

In behavior patterns, the nationalists resemble gang boys from the working class who value toughness, the display of courage, independence, and the successful defense of honor. In the classroom, gang boys may intentionally violate a rule of conduct in order to test the teacher's trust in them and demonstrate that their presence in school is indeed voluntary and should be respected as such (Werthman 1967). When the teacher uses imperatives or derogatory statements to restore order and affirm authority rights, he challenges the boys' own claims to autonomy and initiates a character contest over the preservation of honor. This classroom drama is consistent with our knowledge of the nationalists, but very little is known about their life in the peer group or gang. Those

who were offenders did tend to have friends who were or had been in trouble with the police, and, from the boys' perspective, teachers were not inclined to think well of their companions. But the nationalists were not more likely than other boys to respect or identify with best friends.

Reward deprivation in school and conflicts with white authority could result from as well as strengthen nationalistic sentiment. The acquisition of this attitude in childhood—from older siblings, peers, or parents—might enhance awareness and lessen tolerance of racial injustice, developing sensitivities and defensive tendencies which increase the likelihood of confrontations with white authority. If the demeanor of boys who are apprehended by authority figures influences their treatment or disposition, as some research suggests,¹¹ the nationalists' aggressiveness may be a significant factor in the severity and frequency of punishment they have received. In any case, there is a strong connection between school discipline and police arrests. Most of the boys who were expelled from school are also juvenile offenders.

In review, we find intergroup distance on estrangement from school most pronounced between the nationalists, on the one hand, and youth who favored integration, on the other. Overall there is a high degree of correspondence on positive feeling toward school among the integrationists and pluralists, although the latter were more conscious of teacher favoritism toward white students. The uncommitted closely resembled the nationalists on degree of dissatisfaction with school, but they, as well as boys who favored integration, were less inclined to act out their frustrations in the classroom. The nationalists ranked highest on occasions of interpersonal conflict and punishment by school officials and police. In these respects, the nationalists closely resemble the black nationalist sympathizers in Marx's survey of Negro adults in the mid-sixties (1967, p. 115). Approval of riots and violence as a means to an end and antipolice sentiment were most prevalent among these adults. Although substantial change has occurred in black ideology and strategy since the mid-sixties, the relative prevalence of a conflict approach to white authority among the nationalists (as we have defined them) is not likely to have changed appreciably. The nationalist perspective is of course only one form of black consciousness.

¹¹ Through observations of police encounters with youth, Piliavin and Briar (1964) found that juvenile demeanor has considerable effect on the severity of disposition: "Boys who in their interactions with officers did not manifest what were considered to be appropriate signs of respect tended to receive the more severe dispositions" (p. 210). Uncooperative demeanor was observed among a third of the black adolescents and one-sixth of the white youth. In this regard, it is worth noting that the nationalists were least likely to claim respect for police, in contrast to two-thirds of the integrationists.

Achievement Prospects and Anticipated Barriers

Though race is an objective element in the life chances of all boys in the study, those who favored black solidarity were most conscious of the interdependence between individual and group prospects. The implications of this awareness for goal setting and realistic expectations depend on family support, intelligence, and school success. Such conditions are supportive of individualistic achievement among the pluralists, but their sensitivity to racial barriers may produce expectations which are lower than goals. By comparison, the nationalists' prospects for achievement through legitimate channels are more limited. This factor, coupled with the nationalists' vocational conception of schooling, points to relatively low expectations and desires concerning traditional forms of higher education. A similar prediction seems applicable to the uncommitted, owing to their limited intellectual ability.

Three types of achievement prospects were identified by comparing aspirations and expectations on the completion of four years of college: desire and expectation to achieve this goal; college aspirations coupled with lower expectations; and low aspirations-expectations (below college). Only a few boys held higher expectations than aspirations. Confidence in one's opportunity and ability to succeed is particularly evident in the integrationists' outlook, and these boys were most likely to expect a college education. This expectation level and the integrationists' racial attitudes evoke in some respects the "make-believe world" of Frazier's black bourgeoisie (1957). Their optimism regarding higher education clearly produces a sizable risk of subsequent disappointments in adult life. While the pluralists do not differ from the integrationists on aspiration level, this ambition is more likely to exceed their expectations concerning future accomplishments. Higher goals than expectations reflect anticipated frustration, as well as hope, and are correlated in the present sample with anxious preoccupation with adult roles, depressed feelings, and the belief that one has to be much better than others in order to achieve comparable success. In view of the pluralists' goals and perception of the future (see table 5), it is not surprising that they were most likely to express these sentiments.¹²

Compared with boys who favored integration, the uncommitted and nationalists are less likely to think about the future and to want or expect a college education. The nationalists rank lower than the other three groups on college expectations, a perspective which is more a consequence

¹² For instance, 53 percent of the pluralists reported that they often felt discouraged, in comparison with a third of the other boys. On a six-item index of concern about the future (work, college, aptitude, etc.), the pluralists were nearly twice as likely to score in the high category as boys in the other three groups. The relation between these indexes and educational goal expectations is reported in Elder (1970).

Intergroup Attitudes and Social Ascent

of school difficulties than vocational interests. Such expectations were associated with school punishment, but not with a preference for job training in the schools.

Reward deprivation occurs at a different point in time for the nationalists and pluralists—the present versus the future—and this difference has at least one implication for their reactions or adaptations to deprivation. When failure is anticipated one can still maintain hope for the best, as seen in the future concerns of the pluralists, and such hope sustains com-

TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS ON EDUCATIONAL
GOALS AND PERCEPTION OF FUTURE

EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND PER- CEPTION OF FUTURE	PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO BOYS BY INTERGROUP ORIENTATIONS				SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE (F-RATIO)
	Uncom- mitted N = 37 ^a	Nation- alists N = 41	Integra- tionists N = 101	Plural- ists N = 76	
1. Educational goals:					
College aspiration and expectation	22	12	42	24	*
College aspiration only .	11	15	12	28	N.S.
Noncollege aspiration and expectation	68	73	47	49	*
2. Sometimes feel that I have to be twice as good as others	50	46	61	65	N.S.
3. Often think about what I'll do and be after high school	24	22	50	45	*
4. Racial discrimination may prevent me from getting desired job	62	83	66	69	N.S.

^a Minimal number of cases.
* $p < .01$.

mitment to achievement through legitimate channels. Actions that would further jeopardize prospects are likely to be avoided. By comparison, the nationalists' deprivations in school and community minimize their investments in the social order and consequently their benefits from compliance. This situation is conducive to normative expediency, and the nationalists were more likely to prefer a course of action which included breaking rules to get ahead, circumventing the law if one can get away with it, and taking advantage of "suckers."¹³

There are lower-level alternatives in higher education, such as junior college, which are within the grasp of some boys in the sample who ac-

¹³ The greatest difference in approval of these actions is between the nationalists and boys who favored integration (average percentages, 65 vs. 41). The uncommitted were located between these extremes.

quired liabilities in secondary school. Junior colleges in the state of California accept students who have not completed high school, and this opportunity is widely recognized in the community. In fact, nearly half of the nationalists and a slightly smaller proportion of the pluralists expected to achieve the equivalent of a junior-college education, in contrast to a third of the other boys in the sample. Awareness of this option in higher education is vividly illustrated by the following comments of a boy with conduct and achievement problems.

Q. How certain are you that you'll go to college?

A. I'm pretty certain—'cause like junior college, you don't have to finish high school. You can be 18 years old to go there.

Q. You don't have to finish high school?

A. No.

Q. So, you don't think you'll finish it?

A. I mean, if something comes up and I can't finish school, I'm gonna go to college, I don't care what comes up. [Wilson 1967, p. 199]

Though boys who favored black solidarity are more aware of racial discrimination than other youth, this difference is not large in the area of occupational achievement and does not explain their relatively low educational expectations. Both personal experience with and recognition of racial discrimination are relatively common among boys in all four groups. For instance, three-fourths of the adolescents reported direct encounters with racial discrimination, and this experience did not vary by intergroup orientation (not shown in table 5). One of the missing links in the analysis is the particular interpretation that mediates the relationship between perceived racial discrimination and intergroup attitudes. It seems likely that meanings attributed to racial discrimination would vary markedly in relation to attitudes toward black solidarity. For instance, boys who favor integration but not black solidarity may expect some difficulty in getting a desired job because they are black, and yet believe that they can surmount whatever barriers the future holds in store for them. Needless to say, this definition of the situation is not likely to reinforce awareness of the interdependence between individual and group prospects. On the other hand, perception of racial discrimination is likely to increase awareness of this interdependence and foster identification with the black community when deprivations associated with such acts are attributed to a white-dominated social order rather than to the self.¹⁴

¹⁴ For an important contribution to the literature on blame attribution, see Gurin's (1970) study of the motivational correlates of occupational aspirations among Negro males in ten predominantly black colleges in the South. The analysis distinguished between a youth's belief in his ability to "control reinforcements" by his own efforts and a general Protestant Ethic belief regarding the role of internal and external forces in controlling the life prospects of other Negroes. As one would expect, personal con-

In terms of group attitude and status expectation, there is reason to expect greater stability of identity among the nationalists than among the pluralists. A singular interest in black solidarity would tend to strengthen racial identification through a reinforcing network of reference groups, while the dual orientation of the pluralists involves divided and perhaps conflicting loyalties and bases of self-evaluation. Moreover, a racial contrast in self-definition is more pronounced in the nationalists' world view. Status ambiguity associated with discrepant educational desires and expectations may be an additional source of instability in the pluralists' self-perception and evaluation. Self-report data in the survey do not provide an adequate test of this difference in self-concept, although the pluralists were most likely to claim that they had pretended and would prefer to be another person (49 percent).¹⁵ Boys who identified with only one objective, either black solidarity or racial integration, were least likely to prefer to be like another person, and they did not differ in this respect (31 percent). The uncommitted were located between these extreme groups (41 percent).

Since these data do not refer to the boys' self-identification on the basis of race, or to the racial identity of the "other" person, a desire to be like someone else may not have racial significance. Thus the corresponding response of the nationalists and integrationists toward being another person may not imply similarity in racial identity. However, our results on preference for another identity do suggest that affirmation of conflicting or competing ideals is a source of inner tension and conflict (cf. Hartley 1951), an emotional state which resembles the identity dilemma poignantly described by DuBois more than sixty years ago: "One feels his two-ness . . . an American, a Negro, two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals, in one dark body. . . . He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon, without having the doors of opportunity closed roughly in his face" (1903, pp. 3-4).

LIFE OPPORTUNITY, COMPETENCE, AND INTERGROUP ORIENTATION

Opportunity for rewarding accomplishment and competence lessen dependence on other persons or groups, and it is through such oppor-

trol was highly correlated with aspiration measures, but students who blamed discrimination for the plight of Negroes were more likely to be activists and tended to have higher aspirations under certain conditions.

¹⁵ The two items are, "I'm not the person I pretend to be," and "I often feel that I would like to be someone else." Percentages shown in the text represent unweighted averages for agree responses to each statement.

tunity that personal efficacy is acquired. Deprivations in this experience and skill are commonplace in the lives of minority children. Cumulative disadvantages in life prospects are coupled with powerlessness since power creates and provides access to opportunity. Smith describes opportunity, respect, and power as strategic determinants of the competent self, characterized by productive engagement with the environment: "[P]ower is the kingpin of the system. Power receives respect and guarantees access to opportunity" (1968, p. 313).

In a deprivational context, adolescent support for black power or solidarity expresses ingroup dependence and a desire to gain respect as well as improved life chances through the collective power of Negro Americans. This adaptation contrasts with the response of able youth who perceive favorable opportunities in life and feel respected, are prepared to leave their minority group in a psychological sense, and are attracted to the appeal of a racially integrated society. Some evidence of these differences between identification with black solidarity and racial integration was obtained in our sample of Negro boys of high school age.

Allegiance to black solidarity and a personal commitment to racial integration are not mutually exclusive among the identifications of black youth, although support for both ideals or neither may be stressful. A major historical theme in the black movement is conflict between the integrationist and nationalist forces, but there have always been individuals and groups that have worked to bring selected aspects of each world together in a united front. In the present study, identification with one cause—black solidarity (political power, leadership, and self-defense) or racial integration—was not predictive of attitudes toward the other. The largest group of boys favored integration more than black solidarity (integrationist), but support for both ideals ranked next in popularity (pluralists). The least popular intergroup attitudes included support for only black solidarity (nationalists) and indifference or negative sentiment toward both causes (uncommitted). By delineating intergroup attitudes and the pluralist option, we find that a substantial number of boys who favor racial integration are not indifferent to the collective interests of the black community, and that a majority of those who believe in black solidarity also believe in racial integration. Beyond the field of race relations, the typology makes explicit intergroup alternatives which are sometimes overlooked in research on two reference groups or individuals. This oversight has occurred, for instance, in studies of adolescent attitudes toward parents and peers. Until recently there has been a tendency to assume that peer and parent identification are opposite ends of the same continuum, thus excluding congruent attitudes toward both sets of reference figures.

On the empirical level, the four intergroup attitudes vary in relation

to interracial contact, ingroup-outgroup feeling, and commitment to change strategies. As might be expected, frequency of interracial contact and positive sentiment toward whites were correlated with personal interest in an interracial community; the relationship was not modified by positive or negative sentiment toward black solidarity. The nationalists ranked highest on ethnocentrism or ingroup preference, considerably higher than the pluralists and especially the integrationists, and they were most strongly attracted to the Black Muslims. Levels of ingroup preference and outgroup hostility were not comparable; only a fifth of the nationalists expressed antipathy toward whites, while approximately half of these boys reported some preference for their own racial group. Two change strategies—residential desegregation and improvement of the black community—received their greatest support from the pluralists and nationalists, followed at a distance by the integrationists and a small proportion of the uncommitted. As an intermediate group that shares some views held by the nationalists and integrationists, the pluralists couple positive interracial ties with an ingroup commitment and some uncertainty of self.

On life opportunity and competence, perceived as well as objective, the integrationists ranked above the other groups, followed by the pluralists, nationalists, and uncommitted. Factors bearing upon or indicating life chances included family status (cultural and economic), grades, and relations with authority figures in school and community, and achievement prospects, especially in education. Personal competence was measured by performance on an IQ test, subjective independence from the family, and mastery beliefs. Individualistic achievement is compatible with a favorable opportunity structure and intellectual competence, and both factors were most characteristic of the integrationists. Their family status was not substantially higher than that of other boys, but they were generally higher on IQ, school commitment and satisfaction, and achievement expectations. By comparison, the pluralists differed primarily on their lower expectations regarding future achievement; they were more aware of racial discrimination and were more likely to anticipate failure to achieve their aspirations. On a wide range of indicators, the nationalists were more limited in achievement opportunity or prospects than boys who favored integration. They tended to have less confidence in parental support, received lower grades in school, and were less satisfied with school; a larger percentage of these boys received discipline from school and legal authorities, and very few expected to achieve a college education. The uncommitted also perceived limited opportunity, but they differed most from other boys in the sample on their relative incompetence, expressed in a low average IQ, family dependence, and fatalism. In these respects, there is some resemblance

between the uncommitted and adults who are acquiescent and politically apathetic.

Since the study is cross-sectional, most of the between-group differences are not amenable to causal interpretation. Causal direction is less of a problem for family background and IQ, which are clearly antecedent to the intergroup attitudes, than for attitude and experiential variables. For instance, racial expectations held by the nationalists may well have contributed to and resulted from their low grades and authority conflicts in school. Likewise, racial isolation may be both cause and consequence of negative sentiment toward racial integration. In addition, we were unable to trace the particular paths and turning points leading to each intergroup attitude, such as childhood experiences—attitude transmission through parents and peers, encounters with discrimination, and degree of racial isolation.

The continued growth of black consciousness and ingroup commitment has important implications for the content of child socialization in families established by this age group, for the correlates of nationalistic feeling, and for the current popularity of pluralism. In what area, if any, is ideological change related to generational change in child rearing and family relationships? Research on this question would benefit from an understanding of the intergroup attitudes of girls in view of the centrality of Negro mothers in child rearing and culture transmission. An important question here is the relative stability of each intergroup attitude from adolescence to the adult years, since a number of studies have found black consciousness to be most prevalent among the young. For reasons stated earlier, one would expect the nationalist perspective to be more resistant to change than the dual orientation of the pluralists. Second, racial change since the mid-sixties suggests that the nationalist attitude (as we have defined it) has become more popular at the expense of the uncommitted and integrationist groups, and that contemporary youth who support only black solidarity are characterized by a greater sense of mastery, pride, and commitment to the future. Within the nationalist group in the present sample, this outlook was most characteristic of boys who did not approve of the Black Muslims.

If nationalist sentiment has become more popular among the young in recent years, it remains a minority position which is restricted by the persistent strength of support for racial integration in this age group. The converging levels of support for racial integration and black solidarity suggest that advocates of both causes have increased markedly since the mid-sixties. This perspective expresses an illusive ideal, a pluralistic community in which blacks can affirm their racial identity, contribute to the social, economic, and cultural life of their people, and freely participate in relationships with whites that are characterized by friendship and

interdependence. Though reality continues to weaken the plausibility of this goal, a large body of sentiment in the black community remains committed to the belief that it is or will be possible for the young to state with equal pride and certitude, "I am black, I am a man, I am an American."¹⁶

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¹⁶ This sentence is adapted from Gordon's concluding sentence in *Assimilation in American Life*.

Black Invisibility, the Press, and the Los Angeles Riot¹

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Previous survey research indicated the importance of "black invisibility" for understanding the Los Angeles riot of 1965 and black reactions to it. The extent and nature of this invisibility were explored by means of a content analysis of Los Angeles newspapers from 1892-1968. The results indicate that little attention has been given in the press to blacks throughout the twentieth century, and coverage of blacks relative to their proportion of the population actually diminished from 1892 to just before the riot. The great increase in coverage during the riot itself returned rapidly to the pre-riot level by early 1966. The white public in Los Angeles, local white public officials, and subsequent press coverage were largely unsympathetic to Negro grievances. While press attention to blacks has not increased, its content has changed markedly from coverage of conventionally stereotyped activity to emphasis on interracial conflict. Possible consequences of black invisibility for race relations in the United States are suggested.

Ralph Ellison (1952, pp. 7-8), the black author, has eloquently described man's need for attention and his potential for violence when this need is frustrated: "I am an invisible man . . . simply because people refuse to see me. . . . You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real world . . . and you strike out with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them recognize you." Eighteen years after Ellison's portrayal of black invisibility, the Watts ghetto erupted into violence. In this paper, we wish to explore the nature of black invisibility in Los Angeles and its relationship to the racial violence that rocked Los Angeles and many other American cities during the 1960s.

By "black invisibility," we mean a condition describing the perceptual world of the white American. He is physically isolated from blacks, hence

¹ This study was supported by National Science Foundation grants to author Sears. It was conducted while Johnson and McConahay were USPHS predoctoral fellows in social psychology at UCLA. A preliminary version was presented at the annual meeting of the Western Psychological Association in Vancouver, B.C., June 1969. We wish to thank newspaper coders—Karen Stanley Ebeling, Sandra Lanto, Don Mednick, and Albert Lauck—and UCLA librarians—Mrs. Frances V. Lovejoy and Mrs. Frances E. Rose. Computing services were provided by the UCLA Health Sciences Computing Facility under NIMH grant FR-3.

they are physically invisible to him, and his few physical contacts with them are structured so that blacks are psychologically invisible to him as well. Thus, blacks essentially do not exist in the subjective world of the white American.

The importance of black invisibility in contributing to racial violence is suggested by the salience of "attention-seeking" in blacks' interpretations of the Watts insurrection. Martin Luther King reported that in the days following the outburst, he was touring the riot area with Bayard Rustin and Andrew Young when they encountered a group of black youngsters shouting joyously, "We won! We won!" The three civil rights leaders asked them, "How can you say you won when thirty-four Negroes are dead, your community is destroyed, and whites are using the riot as an excuse for inaction?" The response was shouted back immediately: "We won because we made them pay attention to us" (King 1967, p. 112).

Survey data also emphasized the centrality of increased white awareness of blacks in inducing optimism among blacks about the riot's consequences. Throughout the black community, the riot was interpreted as a violent protest against white mistreatment and neglect (Sears and Tomlinson 1968). Blacks perceiving "attention-seeking" as the purpose of the riot were more optimistic about its outcome than those perceiving instrumental or cathartic purposes; similarly, those feeling the riot helped the Negroes' cause by calling attention to blacks were more optimistic than those feeling the riot helped by changing white attitudes, bringing economic aid to the ghetto, or by having psychological impact upon black people. Furthermore, "attention-seeking" accounted for more of the variance in optimism regarding riot aftereffects than any of the usual indicators of social position or demographic location (Sears and McConahay 1970), and even accounted for more variance than riot participation itself (Sears and McConahay 1969).

BLACK INVISIBILITY

The invisibility of the black population prior to the riots is in some sense well known, yet its true magnitude usually shocks even informed observers. The causes of invisibility are both physical and psychological. Physical invisibility is a consequence of thoroughgoing racial segregation of housing, education, occupation, and social life in the United States. Whites have little personal contact with blacks in any setting. Indeed, from the earliest years of a white child's life, he is isolated from blacks. Coleman et al. (1966) reported that, nationwide, almost 80 percent of all white schoolchildren of all ages attend schools that are more than 90

percent white, and that the average white elementary or secondary school pupil attends a school in which 97 percent of the teachers are white.

Los Angeles seems to be no exception. The opportunity for interracial contact there was as slim as in any other northern or western city in the years before the 1965 riot. Residential segregation has been at least as thorough in Los Angeles. The best data come from Taeuber and Taeuber's (1965) index of residential segregation which—with a range of 0–100—may be interpreted as the minimum percentage of nonwhites who would have to change the block on which they live in order to produce an unsegregated distribution. For Los Angeles, this percentage was 84.2 in 1940, 84.6 in 1950, and 81.8 in 1960, placing it generally around the middle of the distribution for major northern cities—more segregated than New York and Washington, but less than Chicago and Detroit.² Studies of the degree of school segregation in Los Angeles make the same point (Caughey and Caughey, 1966). Because schools are filled on a neighborhood basis, and the neighborhoods are highly segregated, the Los Angeles schools are as segregated as those of other major northern cities.

Negroes have represented a substantial minority in the city of Los Angeles since World War II, totaling 13.5 percent in the 1960 census. Yet whites rarely come into contact with Negroes in their everyday lives. A 1969 survey of whites in the northern San Fernando Valley, a middle-class suburban area, found that 58 percent said they "are around Negroes" at most once or twice a week. Indeed, 36 percent said they had no contact at all with Negroes in an average week (Sears and Kinder 1970). Of the whites interviewed after the riot—half of whom had deliberately been drawn from the relatively few integrated areas of Los Angeles—only 13 percent said they had "frequent" contact with Negroes living within a block or two of their homes, 14 percent said they had "frequent" contact with Negroes in clubs, organizations, and informal groups, and 25 percent said they had "frequent" contact with Negroes at work (Morris and Jeffries 1970, pp. 480–601). Thus, it is apparent that few whites have any regular, frequent contact with blacks. Their immediate social environments include a vastly smaller proportion of blacks than does the metropolis as a whole.

The invisibility of the black community to whites is further emphasized by the fact that relatively few whites have ever even visited the major black residential areas of Los Angeles. In the post-riot survey of whites (see Morris and Jeffries 1970, pp. 480–601), only 23 percent

² This no doubt overestimates the degree of integration in Los Angeles. The index is computed for all nonwhites, rather than solely for Negroes, thus including large numbers of Orientals in West Coast cities, but not elsewhere. Since Orientals are somewhat more assimilated residentially than Negroes, the index is distorted downward in these cases.

claimed to have ever shopped, worked, visited friends, or lived in Watts; 31 percent had never been to Watts, and 46 percent had only driven through the area. Similarly, 54 percent had never been to Pacoima—a small black area in the San Fernando Valley—and 54 percent had never been to Leimert Park, a middle-class black area in south-central Los Angeles. In short, it is clear that the average white man in Los Angeles has only a trivial amount of personal experience with blacks. He lives in a white world. Blacks, on the other hand, more often move back and forth between the dominant white world and the black ghetto.³ The poor in general, and the blacks in particular, are moderately familiar with the affluent areas of American cities, but are themselves invisible to the more affluent and powerful in our society.

The psychological invisibility of black people takes over where physical isolation fails. The few interracial contacts that do occur usually place the blacks in an inferior role—waitresses, nurse's aides, and trash collectors—to which whites are generally indifferent. But invisibility is not by any means limited to blacks in low status positions. Jacobs (1967) has sensitively described the ways in which whites communicate psychological invisibility to blacks in even the best of public agencies. He argued that the middle-class whites who staff and direct the bureaucracies in school systems, welfare bureaus, police departments, housing agencies, and hospitals make decisions in terms of what is most convenient for their own needs or the needs of other middle-class whites to whom they must answer, rather than the needs of the blacks they serve. For example, the rules regarding the presence of a man in a household receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children consider the sensitivities of the visible white taxpayer, not the needs of the invisible black child whom the program is supposed to help.

³ By these same standards, however, the majority whites are not at all invisible to blacks. Black contact with white residential areas was considerably more common than white contact with black areas, as indicated by our post-riot survey of blacks. Only 10 percent of the blacks interviewed had never been to Beverly Hills, and 23 percent had never been to Westwood, to mention two of the more exclusive white areas of Los Angeles (of course, this contact of blacks with white areas was principally the result of employment or casual driving, rather than residential mixing or visits with friends). Black people also reported somewhat more personal contact with whites than whites did with blacks. For example, 19 percent of the blacks reported "frequent" contact with whites in their neighborhood, and 23 percent on the streets. Almost half of the Negroes had had frequent contacts with whites at work, whether with their employer or with a fellow worker. Similarly, whites are much more visible to black schoolchildren than blacks to white children; for example, in the mid-1960s the average black elementary schoolchild was in a school with 35 percent white teachers, while white children attended schools with only 3 percent black teachers. And 35 percent of the black first-graders were in schools more than 10 percent white, while about 20 percent of the whites were in schools more than 10 percent black (see Coleman 1966, p. 3). Harrington (1962) has emphasized the same imbalance in discussing the invisibility of the poor more generally.

Given that whites have very little direct personal knowledge of blacks, the mass media could potentially fill an important gap, communicating to whites the attitudes, feelings, life styles, and even the very existence of black people. Indeed, it is apparent that, without the aid of the media, most whites are likely to get very little information of any kind about blacks.

This study investigates media attention to the black population, therefore, for two main reasons. First, media attention reflects the degree of black visibility to whites in America at any given time, and thus is a useful indicator of it. Second, media attention also partially governs black visibility, by partially determining the amount of second-hand communication whites receive about blacks.

The daily press was chosen as the primary data source, because (1) we wished to trace black invisibility over a long historical period, and (2) press coverage could be systematically and reliably measured at relatively low cost, whereas other media could be investigated only with considerably greater expense, and on the basis of much less complete archives.

Our basic hypothesis was that historically the white majority in Los Angeles had paid almost no attention to the black community, either in the media or in everyday life. Our data collection was aimed at three main issues: (1) to investigate press attention to blacks throughout most of the history of Los Angeles; (2) to determine whether black invisibility, as reflected in the press, was increasing or decreasing before the 1965 riot; and (3) to determine whether or not the riot actually contributed to overcoming black invisibility.

METHOD

Sample Surveys

The data come from sample surveys of black and white Los Angeles residents, and from a content analysis of Los Angeles newspapers. The survey data were obtained in interviews conducted in late 1965 and early 1966, in the aftermath of the Watts riot of August 1965. The black sample ($N = 586$) was representative of the large portion (46.5 square miles) of south-central Los Angeles sealed off by a curfew imposed during the rioting. The curfew zone contained about 75 percent of the blacks living in Los Angeles County, thus representing the major concentration of blacks in the metropolitan area. Interviewing was done by black interviewers living in the curfew zone. For more information on the nature of this sample and the method employed, see Tomlinson and TenHouten (1970, pp. 127-39).

Whites ($N = 583$) were sampled from six communities in Los Angeles

County (half of which were racially integrated and half nonintegrated) at high, medium, and low socioeconomic levels. This sample was therefore not wholly representative of the county, overrepresenting high socioeconomic status and racially integrated areas, thus probably underestimating racial hostilities. Nevertheless, it represents a useful approximation of white opinion. The study is described in more detail by Morris and Jeffries (1970, pp. 480-601).

Coding Press Coverage

References to Negroes in the two major Los Angeles metropolitan newspapers were analyzed for the period 1892-1968. The sampling of newspapers to be coded was most intensive during the period from 1964 through 1968, to obtain sensitive indicators of attention in the years surrounding the riot. For the Los Angeles *Times*, two issues were randomly selected from each year from 1892 to 1964, then one per month from August 1964 through 1966. Each day's issues during the Watts riot were also included. For 1967 and 1968, ten papers were selected with no more than one for each month.

The other newspaper analyzed was the Hearst chain's *Herald-Examiner* and its several predecessors—the *Evening Express*, the *Evening Herald*, the *Herald-Express*, and the *Examiner*. Two issues were selected for each period of five years from 1892 to 1930, and three for each five years from 1931 to 1964. The month, week, and day were selected randomly. Which one of the several predecessors was coded prior to the final emergence of the *Herald-Examiner* was also chosen randomly. In addition, one newspaper from three of the last five months in 1964, and from six months each of 1965, 1966, 1967, and 1968 were chosen. A total of 144 *Times* and 71 *Herald-Examiners* were ultimately coded.⁴

The coder first selected all those articles in a given newspaper that referred to Negroes. An article was considered to refer to Negroes if it contained racial words, referred to Negro persons, named a pictured Negro, referred to laws and/or legislation dealing with racial matters, to geographic units known to be predominantly Negro (e.g., Watts, Harlem, Nigeria) or a geographic location known to be in a predominantly Negro area as determined by census tract data (e.g., 1600 W. 115th St., Los Angeles), to civil rights demonstrations, to riots in which Negroes

⁴ The original plan was to take a constant sample from 1892 to 1963. Starting in 1964, a larger sample was drawn to allow a more detailed analysis of the nature of coverage leading up to and subsequent to the Los Angeles riot. As coding progressed, the time-consuming nature of gathering the data became evident, making it necessary to trim the sample. Early analyses showed a consistent low level of Negro space prior to the 1960s. For this reason, half of the original sample for 1936-50 and a quarter of the 1951-63 sample were not coded to enable more intensive analysis of the years surrounding the Los Angeles riot. For the same reason, newspapers published in 1967 and 1968 were not content-coded.

were known to predominate, or pictured a race-related scene, such as a riot scene.

Two measures of the volume of coverage were drawn from this coding. One was simply the number of news items referring to Negroes per full page of news in the newspaper. A news item, by our definition, could be anything from one word to a five-page article, however. Because of this great variability in the amount of space devoted to any single item, a second measure was also used. This was the percentage of the total news space that was devoted to Negroes. This was determined by measuring each item referring to Negroes in square inches, and then measuring the entire issue for total square inches of news space. In determining space devoted to Negroes, only the amount of space that dealt with Negroes in the article was used along with the headline space if the article was more than 75 percent devoted to news about Negroes or if there were racial words in the headline. Advertising was not included in the total news space, and advertising with references to Negroes was not coded (for data on Negroes in advertisements, see Kassarian 1970).⁵ The sports and comic sections of the newspapers were arbitrarily excluded from the analysis as not constituting news space. Therefore, both measures reflect coverage of Negroes relative to total news space, exclusive of advertising, sports, and comics.

For the main part of the analyses, three coders were used. Coder 1 (C1) coded ninety-eight issues, coder 2 (C2) eighty-four, and coder 3 (C3) fifteen. To measure coding reliability, a subsample of fifteen newspapers (with 204 articles referring to Negroes) was coded by both C1 and C2, and two papers (with forty-four articles referring to Negroes) by both C1 and C3. Intercoder reliability was assessed on (1) the number of news items referring to Negroes found per issue, (2) the news space per reference, and (3) whether or not the headline should be included as referring to Negroes. On these latter two dimensions, intercoder reliability was quite high. With respect to the measurement of space, $r = .98$ between C1 and C2, and $r = .93$ between C1 and C3; C1 and C2 agreed in 93 percent of the cases on whether or not the headline met the criteria for inclusion in Negro space, and 95 percent agreement held for C1 and C3. Reliability was more mixed on number of news items found and coded as referring to Negroes, but is probably satisfactory.⁶ In any case,

⁵ For the period 1932-68, total news space was computed by measuring the total newspaper space—exclusive of comics, sports pages, and classified ads—then multiplying by the proportion that news lineage represented for that year of display advertising lineage plus news lineage combined (i.e., excluding classified ad lineage, office and legal advertising, etc.). For these latter figures we wish to express thanks to the Los Angeles Times. The amount of advertising prior to 1932 was estimated by counting the pages of advertising in a random issue for each year.

⁶ Agreement on the number of news items found and coded as Negro was rather high between C1 and C3 (each coded 89 percent of the total items that either found), but

the main results of the study are very similar for the two measures of press coverage, and across the two newspapers coded, so one should feel considerable confidence in them.

Coding News Content

In addition to measuring the volume of press coverage as described above, the coders assessed the content of news items. The coder first assigned each item to one of 197 content categories. To simplify the data presentation, these were later grouped into four main groups with a total of ten subcategories.

The first major category, *Stereotypes*, consisted of three subcategories. "Antisocial" contained all crime and other antisocial actions by individual Negroes. "Sensational" consisted of all sensational news not in other categories, such as accidents, natural catastrophes, and social conflicts that were neither antisocial nor concerned with civil rights, such as a Negro serving as a witness in court against a white man. "Entertainment" included all references to black performers.

The second major category, *Civil Rights*, also included three subcategories. "Positive Steps" consisted of all items reporting actual or advocated advances in Negro rights, and coverage of civil rights leaders and groups. "Negative Steps" contained those items reporting opposition to integration or civil rights, steps taken against Negro rights, and instances of discrimination. The "Ambivalent" category contained all coverage of civil rights and political activity relevant to Negroes that neither promoted nor blocked their welfare in terms of actions taken or suggested. It also included nonviolent conflict over civil rights at the individual, group, and governmental levels, such as "civil rights demonstrations" and "poverty program criticized."

The third main category is *Interracial Violence*. This contained all coverage and follow-up of interracial riots, and other instances of interracial violence, such as lynchings and killings of civil rights workers.

less between C1 and C2; while C2 coded 96 percent of the items that either found, C1 coded only 76 percent. Those items only found by C2 were mostly small parts of larger articles. Thirty-three percent were less than one square inch in space (i.e., less than four lines of an average column) and 72 percent were parts of larger articles. Hence the discrepancies do not seem serious in terms of the larger goals of the coding, in that there were no gross oversights or disagreements as to what constituted a "Negro" item. Also, these minor disagreements did not seem to affect the main dependent variable, the percentage of news space devoted to Negroes, since the reliability for C1 and C2 on this measure was $r = .95$, including the missed articles. Two additional coders (C4 and C5) were used to expand the *Herald-Examiner* sample for the number of news items; C1 and C4 coded two of the same papers for a total of thirty-five articles; C4 found 86 percent of the articles either found, and C1 found 80 percent of the articles either found; C1 and C5 coded three of the same papers, for a total of forty-one articles; C1 found 90 percent of the articles either coded and C5 found 80 percent.

The fourth category, *Other*, included three subcategories. "Everyday Life" contained the news of Negroes participating in social activities, cultural events, religion, business, education, and other news of a favorable nature, such as "Negro wins award." The "International" category contained all references to black nations and blacks of other countries. A "Miscellaneous" category was used for other items not classifiable in these terms where references were too brief and obscure, such as in an index, or unclassifiable, such as the story about a family being awakened in their burning home by the barking of a dog named "Nigger."

PRE-RIOT VISIBILITY

Amount of Press Coverage

During the long period from 1892 to the Supreme Court's school desegregation case of 1954, there was almost no coverage of blacks in the Los Angeles press. As shown in figure 1, less than 1 percent of the total news space was normally devoted to blacks, except for a brief period early in the century when considerable racial strife surrounded the imposition of rigid Jim Crow regulations in the south. Aside from that, press coverage of Negro news was uncommon in either the *Los Angeles Times* or the *Herald-Examiner*, with coverage being remarkably similar in the two papers. Even after the major growth of the local black community began during World War II, news space devoted to Negroes showed no substantial increase. Blacks must indeed have been largely invisible to whites in Los Angeles during these many long years.⁷

Many observers believed that sympathy and attention to Negroes were increasing in the 1950s and 1960s, due to the school desegregation decision of 1954 and the increasing civil rights activism thereafter. Do the data show that black visibility was rising before the riot of 1965? At first glance it may appear that the data do show an increase in coverage; from 1893 to August 1965, both newspapers showed statistically significant increases in the amount of news space devoted to Negroes, and the number of news items referring to them increased significantly in the *Times*, but only slightly in the *Herald-Examiner*. Figures 1 and 2 give the data.⁸

⁷ The few earlier studies of press coverage of Negroes also report that it has been very small relative to the size of the Negro population (cf. Simpson's [1936] sampling of four Philadelphia newspapers from 1908 to 1932, and Gist's [1932] content analysis of Negro news during the early 1930s). Carter (1957) reports that southern papers devoted less than 1 percent of their news space to desegregation news immediately after the Supreme Court rulings were made.

⁸ The statistical significance of pre-riot increases in press coverage of Negroes from 1893 to 1965 is as follows: (1) percentage of space—*Times*: $F = 40.40$, 1/98 df, $P < .001$; *Herald-Examiner*: $F = 6.34$, 1/23 df, $P < .05$; (2) news items per page—*Times*: $F = 4.08$, 1/98 df, $P < .05$; *Herald-Examiner*: $F = 0.32$, 1/31 df, N.S. The F -ratios are for the linear effects of coverage over years, by analysis of variance. All significance tests are based upon five-year groupings until 1963, thus data from 1962 have been excluded.




FIG. 1.—Percentage of news space devoted to Negroes




FIG. 2.—News items per page referring to Negroes

However, the increases in press attention prior to the riot were actually rather slight, except for the *Times*' increase in news space. They did not even keep pace with the rapid growth in the size of the local black community. As shown in figure 1, the proportion of blacks in Los Angeles increased greatly after 1940. If we correct for this growth, press coverage of blacks actually *decreased* significantly before the riot (the data are shown in figs. 3, 4). That is, relative to the percentage of Negroes in Los




FIG. 3.—Percentage of news space devoted to Negroes, corrected for proportion of Negroes in Los Angeles.

Angeles, press coverage of blacks significantly declined in both newspapers, by both of our indices, from 1893 up to the riot. The fact that data from the two newspapers are so similar adds considerably to the credibility of this finding.⁹

⁹ Correction for black population growth was made by dividing the dependent variables (news space and news items) by the percentage of Negroes in the city of Los Angeles during each time period. The city figure was used because it contained most of the local Negroes, and because the riot took place largely within the city. Since most blacks live within the city limits, county proportions have always been lower, but have increased at roughly the same rate. The national percentage of Negroes remained roughly constant throughout the period of this study, at around 10 percent. The statistical significance of this pre-riot decrease in press coverage of Negroes from 1893 to 1965, when corrected for Negro proportion of Los Angeles city residents, is as follows: (1) percentage space—*Times*: $F = 3.48$, 1/98 df, $P < .10$; *Herald-Examiner*: $F = 12.99$, 1/23 df, $P < .005$; (2) news items per page—*Times*: $F = 42.18$, 1/98 df, $P < .001$; *Herald-Examiner*: $F = 1.52$, 1/31 df, N.S. This decrease is even more striking when one considers that the present data have been corrected for advertising. The proportion of newspaper space devoted to advertising has been increasing steadily

This surprising decline demanded closer examination of the pre-riot data. Inspection of figures 1 and 2 revealed a certain amount of news about Negroes around the turn of the century (most of it quite racist in genre, as will be seen), at a time when there were relatively few Negroes in the West. Even this minimal coverage appears to have dropped off during the long period surrounding the two world wars, until an upturn in the late 1950s. However, this late increase came considerably after the




FIG. 4.—News items per page referring to Negroes, corrected for proportion of Negroes in Los Angeles.

upsurge in the local black population, and never really caught up with it, as may be seen in figures 3 and 4.

This suggested testing for a U-shaped curve of press coverage over the years prior to the riot, from 1893 to 1965. And indeed, both of our measures of press attention yielded a significant U-shaped (quadratic) relationship between press coverage and time over the sample period, on each

over the years, from a low of 26 percent in 1893 to a high of 59 percent in 1967. If we were to consider the total newspaper as the reader sees it, the decrease in per capita coverage of blacks would thus be even more dramatic. The finding that newspaper coverage of black Americans did not increase until just before the Watts riot relative to northern Negro population growth was also obtained in the two relevant prior studies. Simpson (1936) found that per capita news space devoted to Negroes in Philadelphia declined from the early part of the century to the 1920s and 1930s. Kassarian (1970) reports no general increase in the use of Negroes in advertising in eleven national magazines across the years 1946, 1956, and 1965, but a substantial increase by 1969.

newspaper. This remained, though not as strongly, even when press coverage was corrected for the increase in the local Negro population.¹⁰ Hence, after a half-century-long period of real invisibility—from the turn of the century to the postwar period—press coverage of blacks appears to have begun increasing, if very slightly, even before the riot.

Nevertheless, one should not imagine that this late upturn was simply the culmination of a long linear increase in sympathy and attention to Negroes. This was not the case at all. First, the gap between the number of Negroes in Los Angeles and the press attention they received was actually widening with time, as already indicated. Second, press coverage increased only in the last few months before the riot, not during the previous decade of intensive civil rights activity. The civil rights decade (1953–62) did not differ significantly (by *t*-test) from the postwar decade (1943–52) in corrected news space or news items, whereas the last few months before the riot (1964–65) showed slightly (but significantly) more press attention than in the postwar period.

In short, the press had increasingly contributed to black invisibility for more than a half century, failing to redress it even when civil rights activism became commonplace across the country. Only in the last few months before the riot did press coverage begin to increase, and even then not very dramatically.

Content of Press Coverage

Perhaps it is just as well that press coverage of blacks was so rare for so many years, because the content of it was mostly degrading. Table 1 presents the historical trends in the content of news items dealing with Negroes. Initially, the press largely recorded acts of crime and other such sensational, "yellow-journalism" news, in addition to accounts of atrocities committed upon blacks.

Between the two world wars, some Negroes became quite prominent in the entertainment world, and increasingly were given press attention in this role. Crime, sensationalism, and acts of interracial violence were less commonly reported. However, during the interwar period, only a slim percentage of the total news about Negroes was given to his struggle for equality (17 percent).

¹⁰ The statistical significance of the U-shaped effect of time on pre-riot press coverage is as follows: (1) percentage space—*Times*: $F = 46.51$, 1/98 df, $P < .001$; *Herald-Examiner*— $F = 11.91$, 1/23 df, $P < .005$; (2) for news items per page—*Times*: $F = 33.64$, 1/98 df, $P < .001$; *Herald-Examiner*: $F = 9.88$, 1/31 df, $P < .01$. Correcting for Negro proportion of Los Angeles residents yields the following significance levels for the same four comparisons: $F = 5.79$, 1/98 df, $P < .05$; $F = 8.39$, 1/23 df, $P < .01$; $F = 4.61$, 1/98 df, $P < .05$; $F = 10.22$, 1/31 df, $P < .005$. The *F*-ratios are the quadratic components of the influence of years on press coverage, by analysis of variance.

In the period from World War II to the Watts riot, coverage of anti-social and sensational news diminished almost to the vanishing point. From absorbing 35 percent of Negro press coverage prior to 1920, such coverage drew only 4 percent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Entertainment remained an important focus of attention, but appeared to be on the wane.

The most important postwar change, of course, was the increased attention given to civil rights efforts of all kinds. From the low point of 17 percent in the 1920s and 1930s, it rose to 47 percent in the late 1950s and

TABLE 1
CONTENT OF NEGRO NEWS ITEMS FOR COMBINED
LOS ANGELES NEWSPAPERS
(PERCENTAGES)

Categories	1892-1919	1920-39	1940-54	1954-65 (Pre-riot)	1965-66 (Post-riot)
Stereotypic.....	43	52	29	21	17
Antisocial.....	20	16	5	2	3
Sensational.....	15	9	0	2	3
Entertainment.....	8	27	24	17	11
Civil Rights.....	23	17	35	47	46
Positive steps.....	6	1	4	17	18
Negative steps.....	3	1	2	7	9
Ambivalent or neutral.....	14	16	29	23	19
Interracial Violence...	13	1	4	6	19
Other.....	21	30	32	26	18
Everyday Life.....	9	3	7	5	3
International.....	4	6	9	16	9
Miscellaneous.....	8	21	16	5	6
Total number of items.....	100% (174)	100% (158)	100% (46)	100% (538)	100% (442)

NOTE.—Percentages are based on the total number of items for both newspapers, weighting the *Times* somewhat more heavily due to its larger sample.

early 1960s. However, it must be remembered that until just prior to the riot, this still represented an unimportant focus of attention. As shown in figure 1, only about 2 percent of the total news space was devoted to Negroes in the late 1950s; though civil rights efforts received almost half of that, they still occupied a minor and relatively obscure niche in the news of the time.

These trends in content, like those in the total amount of Negro news, did not merely reflect the editorial whims of one newspaper or newspaper chain. Table 2 illustrates the parallel development of these trends in both the *Times* and the *Herald-Examiner*. The main difference between the two papers was that the *Herald-Examiner* was slower to increase coverage of civil rights than the *Times*. In the *Times* the change occurred in the

period from 1940 to 1954. The parallel increase in civil rights coverage in the *Herald Examiner* occurred only in the period after 1954.

Blacks' Attitudes toward the Media

The bias of the white-owned press did not go unnoticed in the black community. Table 3 presents data on the black sample's evaluations of the fairness of media coverage of the black community. Large minorities of the black community felt the two major newspapers treated the Negro community unfairly, and somewhat smaller numbers felt the same way about the electronic media. In fact, the *Times*, then highly conservative,

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF CONTENT OF NEGRO NEWS ITEMS
IN *Times* AND *Herald-Examiner*
(PERCENTAGES)

	1892-1919	1920-39	1940-54	1954-65 (Pre-Riot)	1965-66 (Post-Riot)
Stereotypic:					
<i>Times</i>	44	52	17	19	17
<i>Herald-Examiner</i>	34	52	50	30	17
Civil Rights:					
<i>Times</i>	21	18	45	51	49
<i>Herald-Examiner</i>	33	14	19	35	38
Interracial Violence:					
<i>Times</i>	15	1	3	5	19
<i>Herald-Examiner</i>	4	0	6	7	17
Other:					
<i>Times</i>	20	29	35	25	15
<i>Herald-Examiner</i>	29	34	25	28	28

TABLE 3
BLACK RESPONDENTS' EVALUATIONS OF LOCAL MEDIA'S
COVERAGE OF THE NEGRO COMMUNITY
(PERCENTAGES)

Media	Fairly	Unfairly	Other	Net Affect
Community-wide:				
Los Angeles <i>Times</i>	38	44	18	- 6
Los Angeles <i>Herald-Examiner</i> ..	54	31	15	+23
Television in general.....	63	29	8	+34
Radio in general.....	64	26	10	+38
Negro-oriented:				
Los Angeles <i>Herald-Dispatch</i> ..	35	17	48	+18
Los Angeles <i>Sentinel</i>	48	6	46	+42
KGFJ.....	76	7	17	+69

NOTE.—The specific question was, "How fairly do the following cover the problems of the Negro community?" "Net affect" is computed by subtracting the "unfair" proportion from "fair." The *N* for each row is 586. Most of the "other" responses are "don't know"; "no answer," and "other" contribute smaller amounts.

was more often thought unfair than fair. This was a harsh indictment of the major community newspapers. By comparison, black respondents were considerably more favorable to most other white-dominated institutions and white politicians (Sears 1969), and much more positive to the two local Negro newspapers and a local radio station catering primarily to a black audience, as shown in table 3. In these cases, criticism was rare.

POST-RIOT VISIBILITY

The black community emerged from the violence interpreting the riot as an attempt to call attention to, and to redress, a series of legitimate grievances. Police brutality, merchant exploitation, racial discrimination, poor service in public agencies, deteriorating housing—all were perceived as longstanding ills that whites had been able to ignore until the riot forcefully made them take notice. The growth and development of this ideology about the riot, and the pivotal role of attention-seeking in it, have been examined in detail elsewhere (Tomlinson 1968; Sears and Tomlinson 1968; Sears and McConahay 1970, pp. 413-79). Here we wish to examine whether or not whites responded as the blacks' riot ideology hoped they would. That is, had the difficult social conditions existing in the Los Angeles ghetto suddenly and forcefully been brought to their attention? Was there an attentive and sympathetic response to the riot among whites? And did they emerge from the disaster with the resolve to try to redress the legitimate grievances of the black population?

Amount of Press Coverage

Press attention, at least, apparently did *not* increase after the riot, surprisingly enough. The *T*-tests comparing the pre-riot 1964 and 1965 papers with the post-riot papers from 1965 through 1968 yielded no significant differences for either the *Times* or the *Herald-Examiner* on any of the four measures used above—the percentage of news space devoted to Negroes, the number of news items referring to Negroes per page, or either of these corrected for the percentage of Negroes in the city of Los Angeles.

Instead, post-riot newspaper coverage, like pre-riot coverage, continued well below the proportion of blacks in the population, as shown in figures 1-4. In fact, coverage was significantly below the population proportion at all but two points; when confidence intervals are set up around the census proportion of blacks in Los Angeles for every year from 1964 to 1968, black coverage in all but the 1965 post-riot *Times* and the 1967 *Herald-Examiner* was significantly ($P < .05$) below the population proportion of Negroes. Thus, even after the riot, there was little evidence

that the Negro population was receiving its "fair share" of press attention, despite the near-crisis nature of race relations.

Content of Press Coverage

The content of post-riot press coverage similarly reflected no greater sympathetic attention to black grievances from whites. As shown in table 1, attention to civil rights—whether positive or negative—remained about the same. Post-riot coverage did include considerably more attention to interracial violence, of course, mainly due to discussions of the riot. Combined with slight increases in other unfavorable categories (Antisocial, Sensational, and Negative Steps in Civil Rights), unfavorable references rose from 15 percent before the riot to 34 percent afterward. Since there was actually a decrease in the several favorable categories (Entertainment, Positive Steps in Civil Rights, Everyday Life), the net outcome of the riot was a significant increase in unfavorable content ($X^2 = 4.02$, 1 df, $P < .05$). Again these results are very similar for the two newspapers, as shown in table 2. Thus, the press reaction to the riot fulfilled neither of the hopeful expectations of the black community—attention did not increase, and sympathy actually decreased.

Public Response of the White Community

The white community as a whole also failed to respond attentively and sympathetically. The public statements of local white civic and government officials immediately blamed the violence upon a rich variety of deviant, hostile, and pathetic types—especially civil rights agitators, criminals, and recent migrants from the South. The mayor wrote police brutality charges off to "Communists, dupes, and demagogues." The police chief, William Parker, pictured the rioting as "the result of a rebellion of a gang of Negro hoodlums who had no real purpose except rebellion and destruction" and blamed "malcontents who had dragged ghosts here with reports about Bogalusa and Americus, which is not the situation here."¹¹

This angry refusal to view the Negroes' problems sympathetically was also dominant in white public opinion at the "grass roots" level. Although both whites (79 percent) and blacks (84 percent) agreed that the riot made whites more aware of Negro problems, only 32 percent of the whites felt it made them more sympathetic to those problems. A majority of blacks (51 percent), on the other hand, expected whites to be more

¹¹ For a detailed treatment of the responses of white and black leaders on the local, state, and national level, as well as a more complete account of the causes and effects of the rioting, see Sears and McConahay (*The Politics of Violence* [Boston: Houghton Mifflin, forthcoming]).

sympathetic. Enormous differences separated the races with regard to perceptions of the riot's effects upon race relations. Among whites, there was a strong consensus that the riot increased the gap between the races (71 percent) and that it hurt the Negro's cause (75 percent). Vastly fewer blacks expected relations to deteriorate (23 percent and 24 percent, respectively). These data are discussed elsewhere more completely by Morris and Jeffries (1970, pp. 480-601) and Sears and Tomlinson (1968).

Thus, whites and blacks were agreed only in expecting greater white awareness of Negro problems. As we have seen, however, it appears that this was not fulfilled in great measure. While press coverage is an indirect measure of white awareness of, and attention to Negro problems, it does suggest that the immediate close attention to the black community stimulated by the actual events of the riot was short-lived, and that subsequently press coverage of the black community returned to "normal." The white community appears to have been able to sweep the problems of the large black minority back under the rug.

CURRENT VISIBILITY

How does the situation now stand? Has press coverage of Negro news increased reliably since 1893? Figures 1 and 2 indeed show increases both in space devoted to Negroes and in the number of news items concerned with them. In fact, the increase (i.e., the linear component of the analysis of variance) is significant for the space index for both the *Times* ($F = 103.65$, 1/118 df, $P < .001$) and the *Herald-Examiner* ($F = 12.40$, 1/32 df, $P < .005$), and also for the number of news items per page in each paper ($F = 59.89$, 1/118 df, $P < .001$ and $F = 6.53$, 1/51 df, $P < .025$, respectively). This would seem to reflect a genuine reduction in the black man's invisibility in this century.

However, this increase in press attention has, at best, merely paralleled the local Negro population growth; it does not represent more balanced coverage of the races. Figure 3 shows that blacks consistently have received only about 20 percent of the news space that would be expected from the size of the local black population. It also shows that the increase in press coverage from 1893 to 1968 merely compensated for the increase in the size of the local black community, rather than revealing any greater attention to the black community for its own sake. An analysis of variance on the news space index, corrected for the proportion of Negroes in Los Angeles, yielded no significant increase with time (i.e., no significant linear trend) in either newspaper. Applying the same analysis to our other index—the number of news items concerning Negroes—reveals a significant *decrease* in press attention to Negroes since 1893 in both newspapers, as shown in figure 3 (*Times*: $F = 22.15$, 1/118 df,

$P < .001$; *Herald-Examiner*: $F = 47.13$, $1/51$ df, $P < .001$). The two newspapers again parallel each other on each index, adding substantial credibility to these findings.

Despite this continued low level of attention, however, the content of press references to blacks has changed dramatically. The era between the world wars was the high-water mark of relatively stable and conflict-free relegation of Negroes to a stereotyped lower-caste position. Highly restrictive Jim Crow practices were the unchallenged rule in the South, and collective civil rights efforts were rare. Thus, the content of Negro press coverage tended to support the status quo, rarely presenting efforts to change it.

This is no longer true. Most notably, the proportion of news items depicting Negroes in stereotyped lower-caste roles has dropped dramatically. From 1920 to 1939, a majority (52 percent) of Negro items fell in the Antisocial, Sensational, and Entertainment categories. After the riot, only 17 percent did, as shown in table 1.¹² In contrast, items describing conflicts over the Negro's lower-caste position have become dominant. Negroes' grievances with their status, and efforts to redress them, categorized as "Civil Rights" items, almost tripled from the interwar to post-riot periods, from 17 percent to 46 percent. Inclusion of incidents of interracial violence—the most extreme form of racial conflict—makes the increase even more dramatic: from 18 percent to 65 percent.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The main findings of the study were these:

1. The invisibility of blacks in Los Angeles was indicated by the rarity of whites' contact with blacks in their normal lives, and the low level of press coverage of blacks throughout the period sampled. Moreover, press coverage of blacks did not significantly increase from 1893 to 1968, relative to the growth of the black population in Los Angeles. The content of

¹² This drop in stereotyped reporting of Negroes has also been obtained in previous studies. Bryant (1935) found that almost all (84 percent) the Negro news in 1922 and 1932 Texas papers was of antisocial events, and Gist (1932) reports that 47 percent of the Negro space in seventeen major U. S. papers during the early 1930s was antisocial. Simpson (1936) found that sensational news, especially crime, constituted the majority of the Philadelphia Negro news from 1908 to 1932. The percentage of Negro crime news increased from 46 percent of the Negro news in the period 1908–18, to 53 percent in the 1920s, and decreased to 35 percent in the 1930s. He concluded, "The most common attitude in Philadelphia is one of indifference to Negroes unless a Negro commits an especially 'bad' crime or interferes in some way with the white man's peace of mind" (p. 118). Kassarian (1970) reports that, in ads presenting American Negroes, stereotyped menial depictions decreased sharply from 1946 to 1969. However, the main increases were in entertainment, sports, and high fashion models, with lesser increases in depictions of Negroes as white-collar workers and professionals.

the press coverage of blacks did change sharply, however, from emphasis on unflattering stereotypes to concentration on racial conflict.

2. Black invisibility had not been diminishing substantially before the Watts riot. Press coverage of blacks actually decreased from 1893 to 1965 relative to the number of Negroes in Los Angeles, except for the last few months before the riot.

3. Blacks tended to regard the riot as an effort to overcome invisibility, by attracting whites' sympathetic attention to their legitimate grievances. However, black visibility did not increase after the riot—at least not as measured by press coverage of the black population. And press content did not reveal a significant increase of emphasis on black grievances following the riot. The trend set in motion in the 1950s—to increase the coverage of racial conflict—continued, but the press tended to reflect the interpretation of the riot expressed by white public officials and white public opinion. Local officials responded to the riot primarily as a threat to the public safety, rather than as a symptom of serious problems demanding attention. The white public felt the riot would result in less sympathetic treatment of the black community.

The most compelling single finding of the content analysis is that press coverage of blacks has been so slight throughout the entire twentieth century. The Kerner Commission's observation that "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal" (*Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* [1968, p. 1]) perhaps somewhat overdramatizes the more sobering truth, that black and white America have *always* been separate and that nothing about that is really changing at all. The black ghettos have unswervingly insulated whites from physical and social contact with blacks, and the preoccupation of the white press with white news has prevented whites from gaining even symbolic and vicarious knowledge of blacks. Moreover, the rise in civil rights litigation, in Negro political activism, in black militancy, and even the riots have not increased per capita press coverage of blacks in Los Angeles. If anything, the gap is widening between the size of the black population and the attention given it by whites.

There are a number of important implications of this continuing pattern of black invisibility, particularly considering content changes in the "image" of the black population presented to whites. Four seem particularly important to us.

First, black invisibility has badly confused whites' understanding of racism. Everyone understands individual acts of bigotry and legalized segregation, as traditionally practiced in the south, and almost all northern whites oppose them quite comfortably (Sears and Kinder 1970; Sheatsley 1966). Yet this sins-of-commission model only confuses whites' understanding of northern sins-of-omission. Northern whites cannot see

"white racism" in their own attitudes and behavior, because for the most part their actions do not even remotely resemble their image of the crude red-neck racism of the overt southern bigot. Thus, they simply reject the notion that they contribute to racism (e.g., one recent poll found that only 31 percent of a national white sample agreed with the Kerner Commission in blaming "white racism" for racial conflicts [CBS News 1968]).

Racial oppression now comes more often from the indifference and inattention of apparently polite and well-meaning whites than from naked bigotry. Blacks as persons, and their grievances, are too easily put out of mind. Preoccupied with their own interests, even the most liberal of whites have been easily distracted from the faint signals emanating from the isolated ghetto.

Similarly, the press has not been anti-black in recent times as much as it has been more concerned with whites. It is an institution controlled by white society for the convenience and needs of whites, and thus often to the exclusion of blacks. By helping to perpetuate black invisibility, however, it both embodies institutional racism and fails to combat the white public's ignorance about it (Carmichael and Hamilton 1967).

A second implication is more ominous. There is some suggestive evidence that black invisibility has actually facilitated the exploitation of black people by whites. Experimental studies have consistently shown that the tendency to harm, exploit, or take advantage of others is reduced by greater information about them, or by greater physical and psychological proximity to them (Lewicki 1969; Milgram 1965, pp. 243-62). Even when a subject perceives the target person as very different from himself (as is obviously the case for most white people viewing blacks in our society), greater knowledge about the target person reduces exploitation of him (Lewicki 1969). Certainly, retribution against villains can be openly countenanced by all. Beyond that, it may be that inhumanity depends upon the invisibility of the victim.

Third, there has been much speculation about improvements in blacks' self-images arising from the riots. And, indeed, the riots did represent a level of collective retaliation against an oppressive social system that was unparalleled in the history of the American Negro. Yet much earlier improvements in the image of the black man are unmistakable in the changes in press coverage of the Negro through this century. Around the turn of the century, the Negro was pictured as impulsively and ineffectually criminal, and when not criminal, given to great silliness and bizarre habits. Between the wars, the Negro as an entertainer became more prominent, but still not in high-status roles. Press coverage of black entertainers mainly promoted uncomplimentary stereotypes of Negroes acting as tap dancers or in such roles as Rochester and Amos and Andy.

After World War II, however, the social activist began to receive much increased attention.

One can speculate that this change, which long antedated either the riots or the rise of black militancy as it is known today, began the difficult process of changing the public image of the black man among both whites and blacks. This may be one reason why blacks in their thirties and forties today differ surprisingly little in militancy and politicization from their younger brethren (Campbell and Schuman 1968, pp. 1-67; Sears 1969; Sears and McConahay 1970, pp. 413-79). Perhaps the re-socialization of the previously apolitical black population to more activist norms has been proceeding longer than commonly recognized. Improvements in "black identity" today may reflect the modest publicity about the integrationist labors of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the riots and militancy of the 1960s.

However, this change in media content bears with it the potential for badly frightening a white population that is quite naïve and inexperienced about blacks (Sears and Kinder 1970). Press attention to the black community today is primarily devoted to its conflicts with the broader society, with its unhappiness with the status quo, and with its efforts to overturn it. Thus, in earlier days whites must have rested more comfortably with their ignorance of the black world, assuming that blacks really preferred the status quo. Today the conflict is much more apparent, even if the white majority continues to try to protect itself from it by indifference and inattention. And the violence of the riots has served as the justification for further inattention and inaction, and for added repression. Indeed, the riots gave body to whites' fears of a rebellious black population, just as Negro crime had earlier in the century. There are many signs that black invisibility is once again becoming a serious problem, now that the mass riots seem to be receding into the past. Racial isolation is not markedly decreasing. Our data indicate that the increased visibility in media news coverage induced by the riots was only a temporary phenomenon. Further, increased attention to ecology, women, and other new causes, however legitimate, helps to again shunt the blacks into the back pages of newspapers and the minds of white America. With the reemergence of black invisibility as a serious and chronic problem in American race relations, blacks' needs, and even their demands, may again be heard only indistinctly throughout most of white America.

Thus, finally, what changes in press coverage might help race relations? The obvious suggestion is that simply increasing coverage would help overcome black invisibility, and thus improve race relations. However, this would not necessarily have the desired result in itself. Increases in the volume of press coverage must also be accompanied with a change

in its content. As we have seen, the considerable coverage of racial news around the turn of the century did not have a leavening effect upon race relations, because of its stereotypic nature. A similar problem exists today with "formula reporting." Hodding Carter (1968, pp. 38-41) has described the formulas used to report events concerning blacks in the 1950s, such as the cruel Southern sheriff mistreating the poor Negro, and currently, as the black militants and nationwide conspiracies disrupting the peace of civilized society. Anything that happens with Negroes tends to be reported in these terms; increased coverage of this sort would obviously only exacerbate whites' already great racial anxieties. The problem is that such material is all that is currently considered "newsworthy." It is evident that such formula reporting would have to be abandoned in favor of more representative treatment of blacks before increased coverage could help reduce racism, or even reduce institutionalized racism in the communications industry.¹³

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¹³ We have not necessarily assumed that the press is "racist"—in the sense that it deliberately suppresses news about blacks—or that the press is any more responsible for black invisibility than the rest of the white population. Indeed, the lack of coverage of blacks could simply be due to the lack of "newsworthy" black news. As David Seidman has pointed out to us, powerless people in general (black or white) are conventionally regarded as not very "newsworthy," but that should not itself be taken as an indication of a racial bias in the press. What is needed, perhaps, is an examination of the class bias in the press as well as the racial bias. In any event, our main interest here has been in documenting the fact and extent of black invisibility, and in examining its consequences, rather than in trying to determine its causes.

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Skin Color, Status, and Mate Selection¹

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Data from a sample of 350 Negro married couples in Washington, D.C., are analyzed to examine the changing relationship between status attributes, mate selection, and skin color, by comparison of duration-of-marriage cohorts. We find that the traditional status advantage of light-skinned women holds for all cohorts, with little indication of change. For men, on the other hand, darker-skinned men experienced better status and mate-selection opportunities in more recent cohorts than in earlier ones. The higher job-mobility orientation of dark-skinned men evidently explains their improved mobility. These findings suggest a change in the evaluation of differential skin color for men within the Negro community.

James Baldwin (1955, p. 68) says, "It is part of the price the Negro pays for his position in that society that . . . he is almost always acting." This implies that playing the role of "Negro" requires the Negro to behave in ways that are inconsistent with his concept of himself, as others have observed. Yet if there were no effects of the role one plays upon the self-concept, American Negroes would not bear the "mark of oppression," and sociologists would have long since lost interest in role theory. But Pettigrew (1967), after acknowledging Baldwin's point, remarks:

Both Whites and Negroes confuse their own roles as being an essential part of themselves. . . . A large body of psychological research convincingly demonstrates the power of role-playing to change deeply-held attitudes, values, and even conceptions of self. Moreover, these remarkable changes have been rendered by temporary role adoptions of an exceedingly trivial nature when compared to the life-long role of "Negro." Imagine, then, the depth of the effects of having to play a role which has such vast personal and social significance that it influences virtually all aspects of daily living. Indeed, the resulting confusion of self-identity and lowering of self-esteem are two of the most serious "marks of oppression" upon Negro American personality. [Pp. 151-52]

Whether one approaches the problem from role theory with Pettigrew or from a psychodynamic perspective with Kardiner and Ovesey (1951, pp. 303-4), constant playing of the Negro role has produced a damaged self-concept, one of low self-esteem and self-contempt.

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Skin Color and Mate Selection

Among the most clear-cut aspects of this process is the well-documented negative evaluation of skin pigmentation by Negroes. Several decades of research have demonstrated that Negroes themselves have defined dark skin as undesirable and light skin as desirable. This scale of values has formed the basis for judging the attractiveness of others as well as a determinant of self-esteem (Dollard 1957; Drake and Cayton 1962; Kardiner and Ovesey 1964; Warner, Junker, and Adams 1941). Case history material on the Negro family contains numerous observations of children with light skin receiving preferential treatment from their own parents (Dollard 1957; Drake and Cayton 1962; Kardiner and Ovesey 1964; Warner et al. 1941). Negro periodicals have long contained advertisements for skin lighteners. Kardiner and Ovesey (1951, p. 253) report the pathetic case of a mother who used a daily bleach bath on her dark-skinned child. The presence of skin color attitudes can be observed in Negro children as young as four years old (Asher and Allen 1969; Clark 1963; Clark and Clark 1947; Goodman 1964; Landreth and Johnson 1953; Morland 1958; Mussen 1953; Stevenson and Stewart 1958; Trager and Yarrow 1952). Herndon (1969) remarks how these evaluations dominate interaction among the Negro high school children he observed in the 1950s:

Every common derisive word, all the abusive nicknames, nouns, and adjectives, all the big-lip, liver-lips, burr-heads, fuzzy-heads, kinky-haired, nappy-headed, big-leg high-ass, apes, monkeys, and too-blacks were dragged out daily and heaped on each other casually or furiously, continually and fanatically. The focal point of all this was the head and color of skin, and the point was ugliness. Nose, lips, hair, all counted, but nothing else could produce the real anger of a kid being called black. [P. 69]

All studies are consistent in finding that, in comparison with their blacker brothers, light-skinned Negroes are more likely to be in higher socioeconomic strata, are more likely to experience status advancement, and are preferred as marriage partners (Davis, Gardner, and Gardner 1965; Dollard 1957; Drake and Cayton 1962; Edwards 1959; Frazier 1940; Frazier 1966; Freeman et al. 1966; Warner et al. 1941).

The importance of skin color as a status determinant has been declining, according to the nearly unanimous opinion of recent observers (Davis et al. 1965; Drake and Cayton 1962; Frazier 1940; Glenn 1963). To our knowledge, no one has published any systematic evidence of this decline, and in one recent paper Freeman et al. (1966) concluded that marriage patterns by skin color have not changed recently. Recent writers have offered the material for explanation: during the period of racial activism, Negroes have rejected the old role of "Negro" and are inventing a new role for themselves which departs radically from the acceptance of inferiority. With the new role comes a new self-concept.

The entire movement for the serious study of "black culture," and the glorification of social and biological characteristics peculiar to Negroes (Lincoln 1961), can be seen as an explicit fashioning of a new self-concept consistent with the new behavior.

The suggestions of decline in importance of skin color are not a phenomenon of the late sixties. Edwards (1959) reported over a decade ago that there were at that time observable changes in skin color distributions between older and younger Negro professionals. As early as 1963, at a conference to study the Negro self-concept, Negro observers were suggesting that research on the influence of color on personality completed twenty or more years before "might be quite wrong in the context of today's sit-ins, marches, wake-ins, picketings, and so forth" (Kvaraceus et al. 1965, p. 43). One Negro leader was quoted at that time as saying, "It is interesting to note that all the major leaders among Negroes today tend to be quite Negroid in appearance. In fact, my black skin has a great value among Negroes today. I do remember a time when being as black as I am did not have much value, but today it is different" (Kvaraceus et al. 1965, p. 43). If this observer is typical, then black really is beautiful, and rather than looking for a disappearance of the relationship between skin color and status, we might well look for a *reversal* of the relationship. Others at that conference were not so sanguine about the future, concluding that "unfortunately it hardly seems possible that a reversal of the value system will occur for many, and certainly not for a long time to come" (Kvaraceus et al. 1965, p. 16).

The present paper presents data to examine the trend of relationships between skin color, status attributes, and mate selection. This examination has been guided by the conservative hypothesis that the older relationship has been declining.² The basic structure of our argument is that the Negro struggle to escape from inferior status is accompanied by a change in the evaluation of differential skin color within the Negro community, which will change self-concepts and social judgments and eventually make skin color irrelevant to status placement and mate selection.

METHOD

From the birth certificates of the District of Columbia for the year beginning July 1, 1965, a sample stratified on the basis of social class as

² It would be technically inaccurate to state that we were testing this hypothesis at the outset of our study. The data were originally gathered for another purpose. Furthermore, we began this analysis with a different hypothesis in mind, specifically, that status and skin color are related, and therefore we were ignoring the time element. However, when finding distributions which lacked linearity, we began looking at the time element to see if it would clarify the relationships. The data we present here represent the product of the process designed to provide clarity and focus to our earlier analyses.

indicated by the father's occupation was drawn, and interviews with 1,700 of the mothers were obtained. From these interviews a sample stratified on the basis of social class and social mobility was drawn, and interviews were completed with 350 of the husbands. The data reported here are for the couples in which complete information was obtained from both spouses.

Negro females interviewed the wives, and Negro males interviewed the husbands a month or more later. Skin color of the respondent was rated by the interviewer on a five-point scale ranging from "very light" to "black." Skin color was judged from the face; no color chart was provided. We assume that a genetically accurate estimate was unnecessary since the operation of skin color as a determinant of life chances is presumably through its perception in social situations, and this method most accurately approximates the perception of skin color in the social setting.³ Husbands' and fathers' occupations were coded on a seven-position Warner-type scale (Warner, Meeker, and Eells 1949, pp. 136-38, 140-41) and, for some analyses, collapsed into middle and lower class. For some analyses a person is considered socially mobile if his present class differs from that of his household head when the respondent was age ten to fourteen. For other analyses, mobility was arranged on a thirteen-point scale, ranging from one (six positions downward) through seven (no change) to thirteen (six positions upward), using the seven-position occupational placement.

We have assumed that educational, occupational, and mate-selection decisions are made at approximately the same age for different age cohorts. Since mate selection and status are conceptually linked for females, we have selected comparisons of successive marriage cohorts as the only available and uniformly applicable reflection of changes over time. We established four years-of-marriage categories for some analyses: one to two, three to five, six to eight, and nine or more;⁴ this yielded a total of about 65 cases in both the first and third categories, and 105 in each of the other categories. For some analyses we were required to collapse the data into categories representing less than six and six or more years of marriage. The earlier married groups were mostly in their thirties (mean age was thirty-five for men, thirty-one for women). They were of

³ To assess reliability, a second interview was conducted with a random sample of forty-six of the female respondents. The first and second interviews were always conducted by different interviewers. The product-moment correlation coefficient between skin color ratings made during the two interviews was .78, $p < .001$.

⁴ We do not have data on ages for occupational and educational decisions; but we do know that the mean age at marriage is the same for those married less than six years (20.58 for women, 24.75 for men) and those married six years or more (20.24 for women, 24.52 for men). In the total sample the correlation between age and duration of marriage was .68 for men, .77 for women.

high school age during the 1940s and early 1950s. The more recently married groups were mostly in their twenties (mean age was twenty-eight for men, twenty-four for women), of high school age during the big days of the civil rights movement in the 1950s. The group married earlier was already adult when these events occurred; half were married by 1955. One might expect that heightened racial consciousness would have influenced the recently married group in time to have an effect on educational, occupational, and mate-selection decisions, while the earlier married group may have been exposed to these influences too late for it to have had an impact on many status-relevant decisions. The fact remains, however, that we are testing longitudinal hypotheses from data which are cross-sectional.

Individual cases in the sample were weighted with the reciprocals of the sampling fractions in order to compensate for the biases introduced by unequal sampling ratios.

This study has several limitations which must be recognized when viewing the findings. First, it includes people in only one city who are parents of a recent birth event and married and living together. It thus omits those who are unmarried or in broken marriages, and overrepresents the fertile. Second, the completion rate was about two out of three.⁵ Third, in order to get a sufficient number of middle-class respondents, and upwardly and downwardly mobile respondents, widely disparate sampling rates had to be used. This introduces problems in estimating variance for significance tests, for it is clear that when a parameter calculation contains some cases which are entered a number of times, the variance is less than had that many cases actually been interviewed and the data for each entered.⁶ Solutions for this problem have not been published. Many other researchers have either not recognized the problem or ignored it. Finally, as mentioned above, a longi-

⁵ To see if the total female sample (all 1,700 women interviewed) was biased with respect to certain variables, we compared the interviewed cases with the entire population on ten variables included on the vital certificates: sex of baby, gestation, month of delivery, census tract of residence, age of mother, legitimacy status, number of children, number of children born alive, total number of pregnancies, and birth weight. There were no substantial differences between the samples and the population for any of these comparisons. We also prepared correlation matrices relating each of the ten variables with each other within the interviewed samples and the total population. The values obtained for the interviewed cases and the population were similar. We concluded that the larger sample is representative of the total population with respect to these ten variables. This does not mean, however, that this is true for the smaller number of women used in this analysis, their husbands, or for other variables.

⁶ This inflates significance tests by a small but unknown amount. We know our estimates of other parameters are unbiased, but our probability of finding significant differences is spuriously increased. Inflation also increases the probability of achieving statistical significance by virtue of increase in numbers. To guard against achieving significance due to this, the actual number of cases interviewed rather than the weighted totals were entered into the calculation of tests of significance.

tudinal design would have been desirable for testing the hypothesis, and the extent to which the cohort analysis actually represents changes over time is dependent upon the assumptions which we made.

FINDINGS FOR MEN

Since examination of contingency tables revealed that not all of our relationships were linear, we calculated η 's on the relationships between male skin color and several status variables using four marital duration categories. Table 1 presents the η values. (Negative signs mean dark skin is a disadvantage.) Examination of the η values indicates that for each variable for each subsequent marital duration category there is a shift away from dark skin being disadvantaged, until in the shortest duration category the dark-skinned men are at an advantage. For the sixteen η values

TABLE 1
 η VALUES FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DARKNESS OF MALE
SKIN COLOR AND SELECTED STATUS VARIABLES,
BY YEARS OF MARRIAGE

Years Married	Husband Education	Wife Education	Wife Skin Color	Husband Mobility
1-2.....	+ .55	+ .26	.27	+ .61
3-5.....	+ .54	+ .54	.35	+ .45
6-8.....	.66	+ .64	-.39	+ .48
9+.....	-.86	-.78	-.55	-.66

NOTE.—Signs have been placed on the η values to indicate direction of the relationship in those instances where it was obvious from inspection of the contingency tables.

shown, the only exception to this statement is for the relationship between darkness of male skin color and skin color of spouses.⁷ We will examine this special case in the last section.

We next examined the relationship between skin color and four status variables by contingency table analysis, this time introducing husband's occupation and family income. Table 2 presents the contingency coefficients, with negative signs indicating dark skin at a disadvantage. In every case, the two marital duration groups show opposite signs, are significantly different for the two time periods, and show dark-skinned men at an advantage in the recently married group.⁸

⁷ We also performed standard Pearsonian correlation analysis of the relationships shown in table 1. For simplicity we have omitted tables showing these data, but they show exactly the same patterns as table 1.

⁸ Because of our surprise at the reversal of the status relationship for men, and because skin color is related to age in the sample (more of the darker skinned are older), we examined the data using partial correlation. Controlling for age, for those married six or more years, darkness of skin color is negatively but not significantly related to mobility ($r_{12.3} = +.16$).

What accounts for the greater likelihood of the recently married dark-skinned men to be upwardly mobile? Are they now the recipients of positive discriminatory benefits? Has black pride made the darker-skinned men more ambitious? The interview schedule included a measure which bears on the last question: job-mobility orientation, or the extent to which the man was willing to sacrifice health, friends, family, and familiar surroundings to get a better job.⁹ The data in table 3 show that

TABLE 2
CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN DARKNESS OF MALE SKIN
COLOR AND STATUS

Years Married	Husband Education	Wife Education	Husband Occupation	Family Income
1-5093	+ .225*	+ .166	+ .144
6+ . . .	-.279*	-.116	-.157	-.312*

NOTE.—The number of cases on which the values are calculated ranges from 162 to 175. Skin color is collapsed into three categories: light (very light plus light), medium, and dark (dark plus black). Signs have been placed on the coefficients to indicate direction of the relationship in the instances where it was obvious from inspection of the contingency tables.

* χ^2 significant at $p < .05$.

TABLE 3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MALE SKIN COLOR
AND JOB MOBILITY ORIENTATION

MOBILITY ORIENTATION	SKIN COLOR*							
	Very Light		Light		Medium		Dark Plus Black	
	N ^a	% ^b	N	%	N	%	N	%
High	5	10.3	30	40.0	84	50.5	51	73.8
Medium	6	47.8	43	38.3	78	36.7	23	24.5
Low	2	41.9	8	21.7	13	12.8	6	1.7
Total	13	100.0	81	100.0	175	100.0	80	100.0

^a Number of cases interviewed.

^b Percentages are derived from the inflated sample.

* $\chi^2 = 34.81$, $p < .001$. The Very Light and Light categories were collapsed for calculating χ^2 .

⁹ The questions: "In order to get ahead, how much would it matter to you (1) if you had to take a job that might hurt your health, (2) if you had to take a job that caused you to be away from home overnight a lot, (3) if you had to move away from your friends, (4) if you had to move away from your relatives?" Responses were "would matter a lot," "would matter a little," and "wouldn't matter at all," scored 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The mean of the four scores was obtained for each respondent. The distribution of the means was divided at 1.5 and 2.0 to form three categories: low, medium, and high job-mobility orientation.

the darkest-skinned men are oriented toward making sacrifices to advance, with each progressively lighter-skin group less strongly oriented. For men married less than six years, the zero-order correlation between skin color and mobility is .17 ($p < .05$), but the partial correlation adjusted for mobility orientation is only .11 (N.S.). The minimal contribution of skin color to mobility when controlling for orientation is more obvious in table 4, the summary of analysis of variance for men married most recently. In a regression of mobility orientation on mobility, the added variance explained by including skin color in the model is negligible. Adding mobility orientation to a regression of skin color with mobility explains twice as much variation as skin color alone. From this analysis, we conclude that skin color makes a significant contribution to

TABLE 4

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: MALE SKIN COLOR AND MOBILITY ORIENTATION (INDEPENDENT VARIABLES) WITH INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY (DEPENDENT VARIABLE), FOR MEN MARRIED LESS THAN SIX YEARS

	df	SS	MS	F
Explained:.....	2	1,367.57	683.78	8.07**
By mobility orientation alone	1	1,198.18
By adding skin color.....	1	169.39	169.39	2.00
By skin color alone.....	1	448.19
By adding mobility orientation.....	1	919.38	919.38	10.85*
Unexplained.....	168	14,236.30	84.74	...
Total.....	170	15,603.87

* $p < .01$.

** $p < .001$.

mobility only through increasing mobility orientation. We reason that the mobility experience of recently married men with dark skins is due to the impact of increased racial pride upon their orientation toward achieving occupational mobility.

It is of interest to note that among men married six or more years, those with dark skins have relatively high mobility orientation ($r = .25$, $p < .01$), but they are not more likely than those with lighter skins to have experienced upward mobility ($r = .00$). The lack of a relationship between skin color and mobility in the presence of a relationship between skin color and mobility orientation suggests that racial pride also increased the mobility orientation of these men, but since status-relevant decisions were made prior to the heightening of racial pride, mobility orientation was not translated into mobility.¹⁰

¹⁰ For those who may find the contingency relationship of skin color to mobility orientation too strong to be believed, and suspect relationships between it and other

An alternative explanation for our findings is based on the supposition that black-skinned Negroes have always known that they would have to work harder and sacrifice to get ahead. Perhaps they even brought up their dark-skinned sons to be more work oriented. During the recent period, more job opportunities have opened up for Negroes generally. When this occurred, it was the blackest who were already equipped with the psychological orientation which allowed them to move in on the new opportunities. This interpretation is in no way inconsistent with our data, and on that account it must be considered seriously. From any of the published materials relating skin color to personality, however, it is hard to see how one would predict that, even when "nothing has happened" on the race front, the blackest men would be the most ambitious,

TABLE 5
 η VALUES FOR RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DARKNESS OF
 FEMALE SKIN COLOR AND SELECTED STATUS
 VARIABLES, BY YEARS OF MARRIAGE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE (YEARS MARRIED)	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE (WIFE'S SKIN COLOR)		
	Husband Education	Wife Education	Husband Mobility
1-2.....	-.53	-.47	-.53
3-5.....	-.43	-.47	-.52
6-8.....	-.77	-.55	-.35
9+.....	-.73	-.69	-.57

since there is unmistakable evidence of their poor chances for success. Until more evidence is available or until a more convincing theoretical support can be found for this argument, we prefer our first explanation.

FINDINGS FOR WOMEN

Analysis of the relationship between skin color of the wives and their status characteristics shows an entirely different pattern from that of the men. Table 5 presents η 's between skin color and selected status characteristics for females by duration of marriage. (Negative signs mean dark is disadvantaged.) In the group married longest, the relationships look very much like those for men, with dark-skinned women suffering status disadvantage. But whereas in each subsequent male cohort the dark-skinned fared better, actually being at an advantage in the most recent cohort, between cohorts for the women the change is less dra-

variables, we offer the following additional selection of Pearsonian zero-order correlation coefficients between mobility orientation and selected other characteristics of all husbands: age, .05; education, -.07; present occupation, -.05; years married, -.04.

matic. Although there is a trend toward less educational disadvantage for self and spouse for the dark-skinned women in recent cohorts, the disadvantage in obtaining an upwardly mobile husband remains constant.¹¹ It appears from the data presented that skin-color evaluation may have changed slightly for women, removing some of the status disadvantage which dark-skinned women traditionally have experienced, but this disadvantage is still significant.

MATE SELECTION BY SKIN COLOR

A closer look at mate-selection patterns by skin color reveals the nature of the sex difference in the changed evaluation of skin color. We can examine the strength of the relationship by examining the η 's for the four

TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF SKIN COLOR OF WIFE BY SKIN COLOR OF HUSBAND
AND BY NUMBER OF YEARS MARRIED

SKIN COLOR OF HUSBAND	SKIN COLOR OF WIFE						Total (%)
	Light		Medium		Dark		
	N*	%†	N	%	N	%	
	Married Less Than Six Years						
Light.....	24	48.3	21	35.0	5	16.7	100.0
Medium...	18	12.5	53	71.8	15	15.7	100.0
Dark.....	16	40.4	15	40.7	5	18.9	100.0
Married Six or More Years							
Light.....	24	68.3	14	11.0	3	20.7	100.0
Medium...	34	16.1	33	55.2	20	28.7	100.0
Dark.....	10	19.6	19	49.5	12	30.9	100.0

NOTE.—Braces indicate percentages with statistically significant differences using z-test with $p < .01$.

* Number of cases interviewed.

† Percentages are derived from the inflated sample.

marriage cohorts in table 1. The decline in the relationship between skin color of spouses with each more recent marriage cohort is discernible. A contingency table analysis (table 6) compares two marriage duration groups. For the longer-married group, lights overselect lights and underselect mediums and darks, and this is symmetrical by sex. The most interesting difference in the recent cohort is the increased probability of dark men marrying light women. This points up the shift in status value of dark skin for men but not for women.

¹¹ A contingency table analysis and a Pearsonian correlation analysis (not shown) were also performed, with essentially identical results. It therefore appears extremely unlikely that the relationships shown in table 5 are a fortuitous accident of one type of analysis.

CONCLUSIONS

We have demonstrated that for this Negro, urban, married sample of recent parents, the relationship between skin color and status variables has not shown any important change in recent marriage cohorts of women, so that the traditional status advantage of light-skinned women has not significantly altered. For men in this sample, relationships between skin color and status attributes have shown a dramatic shift between recent marriage cohorts. Among those married since 1960, the blackest men fare better in status acquisition than those with lighter skin. The reverse is true for those married earlier. The dark-skinned men of whatever marital duration are far more likely to have high job-mobility orientation than light-skinned men. Furthermore, dark skin is only associated with status mobility through its relationship to high mobility orientation, and only for those married since 1960. For those with dark skin married earlier, job-mobility orientation appears only as a potential source of frustration. Our explanation of this finding is that racial pride makes the blackest the proudest and most motivated. If this motivation comes before a man has crossed all his status bridges, it can be converted into status assets.

In formulating our initial hypothesis we clearly underestimated the impact of the Negro struggle for racial equality on the skin-color attitudes and self-concepts of men in the Negro community surveyed, and therefore did not anticipate that a reversal of traditional findings could already have occurred. Our data strongly suggest that the trends in this new direction started at least as early as the late fifties and are therefore associated with the entire period of Negro activism. The current popular glorification of blackness and Negro characteristics generally appears in perspective as the continuation of this trend "on beyond zero," at least for men.

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Ability to Alter Skin Color: Some Implications for American Society¹

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Sociocultural implications of man's forthcoming capacity to alter the color of human skin are explored. Current progress in understanding the mechanisms for lightening and darkening skin is reviewed, and future developments are suggested. Probabilities of reaction and acceptance of an alteration technology are examined in terms of "operational characteristics" (e.g., cost, permanence and speed of change, method of application), contemporary social reactions to "passing," traditional ideals of Negro appearance, the rise of militant perspectives, and the interplay of white and Negro reactions to an alteration technology. Reactions among whites to the availability of mechanisms for darkening skin are analyzed with regard to aesthetics (fashion) and ideological "reverse passing."

In light of advances in dermatology it has become pertinent to consider what the social consequences would be of an ability to change one's apparent race. Specifically, since social reaction to race often is determined by outward, visible manifestations, the effects of a capacity to alter at will the color of one's skin must be seriously examined.² It must be clear at the onset that this does not mean the application of superficial external dressings or stains to the skin but to controlled alterations of its color. In view of the importance that so much of the world attaches to skin color, it is mystifying how it should have escaped widespread attention that crude techniques to change skin color already exist and that these techniques are probably improvable. This paper reviews briefly the work that has been done before discussing possible social implications.

DESCRIPTION OF BIOMEDICAL ADVANCES

The color of human skin can be changed by known methods. It can be made significantly lighter or darker, using different approaches. The alteration is very marked and quite dramatic: interested readers can

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Seventh International Conference on Cell Pigmentation, Seattle, September 1969, and the Southern Sociological Society meetings, Atlanta, April 1970. I am indebted to Norval Glenn and Aaron Lerner for their helpful suggestions. Naturally the analysis and the conclusions remain my responsibility.

² The writings of John Howard Griffin (1960), who disguised himself as a Negro, provide excellent clues to the psychological effects of one form of color change. Recently, Grace Halsell has emerged from a similar journey (Halsell 1969), managed

examine several color photographs in Stolar (1963), Lasker (1968), and—if frogs suffice—Lerner (1961).

Skin *darkeners*, excluding stains, are of two types: those that stimulate the creation of melanin pigment and those that stimulate the tanning process from exposure to ultraviolet radiation. The drug psoralen will cause light skin to tan deep brown—strikingly dark—upon exposure to the sun or ultraviolet light. John Griffin used psoralen treatment prior to his experiences as a “Negro.” Psoralen is sometimes used, in smaller doses, as a treatment for vitiligo, a skin disorder in which patches of skin turn dead-white, leaving the individual more or less disfigured by blotches of different color. Treatment of vitiligo has also played a role in the study of skin lightening.

A second technique for darkening skin uses a hormone known as MSH (for melanocyte-stimulating hormone) to stimulate the production of melanin in the skin.³ The operation of MSH is still imperfectly understood, but it is clearly effective. MSH has now been synthesized, and in mass production its price would probably be modest. It can be applied only through injection. Human subjects given large injections of MSH begin to darken within twenty-four hours; daily doses increase darkening until discontinued. The skin returns to its normal color three to five weeks after the last injection. The skin of Negroes shows a more marked and more rapid response to MSH than that of whites (Lerner 1961, p. 102). Psoralen and MSH constitute the known effective means of darkening human skin.⁴

Of greater social interest, however, in view of the state of the world's prejudices, are means of rendering human skin *lighter* in color.

Monobenzyll ether of hydroquinone (MBEH) lightens skin and, since the late 1940s, Dr. Robert Stolar has used it to treat Negro patients who have vitiligo. He has used MBEH to make some of his patients “white.”⁵

solely by changing skin color. Halsell never altered intonation or vocabulary. In addition to factual experience, the 1960s also witnessed considerable fictional treatment of pigment change.

³ All human skins except those of albinos contain melanin, a brown-to-black pigment which forms the basis of skin color. Color difference among races stems from the amount and spatial distribution of melanin in the skin.

⁴ In addition to these agents, estrogen is now recognized as a marginal skin darkener, which explains why some pregnant women become slightly darkened. Artificial use of estrogen also produces darkening.

⁵ The treatment has consisted of daily application of MBEH to the skin in ointment form. After four to eight weeks, skin depigmentation becomes apparent. Hair and eye color remain normal. In some patients, depigmentation occurs in skin areas distant from the sites of application. It has also been noted that depigmentation may continue even after treatment with MBEH is discontinued (Spencer 1961). No patient has failed to respond with at least some degree of depigmentation. In fifty-five patients (Lasker 1968), Stolar has continued his treatment to virtually total depigmentation,

On nonvitiliginous subjects, depigmentation of various degrees also occurred, but repigmentation occurred spontaneously if the ointment was not continually applied.⁶

There are obviously drawbacks that cast doubt on the efficacy of MBEH in mass usage, although its present limited application on vitiligo sufferers has evidently been a great success. But, of the drawbacks, some are clearly hypothetical, some can be eliminated, and some depend simply on individual conscientiousness.

It is impossible to predict future development in this or any field, but one can detect enthusiasm among research dermatologists.⁷ The skin darkener, MSH, now synthesized, is a naturally occurring hormone from the pituitary gland. There are, in fact, two natural varieties of MSH, both of which produce the darkening effect. Theoretically, there should also be one or more hormones that lighten human skin; that is, there should be at least one natural mechanism that works in each direction.⁸ Since persons with vitiligo are born with normal-appearing skin, there *must* be a natural mechanism to produce the white patches later. There may, in fact, be more than one such mechanism, in view of the possibility that there are several forms of vitiligo (Stolar 1963, p. 72). There is widespread feeling that the medical exploration of enpigmentation and depigmentation has only begun to bear fruit.

THE QUESTION OF MASS ACCEPTANCE

A new technology can be examined at three levels: Will it work? Will it be used, and by whom (mass acceptance)? What are the direct and indirect consequences—social, economic, political, psychological? The latter questions are, for the most part, both dependent upon and more uncertain than the earlier questions. The first question is already answered for both skin darkeners and lighteners (if MBEH is regarded as an acceptable technical solution). Some years ago, the question of mass acceptance might also have been readily answerable: “no” for the darkener and “yes” for the lightener. Today, the issues of mass acceptance are much more problematic. The question of usage is intricate and, at the

a process requiring from two to three years (Stolar 1963). Depigmentation proved permanent among those with vitiligo, although exposure to sunlight would sometimes produce brown spots on the areas exposed.

⁶ Throughout his experiments, Stolar kept close track of any adverse reactions to the treatment. Reactions were generally good, with little or no irritation reported. Those few that did experience irritation were able to continue on reduced dosage.

⁷ While presenting a paper, I benefited from informal conversations at the Seventh International Conference on Cell Pigmentation (Seattle, September 1969).

⁸ Personal communication from Aaron Lerner, Yale University School of Medicine, February 1, 1969.

same time, critical to the entire examination: indeed, by addressing this topic systematically, many of the social issues which may confront American society are brought out.

ACCEPTANCE OF SKIN LIGHTENERS

The rise of "black militancy," the search for black identity, and the stress placed upon Black Pride have had myriad implications over the past few years—from widespread rejection of the word "Negro" to promotion of the idea that "black is beautiful." That mass acceptance of anything so destructive of these new concepts as a truly effective skin lightener is unlikely might appear to be self-evident.⁹ But the analysis is not so straightforward; for example, *Ebony* and many other Negro-oriented magazines still carry advertisements for skin creams, hair straighteners, and similar blandishments.¹⁰ In spite of the marginal usefulness of these products, manufacturers are still making money or hope to do so.¹¹

As Cruse (1968) illustrates, the polar themes of integration and separatism have for years been a burning question among black intellectuals. Disputes about criteria of beauty—whether to be as close as possible to whites or as far removed as possible—have reflected parallel questioning on the part of the black masses. The question of mass acceptance of a skin lightener, therefore, defies easy solution.

The complexity of the question can be illustrated by examining the critical variables involved. Prominent among these are contemporary attitudes, prior to public announcement, toward the phenomenon of passing. The analogy between contemporary passing and the situation which would ensue under a technique to alter skin color may, in some respects, be a close one, so that these "pre-announcement" attitudes provide a useful first step in our inquiry.¹²

⁹ It is widely known that "black beauty" is promoted to eliminate a hopeless attempt to emulate white appearance standards. But Grier and Cobbs (1968) equally stress the psychological significance (and detrimental quality) of the hair-straightening process which all Negro women used to endure. Thus, in addition to obvious psychological attractions, the stress upon blackness and naturalness reaps less recognized benefits.

¹⁰ The ads which promise to lighten skin are not so blatant or direct as in earlier years; the reader must read between the lines: "Helps to clear away unnaturally dark areas." The recent issues of Negro magazines contain advertisements for both "natural" or "Afro" hairstyles and the more traditional ones. The word "natural" has become such a good word that even ads which obviously offer the traditional styles (pictorially) usually use it.

¹¹ *Ebony* itself, a mass-circulation magazine with some 3 million readers, far surpasses in volume of sales any other single medium of black expression. It is obvious that the old market is still alive. Lasker (1968) quotes a figure of \$14 million for sales in 1968 of marketed bleaches (relatively ineffective) and hair straighteners.

¹² Estimates of the volume of permanent passing in the United States vary from 25,000 to 300,000 per year. These are estimates only; the real figure is not only unknown but

Even a skin lightener of unparalleled effectiveness, however, would obviously not remove secondary racial characteristics, which might impede passing for certain individuals. Stolar's vitiligo patients are quite instructive, for they were just ordinary-looking Negroes whose only unique characteristic was their common affliction, and later their common depigmentation, while their secondary racial characteristics did not change. Stolar reports that "almost all the patients I worked with, even the ones with very Negroid features, pass easily, because there are whites walking around with comparable features" (Lasker 1968, p. 65). This was especially likely if the patients dyed their hair. One patient was able to move among her friends without being recognized, and each patient evidently changed social status; many obtained better jobs. And of course the experience of John Griffin and Grace Halsell shows that whites will be taken for blacks if they are black. Nevertheless, one must be cautious in extrapolating such findings, since increased public knowledge of the technique would presumably make a decided difference in the acceptability of those with marked Negroid features.

Assuming for the moment an analogy to traditional passing, it is important to note that passing itself is complex, and several forms may be distinguished. "There are various degrees of passing, accompanied by different degrees of estrangement from the Negro group and emotional identification with the white community" (Drake and Cayton 1962, p. 160). Many Negroes will occasionally pass just for convenience, to get better service; some develop the practice of passing just for amusement. Since it is at the whites' expense, this behavior apparently generates no feeling of guilt or disloyalty to the race. This may be true also of passing for economic necessity, in which case the individual gains better employment but returns to the black community for social contacts. Finally, a light-skinned Negro may turn his back on the race and cross the color line completely, associating only with whites. As Drake and Cayton put it, "For a Negro to pass socially means sociological death and rebirth" (1962, p. 163).

Whether or not other Negroes protect the identified passer may depend upon whether the acquaintance feels he is being slighted or whether he understands that the passing is for economic reasons. While passing for social reasons (for the company of whites) almost invariably arouses deep hostility, passing for economic reasons may be treated with understanding or at least acceptance.¹³

essentially unknowable, given the delicacy of the matter. For an excellent discussion, see Drake and Cayton (1962, pp. 159-73).

¹³ Parenthetically, it is significant that we know virtually nothing about the psychological effects of racial passing. It should also be noted that our information on passing in the United States has become dated.

Attitudes today are in flux due to the emergence of militant perspectives. The time of introduction would be a major factor because, especially among the younger blacks, the trend is running strongly toward acceptance of cultural pluralism.¹⁴ With only modest extrapolation of these trends, it seems clear that the later such an innovation is introduced, the greater the hostility to passing may be.¹⁵ There are numerous indications that attitudes are changing; cultural manifestations of Black Pride are becoming widely accepted.¹⁶ Just how successful this search by American Negroes for a new identity will be is crucial; it can provide a psychological anchor for the individual, notwithstanding the economic inducements of passing. If, on the other hand, passing affords only temporary respite, then the appearance of a true skin lightener should be received by at least inward rejoicing and a concomitant strain toward acceptance.¹⁷

Analysis of pre-announcement attitudes, instructive though it may be, is insufficient to forecast the degree of mass acceptance. Response to an innovation of this magnitude would be based not only on preexisting attitudes; the innovation would generate new attitudes in its own right, and the very announcement of such an epochal innovation would demand reconceptualization. Presumably, a fundamental reappraisal of racial questions would occur by black and white, militant and integrationist.¹⁸

¹⁴ Several recent studies have shown that, in spite of militant urging, a strong majority of the black community still supports structural assimilation (as opposed to, say, a black state). But the studies also show growing support for cultural pluralism (or cultural nationalism) with separateness in clothing, music, and concepts of beauty. (William J. Wilson presented a substitute paper on this topic: Session 65, 1969 ASA meetings.)

¹⁵ For further substantiation of recent attitude change in Negro college students, see Morland and Williams (1969, p. 110).

¹⁶ Along with other observers, Glenn (1963) concluded that the importance of skin color as a basis for status is diminishing; from data of a study published elsewhere in this issue of the *Journal*, Udry, Bauman, and Chase conclude that the traditional advantage of light-skinned Negro men in mate selection has declined, although no change is found for women.

¹⁷ Some doubts about the ultimate efficacy of Black Pride are raised by a limited study of Philadelphia black preschool children. For his undergraduate thesis at Princeton, James A. Floyd, Jr., ascertained the strength of parental beliefs in Black Pride and Black Power concepts. Using Morland's picture test, he examined racial awareness in their children ("Self-Concept Development in Black Children," 1969). He found the only significant relationship between parent beliefs and children's responses was: "the stronger the parent's support of 'Black Power,' 'Black Pride,' and the 'Black Revolution' in general, the more the child wants to be white." The study is reported in Morland (1969, p. 373).

¹⁸ A voluminous and sophisticated literature exists on the topics of attitude change and acceptance (diffusion) of innovations, both of which appear relevant to the question at hand. For an overview of the literature on the diffusion of innovations, see Katz, Levin, and Hamilton (1963) and Rogers (1962). For attitude-change theories, see Cohen (1964).

Preexisting attitudes cannot be ignored in the reformulation, but they will provide only one component of the emerging post-announcement orientation.

For post-announcement attitudes, the nature of the perfected technique itself, its strengths and drawbacks, would inevitably be significant. This refers not only to such evident factors as cost and availability, ease of application, or toxicity, although these have obvious implications for usage, but most clearly in those variables specific to the problem of skin color change: the rapidity of change from a single dose, the "naturalness" of appearance, the evenness of the change across body surfaces. Significantly, of the three existing techniques, only MSH comes out successfully on most of these dimensions. The lightener does not perform at all well.

The nature of white reactions should be of great significance. Indeed, the reaction among Negroes in America might depend to a considerable degree upon the reaction among American whites. This is paradoxical not only because of the strong thrust for black cultural independence; the reaction might perhaps be strongest by the militants who regard themselves as most independent of white demands. If white racists passed laws against color change in a last stand against "defilement," the black reaction, even by militants, might be extensive use as a measure of defiance. They would be mightily tempted to "sing the king's beard." At the same time, perceptive individuals would recognize that the technique precipitates a crisis for black identity.

Widespread popular adoption of skin lighteners would undoubtedly engender efforts to transfer prejudice to such secondary racial characteristics as lips, nostrils, and hair. Whites possessing one or more Negroid characteristics, however, would greet such attempts with rage.¹⁹ It is questionable whether such efforts to transfer prejudice would be entirely successful.

POPULAR ACCEPTANCE OF SKIN DARKENERS

As with skin lighteners, mass adoption of a skin darkener would raise both aesthetic and ideological issues. On the one hand, we have the long-standing paradox that it is considered aesthetically attractive for a person to be dark (or "tanned"), yet if the natural color is too dark the person encounters racial prejudice. The fashions of bodily aesthetics are wonderfully changeable; the question may be raised whether a drug

¹⁹ Many dark-skinned persons do not have these secondary features. Those that do could make use of the widespread availability of hair straighteners, hair dyes, and similar mechanisms, or, as John Griffin did, simply shave their hair and pretend to be bald, or wear a wig. The devices are legion, and they would be aided by powerful men who consider themselves truly "white" but happen to have nonwhite features.

which turns one dark under the bathing suit as well as elsewhere could become fashionable. The question is impossible to answer in its entirety, but certain conclusions are clear. To begin with, technology for turning light people dark is more effective than that for turning dark people light. It is clear that the technical characteristics of a skin darkener would affect popular acceptance, and it is interesting to note that on most criteria MSH comes out very well. Thinking, then, of a decade after introduction (perhaps conservative), the adoption of skin darkeners for beauty purposes is entirely possible.

That this estimate may be conservative is clear when the recent history of the "natural" hairstyle is examined. What started as a symbol of black militant protest was ultimately absorbed by many in the Negro middle class. The latest stage has been adoption of the "kink" by white fashion. In certain metropolitan centers, fashionable boutiques and even department stores have carried "natural" wigs for whites in all colors from black to blonde.²⁰ Fashion, then, which can lead white men and women to broil for hours under the sun, and which can steal the militants' "thing," may ultimately be capable of making darkness under the bathing suit fashionable.

The possibility of an ideological use of a skin darkener must be seriously considered within the near future. The idealism and direct-action orientation of youth today provide fertile ground for a movement of reverse passing. Analogies with the southern Freedom Riders come quickly to mind. The alienated segment today easily outnumbers previous cohorts. The desire to throw off parental bonds, the moral admonition to "do one's own thing," the enthusiasm to expose hypocrisy, even a desire for "voluntary servitude" in the black cause—all could be served by reverse passing. This suggests that the experiences of Griffin and Halsell may be repeated by hundreds, perhaps thousands, and that the use of skin darkeners for serious ideological purposes (or for psychiatric adjustment) must be considered as a possibility.

CONCLUSION

Although parts of the preceding analysis were of necessity highly speculative, certain points are unmistakably clear. Techniques to alter skin color exist, and efforts to improve them are both feasible and well advanced. The possibility definitely exists that the advent of such techniques on a production scale would lead to widespread usage by segments of the black and/or white populations. Such wide acceptance would undoubtedly produce massive alterations in racial attitudes within both races—

²⁰ *Women's Wear Daily*, often regarded as the trade's bible, has noted the trend and given its seal of approval (*Ebony*, January 1969, pp. 104-9).

alterations of such magnitude as to be of fundamental importance to American society.

The material presented has covered only selected implications for American society, omitting discussion of the possible use of a pigmentation technology by other racial groups—"Chicanos" or American Indians, for example. Its possible effects on interracial marriage have not been explored here, nor the possible impact of the technique in other societies such as the Union of South Africa. Internationally, this is not strictly a black-white problem, for skin color and class or caste are closely aligned in many societies.

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Commentary and Debate

FURTHER COMMENTS ON ROBERT COOK'S REVIEW OF *THE ACTIVE SOCIETY*

Permit me to comment upon the controversy aroused by the *AJS* in its assignment of the review of Amitai Etzioni's *The Active Society*. The reviewer, Robert Cook, appeared at first glance not to be a sociologist. That, in fact, he is a man with some experience in the field is immaterial. The point is that your readers, apparently believing that he was not, rushed to protest the assignment of Mr. Etzioni's book to a reviewer who is not a member of the "community of scholars." I am not surprised at this clear intellectual-elitist bias of sociologists, but I feel compelled to protest.

As sociologists, we study the real world. If our analyses are correct, they should be able to be read and criticized by thoughtful persons outside sociology. We sometimes tend to become rather myopic in our views; we read each other, develop our hypotheses and research techniques in collaboration with each other, and evaluate our hypotheses on the basis of data which are all too often filtered through our own artificially created coding systems. All this can be done without a single contact with the real world; our field work is most often done by others, with the major researcher not having met a single respondent. Perhaps an occasional review by a nonsociologist would help to redirect our perspective.

In recent years, sociologists have purported to be concerned with *problems* of the real world. (Witness dialogues in the *American Sociologist* and the 1970 meetings of the American Sociological Association.) To claim that the only critics of our analyses and our proposed solutions to these problems should be members of the discipline is both unwise and unreasonable.

I think our knowledge of social behavior should remind us that it is unlikely that people will accept our suggestions as to how their lives should be run without demanding some right to consider vigorously and carefully whether this is, indeed, the kind of life they want for themselves. In the unlikely event that we should be given this mandate, I wonder whether we should *choose* to make such decisions. Does our knowledge give us the right to assume such an elitist position? Do we dare presume today's generalizations are infallible?

If we are not to fall into this elitist trap, I think we must assume and be pleased that nonsociologists will evaluate our work in terms of both their own experiential evidence of social behavior and their ideal view of society. As Cook points out in his response to the criticisms, it serves as a

check on our own biases, telling us whether our ideas are achieving acceptability "outside" and suggesting reasons for the acceptance or lack of it. I am not suggesting that all reviews be by nonprofessionals, nor that sociological works be reviewed by an unselective group of laymen, but only that some works such as *The Active Society*, which are general commentaries on the society, might do well to sustain the criticism of the intelligent and well-read nonprofessional.

I am also suggesting that *ad hominem* arguments might well be avoided, not only by reviewers, but also by the readers of the reviews. In their correspondence concerning Cook's review, most of your commentators paid scant attention to the substance of his review, complaining only about his presumed lack of professional qualifications.

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Erratum

The editor's note which appears at the end of Don Martindale's review of *On Social Order and Mass Society* by Theodor Geiger and *Symbols and Social Theory* by Hugh Dalziel Duncan (*AJS*, September 1970, pp. 359-61) is actually a footnote by the reviewer, mistakenly referred to as an editorial note.

Book Reviews

Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. By Alfred Schutz. Edited, annotated, and with an introduction by Richard M. Zaner. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970. Pp. xxiv+186. \$6.75.

The Relevance of Sociology. Edited by Jack D. Douglas. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1970. Pp. xii+233. \$2.65 (paper).

Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development. By Charles Hampden-Turner. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. xii+434. \$11.25 (cloth); \$4.95 (paper).

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Two of Max Weber's most noted methodological doctrines, the conception of interpretative understanding (*Verstehen*) and the postulate of ethical neutrality in social research, have been the subject of renewed critical attention in recent years. The former has been reconsidered in connection with a growing interest in phenomenological sociology, the latter in connection with calls for more diagnostic, critical, partisan, and prophetic styles of sociology.

The phenomenological movement in sociology finds its most seminal spokesman in the Viennese philosopher Alfred Schutz. Like George Herbert Mead, whom he resembles in many respects, Schutz was not widely appreciated during his lifetime; recognition has awaited the devoted efforts of students (and of Mrs. Schutz) to make his words more accessible. This they did with the *Collected Papers*, published in three volumes from 1962 to 1965, and a fine translation of his one published book, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, which appeared in 1967. These works reveal Schutz as a meticulous craftsman and highly original thinker, dedicated to solidly grounding a view of social reality and of social science in which "action" is the fundamental point of reference. *Verstehen* is not only a crucial tool for sociology, it is also the natural form of commonsense knowledge of human affairs which all men employ in everyday experience. To understand social reality one must therefore grasp the meaning which acts have for actors, and to this end Schutz provides an ingenious set of conceptions, including that of the actor's "biographical situation," a typology of alter egos, the idea of the actor's "stock of knowledge at hand," and its constitutive "systems of relevance."

It is these last two conceptions which are explored with unprecedented subtlety in the latest posthumous publication. Richard M. Zaner has excellently edited this unfinished first draft of a manuscript written in English in the late 1940s. *Reflections* develops the argument that systems of relevance which orient actors in daily life are of three distinct kinds—topical, interpretational, and motivational—and that any one of

them may become the starting point for bringing about changes in the other two. It also analyzes the ways in which each actor's unique stock of knowledge is built up, through a process of "sedimentation," during his life history; the ways in which this process is typically stopped, temporarily interrupted, or recommenced; and, in a few suggestive fragments, the structure of gaps or "vacancies" in the actor's stock of knowledge.

Schutz thus extends not only Weber's concern about the subjective meanings of actors but also Simmel's analysis of the internal differentiation of selves. Drawing on Simmel's conception of the self as inexorably fragmented, he sees this fragmentation due to the fact that (1) we live simultaneously in multiple systems of relevances, different "provinces of meaning," and (2) we are involved in each sector of reality with different layers of our personality, because of our autobiographical situation. Hence "we carry along at any time a certain number of elements of our knowledge not consistent in themselves and not compatible with one another," a condition which we normally disregard as long as we have no compelling motives to face such a situation of conflict.

For the sociologist it is particularly disappointing that Schutz deals here only with the situation of the abstracted individual; he did not write the projected parts of the study which were to examine the effect of social and cultural organization on the systems of relevance. This and related questions are presumably carried further in his final work, *Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, which is due to be published in German soon and then to be translated into English. Meanwhile, *Reflections* may be of some appeal both to those few sociologists who seek to follow a phenomenological method in social research and to those who wish to think in more philosophically precise ways about the problem of relevance.

What the eleven papers collected in *The Relevance of Sociology* may lack in philosophical precision (not much, really), they make up for with moral passion, honest probing, and provocative prose. The anthology opens with three trumpet calls for engagement: for an art of social diagnosis (Mills), political action and leadership (Galbraith), and the construction of utopias (Wilbert Moore). The rest of the volume—Weber's "Science as a Vocation," six essays reprinted from *Social Problems* and *American Sociologist*, and the title essay freshly written by the editor—explores issues related to commitment and objectivity.

What is missing in this picture is an attempt to spell out just what sociology can do to help. Howard Waitzkin offers a realistic assessment of some of the factors—cooptation, career opportunity costs, elitism—which tend to undermine the contributions of applied sociology. But there is no examination of the *different types of social knowledge and the specific ways in which these may relate to praxis*—an omission which may say a lot about the level of seriousness with which the relevance of sociology has been discussed thus far.

The dialectical highpoint of the book is Alvin Gouldner's searching analysis of "The Sociologist as Partisan," an analysis which brings him

somewhat closer to Weber's position than he was in "Anti-Minotaur." In response to the essay by Howard S. Becker, which invites sociologists to take sides on behalf of all underdogs, Gouldner argues that neither weakness nor power as such is a compelling value, that attraction to the underdog's exotic difference easily becomes a patronizing romanticism and, indeed, one that is commercially rewarding today. Gouldner proposes a broader kind of partisanship, one committed to man's common humanity, and one compatible with a quest for objectivity because it involves adoption of an "outside" standpoint: "probably the only way in which we can even recognize and identify the participants' standpoint." Melvin Tumin and Jack Douglas project similar visions of the calling of sociology, the latter arguing that "man is in more desperate need of an objective understanding of himself in his world than he is of anything else," and that sociologists default on their responsibility to minister to that need by yielding to the "libertine freedoms of narrow identifications."

Douglas also has some tough-minded suggestions for how to uphold objectivity in social research, notably, to institute an *independent check* of the sociologist's ongoing research experience. Gouldner is more concerned with the inner preconditions for sociological objectivity: it requires a highly developed moral character, one that can resist the temptations of hypocrisy and the need to be loved and that is capable of absorbing facts inimical to one's own desires and values. Whether one sees those ethical commitments as antagonistic to a "professional" orientation, as Gouldner does, or sees them as the proper foundation of right professional behavior, as I do, is a matter of taste, I suppose. In either case, the *moral* strength needed for the pursuit of objectivity in social research tends to be undermined, as Gouldner aptly observes, by "a compulsive and exclusive cultivation of purely technical standards of research and of education, so that there is neither a regard nor a locus of responsibility for the cultivation of those very moral qualities on which objectivity rests." While Gouldner remains bothered by Weber's rhetoric of the segregation of facts and value judgments, he appreciates Weber's view that the maintenance of objectivity requires a persisting moral effort.

The author of *Radical Man* not only talks about being relevant, he does something about it. The trouble is that he cannot decide whether he wants to be narrowly partisan or objective in either Weber's or Gouldner's sense of the term.

This and related confusions corrupt what is otherwise an ambitious synthesis of social psychological studies and a spirited tour de force.

Thus, after boldly announcing that a social science which relies on detachment, precision, empiricism, experimentation, and mathematical analysis is grievously misguided, Hampden-Turner fields his own argument armed with a battery of psychometric instruments, laboratory experiments, and intercorrelation matrices—even a chapter called "Corporate Radicalism," because "studies of change in business organizations are among the very few records, adequately researched, of the processes of psycho-social development." After maturely observing that persons

who polarize over "false dichotomies" like determinism versus freedom thereby reveal themselves to be psycho-social infants, he marshals all the evidence he can to show that the world is divided into conservatives and radicals, that one issue which distinguishes them is determinism versus freedom, and that what the world needs is more confrontations between them. After rejecting "elitism" as a conservative vice, he builds an elaborate case to show that most radicals are paragons of mental health, the avant-garde of a neurotic species.

The chief talking point in this argument is a new model of "psycho-social development"—a term which, incidentally, is never defined. Hampden-Turner has invented a cyclical model of the process—apparently unaware that Talcott Parsons pioneered similar models in the 1950s, for the only reference to Parsons is a naughty footnote where he tells that Mills once "teased" Parsons—which represents the mutually generative "existential capacities" of perception, identity, competence, risk taking, and openness to dialogue. The model is buttressed by references to numerous authorities on mental health. Then, out of nowhere, we are told that these capacities are peculiar to "radical man." What's more, scientific evidence is adduced to show that these capacities are correlated with traits such as "ease in talking and making friends," "high occupational focus," "great powers of work and concentration," "giving others the benefit of the doubt," "childhood friends known and liked by parents," "tendency toward feeling responsible"—such a cluster of PTA-approved virtues that Radical Man begins to resemble the well-adjusted girl next door.

Next, the appeal of Radical Man is heightened by contrasting him with his opposite, Anomic Man, alias Conservative Man. Never mind that the critique of anomie originated with and has always been central for conservative social thinkers. Nor that conservative thinkers have been especially drawn to an appreciation of man's ability to create and transmit symbols; the capacities for synthesizing and symbolizing, we now learn, are *radical* human capacities! [sic] (p. 20). Nor that conservative thinkers have historically been the loudest and most consistent opponents of mindless technology; this disease is now identified as "crypto-conservatism."

Having associated all good things with Radical Man, the author makes clear that not all radical men are so good. First he disqualifies the Old Left; they are more like conservatives than like the true New Left radicals. In case we are squeamish, he also disqualifies the "Psychedelic Left." Then he further disarms us: not even all empirical New Left radicals are so good. Some, he insists, are really rebellious just for the sake of destruction; many have been identified as pre-moral opportunists rather than autonomous followers of principle; there are many resemblances between the (New) Radical Left and the Radical Right; in one study, 20 percent of those on the Left turned out to be more dogmatic, narrow, and authoritarian than the average conservative student. Having thus reinstated himself as Mr. Supra-Partisan, Hampden-Turner is ready to de-

liver his coup de grâce. The violent confrontations triggered by radical students are potentially quite beneficial; the violence at Columbia University probably decreased the amount of violence in the world, in the long run; it would be a good idea "if we locked up some administrators" for sixteen hours in a room with radical students, for the only alternatives (in the words of that old radical poet T. S. Eliot) are "fire [of confrontation] or fire [of war]."

For Gouldner's dictum that a "partisanship unable to transcend the immediacies of narrowly conceived political commitment is simply just one more form of market research," *Radical Man* is a possible case in point. What else can one say of a book which equates the intersubjective honesty and good will of Buberian dialogue and *T*-groups with the manipulative, hate-filled transactions of campus confrontations, except that its telling examples and humane intent are vitiated by a consistent failure to make some terribly elementary distinctions: between personal *creativity* and ideological *radicalism*, and between qualities of *personality* and wise action in *politics*. Suddenly someone like Schutz seems terribly relevant; in Zaner's words, "the urgency of the questions pertaining to the human condition, [Schutz] felt, demanded thoroughness and breadth of comprehension, or they inevitably become distorted, misunderstood, mere leaves on a bitter wind leading to ineffectual and fanatic actions which only serve to worsen the crisis of modern man."

Constructing Social Theories. By Arthur L. Stinchcombe. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968. Pp. 303. \$3.95 (paper).

Essays in Sociological Explanation. By Neil J. Smelser. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. vii+280. \$8.25.

Politics of Social Research: An Inquiry into the Ethics and Responsibilities of Social Scientists. By Ralph L. Beals. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. vii+228. \$6.95.

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Many sociologists believe the discipline is currently passing through a crisis, a stage in its development where the old work styles, sensibilities, ideologies, and methods are being challenged and in many quarters, rejected. These problems are so pervasive that sociologists currently producing intelligent monographs almost inevitably deal with some aspect of the "crisis."

These three books are not exceptions. Arthur Stinchcombe and Neil Smelser focus on difficulties in developing social theories; and Ralph Beals on problems and politics involved in gathering data. I will deal primarily with what the authors implicitly and explicitly say about the process of theorizing and the state of that art today.

Smelser's book consists of eight essays which examine two main

themes: the codification of sociology and the relationship between sociology and its sister social and behavioral sciences. The essays, five of which had been previously published, are a good summary of much of Smelser's theoretical work over the past ten years. From the point of view of methodological and theoretical problems of explanation, Smelser reviews his work in historical sociology, in collective behavior, and in economic development and social change.

Stinchcombe's book is more ambitious. His aim is to teach the observer of social life the way to build theories which will help explain empirical uniformities. This is a demanding self-imposed assignment, since one of the salient features of sociological theories in the past has been their association with the idiosyncratic styles of individual theorists. Although sociologists have tried to imitate the logical structure and style of a Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Parsons, or Merton, few have succeeded in achieving anything beyond a crude form of mannerism. Stinchcombe starts with a set of data needing explanation, and for which no theory exists. His approach to inventing an appropriate theory is inductive. In fact, the entire book depicts Stinchcombe "the methodologist" as much as "the theorist" and is testimony to the necessary interplay between the two enterprises. The monograph is divided into two fundamentally discrete sections which only loosely hold together: one treats the properties of low-level theories; the other details strategies of concept formation.

Stinchcombe briefly analyzes the process of creating causal theories and the way to test them against plausible alternatives. An extended discussion of the logical structure of causal theories follows. He focuses on the definition and relationships between variables and concepts. (There is an abundance of concrete examples.) Stinchcombe considers three types of complex causal structures: demographic, functional, and historicist explanations. A demographic theory is "one in which a causal force is assumed to be *proportional to the number of people of a certain kind*. The number of people of that kind is, in the general case, determined by other causal processes" (p. 50, author's italics).

Functional explanations are suggested by behavior patterns "in which the *consequences* of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements of the *causes* of that behavior. . . . Whenever we find *uniformity of the consequences* of action but *great variety of the behavior causing those consequences*, a functional explanation in which the consequences serve as a cause is suggested" (p. 80, author's italics). A brilliant, but all too abbreviated, section of the analysis of functional structures reformulates Marx's ideas on the structure of parliamentary democracy in terms of a functional model. Stinchcombe focuses on the differential consequences of patterns of behavior for contending social classes. Changes in the forces of production, shifts which are necessary to maintain the power of the ruling class, have consequences which are in the interest of the ruling class at Time 1, but which also have unanticipated consequences which ultimately produce the conditions that undermine the ruling class at Time 2. Stinchcombe's analysis retains the dynamic character of Marx,

yet clearly illustrates the overlap between Marxian and functional orientations. There is a rich and relatively unmined set of materials in the work of Marx, especially in his later correspondences with S. Meyer and A. Vogt, which corroborate Stinchcombe's argument of the functional structure of some of Marx's ideas, and it is unfortunate that Stinchcombe did not expand this section. This section, like many others in the book, is tantalizing.

Finally, historicist explanations are called for when "an effect created by causes at some previous period *becomes a cause of that same effect* in succeeding periods' (p. 103, author's italics).

These three forms of causal structures give us clues to the latent structure of Stinchcombe's approach to theoretical problems. In brief, by adopting a form of eclecticism, he avoids the difficulties stemming from the incompleteness of sociological paradigms. He accepts the approaches of diverse schools of thought in sociology and holds that the selection of a theoretical perspective should be fundamentally determined by the nature of the data that the investigator has in hand. Smelser's essays also adopt a similar eclectic position.

By embracing such a catholic approach, Stinchcombe and Smelser implicitly raise some important issues about commitments to schools of sociological thought. It is almost fashionable now to reject functional analysis as a mode of explanation. Its detractors claim that it is a complete theory when it is, in fact, the bare outlines of an approach to explaining patterns of behavior. Yet it is often rejected on the basis of *ad hominem* arguments about the ideological biases of the sociologists who use it. Indeed, a great number of the dissenters are incapable of outlining the fundamental structure of the orientation, or of citing studies that have made use of it (or for that matter, those that have not). In a way, the critics of functionalism beat at a straw man, since the theory has never really been developed to the point where it can be systematically tested against a wide variety of empirical data.

Conflict can play a constructive role among various segments of a scientific community. In fact, historians of science such as Kuhn and Gillespie have pointed out that some level of conflict is inextricably related to scientific development. The history of the "harder sciences" has been marked by intense conflicts over different theoretical orientations. In geology, for example, disputes in the early nineteenth century were every bit as "heated" as those that we are now witnessing in contemporary sociology. Conflict between schools of thought—conflicts often based more on value disagreements than cognitive differences—is often one of the marks of relatively "immature" disciplines. Smelser notes: "As [a discipline] achieves scientific maturity, it more nearly attains consensus on the scientific problems to be posed, the relevant independent variables, a theoretical and philosophical perspective, and appropriate research methods. Simultaneously it witnesses a decline of distinctive schools; a decline in the quantity of polemic about the 'nature' of the field and the value of different 'approaches' to the field; a decline in

propaganda, proselytization, and defensiveness; and an increase in discussion of findings in relation to accepted criteria of validation" (p. 7). The history of older sciences suggests that theoretical consensus is hard won. Perhaps sociology will follow the course taken by the harder sciences. However, at this point in the history of sociology, each of the different theoretical orientations must be allowed to evolve so that it can be evaluated on the basis of its effectiveness in explaining social activities of social life. I believe, and I think Smelser and Stinchcombe would agree, that no sociological orientation has reached that stage of development.

Implicitly, both authors suggest profound and significant differences between the origin and evolution of strategic problems in the social as compared with the physical sciences. In the physical sciences theoretical paradigms and prior empirical research lead investigators directly to many of the problems that must be solved for future advance. In contrast, sociologists not only find it hard to agree on what constitutes facts but also find it exceedingly difficult to identify a hierarchy of problems. In sociology the selection of problems worthy of study and allocation of resources to them seem to be dictated by personal taste. There are few institutionally recognized taste makers. One has no sense of agreement among social theorists as to what problems must be solved or even addressed to produce cumulative advance.

Although both authors go far in setting down the logical principles of theory construction and conceptualization, they do not give the reader an idea of what actually goes on in the day-to-day operation of developing a theory. From Francis Bacon to James D. Watson, scientists remind us that the public record of a science tends to produce a mythology: it represents the scientist as moving toward his final product by logical steps. Is this really the full story of the complex ways in which social or physical theories are constructed? What of all the false starts, the poor ideas, the collaborations and interactions with colleagues, the inspirations, the serendipities? Are these not also an integral, if not necessary, aspect to the building of a theory? Although some contend that these aspects of the development of a discipline are best left to autobiographies, I think we need to increase the autobiographical elements in our monographs if we wish to convey to the incipient sociologist the actual process of discovery. Stinchcombe, for example, has a truly brilliant discussion of the conceptualization of power phenomena in chapter four. Yet the reader is presented with the final product, which is of the first rank, but which is like a diamond already cut and polished when discovered. It is difficult to envision what the diamond looked like in the rough.

One final comment on these two books is in order. Both of them should be extremely useful for classroom teaching. The first section of Smelser's book is as good as any I know in identifying the sociological perspective and in differentiating it from the economic, psychological, and anthropo-

logical points of view. And Stinchcombe's monograph should be must reading for students of the relationship between theoretical and methodological problems.

Beals's volume deals with a different set of problems. He discusses the relationship between academic researcher and government research funding agencies. He attempts to answer the following questions: What, if any, are the obligations of social scientists to their government? What problems are faced by researchers in carrying out research funded by controversial government agencies, such as the Department of Defense, or the CIA? How can a social scientist working for the government "retain his freedom, honesty and integrity, promote the development of his discipline and insure the application of his findings for human welfare" (p. 18)? The materials that Beals brings to bear on these questions are by and large treated in a rather pedestrian way. However, the book does raise two interesting problems.

First, the social scientist who works for the government is often placed in a position of role conflict, in which he must deal with two reference groups with seemingly incompatible goals and values. How does an "academic man" maintain his commitment to the goals and values of the wider academic community as well as to the local organizational norms of the funding agency? The cross-pressures under which the "local-cosmopolitan" scientist works produces the expected result: it is difficult for the government to recruit capable researchers and to retain those that it does manage to co-opt.

Second, when Beals outlines the difficulty that American researchers have in gathering data in foreign cultures, especially when their research is sponsored by the government, he stumbles on a significant problem of the relationship between what Robert Merton has recently called "insiders" and "outsiders." The claim of insiders, in brief, is that they hold a privileged position of access to knowledge. The logical conclusion of this argument is that only blacks can study blacks, only women can study women, only Mexicans can study Mexicans with any degree of comprehension of the cultural values and mores of each group. Beals notes, especially in describing the "Sanchez affair," how the social characteristics of an investigator are increasingly affecting the success that he has in gathering data. The problem has little to do with the actual competence of the investigator. For the doctrine of the "insider" holds that, regardless of the talents of the "outside" investigator, he cannot gain access to the "social truth." This doctrine, with its obvious implications for the collection and analysis of sociological data, is becoming an increasingly disturbing problem for investigators and deserves additional study by social scientists.

In conclusion, the Stinchcombe and Smelser books are worthwhile and instructive reading. While they may occasionally be off base or in error, they show perceptiveness and sensitivity in dealing with some of the more salient problems facing sociological theory.

Beyond Belief. By Robert N. Bellah. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Pp. xi+291. \$7.95.

Andrew M. Greeley

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There are a few of us distinguished enough to be able to include our book reviews when we publish collections of our essays, and there are fewer of us still who are capable of writing the kinds of book reviews that *deserve* to be published in the collection of our essays. Robert N. Bellah's reviews of *Honest to God* by Bishop John Robinson and *Love's Body* by Norman O. Brown are sufficient evidence that anything that a scholar of the highest quality does is worth reading and worth rereading. As a matter of fact, my own inclination is to think that what Bellah has to say about Brown and Robinson is of considerably more interest than what Brown and Robinson themselves have to say.

Beyond Belief is a collection of essays and articles written by Bellah for the most part during the 1960s; while most of the articles could be hunted up in the journals in which they were originally published, it is still extremely helpful to have the slender but impressive corpus of Bellah's work during the last decade gathered together into one place. Anyone who is at all interested in the sociology of religion will want to own a copy of *Beyond Belief* if only to have immediate access to "Religious Evolution," "Civil Religion in America," "Transcendence in Contemporary Piety," and "Between Religion and Social Science"—in my judgment, Bellah's foremost contributions to the sociology of religion.

It is well known, of course, that Bellah is a Parsonian and a Weberian. *Beyond Belief* makes it clear that he is willing to push the stand that Parsons and Weber take concerning man as a "meaning seeking" creature to logical conclusions which neither of his two masters seem to have reached. He states: "My conclusion, then, runs about as contrary to so-called secularization theory as is humanly possible. It is my feeling that religion, instead of becoming increasingly peripheral and vestigial, is again moving into the center of our cultural preoccupations. This is happening both for purely intellectual reasons having to do with the re-emergence of the religious issue in the sciences of man and for practical historical reasons having to do with the increasing disillusionment with a world built on utilitarianism and science alone. Religion was the traditional mode by which men interpreted their world to themselves. Increasingly modern man has turned to social sciences for this interpretation. As social science has attempted more and more to grasp the totality of man it has recognized many of the preoccupations of traditional religion. As traditional religion has sought to relate to the contemporary world it has leaned more and more on social scientific contributions to the understanding of man" (p. 266).

And, even more succinctly, he notes, "The conclusion grows ever stronger that religion is a part of the species life of man, as central to his self-definition as speech" (p. 223).

But the most striking conclusion that Bellah makes for the sociology of religion is contained in the concluding paragraphs of the volume: "I am not advocating the abandonment of the canons of scientific objectivity or value neutrality, those austere disciplines that will always have their place in scientific work. But those canons were never meant to be ends in themselves, certainly not by Weber, who was passionately committed to ethical and political concerns. They are methodological strictures. They neither relieve us of the obligation to study our subject as whole persons, which means in part as religious persons, nor do they relieve us of the burden of communicating to our students the meaning and value of religion along with its analysis. If this seems to confuse the role of theologian and scientist, of teaching religion and teaching about religion, then so be it. The radical split between knowledge and commitment that exists in our culture and in our universities is not ultimately tenable. Differentiation has gone about as far as it can go. It is time for a new integration" (p. 257).

The author is true to his own principles in what may seem to many readers to be the most remarkable of all of his essays. He traces in the relatively brief introduction his own religious odyssey through fundamentalist Protestantism, Marxism, Tillichian Christianity, and "Berkeley" (which combines a willingness to believe with a skepticism about closed ideologies). "For the deepest truth I have discovered is that if one accepts the loss, if one gives up clinging to what is irretrievably gone, then the nothing which is left is not barren but enormously fruitful . . . the faith of loss is closer to joy than to despair" (p. xx).

Most sociologists would not be brave enough to reveal the connection between their own deepest personal fears and longings of their professional work, and maybe most of us should not do so. But Bellah carries it off superbly. The present writer, whose own religious pilgrimage differs from Bellah's about as much as it possibly could, will still acknowledge that his introduction notably improves the usefulness of the rest of the book, both as sociology of religion and as a record of the religion of a sociologist.

The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. By Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune. New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970. Pp. xii+153. \$8.50.

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It is surprising, in view of the very large amount of comparative study during the past decade, that so little has been written about theoretical and metamethodological problems of comparative analysis. A vast

amount has been written on such subjects as problems of data collection, storage, retrieval, and interpretation; pitfalls in employing conventional survey research procedures on a comparative basis; the viability of specific concepts in cross-cultural perspective; and so on. But aside from relatively short contributions from such people as Bendix, Marsh, Galtung, Osgood, Rokkan, Sjöberg, and Scheuch, there has existed a remarkable lack of work on the general problems of comparative analysis. It is thus exciting and intellectually relieving to welcome a book which claims to be pivotally concerned with theoretical issues.

Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune set the tone for their book in the stress which they quickly put upon two points; first, they emphasize that the major goal of comparative research is to substitute the names of variables for the names of concrete social systems; and, second, they maintain that the question of the comparability of two or more social phenomena depends upon the level of generality which is applied to express observations. From these two clearly stated premises, much of the book succinctly and logically flows. The principal themes which Przeworski and Teune develop are: explanation and theory; research design and the comparison of relationships between variables; levels of analysis and inference; the formulation of theories in cross-system perspective; forms of measurement; and the establishment of equivalence. A useful bibliography is also included.

The authors emphasize that comparative research should not be regarded as an end in itself—sustained by the idiographic motivation to gain empirical knowledge about a plurality of societies—but as central to the development of a theoretical science. The specific contribution of comparative inquiry in this respect is, as has been noted, the replacement of proper names of concrete systems by the relevant variables. Przeworski and Teune in turn accord *explanation* a central place in theory construction, there being four major requirements of explanatory theory: accuracy, generality, parsimony, and causality. There is, it is argued, a degree of zero-sumness about the relationship between these requirements. In particular, the attainment of a high degree of accuracy is effected at the expense of generality and parsimony. In many respects this book hinges upon the tension obtaining between the goals of accuracy on the one hand and generality/parsimony on the other—Przeworski and Teune clearly favoring the latter over the former. The authors readily concede that their image of theory is not a definitive one but rather that, if their model is accorded viability, then cross-systematic studies become an integral part both of theory testing and theory building. (The generality postulate makes this tautologically accurate.) It is a pity, however, that the criterion of causality has not been developed further. There is perhaps a too-ready acceptance of the Hempelian model of causal explanation; some attention might fruitfully have been given to other types of causation—although this would have undoubtedly put some strain upon the authors' commitment to the view that most problems of uniqueness and universality can be redefined as problems of measurement and the general

tendency to argue that the major problems of comparative research are basically ones of measurement.

The most interesting aspect of this book is its treatment of levels of analysis and relationships between variables in social systems. It is cogently argued, against the tendency to operate in terms of a *most-similar-systems* research design, that "systems differ not when the frequency of particular characteristics differ, but when the patterns of the relationships among variables differ" (p. 45). This is, of course, the basic consideration which gives rise to contributions made by the *system* to the relationship between variables. In discussing systemic contributions, the authors distinguish three major factors: diffusion patterns; settings; and contexts (aggregates of individual characteristics). The discussion of diffusion (Galton's Problem—to which Narroll has recently devoted much attention) is very brief. The debate about diffusion has hinged upon whether a pattern of relationships in a given system is the consequence of diffusion or whether it is a functional relationship. The seeming intractability of this methodological problem is not a reason for not excavating it. This is an especially important point in view of the authors' commitment to theoretical and explanatory issues. One of the points they might have looked at in this connection is that a pattern of relationships may be a consequence of diffusion and at the same time be highly functional. For diffusion to occur successfully in the first place it has by definition to have a functional "home to go to." The discussion of settings is also not entirely satisfactory, mainly because it omits the crucial factor of *cultural variation*. The authors might well consider that they have taken care of this through their inclusion of historical settings (along with institutional, external, behavioral, and physical settings), but here again the commitment to a concern with theoretical problems makes this a worrying gap. In any case, the treatment of historicity is not entirely consistent—for subsequent to mentioning history as a major setting variable, the authors maintain that general laws are necessary in order to explain the properties of any historical event. Thus, "history" does not retain its status as a setting variable.

Przeworski and Teune echo the argument that in discussing problems and making inferences in connection with different levels in a system our aim ought not to be the listing of fallacies but the theoretical interpretation of the observed differences between individual and ecological correlations. They make their point very successfully in reference to the case in which within-system regressions are the same for all systems and are about equal to zero, but the slope of the regression of system means is different from zero—well exemplified by the absence of a relationship between blackness and illiteracy within American states, but an increasingly strong association at the levels of state and region. The authors not only provide an extremely useful sensitization to this problem but also a valuable technical discussion.

It would seem that the topic which Przeworski and Teune regard as most important is that of measurement—particularly the problems in-

volved in obtaining equivalence of measurement with reference to a plurality of systems. The major concern here is to facilitate the context of a system to enter the process of measurement—a process yielded by identifying the subpopulation of indicators relative to each system. However, the notion of context is used here very differently from their previously explicated notion of a contextual (that is, aggregative) setting. In fact, it sounds very much like culture. That Przeworski and Teune emphasize the need to construct equivalence measures across systems such that characteristics specific to the systems in question are given full attention is very welcome. However, most of their arguments in this respect are pitched at the level of *principle*; the actual in situ problems of finding equivalence measures are touched upon only in reference to the International Studies of Values in Politics—a project from which many of the comparative problems dealt with in the book derive.

Generally speaking, this is an extremely useful contribution to the methodology of comparative analysis. But it is certainly not exhaustive. The absence of attention to cultural variation in any explicit form has been given particular attention here. The emphasis on measurement, although fruitful simply in terms of what the authors propose in respect to measurement per se, tends to gloss over not only the problems of culture but also problems of conceptualization and definition. This is not to say that Przeworski and Teune are incorrect in advancing their main theses. The problem is, rather, that their arguments would have been even more effective had they systematically related them to some of the more conventionally understood major problems of comparative inquiry. In this connection, their failure to connect with the problems raised by Scheuch in his examinations of levels of analysis and cultural variation is particularly glaring. However, no one can doubt the importance of their two main conclusions: that specific systems should be regarded as labels for unspecified factors as opposed to limits upon generality, and that the equivalence of measurement statements should be a matter of the validity of inferences rather than of the nature of indicators. In its sensitivity to explanatory theory, this book stands above the vast majority of essays on problems of comparative research. Students of comparative analysis will benefit enormously from the subtlety with which the authors set down the basic guidelines for work in this area.

International Systems and the Modernization of Societies. By J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson. New York: Basic Books, 1968. Pp. 216. \$5.95.

Politics and Change in Developing Countries. Edited by Colin Leys. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Pp. viii+289. \$7.50.

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It is usually encouraging to see established and imaginative scholars seek to break out of traditional but increasingly anachronistic disciplinary or

methodological molds. The results can be suggestive and stimulating, even if the tentativeness of their findings proves frustrating to the reader, and sometimes unrewarding.

We are all acquainted, however, with the pitfalls which await those having the intrepidity to undertake such intellectual excursions. Some try to disguise their confusion in a pedantic style and a structurally weak overarching synthesis of unfamiliar material. Others, seeking safety in numbers and lacking a well-organized format and a common understanding of the problem, go off in a variety of disconnected and unilluminating directions.

The two books here under review exemplify both this admirable desire to explore new territory and the unfortunate consequences which too frequently attend such efforts.

Nettl and Robertson in their volume have sought to counter the tendency of most sociologists to focus exclusive attention on the national entity by underlining "the dynamic relationship between the international and the domestic aspects of individual societies" (p. 60). Examining modernization as a function of the relative acceptance or rejection by nationally defined Third World elites of the differing goals, values, and norms of colonial or other groups of external "benefactors," they suggest a comparative approach to the study of the process of modernization within which "development" becomes less the product of unseen (usually economic) forces largely beyond conscious human control, and more a process directed by national elites aware of the variety of choices before them.

In so doing, they dismiss the outmoded notions of the macro-economists, whose growth models were based on now-suspect data and whose theories implied the predominance of nonmanipulative forces. Instead, they offer a reformulation of the concept of modernization which emphasizes noneconomic factors so as to divorce the term "industrialization" from any prescriptive connotation or necessary association with "modernity" (industrialization being only one of several strategies for achieving it).

So, too, instead of the traditional bent of sociologists to stress structural differentiation within societies, Nettl and Robertson "find the term modernization meaningful mainly in the context of a differentiated international system" (p. 45) wherein national elites seek a moving goal of equivalence with other nations. For this reason, they suggest, it is imperative for the sociologist "to include international relations within his purview" (p. 137).

The authors therefore lay stress on the form and degree of communication in and between societies and the prismatic role of national elites in affecting the course of modernization in their societies. In so doing, they describe a process of "inheritance" from the perspective of Third World "beneficiaries," whose values, goals, and norms define the inheritance situation and significantly affect the degree to which (and manner in which) the inherited bounty from the modernized world is to be used, ranging these on a reform-to-revolution spectrum of political options.

Basing their argument on existing theoretical literature rather than on any significant empirical evidence, Nettl and Robertson disclaim any intention at thoroughness, and profess only a wish to call attention to the utility of applying sociological tools of analysis to the modernization process, as seen from an international point of view. The result, however, is an often confusing and regrettably verbose speculative disquisition which leaves the reader furiously jotting down exceptions and oversights which it would be supercilious to list here. Besides, this may well be considered more a compliment to the authors than a legitimate reviewer's complaint, given their repeated disclaimers.

On the other hand, a compendium such as Colin Leys has edited might have proven a fitting antidote to Nettl and Robertson's speculative essays. This volume being based upon a conference at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in 1968, I expected a series of well-researched, data-based, and carefully focused studies illuminating various facets of Nettl and Robertson's benefactor-beneficiary relationship, seen from a variety of disciplinary and methodological viewpoints. It is operational questions relating to this relationship which many of us hoped the Institute had been established to explore, and which Leys's discursive introduction to the volume leads the reader to anticipate. Yet the book in fact is little more than a potpourri of disconnected, uneven, and otherwise unpublishable articles, which lack any unifying theme, summary overview, or scholarly justification—except as the increasingly inevitable marketed result of the current academic disease of "conference-itis."

This is not to demean indiscriminately all of the contributions to the volume. These range from Nettl's intelligent but anticipated plea for a less deterministic approach to the subject of modernization, to another unhelpful discussion of the military and political development (this one largely an inconclusive "case study" of Ghana by Robert Dowse), and an elementary essay on the possible relevance of the Soviet model of development for Third World countries by Alec Nove (ending with the marvelously uninspiring peroration: "Yet surely Russia's experience is one from which many useful lessons, positive and negative, can be drawn" [p. 84]).

The collection does include a pleasant little essay by Joan Vincent mainly on the potential place of anthropology in the study of political development and an instructive explanation of the case for (and relevant problems which need to be dealt with by) those working in the field of development administration by Bernard Schaffer. W. H. Morris-Jones has contributed an all-too-brief statement on the importance of having more research into the concept and process of political recruitment, and Leys has concluded the volume with a demand for more behavioral and less "logical" models of national plan making and for a shift "from models of plan-making to models of planned behaviour" (p. 275).

What we have, then, in these two books is, in the one case, a suggestive but inconclusive reassessment of the scope and focus of comparative so-

ciology and, in the other, the possible beginnings of an attempt on the part of British scholars to show some interest in utilizing some American tools of analysis in exploring the vast British involvement in the Third World's impulse toward modernization. Yet both fall embarrassingly short of what one would expect of authors of the reputation and competence involved in these efforts—testifying (one fears) to the American rush-into-print syndrome which may now be affecting scholars on both sides of the Atlantic.

Social Theory and African Tribal Organization: The Development of Socio-Legal Theory. By Kenneth S. Carlston. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968. Pp. xi+462. \$10.00.

William Garland

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In this book K. S. Carlston (College of Law, University of Chicago) proposes his view that law is most fruitfully seen within its entire socio-cultural matrix, rather than as a thing in itself, or from the point of view of any one discipline. For this reason Carlston offers a study of law from the vantage of a unified body of social theory. The theory is set forth in a lengthy but compact set of propositions, twenty illustrative ethnographic sketches of African tribes, and a series of conclusions drawn from comparisons of the tribes in respect to his propositions.

Carlston models his "unified social scientific theory" after an idealized, purified anthropological theory. All the other social disciplines are too narrow of view. Anthropology alone takes man in all his dimensions as its object of study. However, praise for wholism of view is accompanied with criticism that anthropology has remained "preoccupied with, though not limited to, tribal man." Moreover, anthropology has not developed sophisticated theory, but has remained "largely a technique of observation and description. The anthropologist is, in essence, a trained observer" (p. ix). Much more damning, he finds there is a subtle but very basic tendency toward ethnocentrism in anthropological concepts and judgments. Anthropologists are said to tend toward defining such terms as "law" in such a way as to reflect our own institutional arrangements and thus obstruct a comparative study of law (pp. 23, 53-63). All the prominent anthropological jurists are faulted, but E. A. Hoebel is singled out for criticism (p. 62). This is ironic for it is clearly to Hoebel that Carlston is most indebted intellectually, although he does not acknowledge this. It is an anthropological view of law in society and culture which Carlston offers, but one supposedly cleansed of ethnocentric concepts, theoretical naïveté, and rustic interests. These are all worthy and ambitious aims and would doubtless promote not only a greater understanding of law, African culture, and human society but also the development of African nations and a world community, Carlston's ultimate interests (p. xi et passim).

The basic proposition of Carlston's theory is: "*Man performs action, which is both symbolic action and social action, in the dimension of time to create order for the purpose of realizing his values*" (p. 64, Carlston's italics). Each italicized term is a section heading for a group of "principles and propositions," which total 113 in number. This set of propositions resembles a formal postulational model, although whether this is intended is not indicated. Nonetheless, it is not a postulational system for there is no deductive relationship between the "basic proposition" and the subordinate principles and propositions. Moreover, there is a high redundancy in the "principles and propositions" (e.g., the seven "propositions" numbered 45, 50, 51, 71, 72, 73, and 108 actually state only two propositions among them), and there seem to be some mutually contradictory propositions, although possible ambiguities prevent documenting this.

The very construction of the set of propositions raises doubts in my mind. The theoretical writings from individual and social psychology, anthropology, sociology, and political science are culled putatively for propositions consonant with the "basic proposition," but it is also evident that Carlston uses other unstated canons which are thus not critically examined. Seemingly, each section of propositions consists of those basic theoretical statements which Carlston feels are most useful and reasonable from each of the behavioral sciences. This seeming eclecticism is all too much like the naïveté and lack of theoretical sophistication which Carlston criticizes in other social scientists.

Perhaps Carlston's own blind spots are best seen in relationship to the data he brings to bear on his theory: where he shares the faults he attributes to anthropologists (fascination with the primitive and ethnocentrism). His ostensible aim is to illustrate his theory by using the concepts and relations in the theory to describe the cultures of twenty African tribes, and to show the relationships between the tribal organization and possible national and international levels of integration, and to do so in a way superior to that of anthropologists. However, the ethnographic sketches do none of these. In fact Carlston uncritically follows the ethnographic accounts of the anthropologists, failing to catch them up about the genuine ethnocentrism and naïveté in their work (e.g., the full acceptance of Evan-Pritchard's account of Nuer leaders not having "real authority" because they lacked the *European* trappings of authority [pp. 357-79]). Also, in describing the lawways of these primitive peoples, Carlston uses as the hallmark of law *sanctions* in response to conflict, and decisions disposing of cases in terms of appropriate rules *the society desires to universally bind behavior* (i.e., justice). Carlston is free to define "law" in any way he chooses, but I find sanction and justice to be no less ethnocentric considerations than those of which Carlston accuses Hoebel (i.e., "law" is defined by Hoebel as existing in those situations in which there is an agent with the legitimate right to use or threaten physical violence to uphold a norm) (pp. 58-63). To define law in terms of justice, for example, eliminates from theoretical purview the

study of law in revolutionary, despotic, or even rapid social change situations. These latter conditions are the very central interests in Carlston's work. Finally, how a study of the twenty *primitive tribes* of Carlston's sample will help enlighten us about *national* and *international* integration is not at all evident. They seem to have been reviewed solely for their own fascinating qualities. Perhaps anthropologists should feel embarrassed that right-minded social scientists forget their caution and rigor when presented with their exotic ethnographies.

The last section, "Conclusion," has little to say, since the data section was not meant to test the theory but only to illustrate it. It consists of noting some correspondences in the data of the several tribes to the propositions of the theory, although many of the noted correspondences are in error (e.g., on p. 335 the organizationally simple, egalitarian Nuer is given as an example of people having a high god because they are "societies with a complex, hierarchical structure"; conversely, nine of the tribes which could have exemplified proposition 1.1.4. are omitted), and nothing of significance can be concluded from the listings, as Carlston himself notes (pp. 90, 92). He nonetheless attempts to draw some conclusions about the potential for conflict or its lack as the people of tribal organizations attempt to integrate themselves into "modern structures of organization" (chap. 18, "Modern Implications"). This section is best dismissed as loose generalization.

Carlston's aim of a science of law within the context of a unified social scientific theory is worthy and valid. But both a more sophisticated unified theory with genuine grounding and a more sophisticated approach to law in that context are required.

Saints of the Atlas. By Ernest Gellner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. xxiii+317. \$9.50.

Hildred Geertz

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Logically elegant but empirically simplistic, Ernest Gellner's analysis of rural Moroccan political structure in the British anthropological tradition attempts to reduce the complexities of Berber social relations to the rigid framework of a segmentary model—and is unconvincing. Gellner, who is professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, began his scholarly career in philosophy, publishing two books in this field (*Words and Things, Thought and Change*) turning only later to social anthropological research. Perhaps this early interest explains the aura of abstract intellectualism that pervades the present volume.

The "saints" of the title are living Moroccan holy men, whose powers of relaying Allah's blessings to ordinary mortals give them access to political influence at many levels of North African society. A group of related saintly villages, scattered among the larger lay population of

partially transhumant shepherds and farmers, formed the focus of Gellner's field work. He maintains that the lay population—here Berber-speaking and until 1933 outside the sovereignty of the Moroccan kingdom—can best be understood in terms of the model of "segmentary societies," as an array of nomadic cohesive kin groups, internally fractionated according to a treelike image of linkages. A semblance of political integration is maintained, precariously and at the cost of considerable violence, primarily through the principle of complementary opposition. That is to say, the balancing off of feuding groups against one another, in constantly shifting alignments, obviates the need for an overarching state. The saintly lineages are treated as outside the segmentary system, as, in Gellner's phrase "artificial foreigners," shielded by moral neutrality and armed with supernatural powers. This position enables them to perform as mediators among the "egalitarian feud-addicted tribesmen" whenever the political equilibrium is threatened. Thus the function of the saintly lineages is to provide an emergency gyroscope-like mechanism which ensures the steady state of the system.

This is a conceptual model, so it is not expected to describe reality exactly, but only to approximate it and to raise further questions. Its usefulness is measured by the proportion of the data it can account for, as against the amount of data which must be dismissed as incidental variation. Unfortunately, Gellner provides us with very little with which to make this judgment. Much of his reporting is at a level of generality which makes it difficult for the reader to tell whether he is giving a summary of many observations or a reasoned guess as to what "ought" logically to be the case on the basis of one or two items of information. His data are weakest and least circumstantial precisely where they are most needed for a test of his thesis: on the day-to-day political relationships among and within the nonsaintly groups prior to the imposition of French authority. These are not the groups among whom he was resident, and what information he seems to have is secondhand, retrospective, sketchy, and idealized.

His best descriptions (and these are tantalizingly interesting) are of the internal structure of the saintly villages between 1954 and 1961, the period of his field work, but this particular material is either irrelevant to the central thesis or else contradictory to it. It is irrelevant if the main assertion of the model is taken to mean that the saintly villages are not at all like nonsaintly ones. It is contradictory if the saintly villages are thought, as Gellner sometimes also suggests, to be merely specialized variants on general Moroccan rural organizational patterns. For the segmentary model assumes a strict equality within and between segments, both ideally and actually, so that they can balance each other off. However, in an intriguing series of comparisons of several saintly villages in the region, which range from being highly peaked to almost flat in the distribution of wealth and political influence, he accounts for the differences among these saintly villages in terms of the presence or absence in each one of what he calls "effective" saints. These are persons of

saintly descent or whom the popular consensus has conferred the active possession of spiritual powers, an attribute which by no means is guaranteed by birth. They are the men who actually carry out the arbitration among the competing lay groupings. Many saintly villages are indistinguishable from lay villages, since they have no effective saints and are correspondingly unstratified. Gellner argues that without the presence of effective saints there can be no stratification within these communities and that the "normal" condition of Moroccan mountain social structure is egalitarian and segmented, not hierarchical and interlocked.

On the basis of what we know about the mountain communities, including Gellner's own reports, it is by no means clear that the saintly villages are sharply different from the nonsaintly, nor that the situation was so prior to "pacification" in 1933. While the segmentary model bears some resemblance to reality, it leads to a markedly inadequate and, I think, distorting interpretation of it. In a society which strongly values force of personality and the capacity to grasp opportunities and to get things done, whether this capacity is based on mobilization of kinship resources, activating claims on clients, economic calculation, manipulation of foreign interests, or access to divine aid, a sociological model which aspires to more than plausibility cannot afford to limit itself to only a few simple principles. It should have sufficient complexity to encompass not only the relationships among the long-range transhumants, an image of which provides Gellner with the basis for his argument, but also those of the settled villages and the sophisticated cities, which must be treated as aspects of a single society.

As one of the first structural studies of Morocco, the book is disappointing. Its virtues are the reverse side of its faults: there is a refreshing sweep and intellectual clarity in its arguments and a singleness of point of view that make *Saints of the Atlas* continuously interesting.

Parliament, Partizans and Society in France, 1946-1958. By Duncan MacRae, Jr. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967. Pp. xiii+375. \$10.00.

Case-Studies in Social Power. Edited by H.-D. Evers. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1969. Pp. 161. Gld. 25.

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The Fourth French Republic has often been cited as an example of a political regime that failed. Even before the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958 under the leadership of General de Gaulle, and much more so thereafter, the shortcomings of the Fourth Republic and the reasons for its downfall have been the object of many brilliant if somewhat speculative studies. While most of them view cabinet instability as one of the main causes of the Fourth Republic's failings, no exhaustive

empirical analyses of "legislative behavior" in the Fourth Republic have so far been published.

Duncan MacRae's study has filled this void. Using a wide variety of data, techniques, and evidence (his research is based on statistical analysis of Assembly roll calls, aggregate voting statistics, and survey data as well as newspaper accounts and sociological analysis of the French social structure), he centers his investigations on the sources of cabinet instability, leaving aside other issues that contributed to the downfall of the Fourth Republic.

Dealing first with the divisions and performance of the different parties in the Assembly, he then links the "legislative behavior" he observes to the broader political and social context of France. Altering or sharpening a good many previous hypotheses, he not only gives an illuminating account of the Fourth Republic's parliamentary system but also points out basic problems the understanding of which is indispensable for anyone concerned with the mechanisms of French political life.

The book can be roughly divided into three parts. After the presentation of basic features of the French social structure and political institutions in a first, largely introductory part (chaps. 1-3), the author devotes Part 2 (chaps. 4-7) to a statistical analysis of intraparty divisions which he considers one of the main sources of cabinet instability. For each legislature, he provides a detailed chronology of the rise and fall of the different cabinets and analyzes each party's internal divisions on selected roll calls. Chapter 7 then sums up the different findings of this part through an overall appraisal of intraparty divisions related to issues (i.e., ideological cleavages) or cabinets (i.e., cleavages resulting from cabinet alliances).

The statistical evidence collected by MacRae in this part greatly renews our knowledge and understanding of the Fourth Republic's parliamentary system. Contrary to well-accepted analyses, short-term cabinet alliances and the intrigues of would-be ministers ("ministrables") do not seem to have been an important source of cabinet instability. The data suggest on the contrary that the "ministrables" consistently supported the cabinets and that *ideological dissensions among the rank-and-file deputies* were the main cause for the downfall of most of the cabinets. The author therefore hypothesizes the existence of two subsystems working somewhat at cross-purposes: *consensus* in the Assembly, among the parliamentary leaders, and *dissensus* of ideology and interest rooted in the constituencies and of which the rank-and-file deputies were the mouthpiece.

This conclusion then leads him to trace the sources of cabinet instability outside the Assembly, through the study of the social bases of voting behavior and of party differences in constituency relations (chaps. 8-11).

He shows that, while stable social divisions—resulting in stable clienteles for each party—had some negative influence on cabinet stability (no party being able to gain sufficient seats from the others, they had to enter governmental coalitions, a fact which considerably strengthened consensus among parliamentary leaders), they were only permissive con-

ditions for political divisions. These divisions, and the ideological character of French politics, could not be traced back to constituency influences. Rather, the author contends that they sprang from the existence of a highly ideological and politicized minority of party activists, upon whom the rank-and-file deputies depended much more heavily than the "ministres" and whose influence can be traced to the political parties' organizational structures.

This outstanding study, integrating analyses of particular aspects of French society carried out with a wide variety of data and methods, exemplifies useful lines of research in political science. One can only hope that it will be followed by many more of the same quality and scholarship.

Of course, some concepts used by the author may need further clarification. For example, his distinction between "issue-specific" and "cabinet-specific" intraparty divisions, although clear in principle, may sometimes prove difficult to apply. Into what category does the opposition to P. Mendès-France's cabinet fall? While clearly cabinet-specific, can it not also be due to the deputies' aversion to his constitutionality theories, viewed as threatening the preeminence of the Assembly? Indeed, Mendès-France was an ideological issue.

One could also object that the author introduces too radical a dichotomy between rank-and-file deputies and "ministres." Although they belonged to separate subsystems, a high degree of complicity did exist between them—if only in view of the defense of the "system." The social system of the Assembly as a whole therefore deserves perhaps a more thorough and qualitative study, for it may have some implications for the author's findings. One could argue, for example, that the "ministres" did not actually have to vote against a cabinet to bring it down. Perhaps simply refraining from openly coming out in favor of it was understood by the rank-and-file deputies of the same faction as a signal to vote against it. The "ministres'" responsibility in cabinet instability could thus be much greater than the statistical data would suggest.

However, as the author himself states, he intended to provide a statistical study of legislative behavior in the Fourth Republic, dealing with quantitative data. More qualitative analysis, although started in the last two chapters, is not in the line of this research. But it should be the object of further and very important studies.

In its field, the book fully attains its objectives. The amount of original statistical data collected, and the way they are presented—permitting everyone to reach his own conclusions—would alone be sufficient to put this book on the top of the reading list of students of political behavior and of French politics alike.

But there is more. For this book is not only a historical analysis of a regime that failed. In his main conclusions, the author in fact points out basic problems of the French social and political structure which did not fade away with the Fourth Republic. The existence of vertical communication channels, preventing bargaining and interorganizational adjustments at the base, and of a very restricted elite at the top, which

alone can bring about the necessary synthesis of conflicting rationalities (dissensus at the base, consensus among the leaders at the top), has been diagnosed in many different segments of French society and still characterizes what could be called the "French style of action." MacRae thus enhances our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of French political life and of the conditions of change.

The very centralized form of government in France seems to indicate a society where power is both highly structured and institutionalized. The selected articles edited by H.-D. Evers in *Case-Studies in Social Power*, on the contrary, have in common that they deal with societies where the power structures are diffuse or amorphous.

The papers of this volume—all based on field research in the respective societies—deal with power structures in a wide variety of societies, ranging from an African tribal society to complex industrial or postindustrial societies, from a small community to a large labor union or a national elite.

The very diversity in methodology and subject matter of the articles included (the studies are not written from a common point of view nor have the writers used the same theoretical framework of analysis) makes it difficult to give an overall judgment on the book, but necessitates a discussion of every article for itself, which of course exceeds the aim of this review.

A good many of the articles included are interesting to read; I especially liked the contributions of Gilbert D. Bartell, Lloyd H. Rogler, and J. David Edelstein, both for the subject matter and for their findings.

But the volume as a whole leaves one unsatisfied. This may be due to the shortcomings inherent in this kind of collection of different articles, unrelated to one another on methodological or theoretical grounds, except perhaps for the common use of a very stretchable concept such as "diffuse power." Assuredly, the editor recognizes this lack of unity in his unfortunately much too brief introduction. In his own words, the volume is not aimed at producing "any coherent picture of power in different social systems, but . . . a number of case studies which would show the diversity and possible diffuseness of power structures in different societies" (p. 2). But this does not really solve the problem. Indeed, it seems that the editor could have chosen some middle road, selecting the different contributions more carefully in reference to some topic matters fixed in advance, so as to ensure a minimum of unity. The overall objectives of the volume might have been less global, but the significance of the book for cross-cultural analysis of diffuse power structures would have been greatly advanced.

Rebellion and Authority: An Analytical Essay on Insurgent Conflicts. By Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. xii+174. \$5.95.

Why Men Rebel. By Ted Robert Gurr. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. xi+421. \$12.50.

James F. Short, Jr.

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Both of these books are concerned with that type of political violence known as rebellion, and the acknowledged purpose of both is generalization and theory. Each seeks to accomplish its task by surveying research and other literature considered relevant and by abundant illustrative examples. Support by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U.S. Department of Defense is acknowledged by the authors of both volumes, with the customary caveats concerning such support.

Here the parallels largely end. Gurr's focus is stated in his title: *why* do men rebel? Leites and Wolf are preoccupied with the *success* or *failure* of rebellion and its converse, the success or failure of authority in avoiding and resisting rebellion. Differences between the volumes are greater than is implied in focus, however. For Gurr, the fundamental and prior problem has to do with the social and psychological forces which cause men to rebel, while Leites and Wolf seem almost to assume the inevitability of rebellion and set about to discern and inform its nature. Gurr finds his answers in the enormous literature of scholarly disciplines, particularly in the sophisticated quantitative analyses of political science (to which he is a distinguished contributor), in economics and history, and in the more traditionally behavioral sciences of psychology, sociology, and anthropology. He develops his theory systematically in the form of hypotheses and corollaries, specifying the form and strength of relationships among variables. Where the research literature is inadequate to answer his questions, or to support his hypotheses, he is often at pains to discuss methods by which such answers and support (or lack of support) may be obtained. Leites and Wolf clearly are cognizant of this scholarly literature, but their treatment of it is sketchy and they find much of it at fault. They draw their inspiration instead chiefly from the formal models of economics and the rich literature of practical men—politicians, professional military men, insurgent leaders, and theorists. The contrast in the two books in this respect is so great that their references scarcely overlap.

Differences such as these are not attributable merely to questions asked but reflect fundamentally different perspectives. The "integrated theory of political violence" toward which Gurr strives is based on relative deprivation, defined more broadly than in reference group theory as "a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities." While Leites and Wolf do not directly challenge relative deprivation as an explanatory hypothesis—indeed they do not even mention the phrase—their primary attack is on what they term the "hearts-and-minds theory." Relative deprivation and hearts-and-minds

cannot by any means be equated. Yet there are similarities. Both stress economic as well as other types of deprivation and in this sense are "demand" theories, and both are concerned primarily with the internal dynamics of political systems. Leites and Wolf view rebellion as a system and employ a cost-effectiveness perspective in analyzing and prescribing strategies calculated to enhance the success of rebels and authorities within this system. They assume rationality on the part of both rebels and authorities; they view "apparent irrationalities" as mistakes, uncertainties, the product of misinformation or insufficient information, etc. "Sympathies" and ideologies are decidedly secondary in their scheme of analyses. Indeed, they stress that rebellion does not depend for its success on popular sympathy and that "the essential material and human input required for the existence of R [rebellion] need only engage a small fraction of the population"; and the trade-off of endogenous and exogenous support for rebellion and for authority is essential to their analysis.

Gurr defends the primacy of "nonrational" motivation to act violently out of anger, based fundamentally on frustration, although he acknowledges that utilitarian justifications for political violence are "highly consequential," and he attempts to integrate them into his theoretical model. He states that "the greatest potential increment to dissident military capacity is external support," but does not systematically examine the role of such support. And so it goes.

It seems important, finally, to note that perhaps the most fundamental difference between these volumes lies in the fact that Leites and Wolf write essentially as policy scientists while Gurr adopts the more traditional scholarly posture. The authors of both volumes come to their tasks with formidable credentials, and the products of their efforts are impressive. I find myself worrying, however, lest those with political power—and particularly with military power—accept the assumptions urged by Leites and Wolf of the virtual inevitability of rebellion, and concentrate entirely on strategic and coercive aspects of the struggle between rebellion and authority to the neglect of the problems which both Leites and Wolf, and Gurr, recognize as underlying the conflict. Control seems always easier to "sell" than do "root causes" and solutions. The policy challenge to all behavioral sciences seems clear and urgent.

The Los Angeles Riots: A Socio-Psychological Study. Edited by Nathan Cohen. New York: Praeger Publishers, published in cooperation with the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, 1970. Pp. xxxii+742. \$20.00.

Institutional Racism in America. Edited by Louis L. Knowles and Kenneth Prewitt. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. xii+180. \$5.95.

Racial Violence in the United States. Edited by Allen D. Grimshaw. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. xviii+553. \$12.50.

Ralph H. Turner

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Here are three very different kinds of books dealing with racial tensions in America. Under the leadership of Nathan Cohen, an interdisciplinary team from the UCLA faculty was quickly organized to study the 1965 Watts holocaust. The principal empirical endeavors were a field survey of 585 blacks in the curfew area and a field survey of 583 whites from selected neighborhoods. The questions asked were of immediate public or practical interest, but they are formulated and the data analyzed with sufficient sophistication to be amenable to serious theoretical interpretation.

The volume opens with a concise but comprehensive summary of major findings and a set of recommendations directed toward ameliorating social conditions, with principal emphasis on the "survivalists"—the 40-45 percent of Negroes pervasively concerned with economic frustration. Approximately half of the book is devoted to analyses of data from the curfew area sample, supplemented by a sample of 124 arrestees. The latter seem not to have been the militant, ideologically sophisticated core, but the looters. The main outlines of the findings come out in the careful statistical analysis by Raymond Murphy and James Watson, including such observations as the wide extent of participation, support, and sympathy for the disturbance among blacks, and the suggestion that increased contact with whites enhances relative deprivation rather than strengthening favorable attitudes. In another unusually interesting chapter, T. M. Tomlinson explores the existence of a riot ideology that might be the foundation for future disturbances, through a close look at militants, identified as those who were favorable toward the Black Muslims. Walter Raine shows the widespread belief in various forms of police brutality, and David Sears and John McConahay find a surprising acceptance of conventional political institutions. Findings from the white sample are analyzed by Richard Morris and Vincent Jeffries, seeking determinants of reactions to the disturbance and attitudes toward Negroes. A supplementary study of ghetto merchants whose establishments were damaged reveals little empathy with rioters and their problems. In a concluding essay, the editor expresses concern that subsequent developments have been more toward law and order than toward large-scale programs for dealing with social problems.

It is not hard to find fault with a study so ambitiously conceived. One may ask whether Cohen's recommendations, with their flavor of the 1930s' New Dealism are incomplete in light of the character of militancy revealed by the research. The total commitment to survey research and the forms of analysis that compare categories of respondents neglects any attention to the processes and dynamics of the collective behavior itself.

Perhaps the urgent concern of the investigators for the admirable objective of promoting understanding for the rioters' point of view kept them from exploring all important leads. Most of the contributors rightly stress frustration as the underlying cause but fail to develop the strong indication from their data that hope is the obverse component. Militants are more hopeful than others of positive change in race relations and favor use of political as well as violent means; few blacks feel that the riots hurt their cause; and attitudes toward the federal government and Democratic party are surprisingly positive. If riots stem from despair, the disappointing aftermath of each riot should precipitate yet another riot; but if frustration coupled with hope is crucial, the usual riot should inoculate the community against further riots for a period.

In spite of any limitations, the range of questions investigated, the sophistication with which questions were designed to answer these questions, and the high standards of data collection and analysis make this undoubtedly the most important study of an interracial disturbance now available. It is unfortunate that work of this importance should have been published in typescript-offset and priced at the discouraging figure of \$20.00.

Institutional Racism is a brief and incomplete catalog of ways in which institutionalized practices in American society either give legitimation to deliberate racial discrimination or cause unintended racial bias. Topics covered are ideology, economic life, education of blacks and whites, and legal and political institutions. The book is primarily a document recording conclusions reached by a team of Stanford University students working in the community, and a call to action, with proposals for dealing with racial inequality. The solutions to institutional racism are to reform white institutions, working toward this end through a participatory democracy, while allowing blacks to control their own communities and solve their own problems.

Unfortunately, examples of sloppy scholarship are rife. On page 82 we read that gerrymandering dilutes Negro power at the polls in Los Angeles, while on page 155 we are told that blacks have greater than their share of representation in the Los Angeles City Council; we hear that American expansion was justified by Social Darwinism—an expansion largely completed before publication of Darwin's work; we are told authoritatively what Black Power means, when any serious student knows that it means different things to different blacks in different situations; the IQ is given so simplistic an interpretation as to embarrass the serious scholars on the environmentalistic side that the authors endorse in caricature. The authors' call for strict reinforcement of building codes in ghetto areas runs counter to the demands of many ghetto leaders, for reasons well known to any sociologist. The legitimate demand that schools stop trying to make whites out of black children should have been qualified by asking how many blacks themselves reject ghetto culture and whether ghetto culture is partly an adaptation to exclusion from the mainstream that deprives the individual of motivations needed to win a share of

benefits in an industrial society. Specific prescriptions, such as making real estate agents change their ways and making home loans easier for blacks to secure, lack attention to problematic aspects of making such proposals work. And the uncritical faith in participatory democracy runs against much evidence that shifts from representative to participatory democracy in recent years have been a recurrent impediment to the reform of discriminatory institutions.

I am tempted to be generous because these people are on the right side. But if our vision is distorted by the well-known principles that virtue is often accepted as a substitute for competence, and that indignation is a sure sign of virtue, we debase the problem being attacked. The consequences of diverting reformist energies into unproductive courses of action on the basis of faulty diagnoses and self-defeating action proposals are too tragic for us to applaud careless work.

Grimshaw has filled an important gap in sociological literature by assembling a comprehensive historical and analytical account of collective interracial violence involving whites and Negroes in the United States. Grimshaw's brief introductions to each chapter and some twelve published and unpublished papers of his own make the book a considerably more creative effort than the usual book of readings. Approximately the first half of the book is historical, consisting of illustrative accounts of violence from the slave revolts to riots in the summer of 1967. Another ninety pages look analytically at various regularities concerning race riots, and a much longer section delves into causation. A final brief section considers questions of control and responsibility for interracial violence.

The readings in this volume are an unusually fine set, well written, important, and carefully pared down and excerpted by the editor for maximum impact and relevance. Most interesting for review purposes is the framework enunciated and used throughout the volume by the editor. The subject is racial violence, a form of *social violence* defined as "assault upon an individual or his property solely or primarily because of his membership in a social category," although in effect Grimshaw has limited himself to *collective* racial violence. The main causal-analytic proposition, familiar to students of Park, Reuter, and Wirth, is that serious racial violence erupts when a subordinate minority attempts to disrupt the traditional accommodative pattern between groups. Major violence comes with the dominant group's response to the subordinate group's refusal to accept that subordinate status. Grimshaw makes an interesting distinction between the traditional Southern race-riot pattern—now defunct, where provocation is in a sacred sphere such as sex, where the minority does not resist, and where the aftermath is to reestablish prior accommodations, and the Northern pattern of secular provocation, minority resistance, and disruption of prior accommodations as the aftermath. There is enough prejudice and tension that every American urban center is violence-prone, so explanations for differential incidence of violence must be sought in patterns of control and other features of community or-

ganization bearing on confrontation. The second half of the 1960s witnessed a change in the meaning of racial violence, from something far removed from the mainstream of civil rights activity to an integral part of the larger movement.

Grimshaw's style is admirably cautious, and his respect for the difficulty of making integrated interpretations of diverse phenomena merits emulation by students. But his orienting framework seems to fit better the events between Reconstruction and 1965 than either the earlier slave revolts or the "ghetto riots" since then. Violence still revolves about challenges to established accommodations, but the use of violence in the guerrilla manner by a minority group as an aggressive strategy is vastly different from punitive mass violence by people secure in the knowledge that they have the numbers and power to control the situation whenever they choose to resort to extreme tactics. Grimshaw's failure to take notice of the significance of Third World ideology, of the important part played by the omnipresent threat of violence in the "nonviolent" civil rights movement, the social legitimation of Negro rage, and other elements in the new pattern makes the book better as an interpretation of the past than as a perspective on the 1970s. In summary, this is a pioneering work, exceptional in its scope and the quality of the materials it includes, containing excellent descriptive and analytic accounts of events through 1967, and supplying an interpretative framework that is most valuable for the period ending with 1964.

Profession without a Community: Engineers in American Society. By Robert Perrucci and Joel F. Gerstl. New York: Random House, 1970. Pp. 194. \$2.50.

The Engineers and the Social System. By Robert Perrucci and Joel F. Gerstl. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969. Pp. xii+344. \$9.95.

Jeffrey M. Schevitz

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Profession without a Community is a journeyman's job of sociological analysis of an increasingly important occupational group. The book covers well the social origins of engineers and engineering students, the education and professional socialization of engineers, the work settings within which engineering roles are performed, the professional-organizational conflict, variations in career patterns, and the interaction among family, career, and the larger community. But like any *respectable* sociologists, the authors never analyzed the way the fundamental values and institutions of American society shape engineering. For example, to what extent is there recognition by engineers (and what are the consequences of such recognition) of the fact that the majority of engineers must design and produce the hardware that satisfies "artificial" needs (e.g., new weapons systems, gadgetry, new model cars)? These needs are

created by corporate advertising to keep our capitalist economy going without redistributing the wealth.

Except for a discussion of the disruptive career effects of technological obsolescence, there is no discussion at all of the recurrent patterns of unemployment to which hundreds of thousands of engineers are subject in the "defense" industries. During 1963-64, approximately 30,000 professional engineers and scientists in the war-defense industries lost their jobs because of mass layoffs by firms throughout the country. It has been estimated by Loomba (whose important study was not cited) that these individuals remained unemployed for a period of three months on the average. Within the last year, according to the Aerospace Industries Association, another 30,000 scientists and engineers have been "surplused." Perrucci and Gerstl note that "Engineers experience considerable mobility between organizations" (p. 179). But the authors examine neither the causes nor the consequences of that mobility. Yet Loomba pinpoints a major determinant of intraorganizational mobility—unemployment. Loomba found that approximately one-quarter of the nation's war-defense industries' turnover rate is due to layoffs for lack of work. It is not clear why the authors avoided this very important issue, but it is clear that such an examination would have to question major American institutions whose operation produces such dislocations and job insecurity.

Another topic that received scant attention is that of the social responsibility of engineers (pp. 84-87). There is a table (pp. 102-3) that reports variations in professional values by degree level, but not by industry. Consequently, we know that "to contribute to society" is a fairly highly regarded value among engineers of all degree levels. But we do not know how important this value orientation is among engineers who design and produce weapons systems in contrast to, for instance, bio-medical engineers. Such an industry breakdown would allow us to ask questions about self-selectivity into industries and social control of engineers within various industries. My research and organizing among engineers has turned up actual instances of intimidation by employers and the government in response to engineers' statements in opposition to the war in Vietnam. Since a table in the same chapter (p. 124) does report an industry breakdown in examining organizational policies regarding encouragement and reward of advanced degree work, we can only wonder on what basis the authors chose their variables.

Heavy reliance on survey research apparently has removed the authors from the *real* activities of engineers who are concerned about the uses of their work. There is no mention of the Society for Social Responsibility in Science (founded in 1949) which includes engineers in industry, government, and academia; there is no mention of the Boston Industrial Mission (founded in 1964) which "initiates and encourages discussion, thinking and action among engineers, scientists, and management of the research and development industry"; and there is no mention of the Technology and Society Committee (founded in 1968), an organization

comprised primarily of industrial engineers and scientists in the San Francisco peninsula defense complex. TASC has over 400 members and associates. It has produced a film, *The Schizophrenia of Working for War*, and has a number of action "TASC Forces."

The Engineers and the Social System, edited by the authors of *Profession without a Community*, fills in many of the lacunae of the first book. Special attention should be accorded to the article, "Science, Business and the American Engineer," by the historian, Edwin Layton. Layton stresses the close association between the rise of industrial capitalism and the growth of engineering. He traces how "the engineering profession in America was called into being and shaped by the needs of large organizations, mostly private corporations" (p. 53). He documents how corporate capitalist organizations, with the goal of production for profit, not use, created and controlled the major engineering associations to prevent and quash movements of engineers to assert their social responsibility. Layton, however, sees the root of the problem of the social control of engineers not with corporate capitalist managers in particular but with bureaucrats in general. Yet Layton's data are all drawn from the American experience. There is no comparison with engineering in a noncapitalist society.

The cross-cultural analysis by William M. Evan covers an area neglected in the other book reviewed here. However, Evan is hemmed in by his methodological emphasis and his ideological blinders. Evan has a hypothesis that the number of engineering students and graduates in a country is directly related to industrialization as measured by GNP per capita. He reports, "The rank order correlation coefficients, though statistically significant, are rather modest [!] in size (.266 and .299) because of the *anomalous* position of several Communist countries. . . . In their [China, Romania, and Poland] effort to accelerate their economic growth, Communist countries have greatly expanded their facilities for the education of engineers" (pp. 113-14; my emphasis). Evan is more interested in excusing his low correlations than in explaining why the Communist countries have such large numbers of engineers. Could it be that socialist economies are more rationally directed toward satisfying the needs of the masses than the economies of other industrializing countries?

In general, the other articles cover in depth the topics adumbrated in the book *Profession without a Community*.

The Legislation of Morality: Law, Drugs and Moral Judgment. By Troy Duster. New York: Free Press, 1970. Pp. x+275. \$6.95.

Peter Park

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In this book, Troy Duster argues persuasively that heroin should be made freely available through physicians and clinics in hospitals to those who seek it. His argument is based partly on the fact that "Opium ad-

dicts are incapacitated neither physically nor mentally" (p. 241) and on the reasoning that making the drug easily obtainable would eliminate secondary crimes presently associated with the "habit," would break the underworld ties with drug taking, and, finally, would restore the stigmatized addicts, whether or not "cured of the habit," as men morally and legally equal to other men. This last point is the overriding concern of the author, and the bulk of the book, one way or another, deals with the problems of being stigmatized as an addict.

This humane concern, which I find personally appealing, is couched in a broader sociological framework having to do with the "law-morality" issues. One of the issues raised is the question of whether or not morality can be legislated. In a generalized attempt to answer this question, Duster considers two dimensions of behavior in relation to morality and legislation: whether or not the behavior is publicly performed and whether or not it entails victims. He then proposes the idea that moral precepts about public behavior entailing victims (e.g., exhibitionism) are the most effectively legislated, since laws are easily enforced in this sector and thus affect behavior. They are the least effective when dealing with private and victimless behavior (e.g., homosexuality among consenting parties), with the other categories of behavior ranging between these two extremes. This is a plausible formulation, according to which legislation against the use of narcotics should be ineffectual, as the author points out. But the fact appears to be that heroin addiction was more prevalent before the passage of the Harrison Act in 1914 than now, and Duster does not challenge this datum which is proudly publicized by the Bureau of Narcotics. (Similarly, there is strong evidence that the rate of alcoholism was lower during Prohibition than now.) Granted that legislation cannot rehabilitate drug addicts or alcoholics, I do not think that it is any more effective in rehabilitating exhibitionists. But when it comes to prevention, legislation may be as effective against one type of behavior as against another, provided that the law is diligently enforced. Thus the current narcotics laws cannot be opposed on this conceptual ground.

Another, related, issue which Duster raises has to do with whether morality or legislation comes first. Admittedly this is a "complex and subtle" problem, as the author realizes, and it may even be a "logically and substantively" senseless question, as he asserts. He sees this as a chicken-egg question. And yet Duster is lucid about how legislation concerning a behavior can change the moral climate from a neutral position to a negative one, as apparently happened with anti-heroin legislation of 1914. He also suggests in strong terms that those in power legislate against the behavior associated with the "vulnerable" class—the minorities, the young, the poor, etc. The use of narcotics indeed seems to have shifted from the secure middle class to a broader basis around the time the Harrison Act came into being, according to Duster's information, although it is not clear which came first. In any event, this issue not only is central to the problem of changing the law concerning the use of narcotics, which the author advocates, but also it cuts right down to the questions having to do with how deviants are created and managed in

and by society. Duster's treatment of this issue ("Empirical Approaches of the Study of Morality") is confusing and disappointing. It is Garfinkel-like not only in the methodological model which Duster adopts but also in the style of presentation.

The relatively fresh approach to deviance, which focuses on the process of being labeled as a deviant rather than on the psychic makeup of the deviant, works well in showing the reasons for the failure of the current efforts to rehabilitate narcotic addicts, including the well-publicized Synanon. From this perspective, a deviant is one not by virtue of what he is or even what he does but by being so labeled by the "community." In the moral sphere this labeling tends to be total; it blanks out the other identifications—and permanently—once a deviant, always a deviant. Duster shows how this process works in an institutional setting in the California Rehabilitation Center (where he has worked as a consultant and a researcher) from the time an addict is committed through his release into the hands of the parole officer.

This approach to deviance points up the social nature of such problems as drug addiction and alcoholism—they are social in that "society" defines them as such. But it fails to answer the question of why certain behaviors are considered problems; and this failure, I might suggest, is due to the tradition-bound ways of thinking about community and deviance which linger on even in the new brand of sociology which Duster practices. Community or society is still thought of as representing a mystical consensus of sentiments, as it has been traditionally in sociology, and moral judgment, such as labeling a deviant, which implies norms and community standards of behavior. This way of reconstructing human behavior in society persists in spite of the professed aims and actual attempts of sociologists of Duster's persuasion to examine the process whereby a person becomes stigmatized. Thus Duster suggests more than once that a moral climate can be created by men who are at the center of power, but he stops short of carrying this insight to the conceptual level where it might be useful in tackling the problems of moral judgment.

Be that as it may, *The Legislation of Morality* is a thoughtful exposé of the fallacies underlying the present narcotics policy; and its recommendations—to legally change the condition of the addicts—together with the supporting arguments should be placed in the hands of men who moralize, legislate, or stigmatize.

The Structure of Psychological Well-Being. By Norman Bradburn. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. v+310. \$9.75.

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This major new contribution to our understanding of psychological well-being is the result of a large-scale sample survey of normal populations by

trained nonprofessional interviewers. The study was designed to determine how the problems of everyday life relate to the psychological well-being of ordinary people and is not concerned with the diagnosis of psychiatric disorders. More than 2,000 subjects were interviewed on multiple occasions in five different areas of the country ranging from the inner city to middle-class suburbia.

The closed-end interviews employed were designed first to obtain statements as to levels of happiness and second to obtain data about various positive and negative feelings related to psychological well-being.

In order to evaluate levels of happiness, subjects were asked to rate themselves as "very happy," "pretty happy," or "not too happy." One-third of the subjects described themselves as "very happy" and 5-15 percent as "not too happy." But more than 20 percent of the population in an economically depressed area described themselves as "not too happy." Women claimed no less happiness than men, but older persons claimed slightly less happiness than young people, possibly because of the increased physical illness associated with aging.

Measures of psychological well-being in the study were obtained by asking subjects whether they had experienced within the past few weeks a variety of positive and negative feelings. Two separate components of psychological well-being were identified: one of positive affect and one of negative affect. Since these two components are independent of each other, knowledge of a person's standing on one component does not permit prediction of his standing on the other. Neither a positive nor a negative feeling state has a significant relationship to self-reports of happiness, but the difference between the positive and negative is highly correlated with happiness and is known as the Affect Balance Scale. An individual experiences a sense of psychological well-being when he has an excess of positive over negative feelings. In contrast, when negative feelings are in excess of positive feelings, the individual experiences a diminished sense of well-being.

The Affect Balance Scale was studied in relation to the variables of sex, age, socioeconomic status, anxiety and poor mental health, marital status, and occupation. Women had slightly lower scores than men on the Affect Balance Scale, but there was little difference in the Affect Balance Scale among various age groups. Those with higher education and income in the study experienced higher positive affect and therefore greater psychological well-being. And those with low incomes and heavy responsibilities manifested lower psychological well-being. The increased positive affect associated with higher education and income was apparently due in part to the greater social participation occurring in persons of higher socioeconomic status. And much of the positive value of social participation was the increased likelihood of the participant's experiencing novel or varied experiences which increase his sense of well-being. Thus, those whose educations, incomes, and occupations placed them in a higher socioeconomic status consistently manifested greater well-being than those in a lower socioeconomic status. Possibly also because of lower education and income, more Negroes than whites reported a low sense of well-being.

Anxiety and poor mental health were found to be highly correlated with negative but not with positive affect. Women subjects were higher in negative affect than men just as they were higher in the other various indicators of poor mental health.

Not being married was strongly associated with a decreased sense of psychological well-being, especially for those who had been separated, divorced, or widowed. Although not being married had a more negative effect on men, adjustment in marriage was more crucial to the psychological well-being of women. Marital tensions were associated only with negative affect, and marriage sociability and companionship only with positive affect.

Being unemployed for men had effects on both positive and negative affect. The reduced social participation caused by unemployment seemed to be primarily responsible for the reduced positive affect. And the greater worry and anxiety associated with the loss of a regular income was apparently responsible for the higher level of negative affect. Also learned from the study was that satisfaction with work and job status results in positive affect while feelings of inadequacy and dissatisfaction with work result in negative affect.

In summary, the authors have contributed an important new dimension to our understanding of human emotional function. At a time when creative planners of new health care delivery systems are questioning whether a system which narrowly concerns itself with sickness can properly consider itself a health system, these authors similarly demonstrate that mental health, or "psychological well-being" as they prefer, is more than the absence of mental illness. Convincing evidence is presented that "psychological well-being" or "happiness" is the surplus of positive over negative feelings—that a man with a very unhappy marriage may have a sense of psychological well-being if his negative feelings are compensated by positive feelings about his work, his children, or his social activities. Psychiatrists have long recognized but poorly understood that one person with an unhappy marriage might decompensate while another similarly disappointed by his marriage never requires treatment. *The Structure of Psychological Well-Being* provides some intriguing pieces to one of mankind's oldest puzzles, the question of human happiness.

Le vestali della classe media [The vestals of the middle class]. By Marzio Barbaglia and Marcello Dei. Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 1969. Pp. 378. L. 4,000 (\$6.40).

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The *contestazione* ("confrontation"), which has been the hallmark of the Italian universities for the past several years, has given rise to many slogans. "Sullo [Minister of Education, 1969] is Allah and the Police are

his Prophets." "The Professors are Servants like the Workers like the Students." "No to the Reform of the Rulers." "Paint the Altar of Society—YELLOW." A university system geared to produce the cultural elite of Italy is under attack by its children. The entire institution of education is designed to funnel away the unworthy, to insure that only the "cream" of the "cream of the crop" will enter the universities.

The Constitution of Italy (1948) provides: "The capable and meritorious, even though they be without the means, have the right to enter the highest levels of instruction. The Republic will make possible this right through scholarships, payments to families, and through other provisions which will be awarded through competitive exams." Despite the provisions of the Constitution, best estimates indicate that fewer than 6 percent of students presently enrolled in higher education come from families of workers and/or peasant backgrounds.

It has long been suspected that the major filter point of the system has been the *sculo media* (equivalent to the American junior high school), and the finest sieve in the filter has been the obligatory courses in Latin. Recent reforms have dispensed with Latin as a requirement for university admission. The present study reveals that 14 percent of the middle-school teachers would abolish Latin from the curriculum. Thus, the teachers stand exposed as the *vestals*, but not necessarily *virgin*.

Marzio Barbaglia and Marcello Dei, in one of the first major researches into the sociology of Italian education, focus on the role of the teacher in the middle school. Intensive and lengthy interviews of hundreds of teachers, principals, and parents were conducted in central Italy (1967) and provide the raw material for this critical appraisal of contemporary Italian education.

Probing into attitudes, aspirations, hopes, despairs, and the private lives of teachers, the authors reveal the frustrations of a profession which is neither fish nor fowl. Well educated, the middle-school teacher is more prestigious than the lowly instructor of the elementary grades; yet he is not entitled to the appellation *professore* as are the teachers in the *liceo*. As one interviewee phrased it, "What do we represent? To the kids we are the overseers least congenial and to the others we are persons who earn little. Our culture doesn't count. We are the servants of the servants" (p. 13).

Middle-school teachers occupy a Janus role as guardians of the gates of society. They function to eliminate from the educational system those children of "inferior" social classes who can profit little from advanced cultural experience. They are the enforcers of socialization toward passivity and subordination to the values of the dominant class. As *vestals* they must instruct their young charges how to obey. They are described as "the custodians of a spent wick." In a society undergoing rapid technological and social change, the teachers stand out as "defenders to the extreme of an historically superannuated patrimony" (p. 329).

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- Goode, W. J. 1967. “The Protection of the Inept.” *American Sociological Review* 32 (February): 5–19.
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Lifetime Commitment in Japan: Roles, Norms, and Values¹

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This paper reexamines the extent and sources of "lifetime commitment"—the practice of working for one firm throughout one's work life—in Japan. Earlier analyses are modified by the introduction of (1) conceptual distinctions between *lifetime commitment as role behavior*, and two types of commitment to a firm: *status enhancement* and *moral loyalty*; (2) Japanese and U.S. data on interfirm mobility; and (3) data from our own research in Japanese factories. On the basis of these conceptual distinctions and data, we conclude that, with regard to lifetime commitment, the degree to which Japan disconfirms theories of modernization and differentiation has been exaggerated.

Theories of economic development and of social and political modernization assert that increasing differentiation is a central component of the shift to greater industrialization and per capita energy consumption. In the economic subsystem of society, differentiation takes the form of a gradual emancipation ("freeing up") of the factors of production from "embeddedness" in diffuse, ascriptive nexuses, and the mobilization of these resources through the mechanism of the market (or its analogue in centrally planned economies). With regard to two of the factors of production—labor and organization—increasing differentiation of the identity of the individual employee from that of the firm for which he works and an increasing rate of *interfirm labor mobility* are predicted. Furthermore, the probability of cases of *partial differentiation* is recognized. Smelser (1968, pp. 131–32) identifies such instances as: "Migratory labor . . . may be a kind of compromise between full membership in a wage-labor force and attachment to an old community life. Cottage industry introduces extended markets but retains the family-production fusion. The employment of families in factories maintains a version of family production. The expenditure of wages on traditional items, like dowries, also manifests the half-entry into the more differentiated industrial-urban structure." The type of partial differentiation with which

¹ The research reported in this paper was partially financed by research grants from the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation and the Ford Foundation.

this paper is concerned is "lifetime commitment" in Japanese industrial firms, that is, entering a firm directly from school and remaining there until retirement. The Japanese case has become strategic in the literature on development, largely through the publication of one book, Abegglen's *The Japanese Factory* (1958). According to this much-cited (and often misinterpreted) study, lifetime commitment is the "general rule in the large factories of Japan" (p. 13). If this is true of technologically modernized firms, then lifetime commitment is no mere transitional phenomenon of Japan's early stages of differentiation. Such findings would be, rather, a crucial instance of the *long-term, stable coexistence of traditional and modern patterns* (Rüchemeyer 1969). Japan is the only non-Western society to have attained a high level of industrialization and is the society with the highest economic growth rate in the postwar period. If such a society has *not* undercut that set of reciprocal rights and obligations between employer and employee that is institutionalized in the lifetime-commitment system, then theories of modernization need some modification.

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the extent to which the Japanese case is, in fact, a disconfirmation of theory. This is done by a careful reading of what Abegglen actually wrote, conceptual clarification, and data, drawn from both published sources and our research in Japanese factories in 1969-70.

THE "LIFETIME COMMITMENT" PATTERN

Abegglen's major conclusion (1958, p. 141) was that "it may be true that the Western style of organization maximizes productivity, but substantial industrial progress can be made within a quite different style of organization." Central to this different social organization, according to Abegglen, is the pattern of "lifetime commitment" (*shūshin kōyō*),² which is supported by Japanese beliefs in "the firm as one family" (*kigyō-ikka*), "familistic management" (*keiei kazokushugi*) (Hazama 1960, p. 137), and the seniority system (*nenko joretsu-seido*). The following quotations summarize Abegglen's (1958) view of the lifetime commitment pattern and its ramifications.

At whatever level of organization in the Japanese factory, the worker commits himself on entrance to the company for the remainder of his working career. . . . Both top management and workers stand in the same lifetime relationship to the company. [P. 11]

[The employee] will not quit the company for industrial employment elsewhere. [P. 11]

The worker, whether laborer or manager . . . is bound, despite potential economic advantage, to remain in the company's employ. [P. 17]

² *Shūshin* means "lifelong, lifetime, permanent," and *kōyō* means "employment."

Lifetime Commitment in Japan

He is a member of the company in a way resembling that in which persons are members of families, fraternal organizations, and other intimate and personal groups in the United States. [P. 11]

[The basic cause of this lifetime commitment pattern in industry is that in Japanese society as a whole] loyalty to the group and an interchange of responsibilities—a system of shared obligation—take the place of the economic basis of employment of workers by the firm. [P. 17]

[Lifetime commitment in industry derives its strength from Japan's traditional, feudal social structure.] At repeated points in the study of the factory, parallels to an essentially feudal system of organization may be seen—not, to be sure, a replication of the feudal loyalties, commitments, rewards, and methods of leadership but a rephrasing of them in the setting of modern industry. [P. 131]

The controversy over the extent of lifetime commitment in Japanese industry has gone on for over a decade now. Several Japan specialists (Taira 1962; Tsuda 1965; Shirai 1967; Cole 1967; Karsh and Cole 1968) have criticized Abegglen. But Abegglen (1968) has had more influence than his critics on sociologists who are not Japan specialists, and he has held to his original position (1968).

In this controversy, there has not been an adequate conceptual distinction between actual *rates* of interfirm mobility, on the one hand, and *values* and *norms* concerning lifetime commitment, on the other hand. In the theory of action, "action" has role, norm, and value components. We shall view interfirm mobility rates as lifetime commitment *role behavior*. Norms are defined as shared frames of reference by which people evaluate their own and others' behavior. Thus, lifetime commitment norms (if they exist) state the conditions under which one should stay in one firm; lifetime commitment values (if they exist) give more general reasons or legitimacy for staying in the same firm.

A role is always oriented to norms and values, but the "Abegglen controversy" has too often given the impression that there is a simple, one-to-one relationship between role behavior, norms, and values. We hope to show, on the contrary, that employees may stay in one firm (lifetime commitment role behavior) for reasons other than the internalization of, and conformity to, lifetime commitment norms and values and, conversely, that employees who say they subscribe to the value or norm of lifetime commitment may nevertheless leave the company. We shall first examine interfirm mobility rates; second, explicate two levels of commitment; and, third, relate the data on rates to the data on commitment norms and values.

INTERFIRM MOBILITY RATES

Although Abegglen (1958, p. 12) did not present any comparative data on interfirm mobility rates in the United States, he asserted that Japan's

rate is much lower: "The magnitude of the difference is very great." The data support him on this score (see table 1). In Japan, the proportion of employees in manufacturing firms of all sizes who left the firm annually was 28.1 percent in 1963, 30.7 percent in 1964, 27.8 percent in 1965, 26.0 percent in 1966, and 28.3 percent in 1967 (Rōdō Shō 1968, p. 227; see also Japan Ministry of Labor 1966, p. 24, table 16, and 1968, pp. 26-27, table 16).

If over one-fourth of Japanese manufacturing employees leave their place of employment annually, what is the interfirm mobility rate of a cohort over the entire work life? Mobility rates must always take into account the time spent in the labor force; otherwise, mobility rates will reflect only differences in length of labor market exposure rather than differences in attachment to one firm. Tominaga (1962, table 13) presents data based on a cross-section sample of 1,227 males above twenty years old, in all occupational strata, living in Tokyo in 1960. The proportion who have always worked for the same firm, analyzed by the period in which they entered the labor force, is as follows: 1956-60, 73.0; 1951-55, 52.5; 1946-50, 34.6; 1941-45, 19.1; 1936-40, 20.0; 1931-35, 13.7; 1926-30, 11.6; 1921-25, 16.0; and 1896-1920 (grouped because of small *N*), 12.9. Thus, even if we consider only those who have entered the labor force since the war (1946-60 period), 49 percent have experienced interfirm mobility. Moreover, among those who have moved, multiple mobility is not negligible, although the number of moves is probably lower in the Tokyo sample than in comparable American samples. Of the total Tokyo sample, 30.6 percent had always worked for one firm; 22.6 percent had made one interfirm move; 18.8 percent, two moves; 13.4 percent, three moves; 6.3 percent, four moves; and 8.2 percent, five or more moves. Although interfirm mobility rates in Tokyo are probably higher than for Japan as a whole, one must conclude

TABLE 1
AVERAGE MONTHLY SEPARATION RATES FOR WAGE AND
SALARY EMPLOYEES, MANUFACTURING SECTOR

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Japan	2.0	2.1	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.3
United States . . .	4.1	4.3	4.0	4.1	3.9	3.9	4.1	4.6	4.6	4.6

SOURCE.—Japan, Rōdō Shō Rōdō Tokai Chosa Bu 1969, p. 63, table 42; U.S. Department of Labor 1969, p. 98, table 15.

NOTE.—For both countries, rate includes regular and temporary workers, transfers within a company, retirements, voluntary quits, and discharges. Rate for voluntary quits alone is not available in comparable terms. The U.S. data are for firms of all sizes; Japanese data are for firms with thirty or more employees. Rate is computed by dividing the number of separated employees during a month by the total number of employees at the end of the previous month and then averaging the twelve monthly rates.

that, in purely behavioral terms, lifetime commitment is far from universal in the Japanese economy.

Scholars who cite Abegglen often give the impression that his lifetime-commitment thesis referred to Japanese factories of all sizes. In fact, Abegglen limited his generalizations to companies with over 1,000 employees: a more accurate title for his book would be *The Large Japanese Factory*. This is crucial, for *only 16 percent* of the Japanese manufacturing labor force worked in firms of 1,000 or more employees in 1960, and the proportion was still 16 percent in 1966 (Rōdō Shō 1968, p. 223, table 7).

Far from being constant, Japan's interfirm mobility rates vary according to such factors as size of firm and employees' sex, age, and length of service. (1) The proportion of employees who leave the firm has a curvilinear relationship to the size of the firm. In 1967, for example, the separation rate was 30.0 percent in firms of five to twenty-nine employees, 35.6 percent in thirty to ninety-nine, 30.5 percent in 100-499, and 21.1 percent in firms of over 500 employees (Rōdō Shō Rōdō Tokei Chosa Bu 1969, p. 64; Rōdō Shō 1968, p. 228). This means that Abegglen was generalizing about firms in the size class which have the lowest quit rates. (2) Females are more likely than males to leave a firm (Japan Ministry of Labor 1968, pp. 26-27, table 16). Thus, even large firms may have relatively high quit rates if they employ a large proportion of females. (3) Quitting rates peak in the younger age and lower seniority groups and decline more or less regularly as age and seniority in the company increase (Rōdō Shō 1969, p. 131, table 37, and p. 68, table 48; Japan Ministry of Labor 1968, p. 43, table 28).

Interfirm mobility rates also vary with the condition of the labor market and the general national economy. Abegglen was writing about the mid-1950s, when Japan's unemployment rate was higher than it is now. The economy was just beginning to emerge from its postwar period of sluggish growth. Today's capital and labor markets are quite different. A falling birth rate and higher educational aspirations have reduced the number of new workers entering the manufacturing sector, although demand for labor has increased. There is now a labor shortage. In Japan, as in the United States, employees are more likely to leave their firm voluntarily in periods of prosperity and favorable labor market conditions. In the United States during the prosperous 1920s about three-fourths of all separations in manufacturing firms were voluntary, in contrast to one-fourth or less in the depressed 1930s (Parnes 1968, p. 484). Similarly, of Japanese employees who quit, the proportion who do so for "personal" (*jiko*) reasons increased from 68 percent in 1956 to 86 percent in 1967 (Rōdō Shō 1969, p. 69, table 49). Contrary to Abegglen's argument, the Japanese response is not funda-

mentally different from the American. Moreover, from this evidence and more to be presented below, it is hard to accept Abegglen's conclusion (1958, p. 17; *italics added*) that "the worker . . . is bound, *despite potential economic advantage*, to remain in the company's employ."

With regard to the mid-1950s, Abegglen (1958, p. 29) asserted that Japan's "recruitment directly from schools into the company is to all intents and purposes the *only* way in which men enter the firm." This statement requires qualification. It is true that the larger firms hire more people directly from school than do smaller firms and that, of all new graduates hired each year during the period from 1957 to 1964, firms of 500 or more employees have been the choice of an increasing proportion, while firms of under 100 employees have been the choice of a decreasing proportion (Ohara Institute 1966, pp. 44 and 52). It is also true that firms with 1,000 or more employees are more likely than smaller firms to have recruited a majority of their employees directly from school (Ohara Institute 1966, p. 59). Having said this, however, it must also be recognized that (a) in the first six months of 1965, only 46 percent of all employees hired in manufacturing firms of all sizes had been recruited directly from school; 37 percent had had previous occupational experience (Japan Ministry of Labor 1966, pp. 30-31, table 20); and (b) even in firms with 500 or more employees, the proportion who had been hired with no previous occupational experience (i.e., mostly new graduates) was only 45 percent in 1956, 41 percent in 1961, and 47 percent in 1963 (Ohara Institute 1966, p. 44). Even in the firms about which Abegglen was generalizing, then, it is not true that recruitment directly from school is virtually the only mode of entry. Although most graduates may try for the large firms, it is not the case that these firms can fill their labor needs from the source.

TWO LEVELS OF LIFETIME COMMITMENT

What do Abegglen and others mean precisely by "lifetime commitment norms and values"? Clearly, lifetime commitment refers to more than the mere behavioral fact of staying in one firm: it means staying *because* one holds certain beliefs and has internalized certain norms and values. Agreed. But what is the content of these beliefs, norms, and values?

The basic meaning of lifetime commitment is, of course, that there is a tightly reciprocal set of obligations between the company and the employee. The company will not discharge the employee except in the most extreme circumstances, and the employee, in return, will not quit the company for employment elsewhere. But it appears to us that there are two levels or layers in these reciprocal obligations. One is that the employee will not leave because his loyalty will be rewarded by the company, over the years, by an accumulation of pay increases, bonus

and fringe benefits, paid vacations, promotions, and, in general, by a steadily advancing status in the company. For convenience, we shall refer to this as the *status-enhancement* type of lifetime commitment. The second, deeper level of commitment is suggested by Abegglen's (1958, p. 17; italics added) claim that "the worker, whether laborer or manager . . . is bound, *despite potential economic advantage*, to remain in the company's employ," and "a system of shared obligation [takes] the place of the economic basis of employment of workers by the firm." This appears to mean that the employee owes the company loyalty, as such, and believes that he should stay in the company because it is morally right to do so, independently of how much status enhancement the firm gives him over the years. This second type will be referred to as the *moral loyalty* type of lifetime commitment values.

Analytically, the status-enhancement level of commitment can be regarded as a norm, the moral loyalty level as a value. Norms are more situationally contingent, that is, more conditional than values. As a norm among employees, perceived adequacy of status enhancement is the condition under which one stays in the firm; perceived inadequacy, the condition under which one is less likely to stay. Moral loyalty, on the other hand, is more a value than a norm because it states relatively unconditionally, "one should not change firms because commitment and loyalty to the firm are valued attributes in themselves, the Japanese way, quite apart from considerations of concrete status advantages."

The variety of meanings which analysts have assigned to lifetime commitment norms and values makes the task of empirical assessment of their salience quite difficult. Yet, if we are ever to go beyond *asserting* the significance of these norms and values in Japan and *demonstrate* them, we must explicate their meaning. The remainder of this paper is our attempt to test the "status-enhancement" and "moral loyalty" types of lifetime commitment with data from one plant of a major Japanese electrical appliance firm. The company has over 13,000 employees, and the plant studied for three months in 1969 has 1,200 employees. This plant, located west of the Osaka-Kobe metropolitan area, produces small electric appliances, such as electric fans and vacuum cleaners.

COMMITMENT BEHAVIOR AND COMMITMENT NORMS AND VALUES

We have argued that there are two levels of lifetime commitment, a normative level (status enhancement) and a value level (moral loyalty). We now ask the central question of this paper: if employees exhibit lifetime commitment role behavior, to what extent is this due to (1) status enhancement and/or moral loyalty, and to what extent is this

due to (2) nonlifetime commitment norms and values and other factors? Although we recognize that (status-enhancement) norms and (moral loyalty) values may vary independently of each other, it will simplify the analysis initially if we combine them.³ This will enable us to specify two dimensions—lifetime commitment role behavior and lifetime commitment norms-values, treat each dimension as present or absent, and thus present a fourfold table. Types 1 and 4 are “pure”; that is, commitment behavior and commitment norms-values are both present or they are both absent. Types 2 and 3 are mixed: in type 2, lifetime commitment role behavior is present, but commitment norms and values are absent; in type 3 the reverse is true. Let us examine these four types in turn, giving them content by drawing upon our extended interviews with about twenty employees and on a long, self-administered questionnaire completed by 85 percent of the production, staff, and managerial personnel ($N = 1,033$).

Type 1

Lifetime commitment role behavior is present; lifetime commitment norms and values are also present. This is the full-blown lifetime commitment pattern: the employee remains in one firm throughout his work life because of a combination of status enhancement and moral loyalty to the company, as such.

Type 2

Lifetime commitment role behavior is present; lifetime commitment norms and values are absent. The employee remains in one firm not for reasons of status enhancement or moral loyalty to the company but because family or regional ties limit his mobility; he is too old to move; he has high solidarity with fellow employees both at work and outside work; his job skills are not marketable in other firms; etc.

Type 3

Lifetime commitment role behavior is absent; lifetime commitment norms and values are present. The employee leaves the company for reasons beyond his control. We were not able to obtain data from employees who had left the electrical appliance firm studied, so we cannot say directly what proportion of this group fits type 3, that is, had lifetime commitment norms and values but had to leave for involuntary reasons. However, table 2, which presents data for all Japanese manufacturing firms, has some partially relevant data. In 1967, 14 percent of the employees who left their firm did so for involuntary reasons. The most common reasons were: (1) the worker had been hired for a fixed period

³ Later on we shall again treat the norm and the value separately.

Lifetime Commitment in Japan

TABLE 2
SEPARATED EMPLOYEES, BY SEX AND REASON, JAPANESE
MANUFACTURING FIRMS, 1967

	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
Involuntary reasons:			
Termination of contract.....	33	41	36
Employer's convenience.....	25	28	26
Worker's misdeed.....	23	15	20
Sickness, injury, etc.....	14	14	14
Fixed retirement.....	5	1	3
Total.....	100 (179,800)	99 (130,100)	99 (309,900)
Voluntary reasons:			
Worker's personal convenience....	100	81	90
Marriage, childbirth.....	...	19	10
Total.....	100 (854,200)	100 (1,076,100)	100 (1,930,300)
All involuntary reasons.....	17	11	14
All voluntary reasons.....	83	89	86
Total.....	100 (1,034,000)	100 (1,206,200)	100 (2,240,200)

SOURCE.—Japan Ministry of Labor 1968, p. 42, table 27.

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses = number employees separated.

and the contract had terminated (36 percent); (2) it was to the company's convenience to discharge him (26 percent); (3) the worker was charged with a misdeed, for example, excessive absenteeism (20 percent); (4) illness and injury (14 percent); (5) fixed retirement age (3 percent). Of these reasons, only (4) and (5) seem a priori to admit of a meaningful type 3 categorization given commitment norms and values. The other three types (1-3) generally seem to preclude meaningful lifetime commitment norms and values in relation to a firm, except under very special circumstances. This is, of course, another example of the fact that available data often do not fit the analytical categories of sociology.

Type 4

Lifetime commitment role behavior is absent; lifetime commitment norms and values are also absent. This is the "pure" instrumental relationship between the employee and the firm. The employee does not believe he owes the company lifetime commitment; and whether or not he experiences what he subjectively defines as adequate status enhancement during his period of employment in the firm he considers it legitimate—for any of numerous reasons—to shift to another firm, and,

in fact, he shifts. Among the reasons are the desire to broaden the range of job skills; to get cleaner, less monotonous, more "masculine" or more "feminine" work; the desire to "stabilize one's life" by moving to a larger firm with better growth prospects, higher pay, or long-range benefits, and the like. Table 2 shows that 86 percent of the Japanese employees who left their firms during 1967 did so for voluntary, personal reasons.

Thus, although both parties violate the tightly reciprocal norm and value expectations of lifetime commitment, the employees are much more likely to do so. From 1956 to 1967, voluntary, personal reasons have always accounted for over two-thirds of the separations. As noted earlier, the proportion who left for personal reasons has increased from 68 percent in 1956 to 86 percent in 1967 (Rōdō Shō 1969, p. 69, table 49). We can conclude that the incidence of type 4 (leaving for voluntary reasons) is much greater than that of type 3 (involuntary separation) and that the difference has been increasing.

In his important participant-observation study of two Japanese factories in which he was employed, Cole (1967, p. 299) uncovered another relationship between role behavior, norms, and values: "Despite the separation rate of 17 percent a year at the auto parts plant and 23 percent a year at the diecast plant and the absence of any formal guarantees, workers and managers at both companies insisted that they had the practice of permanent employment. The explanation [is that] permanent employment refers to limitations on the right of employers to fire, not on the right of workers to quit."

This is clearly a different meaning of "lifetime commitment" than that of Abegglen. As Takezawa (1961, p. 111) puts it, "Even the conception of career employment itself has changed, through union efforts, from management's 'handout' to worker's 'right.'" Although Cole's workers violate what Abegglen calls lifetime commitment (that the employee will not leave and the company will not discharge), both they and their employers claim they have lifetime commitment. This suggests a more adequate formulation: there is a set of reciprocal obligations between the company and its employees, but the nature of the obligations is—for many if not most Japanese employees—only in part what Abegglen claimed. Abegglen was correct in stating that, on the company's side, the obligation was not to dismiss its regular employees except under the most extreme circumstances. But, on the worker's side, the obligation is to work diligently and harmoniously for as long as he is employed in that company but not necessarily to remain in the firm permanently. Thus, although the role behavior, norms, and values Cole describes reflect only one-sided, unbalanced commitment from the point of view of those who accept the Abegglen formulation, when the obliga-

tions are differently defined they are seen as two-way and balanced. The essential difference is that the "fair return" the Japanese sees himself as owing his employer takes more the form of what we might call *present commitment* rather than lifelong commitment.

Our questionnaire data from 1,033 managerial, staff, and production employees in a leading Japanese electrical appliance company extend this newer interpretation in several ways. Specific questions were designed to elicit data on each of the three conceptual areas of lifetime commitment—role behavior, norms, and values.

Role Behavior

From company records, we learned that during the year prior to our field work the separation rate was lower than the national average, 7 percent (3 percent for males and 11 percent for women). To assess the probable future role behavior of the present employees, we asked two questions: (1) how each employee perceived the commitment of his fellow employees, and (2) each employee's own intentions. The first question asked was: "In your view, have most male employees decided to work in this company until retirement?" Table 3 shows the distribution of respondents in the four precoded answer categories. Somewhat over half (54 percent) see "the majority" as committed for life, but over one-third (37 percent) think only a minority (some) are committed. Almost no employees perceived "all" or "none" as committed for life. The second question asked, "Except for reasons of retirement or marriage, do you want to continue to work for this company?" Seventy-one percent of the 938 answering said they wanted to continue, while 29 percent admitted to wanting to quit. Eighty-three percent of the males said they want to continue, in contrast to 59 percent of the females.

Thus, the actual separation rate in the factory is low, and the proportion who *intend to quit*, while somewhat higher, is not radically high. To explain why some want to quit and perceive their fellow employees as not committed for life to the company, while others—the majority—profess and perceive generally lifetime commitment to the company, we must turn to norms and values. To what extent is commitment on the level of role behavior based upon status enhancement or moral loyalty, and to what extent is it based on reasons extraneous to these norms and values?

Norms and Values

To operationalize the concept of status enhancement as the source of an employee's lifetime commitment, we have several measures of social status in the company: sex, age, seniority, education, pay, rank, and

TABLE 3
EMPLOYEES' ATTITUDES TOWARD LIFETIME COMMITMENT IN A LARGE
JAPANESE ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE BRANCH FACTORY

	Percentage
In your view, have most male employees decided to work in this company until retirement?	
All males have decided to stay here.....	3
The majority of males have decided to stay here.....	54
Some males have decided to stay here.....	37
No males have decided to stay here.....	6
Total.....	100 (N = 1,024)
Employees' reasons for wanting to continue to work for the company:	
Pay.....	1
Security and other economic aspects.....	44
Nature of the work (I like the work; it's suitable to me; worthwhile to work for this company).....	23
I live near the place of work.....	10
I am too old to change jobs.....	4
Other reasons (just started work here; no other openings; nothing to do at home [females]; all companies are the same; etc.)..	18
Total.....	100 (N = 356)*
What do you think about an employee who voluntarily seeks a position in another company?	
His behavior is not "Japanese".....	2
He is disloyal.....	11
He is an unscrupulous opportunist.....	10
I can understand his behavior.....	67
If I had the opportunity I would change jobs too.....	10
Total.....	100 (N = 959)

* Of the 672 employees who want to stay in the company, 316 did not give reasons.

job classification. In the electrical firm studied, there is a high degree of consistency among these status variables, that is, a positive relationship between an individual's position with regard to one variable and his or her position on any or all the others. Thus, the employees with the greatest status enhancement are those who are male, older, with longer seniority, and higher education, pay, rank, and job classification. Those with the least status enhancement are female employees, who are much more likely to be younger, with less seniority, and lower education, pay, rank, and job classification.

The first three columns of table 4 present data on the relationship between these measures of status enhancement and the two questions on lifetime commitment behavior. The results generally support the

TABLE 4
ATTITUDES TOWARD LIFETIME COMMITMENT IN JAPANESE ELECTRICAL
APPLIANCE FACTORY, BY SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF EMPLOYEES

EMPLOYEE CHARACTERISTICS	WANT TO QUIT COMPANY (%) (1)	PERCEPTION OF HOW MANY MALE EMPLOYEES COMMITTED		VIEW TOWARD CHANGING FIRMS	
		"Majority" (%) (2)	"Some" (%) (3)	"Not Japa- nese," "Dis- loyal," "Op- portunistic" (%) (4)	"I Can Understand Behavior" (%) (5)
Total.....	29	55	36	23	67
Sex:					
Male.....	17	55	35	17	70
Female.....	41	53	37	27	65
Age:					
39+.....	18	67	26	33	61
33-38.....	17	63	30	21	72
27-32.....	14	56	35	16	73
24-26.....	19	62	27	20	69
21-23.....	34	53	41	14	80
18-20.....	39	52	36	20	68
15-17.....	40	44	46	39	49
Seniority:					
20 years +.....	20	52	38	27	62
16-19.....	20	55	37	18	71
12-15.....	15	60	32	20	71
8-11.....	15	62	30	23	70
6-7.....	32	65	27	8	86
4-5.....	25	49	39	15	82
2-3.....	36	50	41	21	67
Under 2 years.....	40	51	38	32	57
Education:					
University.....	7	70	20	8	83
High school.....	28	61	30	16	73
Junior high school..	32	50	40	27	63
Job classification:					
Creative.....	7	65	25	10	82
Operative.....	20	54	41	25	66
Repetitive.....	31	54	37	21	70
Training.....	39	50	40	29	59
Rank:*					
Upper management	0	74	21	19	78
Lower management	15	45	43	20	76
Rank and file.....	31	53	37	23	66
Basic pay per month:					
Over ¥ 60,000...	14	63	30	23	72
¥ 40,000-59,999..	15	61	30	18	71
¥ 20,000-39,999..	37	50	40	25	66

NOTE.—Total $N = 1,033$; subgroup N 's on which percentages are based are: column 1 = 272; 2 = 556, 3 = 377, 4 = 217, and 5 = 643. Table omits some answer categories in each question, so percentages do not total 100 across.

* Upper management includes section and subsection heads (*kacho* and *kakaricho*); lower management includes first and second line foremen (*kumicho* and *hancho*).

proposition that *professing lifetime commitment behavior for oneself and perceiving it on the part of fellow workers is positively associated with the degree of status enhancement one has experienced in the company*. Those who say they want to quit are disproportionately female, younger, with low seniority, low education, low pay, low rank, and low job classification. Those who profess lifetime commitment have the opposite characteristics. Similarly, those who perceive "the majority" of male employees as committed are older, more highly educated, and higher in rank and pay.

This question is in part projective: employees tend to perceive others as having a level of commitment similar to their own. At the same time, some answered this question more objectively. In doing so, however, they probably tell us more about those fellow employees who work near them, and have similar social characteristics to their own, than about "most male employees." Therefore, older and more highly-ranked employees are more likely to perceive that "the majority of male employees are committed," because those with whom they interact most and know best are also older and higher ranking. Conversely, the youngest workers, those with only junior high school education and lower pay, are more likely to perceive only "some" male employees as committed.

To the employees who said that they want to continue to work for the company, we asked, in an open-ended question, for their reasons (see table 3). The striking thing is that the most common answers are couched in terms of what we have called status enhancement: security and other economic aspects, the worthwhile nature of the work. A smaller proportion gave reasons extraneous to lifetime commitment norms and values, that is, proximity of work to residence and being too old to move (type 2). *Conspicuous by their absence are statements of moral loyalty to the company as such*, for example, "I want to continue working at this company because it is right, morally proper that I do so." This finding is evidence that, *insofar as employees have lifetime commitment, it is based primarily on status enhancement, not on moral loyalty*.

We asked, "Do you think most males should work (*hataraku bekida*) for the same company until retirement?" and provided respondents with three fixed choices: "should work," "it depends," and "should not." We interpret these answers as follows. To say "males should work for the same company until retirement"—which 12 percent did say—is to *favor the value* of lifetime commitment. To say "should not work for the same company"—which only 3 percent said—is to *reject the value* of lifetime commitment. To say, "it depends" is to acknowledge a *norm* of lifetime commitment. Norms are by definition situationally specific, unlike values. The vast majority of the employees—85 percent—gave this qualified, normlike answer. Thus, under certain conditions, the

bulk of the factory personnel would remain in the company for life; but, failing to realize those conditions, this same majority would jettison their sense of commitment to the company. (Which is not to say they would necessarily quit, since quitting behavior may require more than intention.) We have already seen that the conditions under which 85 percent would remain in the same firm for life are essentially *conditions of status enhancement*: economic security, rank, etc. Older employees and those with more seniority are more likely to say that males *should* work for only one company. The reverse is true with regard to "it depends"; that is, the younger and newer employees are more likely to say "it depends." But these differences are slight, and the major point is that the norm-type answer—"it depends"—is so close to being universal that most of the status variables (sex, education, pay, rank, and job classification) are not related to this answer.

It is thus fairly clear that to these employees lifetime commitment is more a (contingent) norm than a value; and it is more closely linked to status-enhancement conditions than to moral loyalty to the company, considered apart from status enhancement. This does not mean that company loyalty is nonexistent. It may have more importance in other areas of behavior and attitudes, such as work performance. It is also possible that other questions might have elicited expressions of moral loyalty in reference to lifetime employment.

If employees define lifetime commitment as Abegglen does, if it calls for moral loyalty to the company, independently of status enhancement ("the worker is bound, *despite potential economic advantage*, to remain in the company's employ"), then we might predict certain consequences. Employees who hear of a fellow employee planning to leave might be indignant and might attempt to censure the quitter—by trying to persuade him to reconsider, by gossiping that he had been asked by management to leave, etc. To uncover attitudes here we asked, "What do you think about an employee who voluntarily seeks a position in another company?" Five forced-choice answers were provided; the results appear in table 3.

Only 23 percent expressed negative attitudes toward a quitter—"his behavior is not 'Japanese,'" "he is disloyal," or "he is an unscrupulous opportunist." Since we may assume that not all these people would openly express their negative attitudes toward such an employee, and since 67 percent said, "I can understand his behavior," and another 10 percent went as far as to say, "if I had the opportunity, I would change jobs too," we may conclude that an employee who decides to quit does not have to run the gauntlet of criticism from many of his fellow workers.

The fourth column of table 4 shows that the lower one's education

and job classification, the more likely one is to support the moral loyalty type of lifetime commitment and agree with the statements that the person who leaves the company voluntarily is "not Japanese," "disloyal," and "opportunistic." The higher the education and job classification, the greater the agreement with the statement that "I can understand his behavior." Data on age and seniority suggest a curvilinear relationship over time: the young, new employees express moral disapprobation about quitting behavior relatively frequently, but, as they get older and gain seniority, they shift away from moral disapprobation and toward the view that quitting is "understandable"; then, as they reach their forties and fifties they appear somewhat to revert to moral disapprobation. This may be a result of the fact that as men approach the retirement age of 55, the chances of actually getting a better job by changing employers become so unlikely that such behavior is *not* "understandable."

Putting this in perspective, we repeat that in no subgroup on any background variable do more than 39 percent morally disapprove of the person who changes employers, and in most subgroups the proportion is much lower. We conclude that moral loyalty, as such, to the company cannot be inferred from these findings.

CONCLUSION

Abegglen's *The Japanese Factory* is a study of the *large* (over 1,000 employees) factory, not of variations in factory social organization in relation to firm size. Less than one-fifth of Japan's manufacturing labor force works in these large firms. These two facts and their implications are inadequately understood in the literature on modernization which so often cites Abegglen. Lifetime commitment—which Abegglen regards as the central aspect of Japanese factory social organization—is most pronounced in large firms. Therefore, generalizations about lifetime commitment in factories in general cannot be based upon data from large firms alone.

Among Japanese manufacturing establishments of all sizes, the annual separation rate ranged between 26 percent and 31 percent during the period 1963–67. Even in the larger firms (over 500 employees) the annual rate ranged between 19 percent and 23 percent during the same period. Moreover, separation rates given only for individual years understate the cumulative proportion of a cohort of employees who change firms during their work life, and this proportion is quite high in Japan. We have also noted that, in Japan as in the United States, the proportion of employees who leave for voluntary reasons varies positively with the level of economic growth and the demand for labor.

Yet the fact remains that the Japanese employee is considerably less likely than the American employee to leave his firm. To explain this difference, especially with regard to the large Japanese firm, we have tried to follow through some basic conceptual distinctions between lifetime commitment role behavior, norms, and values. The reciprocity between the Japanese employee and his company exists, but its symmetry is both less than and different from what Abegglen claims. Employees who stay in one firm (lifetime commitment behavior) often do so not on the basis of lifetime commitment values but for a variety of reasons extraneous to these values.

Abegglen stresses the dissimilarity between Japanese and American factory social organization. About lifetime commitment, we must disagree. Insofar as Japanese employees in large firms stay in one firm for reasons of lifetime commitment, this involves the cumulative advantages of long service (status enhancement) rather than loyalty to the company as such, considered apart from status enhancement. This means Japanese employees' reasons for staying in one firm are *the same reasons that tie Western employees to a firm*. Our findings parallel those of Western studies which show that "commitment" to continued employment in a firm is positively related to status in the organization. The most stable members of an organization—be it Japanese or Western—are those who derive the greatest status and work advantages—pay, rank, seniority, etc.—from the organization (Palmer 1954, p. 72; Parnes 1968, vol. 8, p. 484). Furthermore, our data suggest that the norm of modern, rational, bureaucratic career expectations is well internalized not only among Japanese managerial and staff employees but also among male rank and file workers. In this respect, the Japanese factory is not a fundamentally different type from its Western counterpart.

Thus, of the two interpretations of lifetime commitment suggested by Abegglen and others, one—status enhancement—is supported empirically but is not unique to Japan; the other—moral loyalty to the company as such—would be unique if it existed, but there is no evidence that it does exist *apart from status enhancement*.

As Japan reaches higher levels of modernization, a complex of forces impinges upon lifetime commitment. Some of these forces maintain it, others weaken it. Given these considerations, it is premature to conclude that the pattern constitutes a disconfirmation of the proposition of increasing differentiation.

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System Size and Structural Differentiation in Military Organizations: Testing a Baseline Model of the Division of Labor¹

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The relationship between organizational size and occupational differentiation is examined in thirty-seven units of the United States Coast Guard, broken down into three subtypes of operating systems. This relationship is examined in light of two distinctions for structural differentiation and is tested against a probabilistic model of differentiation based upon system size. A strong positive relationship is found between size and number of occupations, but a strong negative relationship is found between size and internal specialization. The relationship between size and differentiation does not differ significantly from what would be expected on the basis of a random differentiation process in two of the three types of military systems, and does not depart markedly in a third type. It is suggested that differentiation in these systems is determined by a variety of countervailing forces, some pressuring the system toward increased heterogeneity and others pressuring the system toward homogeneity in occupational structure. Two specific variables are suggested for future analysis.

INTRODUCTION

The hypothesis that social systems undergo progressive structural differentiation with increments in their population size has been addressed by many social theorists (e.g., Maine 1888; Spencer 1898; Tonnies 1957; Durkheim 1935; Simmel 1950; Weber 1946; Redfield 1941; and White 1959). When the systems in question are formal organizations in urban-industrial societies and when structural differentiation means the division of labor, we find considerable empirical support for this hypothesis (Rushing 1967). Nevertheless, some basic conceptual and methodological problems that have yet to be resolved in existing theory and research leave room for continued pursuit of the question in organizational con-

¹ This paper is based, in part, on a Master's thesis submitted by Grant W. Childers to the Department of Sociology, Washington State University.

texts. In particular, the kinds of social forces that are presumed to generate increases in differentiation as size increases and the mechanisms through which they are presumed to operate have, in our view, never been systematically examined in empirical research. For this reason, it becomes necessary to develop the idea of structural differentiation in more explicit terms than has hitherto been the practice of sociologists. Such delineation is prerequisite to development of a baseline model of structural differentiation as it relates to organizational size, a model that takes into account the mathematical possibilities for increases in differentiation.

The emphasis of our approach is on rationality of structure directed to pursuit of the organization's specified goals. Thus, positions and their duties are formally defined rather than evolving "spontaneously" with the passage of time. Formal rules insure the continuity of the structure and are designed in an attempt to most efficiently perform the tasks at hand. In keeping with this perspective, and specific to the focus of this paper, is the concept of work division, or the "parcelling out of the work of the organization so that a given individual does not perform all the tasks necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes of the organization, but some subset of them" (Gouldner 1954, p. 404). This "parcelling out" process underlies the model employed in the present paper.

The organizations investigated here are conceived as having been rationally designed (Litterer 1965), and under norms of rationality it is expected that work will be divided (Thompson 1967). If division of work is prerequisite to efficient pursuit of goals, it will to some degree be more extensive in large organizations than in small ones. This can be expected on the basis of size alone, since large organizations can have more occupations than smaller ones. In other words, if division of work is efficient and if rationally functioning organizations seek efficiency, then, because large organizations can divide work more extensively than small organizations, it is expected that they will do so.

In this paper we present data on a number of formal military organizations of varying size, parallel structure, and similar function, in which differentiation can be closely scrutinized in relation to size. Our objectives in doing so are twofold. First, we wish to identify the empirical relationship (if any) that exists between size and differentiation in these systems. Second, we wish to determine to what extent this relationship departs (if at all) from the degree of differentiation that may be predicted by a baseline model. After accomplishing these objectives, we shall return to discussion of the social forces that need to be examined in explaining the size-differentiation relation.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Current literature on the division of labor identifies two general components of the concept. One component is *structural differentiation*, the differentiation of a social system into various occupational roles or other structural parts (e.g., Hawley, Boland, and Boland 1965; Blau, Heydebrand, and Stauffer 1966; Hall, Haas, and Johnson 1967). A second component, which will not be considered here, is a conception of dispersion-concentration, focusing on the way in which individuals are distributed among occupational roles or other structural parts of the system (e.g., Gibbs and Martin 1962; Labovitz and Gibbs 1964; Gibbs and Browning 1966; Rushing 1967, 1968; Pondy 1969; Rushing and Davies 1970).

The first component, structural differentiation, ordinarily refers to differentiation of the system into occupational roles, and this interpretation will be employed here. On first appraisal it would seem that conceptual and measurement problems for structural differentiation are minimal, involving merely identification and counting of the occupations in the system. However, two dimensions of structural differentiation are generated by the following questions: (1) How differentiated is the system in terms of some internal standard or base? (2) How differentiated is the system in terms of some external standard or base? The first question asks about the system in terms of its own parameters, that is, given the system, how differentiated can it become within the limits set by its other characteristics? The second question asks about the number of occupational roles in the system without reference to other system parameters, that is, it asks about the absolute number of occupations in the system.

An intuitive idea of the differences referred to in these questions may be obtained by considering the hypothetical systems illustrated in table 1. In one sense it appears that system A is the most differentiated because it has proceeded to a point of maximum differentiation given the number of individuals it contains. Certainly, none of the other systems in table 1 have proceeded to this point. On the other hand, it might be argued that

TABLE 1
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION IN FOUR HYPOTHETICAL SYSTEMS

SOCIAL SYSTEM	NUMBER OF OCCUPATIONS	NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN OCCUPATION				
		1	2	3	4	5
A.....	2	1	1
B.....	3	3	3	3
C.....	4	5	5	5	5	...
D.....	5	20	20	20	20	20

all the other systems (B, C, and D) are more differentiated than A because they all have more occupations than A. The difference here lies, of course, in the point of reference used. Given one system parameter which can limit the extent of differentiation in the system, in this case the number of individuals it contains, it is true that A is more differentiated than B, B is more differentiated than C, and C is more differentiated than D. However, when the question is asked without respect to this limiting parameter, then the reverse is true. From the second point of view, D is more differentiated than C, C is more differentiated than B, and B is more differentiated than A.

We have, then, two dimensions to the conception of structural differentiation, each generated by a different point of reference. When no other system parameter is considered, these dimensions may be positively related or negatively related (as illustrated in table 1) to one another. However, when the variable of system size is introduced, a more restrictive relationship obtains.

Following Starbuck (1965) we define the size (S) of an organization to be the number of individuals (employees, personnel) it contains. External structural differentiation (Δ) is defined as the number of occupations in the organization. Then, internal structural differentiation (δ) becomes $\delta = \Delta/S$. Clearly, $1 < S < \infty$, and in organizations where one individual can fill no more than one occupational role, $1 \leq \Delta \leq S$, and $1/S \leq \delta \leq 1$. These definitions and restrictions seem to imply that at least one of our conceptions of differentiation is no longer necessary in examining the relationship between size and differentiation, because once we are given the values of any two of these three variables, the other is fixed.

Nevertheless, for the vast majority of S values, knowing that there is a positive relationship between S and Δ (the more conventional conception of the division of labor) does not tell us whether there is a positive or negative relationship between S and δ . The former would indicate a disproportional trend toward internal specialization as size increases, with smaller organizations being more homogeneous internally. The latter would indicate that, even though larger organizations become more differentiated in an absolute sense, larger organizations are more homogeneous internally. Since these different possibilities are important to the development of a rigorous organizational theory of structural differentiation, we shall consider both the internal and external dimensions.

A BASELINE MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION

To the extent that a trend toward structural differentiation may be considered as an inherent characteristic of some kinds of organizational

systems, the system characteristic presumed to generate it here is the constant pressure from norms of rationality to seek efficiency. If this is so, the relationship between size and differentiation may be expected on grounds entirely apart from other (more specific) social and economic pressures; that is, it may be expected on statistical grounds alone.

If it is assumed that an organization can assign no more than one occupation to one individual (that this assumption is appropriate for the present data will be shown later), then that organization can logically have no more occupations than it has members. Consider an organization with five individuals; there exists no possibility of this organization containing more than five occupations. For an organization with ten individuals, 50 percent of the possible numbers of occupations are greater than five. It seems reasonable, then, to expect differentiation to increase with size.

In view of these considerations, an empirical finding of a positive relationship between size and differentiation would be of limited usefulness unless the investigator could specify the expected values of differentiation due to size alone. If such values can be derived, it becomes possible to test whether observed differentiation approaches or departs from expected values based upon a specific model. In establishing such a baseline, as Rapoport (1949, p. 186) observes, the researcher accounts for his own ignorance of actual determining factors by "formulating this ignorance mathematically, as is done in any probabilistic approach to the problem."

In formulating the appropriate model, it is necessary to identify the kinds of events which occur to bring about differentiation in the organization. Since we shall be concerned with formal military organizations, differentiation is entirely planned; occupational roles are allocated prior to operation of the system on a basis of necessary tasks and perceived volume of work.² Roles are planned in accordance with those tasks perceived as necessary to attainment of the system's objectives and the facilities which are available. Two primary factors must be considered by designers: (1) the number of operations to be performed, and (2) the volume of work (per operation) to be accomplished. The first of these will determine the number of occupational roles assigned, while the second will determine the number of individuals allocated to each role.

² Lest the assumptions we make here seem too oversimplified, we should note that military organizations are characterized by a higher degree of planning and formalization of operating procedures than most other types of organizations (Janowitz and Little 1965). This is not only because they are designed to deal speedily with emergency situations, but also, in many cases, because the operating system must be fitted inside a large, mobile machine (submarine, ship, aircraft, tank, etc.). The organization must fit its machine if it is to function properly, and only through a considerable degree of planning can work roles be efficiently meshed within such physical structures.

A little reflection may lead us to challenge the assumption that work roles are assigned in this way. Clearly, one occupational role may be assigned to perform several operations if the volume of work per operation is relatively low. Specific occupational roles might tend to be adjusted closer to the number of operations only when the volume of work per operation is relatively high. Thus, it might be argued that the designer of work flow can adjust the number of occupations and, correspondingly, the number of individuals in each role as the volume of work per operation rises and falls over time. This complicated process of continual adjustment no doubt occurs in many types of organizations where executives are free to redefine work roles as they see fit. A model of this process would be complicated indeed. Fortunately, military organizations of the type considered here (and, no doubt, organizations with similar tasks) have a characteristic that simplifies the situation.

In (American) military organizations the occupational roles are themselves predecided. Designers of military units must select occupational roles from a predetermined list of existing specialties. The initial list is developed at a more general level of decision making in connection with the training programs for the personnel to fill the roles in question. Revisions in the list occur relatively infrequently and usually only in connection with technological developments that make older systems obsolete. Thus, each time a new system is designed, the occupational roles that may be used are established by prior, more general policy decisions. Accordingly, the designer of work flow in military units (aircraft, submarines, ships, etc.) is faced with a predecided pool of occupational specialties. He cannot create his own occupational roles.

When, in addition, we take into account the fact that occupational assignment in military systems precludes assigning one individual to more than one formal role, our initial set of assumptions becomes quite realistic. With the initial pool of occupational specialties from which to select, planning of work flow in a military system can be conceptualized in two steps: (1) the planner selects a number of occupations from the pool as appropriate to task requirements, attempting to match roles to operations as closely as the restrictions of the list permit, and (2) the planner adjusts the number of individuals in each occupation as appropriate to the expected volume of work per role. We may now make the assumptions of our model clear.

First, as indicated earlier, there are arithmetic limits to the number of occupations that an organization of size S can contain. Since $1 \leq \Delta \leq S$, the number of occupations may be any integer value on this continuum. Second, we may select from this range that value which could be expected to exhibit minimal error over a series of predictions. How this value is selected depends on the criteria we apply and the distribution of

Δ for any given S . A minimally restrictive assumption about this distribution, in the absence of specified forces, would be that each possible outcome is equally likely for any given S ; therefore, the conceptualized distribution of Δ values is rectangular (or uniform).

Thus we hypothesize external structural differentiation to be described by the probability mass function

$$P[\Delta(s)|s = S] = \frac{1}{S}, \quad (1)$$

where $P[\Delta(s)|s = S]$ indicates the probability distribution of external structural differentiation, Δ , at size s , given that s takes on the value S . The bivariate probability mass function given in equation (1) provides the information needed to complete the model. Utilizing equation (1) and the standard relations for expectation, we may show that the expected value of external structural differentiation, $E(\Delta)$, is given by

$$E(\Delta) = \sum \Delta P(\Delta) = \frac{1}{S} (1 + 2 + \dots + S) = \frac{S + 1}{2}, \quad (2)$$

where summation is over all values up to the appropriate value of S , and Δ is the observed integer value of differentiation. For an organization of size S , the mean of all possible values of Δ may be obtained from equation (2) as $1/2(S + 1)$. For each organization in the present study, a prediction of $E(\Delta)$ will be determined. These predictions will be used as a baseline against which we test the extent to which observed external structural differentiation falls either above or below the chance expectation.

Since the sets of organizations examined here are of varying sizes, comparisons with the model will be made examining the slope and intercept of the observed linear regression and comparing these with the slope and intercept of the predicted linear regression. Under the assumptions of the model posited here, the regression is given by the linear equation

$$\Delta = \frac{1}{2}S + \frac{1}{2} + e, \quad (3)$$

where e is the error term in the regression. When we allow S to vary, the regression of Δ on S should be described by equation (3). If we find that the observed values do not differ significantly from the plots generated by equation (3), then this would indicate that the random model provides a valid basis for prediction. That is, the observed relationship between S and Δ would occur as if the assumptions of the random model were true.

It is not necessary to test the agreement of the data with the model's corresponding predictions for values of internal structural differentiation, δ , since they are generated by the same assumptions and agreement (or disagreement) with the other. However, we do wish to determine the

strength of the relationship between S and δ and whether it is positive or negative, as indicated earlier. Under the assumptions of the present model, the expected value of internal structural differentiation, $E(\delta)$, is given by

$$E(\delta) = \frac{E(\Delta)}{S} = \frac{S + 1}{2S}, \quad (4)$$

which shows the regression of $E(\delta)$ on S to be a curvilinear decay function, as shown in figure 1 where the random model's predictions for both $E(\Delta)$ and $E(\delta)$ are illustrated for integer values of $1 \leq S \leq 10$. The expected relationship is negative, then, but the curvilinear prediction could make assessment of the strength of the relationship difficult. Fortunately, a simple transformation yields an equation that can be managed by standard linear techniques. By performing the division indicated in equation (4), we see that

$$E(\delta) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}S^{-1}, \quad (5)$$

which specifies a linear relation between $E(\delta)$ and S^{-1} . This equation can be examined through ordinary techniques of correlation and regression.

METHODS

The organizations chosen for study were units of the United States Coast Guard, District Thirteen, with headquarters in Seattle, Washington. Several characteristics of these organizations make them ideal for the purposes of this investigation. The variables of interest are accurately reported and clearly defined in official publications, and thus can be easily




FIG. 1.— $E(\Delta)$ and $E(\delta)$ for integer values of $1 \leq S \leq 10$. $E(\Delta) = \text{---}\bullet\text{---}$; $E(\delta) = \text{---}\circ\text{---}$.

measured. Of equal importance is the fact that the design of these systems conforms to the requirements of the model previously indicated. The units did not develop "spontaneously," but were predesigned by individuals cognizant of their operational goals. Furthermore, the designers allocated roles for accomplishment of perceived tasks from a given "pool" of predefined occupational classifications.³ In other words, the task specialties available for assignment were designated prior to design of the organizations; planners therefore acted (presumably) rationally to insure performance of tasks, assigning occupational roles in proportion to perceived work operations and volume of work per operation (as closely as the restrictions of the list permitted).

The units studied are of three major types and will be treated separately. The first group consists of thirteen vessels (ships), or floating units, ranging in size from six to 181 men. These Coast Guard cutters share a basic responsibility for search and rescue operations, although most are specialized to some extent beyond this. Some service aids to navigation, some conduct weather patrols and perform as auxiliary naval vessels, and others combine all three functions. Variations in technology accompany variations in size and duty, but all are self-contained vessels which share basic requirements of operation and maintenance in order to carry out their duties. All were structurally designed under the same regulations, and the tasks of each were met by selection of occupational specialties from the same "pool."

The second group of units studied are lifeboat stations, probably the most homogeneous group among those selected with respect to technology and goals. Fifteen of these stations, ranging in size from nine to fifty men, were taken from the total of seventeen stations in the district (two were discarded because they combine multiple functions, rendering them incomparable with the others). The fifteen stations retained are basically identical in technology and goals. These stations are scattered strategically along coastal river mouths; their locations are determined by concentrations of commercial and pleasure boat traffic. The duties of each station are the same: prevent the loss of life and property on the sea and river waters.⁴ Technology is basically the same for each station, with only slight variation in the kinds of equipment (small vessels) used. The most important technological variation relates to the amount of

³ A model built on the assumption that Δ values are selected at random for an organization of size S , from the integer values of 1 through S , can provide a valid baseline only if the list of occupations available has at least S occupations. This condition is met for all the organizations in the present study.

⁴ Coast Guard units may be conceived by some as essentially "paramilitary" organizations since they have some "police" functions. A rather large number of similarities between police and military organizations can be drawn, however, and the distinction is, in many cases, of questionable value.

equipment used, and this is a function of the volume of boating traffic and the physical area for which a given station is assigned responsibility.

The last of the three groups consists of the nine divisions of the Coast Guard District Office in Seattle. These divisions are responsible for varying duties, and it is the task assignment of each which underlies its independence. In fact, these divisions considered as a whole represent the basic structural differentiation of the district headquarters itself. Since the divisions vary in size (from two to fifty-two men), they are compared among themselves as subtests of the central hypotheses. Each division is headed by a senior officer who, by virtue of the authority delegated him by the district commander, can make decisions within the boundaries of his specialty, specifying regulations that must be adhered to by the various field commanders. The district office divisions represent the highest echelon of the thirteenth district authority, each with respect to its own area of specialty (personnel, operations, engineering, etc.).

Structural differentiation was measured by enumeration of enlisted rates, plus all officer billets assigned to the unit. "Rate" refers to an occupational role, such as engineman, cook, storekeeper, etc. Although officers do not specialize insofar as rates are concerned, "billets" for officers are formally prescribed for each unit. These billets can be likened to job descriptions, since they delineate in detail the duties of individual officers. Thus, the number of enlisted rates plus the number of officer billets yields the Δ value for a given unit. Values of S are given by the number of enlisted men plus the number of officers assigned to the unit.

Collection of data was accomplished by contacting the Commander, Coast Guard District Thirteen, Seattle, Washington, and arranging for access to the relevant documents. Complete cooperation by Coast Guard personnel allowed access to all needed data. The collection process was facilitated by a master list including personnel allowances for all units in the district. These allowances were broken down by rate and officer billet for use in the present research.⁵

FINDINGS

The hypothesis of a positive correlation between system size, S , and external structural differentiation, Δ , is largely confirmed for the three groups of organizations studied. This relationship is demonstrated in figure 2. A more precise description of the relationship is obtained with

⁵ It should be noted that variations in hierarchical rank, for both officers and enlisted personnel, are conceived as distinguishing occupational roles. Varying levels of authority denote different tasks with respect to performance and supervision. A task requiring one man for performance and another for supervision has been differentiated into two occupational roles and must be treated as such.

Testing a Baseline Model




FIG. 2.—Relationship between Δ and S for three types of military units

Pearsonian correlation coefficients or the coefficient of determination (r^2). Coefficients of determination for the three groups of organizational units are: vessels, .96; office divisions, .92; and lifeboat stations, .79. Coefficients of these magnitudes indicate a strong positive relationship between size and external structural differentiation. Listings of the three groups broken down by size and structural differentiation are shown in table 2.

The hypothesis of a negative curvilinear relationship between S and δ is also largely confirmed for the three types of units, as shown in figure 3. The coefficients of determination for the transformed relationship specified by equation (5) are: vessels, .65; lifeboat stations, .58; and office divisions, .41. While these values are somewhat lower than those reported for external differentiation, it is clear that, overall, the general curvilinear decay function explains a substantial proportion of the variation in internal differentiation.

While the preceding observations confirm in a general way the direc-

TABLE 2
SYSTEM SIZE AND STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION
IN THREE TYPES OF COAST GUARD UNITS

VESSELS ($N=13$)			OFFICES ($N=9$)			STATIONS ($N=15$)		
S	Δ	δ	S	Δ	δ	S	Δ	δ
181	78	0.43	52	32	0.62	50	17	0.34
155	76	0.49	21	20	0.95	30	13	0.43
149	72	0.48	17	8	0.47	27	13	0.48
145	73	0.50	10	9	0.90	21	11	0.52
64	41	0.64	9	8	0.89	19	11	0.58
53	34	0.64	4	4	1.00	18	11	0.61
47	35	0.75	3	3	1.00	16	12	0.75
38	27	0.71	3	3	1.00	16	11	0.67
21	15	0.71	2	2	1.00	16	10	0.63
16	13	0.81	14	10	0.71
13	11	0.85	14	8	0.57
8	8	1.00	12	11	0.92
6	5	0.83	12	9	0.75
						10	7	0.70
						9	6	0.67

NOTE.—Some δ values have minor errors due to rounding.




FIG. 3.—Relationship between δ and S for three types of military units

tion of the size-differentiation relation predicted by the model, it is now of interest to determine just how accurate its predictions are for the relationship between S and Δ . One simple method of examining this aspect of the model is through the use of intraclass correlation, which may be used to examine the hypothesis that the Δ values observed are identical with those computed on the basis of equation (3). Intraclass correlations take the values .98 for vessels, .71 for lifeboat stations, and .90 for district office divisions. As might be expected, lifeboat stations are least amenable to prediction based upon the random model. Predictions from the model are, however, nearly perfect for vessels and quite reasonable for district office divisions.

An alternative perspective on the model's accuracy is obtained by comparing the slope and intercept for each of the observed linear regressions of Δ on S with that expected on the basis of the model. This comparison is shown in table 3. With the information presented here, it is possible to draw some conclusions concerning the usefulness of the model. The first step involves setting 95 percent confidence intervals around the observed slopes and intercepts, accomplished by multiplying the standard error of the observation by the appropriate value of "student's t ," then adding and subtracting the resulting value from the observed slope and intercept estimates. In this way, upper and lower limits are established for the slopes and intercepts, within which the predicted slopes and intercepts must fall if they are to be accepted at the 5 percent level of significance. The results of these computations are shown in table 4.

As shown earlier in table 3, the expected values of slope and intercept for all three subgroups are 0.50. Inspection of table 4 shows that the slope and intercept intervals for both vessels and district office divisions contain the value 0.50. Therefore, for these subgroups, it is reasonable to conclude that observed slopes and intercepts are not inconsistent with those predicted by the model. On the other hand, this is not the case for

TABLE 3
EXPECTED AND OBSERVED SLOPES AND INTERCEPTS

Data Set and Parameter	Expected	Observed	Standard Error of Observed Parameter
Vessels:			
Slope.....	0.50	0.43	0.129
Intercept.....	0.50	8.10	12.000
Offices:			
Slope.....	0.50	0.60	0.229
Intercept.....	0.50	1.72	4.620
Stations:			
Slope.....	0.50	0.23	0.063
Intercept.....	0.50	6.33	1.360

TABLE 4
CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (95 PERCENT) FOR SLOPES AND INTERCEPTS

Data Set and Parameter	Observed Value	<i>t</i>	Upper Limit	Lower Limit
Vessels:				
Slope.....	0.43	2.201	0.71	0.15
Intercept.....	8.10	2.201	34.50	-18.30
Offices:				
Slope.....	0.60	2.365	1.14	0.06
Intercept.....	1.72	2.365	12.62	- 9.18
Stations:				
Slope.....	0.23	2.160	0.37	0.09
Intercept.....	6.33	2.160	9.27	3.39

lifeboat stations; the predicted values of 0.50 are not contained within the limits established around either observed slope or observed intercept. For lifeboat stations, it must be concluded that observed slopes and intercepts are not consistent with those predicted by the model.

Although the use of confidence intervals is adequate for exploration of some aspects of the model, this approach suffers from the fault that the intervals for slopes and intercepts, for each subgroup, are not independent. An alternative simultaneous inference technique suggested by Ostle (1963) may be preferable. By utilizing this technique it is possible to jointly hypothesize the values of slopes and intercepts, simultaneously testing these values against our observations. An analysis of variance for the predicted and observed values of slope and intercept is thus derived. Results of the application of this technique to the present data are shown in table 5.

The probability values cited in table 5 indicate the probability of observing an *F*-ratio as large or larger than that reported if it is assumed that the predicted values of slope and intercept are correct. Interpretation of these probabilities shows that the values for vessels and district offices are highly likely to have occurred by chance as predicted by the random model. However, the values for lifeboat stations are highly unlikely to have occurred (that is, the probability of observations departing

TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SLOPES AND INTERCEPTS

Data Set	<i>F</i> -Ratio	Degree of Freedom	<i>P</i>
Vessels.....	0.24	2, 11	.750 < <i>P</i> < .900
Offices.....	0.37	2, 7	.500 < <i>P</i> < .750
Stations.....	9.55	2, 13	.001 < <i>P</i> < .005

as far from predictions as they did is quite small) if the random model is an adequate approximation. Thus, all three of the testing techniques employed here support the random model as a valid predictor of Δ for vessels and district office divisions, but not for lifeboat stations, although the intraclass correlation for the latter was reasonably substantial.

DISCUSSION

Since the organizations studied here are few in number and quite specific in nature, generalization of the findings to the broader spectrum of formal organizations can be tentative at best. Still, so far as these systems are concerned, a fundamental sociological assumption has been empirically substantiated. Large organizations in the present study were differentiated into greater numbers of occupational roles than were small ones. Furthermore, the relationship was quite strong for three subtypes of military organizations. Simplistic as they are, these findings alone are of considerable significance.

Of equal importance, although less anticipated by sociological theory, is the finding of a negative relationship between size and internal specialization (internal structural differentiation). In spite of the fact that larger organizations in the present study had greater numbers of occupations, they were more internally homogeneous than small ones. Again, despite notable variation in magnitude, the strength of the relationship was substantial for the three types of military systems.

Thus, the observations presented show general agreement with the random model's predictions for direction of size-differentiation relationship for both types of differentiation considered.

The correspondence of observed external differentiation values to the random model's expectation was not perfect for any of the data sets, although it was sufficiently close in two of the three sets to allow acceptance of the model as a reasonable approximation to actual differentiation. External structural differentiation did not vary greatly from the amount of differentiation that would be expected to occur by a random process alone.

The intriguing question now becomes: is this really the case? Two general hypotheses can be submitted in answer: (1) these organizations are differentiated in terms of a random process, or (2) a variety of factors operate, some exerting pressure toward differentiation and others exerting pressure toward homogeneity. If the latter interpretation is correct, then the present findings suggest that the countervailing forces are of about equal strength, tending to cancel one another out in overall pressure exerted on the system. If this is so, the underlying empirical distribution of Δ (for each S) may be approximately normal (possibly with

a leptocurtic bias) around the model's predicted mean, or a value near this mean. Examination of the scattergrams presented earlier and of the strength of the relationships reported strongly suggests this possibility. If the organizations studied here were drawn from a population with uniform Δ distributions for each S , it would be surprising to see, as we have seen, the majority of individual Δ values fitting a neat linear pattern (although it would not be surprising to see their means do so).

Two lines of inquiry may be suggested in attacking these questions. First, more extensive research with a larger number of organizations of each size is needed to determine the nature of the underlying Δ distributions. Second, intensive analysis is required of the specific variables that are believed to create either homogeneity or heterogeneity in the system.

We have not pursued the first of these lines of inquiry here due to a limited number of observations for each value of S ; we have not pursued the second due to limitations of space. Nevertheless, we can suggest that what we expect to find are two of the most powerful explanatory variables that determine differentiation (and the lack of it) in organizations of the kind studied here.

First, because they tend to organize for operation in emergencies, military (and paramilitary) organizations require a structure that can be both mobilized and coordinated with great speed. This contingency produces (1) a centralized system of control in each operating unit, and, accordingly, (2) a clearly graded hierarchy designed to minimize ambiguity in giving and executing orders. Since hierarchy differentiates roles, it would not be surprising to find that rank differentiation (Svalastoga 1964) accounts for a great deal of the occupational differentiation that actually occurs in military and similar systems. We might, then, wish to partial out differentiation due to rank, in order to see how horizontal differentiation alone is related to size. We anticipate that a great deal of the observed differentiation in military systems can be accounted for in this way.

Second, most military (and paramilitary) organizations are continuous action structures; they do not shut down all their operations at the end of a standardized work period. Rather, they operate in continuous shifts of personnel, unlike many nine-to-five organizations, or even more "intermittent" structures (cf. Etzioni 1961, p. 288). Not all roles remain activated on this continuous basis, of course, but enough of them do to pressure the system toward greater homogeneity in occupational structure than systems that operate on a purely nine-to-five basis. The homogenizing influence of continuous operation is quite simple in that the larger the number of work shifts, the larger the number of personnel required to maintain a given role in continuous operation.

Thus, for an organization of any given size, the extent of continuous

operation it requires will increase the ratio of personnel to roles accordingly. We may assess the degree of this bias against differentiation by determining for each organizational unit (1) whether it has the continuous activation property for any of its roles, (2) the number of roles that must remain continuously activated, and (3) the number of work shifts used to maintain them. With this information we may compare the units among themselves in order to determine how much of the pressure away from maximum differentiation in each is accounted for by the continuous action property. For military and similar systems, we anticipate that a great deal of the bias toward homogeneity can be accounted for in this way. We should note in this regard that controlling for the number of continuously activated roles is not merely a methodological problem created by definitions of "size." Continuity in operation is a structural property of organizations that can be used to explain variation in other aspects of their structure.

We suggest, then, that rank differentiation and continuity in operation are two of the countervailing forces that pressure organizational systems toward increased differentiation, on the one hand, and toward increased homogeneity, on the other. Certainly, we do not imagine that these are the only relevant variables (cf. Whyte 1949; Boulding 1953; Haire 1959; Anderson and Warkov 1961; Chandler 1962; Hawley et al. 1965; Hall et al. 1967; Perrow 1967; Rushing 1968), but we do anticipate that they will account for a great deal of the variation in the systems studied here, and possibly for the greatest part of that variation.

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On Transcending the Absurd: An Inquiry in the Sociology of Meaning¹

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The literature of the absurd, represented by the works of Camus, Beckett, Sartre, and others is analyzed for its heuristic value in generating sociological theory. Drawing upon this literature it is argued that rebellion in the face of "institutional absurdity" may be a source of meaning for students and blacks in contemporary American society. Further, it is suggested that we cast off our traditional perspective of viewing man as a "consonance seeker" in favor of viewing him, theoretically, as a "creator of dissonance" to which he can react, the end result of which is the acquisition of meaning. The framework of the absurd is used to offer a critical appraisal of American sociology. The paper concludes in support of an action orientation on the part of American sociologists.

The ideas in this paper owe a debt to activist students with whom I have talked over the past two years. Not the least important of these student groups are our own radical and black caucuses which have made their presence known since the American Sociological Association meetings of 1968 in Boston. Convinced that these groups are truly native products, I attempted to "tune in" on why they appeared to be "tuning out" sociology. I was especially curious about the source of their intellectual direction, whom they were reading, from what body of ideas they were drawing their unity. In the course of informal conversations on various university campuses, I discovered their interest in a body of literature generally referred to as "the literature of the absurd." Following their direction I set out to read and re-read this literature, attempting to share their situational definitions. As I reviewed this literature I developed the thesis of this paper which argues that meaning in contemporary American society may be directly related to man's ability to consciously realize dissonance for himself to which he must react.

Drawing upon the general framework of this literature, I will argue for its use in generating new theoretical directions in sociology and present some examples of the "absurd syndrome" as well as sociological insights

¹ A revised version of a paper read at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, September 1969, San Francisco, California. A special note of thanks is owed Jim Rinehart and Merl Coon for their stimulating and challenging conversations concerning the thesis of this paper. I also wish to thank Moshe Schwartz for reading the manuscript and offering many helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, the shortcomings of the paper remain entirely my own.

which may be drawn from it. I will then apply this framework to a critical appraisal of American sociology generally and conclude with some comments in support of an action orientation on the part of American sociologists.

THE LITERATURE OF THE ABSURD

The literature of the absurd, as used in this paper, refers to the body of ideas which concludes that man's existence in society cannot escape being absurd. Man, in this literature, is viewed as attempting to function in an environment continually steeped in contradiction from which there is no possible meaningful resolution. All that remains for him is the realization, that is, the *conscious ascertainment*, that the final and definitive synthesis—the "good life"—is an impossibility. Choosing to act in the face of this realization, it is argued, becomes the determinant of man's freedom. In other words, man's choosing to act, *with the definite understanding that his action will resolve nothing*, is what determines his freedom.² This position may *itself* be a source of meaning in contemporary American society. Predicated on this realization, social man consciously creates dissonance to which he can then react, and thus he achieves a semblance of meaning. The process, it will further be argued, is continuous—it never ceases. Once the dissonance has been reacted to, and perhaps consonance achieved, man soon creates further dissonance, and so on.

Various currents of thought have been concerned with this theme. They have been known historically as the "theater of the absurd,"³ dialectical thought,⁴ and existentialism, to mention only three. Some of their intellectual mentors have been such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Camus, Sartre, Beckett, and Marcuse. In a general sense, contemporary existential thought can act as an anchor point for discussing the theme of the absurd. At least the term "existentialism" manages to call forth *some kind* of theoretical image when it is presented to social scientists, although the typical reaction is usually one of distaste, espe-

² Thus, man's freedom does not lie only in his *choice* to act (contrary to the views of Sartre and Camus) nor in his *action alone* but, rather, in his choosing to act while realizing his action is relatively inconsequential.

³ Probably the clearest examples of theater of the absurd are the plays of Samuel Beckett. In addition to the work cited in this paper, Beckett's plays *Waiting For Godot*, *Endgame*, and *Krapp's Last Tape* are all indicative of the theme of the absurd. That the work of Beckett is increasingly getting more attention might be evidenced in the fact that Samuel Beckett won the 1969 Nobel Prize for Literature. Interestingly, Beckett refused both the award and the \$73,000 which accompanies it.

⁴ As will be indicated later, it is the *theoretical perspective* offered by dialectical thought which contributes to the framework of the absurd. I am referring, of course, to the perspective that every thesis contains the seeds of its own negation and not to the specific manner in which this perspective has been applied by such classical dialecticians as Hegel and Marx.

cially for American sociologists. Carruth (1964, p. v) sums up well the traditional reaction when the term "existentialism" rears its head:

Existentialism entered the American consciousness like an elephant entering a dark room: there was a good deal of breakage and the people inside naturally mistook the nature of the intrusion. The commonest opinion was that it was an engine of destruction, perhaps a tank that had somehow failed to hear of the end of the war. After a while the lights were turned on and it was seen to be an elephant, whereupon everyone laughed and remarked that a circus must be passing through town. Only later did it become apparent that the elephant was here to stay. Then gradually people recognized that although he was indeed a newcomer and a rather odd-looking addition to the ménage, he was not a stranger: they had known about him all along.

One argument of this paper is that this "theoretical elephant" known as existentialism, and especially its concern with the absurdity of man's being, should finally be recognized by American sociologists and, further, should be put to creative heuristic work in sociology. Hughes (1961) has indicated that "the post-1945 vogue of French existentialism grew directly out of a situation in which a concern with social problems appeared an inescapable necessity" in European social thought. It could be argued, in view of our contemporary concern with social problems in American sociology, that we might also turn to the theoretical and/or heuristic help of existentialism. It is clearly evident to anyone familiar with the literature of the absurd generally, and existentialism in particular, that Carruth (1964, p. xi) is correct when he states that this literature insists that man *confront* the absurd and that this literature, accordingly, is truly a philosophy of our age.

The theoretical framework prescribed by dialectical thought also contributes to the perspective of the absurd. In his now classic work on the social theory of Hegel, Marcuse (1968, p. ix), in discussing dialectical thought, notes that:

Dialectical thought starts with the experience that the world is unfree; . . . man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as "other than they are." Any mode of thought which excludes this contradiction from its logic is a faulty logic. Thought "corresponds" to reality only as it transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure. . . . Freedom is the innermost dynamic of existence, and the very process of existence in an unfree world is "the continuous negation of that which threatens to deny freedom." Thus freedom is essentially negative: existence is both alienation and the process by which the subject comes to itself in comprehending and mastering alienation.

The perspective of identifying contradictions in one's existence, necessary to the thought of any dialectician,⁵ when carried to its logical con-

⁵ It is my suspicion that any comprehensive theory of order or change or, indeed, any *social theory* at all, is *inherently* dialectical in construct. This, however, is subject matter for another paper.

clusion, leads to the position of the absurd. What I am referring to here is the view that every thesis contains its own antithesis from which emerges a synthesis. This synthesis, at the moment of its emergence, then becomes a thesis, and the process continues *ad infinitum*. The "absurd position" is the *conscious realization* that there is no final resolution—no final synthesis⁶—but only a kind of social game whose purpose it is to create theses that will eventually destroy themselves. Thus, "absurd theorists" like Sartre (1956) can conclude that man is never *being* but only *becoming*. But, again, it should be emphasized that it is the *realization* that matters. Then and only then, the argument has it, is man truly free. Then and only then can he choose to act or not to act.

It is my suspicion that the reaction of most sociologists to what has been presented hitherto will be extremely negative inasmuch as the argument presented so far reeks heavily of that most horrible of sins in sociology—reductionism. I shall argue, however, that there is a sociology here if we only activate our sociological imaginations. In the interlude it would be helpful to remind ourselves that no matter how we cut the theoretical pie, any discipline concerned with man and society will inevitably be confronted with subject-object relationships. This realization is certainly the legacy, as I see it, of contemporary *social* social psychology.⁷ That is, if we are ever to achieve a science of society, it will have to be, simultaneously, a science of man. This is hardly a revolutionary discovery in sociological thought. Simmel (1963, pp. 84–87), writing in 1908, for example, noted:

The individual can never stay within a unit which he does not at the same time stay outside of, that he is not incorporated into any order without also confronting it . . . [thus]: to be one with God is conditioned in its very significance by being other than God. . . . The individual is contained in socialization and, at the same time, finds himself confronted by it . . . he exists both for society and for himself. . . . The "within" and "without" between individual and society are not two unrelated definitions but define together the fully homogeneous position of man as a social animal.

The point I am emphasizing here is that there is an inherent subjective element involved in any analysis of social action and, further, we have, in sociology, tended to ignore this element out of fear of falling into the throes of reductionism.⁸ Accordingly, we tend to ignore, *ipso facto*, any

⁶ The rejection here, of *Hegel's* use of dialectic, should be obvious.

⁷ As opposed to *psychological* social psychology.

⁸ Some concern has been expressed, via an anonymous communiqué, that I have failed to note the "profound impact on American sociology" of such "leading theorists" as Dewey, Mead, Cooley, Blumer, and Schutz vis-à-vis subject-object relations. That these seminal theorists concerned themselves with subject-object relations, there is certainly no argument. That they had a "profound impact on American sociology," however, is debatable. If one uses, for example, textbooks

body of literature which orients itself to *only* a reductionistic or psychological perspective. The literature of the absurd, and especially contemporary existentialism, is in this category. I am suggesting, however, that this type of literature can be extremely functional in forcing us to re-examine our own perspectives concerning man and society. If it does nothing else, this brand of conceptualization at least forces us to remind ourselves that social action requires some attention to a subjective element.⁹ The exercise of continuing to examine our basic assumptions concerning man and society, as Madge (1964, pp. 152-53) explicitly suggests, can *only* be valuable for the growth of sociology as a scientific concern. The literature of the absurd, if it does nothing else then, at least forces this reexamination.

The significance of the subjective element in social action and social existence has recently been commented upon by Tiryakian although it still remains relatively untouched as an area of theory *creation* in sociology. Tiryakian (1965, pp. 686-87) has noted:

Not only does sociological knowledge require subjective understanding and objective cognizance of the social situation . . . but it should also be seen as an essentially *radical description* of social reality. Existential phenomenology applied to sociology seeks the *roots* of social existence. . . . Sociological theory can remain true to itself and yet renovate its formulations by focusing on the existential horizon of social life. [Emphasis in the original]

Accordingly, existentialist novelists could be a source of theoretical stimulation (rather than intellectual disdain) for the sociologist. Lee (1966, p. 66), along these lines, has written:

Novelists have done more than social scientists to sensitize readers to the tyranny of social roles over individual behavior, emotion, and thought. . . . The perceptive artistry of the novelist can be very helpful in making us more precisely aware of how we and others cope with the problems of life.

Regardless, then, of its reductionistic undertones (a "dictatorship of the subjective," it might be called), the literature which concerns itself

published in social psychology and/or articles in our leading professional journals (*American Sociological Review* and *American Journal of Sociology*) as a criterion, the paucity of discussion devoted to the works of Dewey, Mead, Cooley, and Blumer is striking. Similarly, the work of Schutz could hardly be classified in the category of having a "profound impact on American sociology." I should mention that the recent article by Norman K. Denzin ("Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodology: A Proposed Synthesis." *American Sociological Review* 34, no. 6 [December 1969]:922-34) is a refreshing exception to this.

⁹ Dialectical thought is once again useful along these lines. Marcuse (1968, p. viii), sounding a great deal like Max Weber, has noted that the legacy of dialectical thought is that truth can be determined *only* in the subject-object totality. Further, he states: "All facts embody the knower as well as the doer: they continuously translate the past into the present. The objects thus 'contain' subjectivity in their very structure."

with the absurdity of man's being ought to be searched for its sociological heuristic value. Most of the remainder of this paper takes its direction from the comments of Lionel Rubinoff (1968, p. 11):

Instead of facing up to the absurd, we either counterfeit or ignore it. Many of our current myths and images of man [such as underlie the practice of the social sciences] have been surreptitiously manufactured for the purpose of counterfeiting the experience of the absurd. I propose to confront the absurd directly by imaginatively living through it . . . a mind which has achieved a . . . critical awareness of the absurd . . . may be said, therefore, to have transcended it. [Brackets in the original]

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE ABSURD: IS THERE ONE?

A major theme of the literature of the absurd is a preoccupation with death. Death is often presented as the only important occurrence in the life of man. Conversely, life is seen as an experience wherein man merely waits for this event. Beckett, in his novel *Malone Dies* (1965a, p. 194), writes: "Coma is for the living. The living. They were always more than I could bear. . . . I stop everything and wait." The novel, in fact, portrays its major character as one who is waiting for the "big event," waiting to die. Death is viewed, then, as an event to be celebrated in the life of man as he wades through the absurdity of his existence. Camus (1961, pp. 33-37), in his novel *The Fall*, pursues this same position, as witnessed in the following conversation of Jean-Baptiste Clamence, the judge-penitent:

Do you know why we are always more just and more generous toward the dead? The reason is simple. With them there is no obligation. . . . If they forced us to anything, it would be to remembering, and we have a short memory. No, it is the recently dead we love among our friends, the painful dead, our emotion, ourselves after all. . . . Something must happen—and that explains most human commitments. Something must happen . . . hurray then for funerals!

The message here is that the central concern is death inasmuch as death brings relief from the absurdity of life. Much of the current unrest in American society may be a result of this *realization*, and its accompanying social forms may be attempts at meaning-acquisition so as to avoid the position of Malone and Jean-Baptiste Clamence.

Samuel Beckett, among others, attempts to identify man's existence as one of almost continual suffering, of continual despair. He writes, in his novel *The Unnamable* (1965b, pp. 304-5): "I, of whom I know nothing, I know my eyes are open, because of the tears that pour from them unceasingly. . . . I'll dry these streaming sockets too, bung them up, there, it's done, no more tears, I'm a big talking ball, talking about things that do not exist, or that exist perhaps, impossible to know, besides the point" (*sic*). Beckett's concern with man's existence as suffering and

despair¹⁰ is carried to its logical conclusion in Sartre's account of the diary of Antoine Roquentin (1964, pp. 33 ff.) wherein Sartre concludes that nausea is existence. Sartre writes:

Nausea . . . spreads at the bottom of the vicious puddle, at the bottom of our time. . . . I have known it for twenty years. . . . So this is Nausea: This blinding evidence? I have scratched my head over it! I've written about it. Now I know: I exist—the world exists—and I know that the world exists. . . . The Nausea has not left me and I don't believe it will leave me so soon; but I no longer have to bear it, it is no longer an illness or a passing fit: it is I. [Emphasis in the original]

Again, the *awareness* here is as significant as the perception. Once an awareness is achieved we can at least choose to act. There are any number of avenues of social action which can materialize on the basis of the absurd syndrome recognition. What is crucial, however, is the conscious *recognition* of the absurd in order to then transcend it. One avenue of reaction, predicated on this recognition, may be rebellion. It may be possible, I am suggesting, that rebellion is a quest for meaning, a quest to transcend the absurd.

Camus (1954, pp. 21–23) has argued that rebellion underlies the very conception of the individual and that, further, the rebel, from his very first step (i.e., his first act of rebellion), is fighting for the integrity of his being. Implicit in this statement is the idea that the individual has become aware of what his “being” is—aware, that is, of what it is he must rebel against. Part of this recognition, as suggested earlier, is the position that the absurd is *never* overcome—all that occurs is the creation of new theses which in turn have *their own contradictions*. A *meaningful* existence, then, could become one of continual rebellion, or as Camus (1954, p. 219) has stated: “I rebel, therefore *we* exist” (my sociological emphasis—the word is from Camus). It is important to note that I am not arguing that nihilism is the source of meaning, nor is that the position of Camus. The argument should *not* be interpreted as “rebellion for rebellion's sake.” Rather, rebellion is a meaning-seeking, goal-oriented activity—it is, in

¹⁰ The theme concerning existence as suffering and despair, as well as the blatant absurdities of life, are portrayed lucidly in the following passage from Beckett (1965b, p. 406): “They love each other, marry, in order to love each other better, more conveniently, he goes to the wars, he dies at the wars, she weeps, with emotion, at having loved him, yep, marries again, in order to love again, more conveniently again, they love each other, you love as many times as necessary, as necessary in order to be happy, he comes back, the other comes back, from the wars, he didn't die at the wars after all, she goes to the station, to meet him, he dies in the train, of emotion, at the thought of seeing her again, having her again, she weeps, weeps again, with emotion again, at having lost him again, yep, goes back to the house, he's dead, the other is dead, the mother-in-law takes him down, he hanged himself, with emotion, at the thought of losing her, she weeps, weeps louder, at having loved him, at having lost him, there's a story for you, that was to teach me the nature of emotion, that's called emotion, what emotion can do, well well, so that's emotion, that's love [*sic*].”

essence, a testimony that life has meaning in the continual fight (read "rebellion") for order and unity. As such, it is the very *antithesis* of nihilism. Camus (1954, pp. 72 ff.) sums this position up clearly:

Human insurrection . . . can only be a prolonged protest against death . . . the protest is always directed at everything in creation which is dissonant, opaque or promises the solution of *continuity*. Essentially, then, we are dealing with a perpetual demand for unity. . . . The rebel does not ask for life, but for reasons for living. . . . To fight against death amounts to claiming that life has a meaning, to fighting for order and for unity. . . . Every rebel, by the movement which sets him in opposition to the oppressor, therefore pleads for life, undertakes to struggle against servitude, falsehood and terror and affirms . . . that . . . [rebellion] is the only value which can save them from nihilism.¹¹

Rebellion may be a clue, then, to the source of meaning for contemporary social man. Given the conscious realization of the *inevitability* of contradictions in his life, he can transcend what would, under these conditions, be a meaningless existence by rebelling against those very conditions. There is meaning, here, in the *act* of rebellion—a continuous protest to what Camus calls "servitude, falsehood and terror." The *act* itself also must be continuous. If the object of the rebellion is alleviated, another object will be created so as to maintain the process.

There is a sociology implicit here. The "creation" of dissonance, to then react to, is oftentimes considered a wholly subjective affair and thus dismissed on sociological grounds. What I would argue is that the institutional structure of society can be the "dissonance creator," and this appears to have special significance in contemporary American society (especially among students and black Americans in many of our large cities). Accordingly, any analysis of social institutions has inherent within it a subject-object framework. Consistent with my argument then, contemporary American society may be characterized by *institutional absurdity* (the "object" aspect), and many members of those same institutions have reached a conscious realization of that absurdity (the "subject" aspect), the end result of which may be a rebellious quest for the non-absurd—for meaning. Inherent in this position, however, is an increasing awareness of the "message of dialectic" which states, in effect, that no definitive solution (in the sense of freedom from contradiction) is ever possible. Thus, meaning becomes related to man's ability for perpetual rebellion or, stated differently, the *act* of rebellion becomes a

¹¹ Camus's work, *The Rebel*, was a reaction to nihilism generally and Nietzsche's nihilism in particular. Along these lines, I would mention that Nietzsche's nihilism may have been traditionally misunderstood. In his *Twilight of the Idols* (1964, p. 472), Nietzsche concludes a section with the moral that "morality must be shot at." He argues, in effect, that this is the only way we can ever change existing values. His argument has a great deal of affinity to Camus's as stated in the latter's *The Rebel*. [The brackets and emphases above are mine]

source of meaning within a social structure of institutional absurdity. These ideas are, again, found in Camus's comments (1954, pp. 26 ff.) concerning rebellion. He notes:

The spirit of revolt can only exist in a society where a theoretic equality conceals great factual inequalities. . . . Man's solidarity is founded upon rebellion and rebellion can only be justified by this solidarity . . . the unhappiness experienced by a single man becomes collective unhappiness. . . . Rebellion is the common ground on which every man bases his . . . values. . . . The most elementary rebellion . . . expresses an aspiration to order . . . the generosity of rebellion . . . refuses injustice without a moment's delay. . . . Rebellion proves . . . that it is the very movement of life and that it cannot be denied without renouncing life. Its purest outburst, on each occasion, gives birth to existence.

There would be, I am certain, very little argument among social scientists concerning the fact that American society today is increasingly cognizant of "theoretic equalities" existing next to "great factual inequalities." Summarily, then, what I am arguing is that this reality is becoming increasingly recognized by members of our society, and their response to it is taking the form of rebellion. Further, these same members of our society are realizing increasingly that the "final synthesis"—the good society—is an unattainable goal. The only route to meaning in such a state of mind (and society) is, accordingly, the *act of reacting* to this situation—that is, the *act of rebellion*.

Given the plausibility of my argument so far, then, a theoretical re-orientation concerning our traditional conception of man in society as a "consonance seeker" (cf. Sumner 1959, pp. 5-6; Steiner and Fishbein 1965, p. 3) is in order. It is necessary, in fact, to *reverse that very assumption* concerning social man in favor of the assumption that he is, rather, a dissonance seeker.¹² Man has meaning in society, this perspective would state, to the extent that he has dissonance for himself to react to. In propositional form this might be stated in the following manner: the greater the absurdity of the institutional structure (i.e., the more *obvious* the inherent contradictions), the greater the probability of awareness (the "catalytic" factor), and the greater proportionately (relative to other structures) the *acts of rebellion* (in search of meaning) within that structure.

Lionel Rubinoff offers some *theoretical* justification for the position

¹² I do not wish to get involved in the obvious semantic difficulty here concerning "dissonance," then, becoming "consonance." It would, at this point only confuse the discussion. It may only be noted in passing that other sociologists have acknowledged that nonconsonance is an integral aspect of social man. Lee (1966, p. 31), for example, has noted: "An actually 'integrated' person, in the sense of a person organized at all times in terms of one set of values, is either a fiction or a candidate for confinement in a mental hospital. On the contrary, individual inconsistency and flexibility among social roles . . . are hallmarks for what passes in society for 'maturity.'"

that man, once aware of the absurdity of his existence, seeks and acquires meaning by way of acts of rebellion. In discussing the works of Sartre, Rubinoff (1968, pp. 161-78) notes Sartre's conception of man as one of wanting "to-be-what-he-is-not" and "not-to-be-what-he-is." From this conception of man, Rubinoff goes on:

We are driven to the realization that every human act is fundamentally ambivalent. . . . [But] as Sartre says, man is freedom. Yet he seeks to escape from freedom through deliberate acts of bad faith . . . man is free because he can choose either to accept his fate with resignation or else to revolt against it. This revolt takes the form of . . . an act through which we come to a lucid consciousness of the human condition. . . . This freedom is the real source of anguish. Anguish is *not* so much the *effect* of freedom as the *consciousness* of it . . . far from being an obstacle to action, anguish is its very condition. [Brackets and emphases mine]

The argument presented earlier in this paper logically concludes this position of Sartre's in the following manner: our freedom is defined in our desire to act *insofar* as we are aware that our acting will not *finally* resolve anything. The anguish that Sartre writes of is due to the *conscious realization* of the latter,¹³ in essence, to an awareness of the absurd syndrome; this awareness, coupled with the *act* of rebellion, results in the transcending of the absurd.

It was the body of literature which concerned itself with man's existence being one of absurdity—the plays and novels of Samuel Beckett, the novels and short stories of Camus and Sartre, the philosophical insights of Herbert Marcuse, among others—which gave rise to the theoretical position concerning man in society presented above. I should now like to utilize that same body of literature and its insights as a frame of reference for briefly commenting upon American sociology generally, and, on the basis of those comments, to argue for an action orientation on the part of American sociologists.

THE ABSURDITY OF SOCIOLOGY: TOWARD A TRANSCENDENCE¹⁴

The causes of contemporary unrest among the student population generally, and sociology graduate and undergraduate students specifically, continues to be debated by sociologists as well as other social scientists. Beckett's comments concerning Pupil Mahood, in his novel *The Unnamable*, perhaps should be thought about when we, in fact, bother to think about what we like to call "our students." Beckett (1965b, p. 337 ff.) writes:

¹³ The conscious realization that our acts will never resolve anything is, as I read it, the real "message" of the absurd literature.

¹⁴ Once again, I acknowledge conversations I have had with radical students on various university campuses and a special note of acknowledgment, here, should go to the radical and black caucus members of the American Sociological Association.

On Transcending the Absurd

Orders, prayers, threats, praise, reproach, reasons. Praise, yes, they gave me to understand I was making progress. Well done, sonny, that will be all for today, run along now back to your dark and see you tomorrow. . . . Pupil Mahood, for the twenty-five thousandth time, what is a mammal? And I'll fall down dead, worn out by the rudiments. But I'll have made progress, they told me so. . . . Mahood, repeat after me, Man is a higher mammal. I couldn't. . . . Frankly, between ourselves, what the hell could it matter . . . that man was this rather than that? . . . But this is my punishment, my crime is my punishment, that's what they judge me for, I expiate vilely, like a pig, dumb, uncomprehending, possessed of no utterance but theirs.

What needs to be emphasized here is *not* a debate as to whether or not Pupil Mahood *is* the contemporary student but, rather, we ought to ask to what extent the contemporary student sees *himself* as a Pupil Mahood. The same commentary and question, I would insist, can apply to militant blacks in our society. In the latter instance, the term "they" in the preceding citation would refer to white society. To the extent that students (and blacks) perceive *themselves* in a Pupil Mahood image, then, they will *act* in order to salvage some semblance of meaning. This interpretation, it would appear, applies especially to students of social behavior. What they are saying, in effect, is they are aware that, hitherto, they have been "possessed of no utterance but theirs" and, accordingly, desire to transcend the social and intellectual nausea which such an awareness brings. A *dialogue* must replace the existing monologue for meaningful understanding to occur, and it must replace it *soon*.

What students of social behavior appear to have said in increasing numbers, concerning their disciplines, is found in the words of Jean-Baptiste Clamence (Camus 1961, pp. 86-87) when he states, "I have never been really able to believe that human affairs were serious matters. I had no idea where the serious might lie, except that it was not in all this I saw around me—which seemed to me merely an amusing game, or tiresome." Students (and many younger sociologists) have, in essence, realized human affairs *are* serious matters—too serious to simply leave to "investigation" with no action. They have gone on record as declaring, again with the judge-penitent (Camus 1961, pp. 131-36): "In philosophy as in politics, I am for any theory that refuses to grant man's innocence and for any practice that treats him as guilty. . . . When we are all guilty, that will be democracy." The plea for action on the part of students and many younger sociologists may be a result of the recognition of "guilt" and an attempt to transcend that result. I am suggesting that we listen very closely to that plea. Toward that end, I would suggest that we exert our social consciences and act, in accordance with the younger vanguard, in initiating necessary changes in this society.

The emphasis of this paper has been on *action*, and that emphasis also

applies to initiating necessary societal change. Simply *arguing* for social reforms in society is no longer good enough. As Rubinoff (1968, p. 170) has suggested, stressing the importance of social reform can easily become a way of minimizing our own personal involvements in the life of this society: complaining simply becomes a substitute for positive action. Accordingly, "scientism" can lead to the same position—it can be an apology for nonaction in the sphere of social problems. In discussing the neglect of humanism in American sociology Lee has reached a similar conclusion. Lee (1966, p. 352) writes:

Positivism has done much to stimulate the growth of what might be called weeds in sociology . . . positivism became the rationalization for the abdication of the social responsibilities of the sociologist both as scientist and as human being. Sociology thus became choked . . . with uncritical apologies in the trappings of "science" for what exists in society.

Rubinoff has argued, similarly, that the social scientists' concern with a value-free social science has played the role of making these same scientists morally sterile. In discussing the idea of a "value-free" inquiry Rubinoff (1968, pp. 3–21) notes that:

Under the influence of this rapidly spreading "scientism," social scientists often lose their sensitivity to the absurdity of things—especially as they become the more expert at constructing explanations. They know the causes of order and disorder, and it no longer fills them with outrage that disorder continues to prevail. . . . The argument that the social sciences are value-free *because* they are scientific falls to the possibility that they have become scientific *in order to be* value-free. Suspicion mounts that the driving force of scientism is now fed by the unconscious need to escape from the responsibility of taking a moral stand and of evaluating the human condition from a moral point of view. [Emphasis in the original]¹⁵

The same author concludes (Rubinoff 1968, p. 21) that there is nothing more dangerous to the health of society than to be influenced by uncritically accepted values and that is precisely what follows, in his opinion, from the dogma that the social sciences are value free. We must, in the words of Nietzsche (1967, p. 254), shoot at existing morality and values. It is only then that the way can be paved for a new system of values and morality to enter. The sociologist of today would do well to move rapidly toward the conscious realization of the inherent contradictions in his society and, accordingly, to take his direction from those *already at that stage*—many of whom are or, increasingly, *were* his students. In effect, transcending our own absurdity lies in joining the action—not in simply "investigating" it.

¹⁵ In an interesting footnote, Rubinoff (1968, p. 223, n. 5), in commenting on studying racism phenomenologically, states: "Men do not believe in racism because it is scientifically grounded; they rather endowed it with scientific credibility *in order to believe in it.*" (Emphasis in the original)

A RADICAL EXISTENTIAL TYPOLOGY OF MEANING¹⁶

A review of meaning acquisition, based upon the thesis of this paper, might reveal four general types:

1. *The "dissonance creators."* This is the type I would refer to as the "radical existential sociologists." These are the social thinkers (students and too few professors!) who have recognized the absurdity of the social structure and who *continue to act with full awareness* of the absurd. Their action, thus, results in transcending the absurd and functions to supply them with meaning. The "dissonance creators" are the ones on the "front lines," so to speak. They are the individuals who see their *act of rebellion* as the only source of meaning and who, accordingly, refuse to relinquish that source of meaning.

2. *The "consonance seekers."* Generally the young, concerned, reform-oriented, social science types. Their "reform-orientation" tends to make them minimally pragmatic (vis-à-vis the realization of reform), but they are also characterized by a certain amount of confusion coupled with hopefulness. They are hopeful, that is, of implementing their reforms but confused when "all remains basically the same." Accordingly, their action, without recognition or awareness of the absurdity of social life, characterizes them as "searchers for meaning." As I implied earlier in this paper, this "type," by not transcending the absurd, continuously creates it by attempting to achieve consonance. The participants in "the New Politics" (the McCarthy movement, the followers of the late Robert Kennedy, etc.), the more radical social workers, and the Saul Alinsky organization-type fall for the most part within this group.

3. *The "defeatist-oriented."* Refers to those who have recognized the absurdity of social life but who have failed to act and, accordingly, have failed to transcend that absurdity. The recognition of the absurd results, rather, in a retreat or, perhaps, an escape from reality. There is little hope, here, for any meaning. Thus, this type is characterized by a continuous struggle to survive in the face of this hopelessness. Subcultures, such as hippies, artists, and drug addicts, as well as the high-risk suicide-prone, are also to be found in this group. It is here that the characters in the novels and short stories of Camus, Sartre, Franz Kafka, and others

¹⁶ I am indebted to Lou Patler and Walda Fishman for their help in conceptualizing these categories of meaning. It has been argued that my "sympathy for students and blacks" and my argument "in favor of action" has led me to a selective bias portrayed in the above categorization. It should be emphasized that this typology is a result of my attempt to *understand the overt social action of students and blacks*. The fact that I agree or disagree with what I see to be their perspective is, at this point, *irrelevant*. As I clearly wish to indicate, the main intention of this typology is to summarize the thesis of the paper.

are found.¹⁷ These are the individuals who, once the recognition and awareness of the absurd is realized, are characterized by apathy and, oftentimes, withdrawal.

4. *The "academic-traditional."* Here are located the individuals, usually social scientists, who are neither aware of the absurdity of their existence nor do they act on anything. They consist of the extremely pragmatic, self-admitted value-neutral individuals who see the acquisition of what they call "knowledge for knowledge's sake" as their *only* goal. They are the people who have built what can be called a "false security" around their knowledge seeking. It is "false" because their knowledge is only temporary. Once presented, it simply awaits refutation, and the process begins anew. They are, in effect, valueless—they are the social scientists who refuse, on scientific grounds, to even *discuss* the concept of meaning. They are easily recognized among our ranks, for they are the "professionals" who teach seminars on social conflict¹⁸ and then retire to do their science.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I began this itinerary through the literature of the absurd by commenting, in a general sense, upon what that body of literature portrayed. Essentially, I attempted to identify the theme of the absurd as it is manifested in existentialism, the theater of the absurd, and dialectical thought. I concluded that this body of ideas is useful in calling our attention *anew* to the subject-object relationship in any social analysis. Accordingly, the literature of the absurd is useful in forcing us to reexamine our basic presuppositions.

I then proceeded to identify a sociology which may be inherent in this framework. After arguing that a conscious *awareness* of the absurd was a *catalyst* to the acquisition of meaning, I proceeded to make the case that meaning may be found in *continual rebellion* in the face of absurdity. The process, it was noted, *must* be continuous in that, coincidental with the awareness mentioned above, is the realization that no synthesis—no final resolution—is ever possible. The sociology here is in conceptualizing the absurdity as an effect of institutions—what I referred to as "institutional absurdity." It remains for research to indicate the nature of this institu-

¹⁷ The reader is reminded of my refusal to accept existential thought and ideas as definitive in developing my conception of meaning. Rather, I argued this literature is useful heuristically.

¹⁸ I have been accused, in an anonymous communication, of either choosing to neglect or of being unaware of the "conflict theorists" tradition in sociology ("e.g., Gumprowicz, Coser, Simmel, etc."). The reader is assured that the former is in fact the case. Indeed, my *awareness* of this "conflict tradition in sociology" is what dictated my choosing to *neglect it*. As any careful reading of this "school" in sociology would demonstrate, none of the "conflict theorists" address themselves specifically to the *issues raised in this paper*.

tionalization—the social evolutionary processes involved in its creation, especially in American society. Along these lines I suggested a reorientation toward our conception of man in society; namely, that he might better be conceptualized as a dissonance seeker, while his *reaction* to the dissonance he finds is, simultaneously, his source of meaning. This reaction, in terms of rebellion, accordingly is how he transcends his institutional absurdity—how he transcends the “absurd syndrome.” It is important to note that man does not *solve* the problem of his absurd existence—he only *transcends* it. In essence, meaning may be a quest for the consciously realized unattainable.¹⁹

Finally, I attempted to apply the absurdity framework to sociology and, as expected, found a “goodness of fit.” In this context I suggested that students as well as blacks in contemporary American society have achieved the *conscious realization state* noted above. Further, I implied that they have reached that stage as a result of what we as *teachers*, or as *whites*, have passed on to them. Students and blacks, then, may be *acting* so as not to “die”—acting, that is, to acquire meaning. I then suggested we follow their lead and thus attempt to transcend our own sociological-scientific absurdity. In essence, we have failed to understand a portion of our subject matter—students and blacks—possibly because we have not yet *discovered* and, thus, have not *shared* their meaning system.

I anticipate that the major complaint against my inquiry, if the sociological establishment is true to form, will be that it is too subjective, too impressionistic to be taken seriously. Perhaps. Grant me, however, that “perhaps,” and we may well have the germ of a radical sociology²⁰—a sociology that must begin with an immediate reorientation or face the possibility of extinction. Refuse to grant that “perhaps” and we can comfortably return to our towers and continue to spin plausible but irrelevant theory which tries, but never succeeds, in “telling it like it really is.”

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¹⁹ In other words, there may be meaning in the state of anomie (see Durkheim 1963, p. 248).

²⁰ It would at least be refreshing for a change to entertain the term “radical sociology” as something other than a contradiction in terms!

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A Research Note on Urbanism and Tolerance¹

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One deduction from Louis Wirth's theories on the psychological effects of city life is that urbanism directly leads to more ethnic tolerance and universalistic attitudes. This hypothesis was tested by examining five national polls ($N = 7,714$) which asked respondents if they would vote for minority-group presidential candidates. The data show that tolerance does increase with size of community. However, as successive controls are added, the relationship approaches zero. The results are interpreted as not supporting the hypothesis and explanations for the nonsupport are explored.

The traditional sociological theory of urban life implies that residence in large cities encourages greater tolerance and universalism (Wirth 1938; Simmel 1957; Park 1952). Wirth lists "toleration of differences" among the hypothesized effects of dense and heterogeneous settlements. This, together with effects such as "impersonality," "rationality," evaluating others according to their "utility," and the breakdown of "traditional bases of solidarity," generates the theory that urbanism encourages the development of universalistic attitudes.

Deducible from this theory is the hypothesis that *the more urban a person's place of residence (defined demographically), the more likely he is to be tolerant of racial and ethnic differences* (particularly in regard to decisions calling for universalistic criteria).

Crucially, the postulated effect of the city is *direct*. Tolerance is not thought to be developed by, for example, greater educational opportunities in the city but, rather, by the direct effect of urban life upon the individual. This appears in Simmel's analysis of the neurological impact of the metropolis and in Wirth's study of the functional adaptations necessary in the heterogeneous density which is his definition of the city.² Therefore, the second hypothesis is that *size of community will be*

¹ The poll data reported in this paper were collected from the Roper Public Opinion Research Center and initially organized under an Office of Education grant to Professor Thomas F. Pettigrew. The author and additional research costs were supported by a National Science Foundation fellowship. I wish to thank Professor Pettigrew and Dr. David J. Armor for their assistance, and Alex Inkeles, Gary T. Marx, and Paul Burstein for their helpful comments.

² Census data show community size to be a correlate of density. How good an index is it of heterogeneity? In recent work, the author drew a sample of "urban places" from the 1960 census. Size was found to be correlated at about .5 with a summary measure of heterogeneity based upon Lieberman's (1969) A_w index of population

related to tolerance independently of other covariant factors. City dwellers should be more tolerant than their otherwise identical counterparts in less urban areas.

The prejudice literature is ambivalent regarding these hypotheses. Close, equal-status contact reduces prejudice, but unequal contact, minority-group density, and competition increase it (Allport 1958; Pettigrew 1969). Larger towns are more likely to have all these phenomena, although contact is most likely not to be close (Molotch 1969).

THE DATA

The American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) has frequently asked the following type of question: "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a —, would you vote for him?" The blank would be filled by the name of a minority group. In the present study, the questions regarding a Negro, Jew, and Catholic were used.³ These items are particularly relevant to testing tolerance in an area presumably calling for universalistic criteria. The Catholic item was used by Pool, Abeleson, and Popkin (1965) to accurately predict the 1960 election. Five Gallup polls asking these questions, with a total sample of 7,714, taken between September 1958 and July 1965, were combined for the following analysis.

RESULTS

Table 1 indicates a strong association in support of the first hypothesis: for each item, the proportion stating that they would vote for the candidate increases with size of community.

Table 2 provides the results for a scale combining the three items. It also confirms the generalization that there is more tolerance in urban areas (Berelson and Steiner 1964, p. 606).

However, the reader will be quick to note several variables which have been ignored in this analysis and which may render the relationship spurious. For example, the South is both more rural and more racially divided than the national average. Thus, we test the second hypothesis: that urban residence is related to tolerance independently of other factors.

diversity. Specific types of diversity (racial, ethnic, educational, occupational, and income) varied a great deal in their degree of association. Density was a poor correlate of heterogeneity. It has also been noted that community size has advantages of its own as a measure of urbanism (Duncan and Reiss 1956).

³ The Pearson product-moment correlations among the three items (which were coded on a three-point scale of "yes," "no opinion," and "no") were as follows: between the Jewish item and the Negro and Catholic ones, .341 and .439, respectively; between the Catholic and Negro items, .282.

TABLE 1
COMMUNITY SIZE CROSS-TABULATED WITH THE PERCENTAGE
OF AFFIRMATIVE RESPONDENTS*

SUBJECT OF QUESTION	COMMUNITY SIZE†				TOTAL (%)
	Farm or Country (%)	Under 25,000 (%)	25 to 500,000 (%)	Over 500,000 (%)	
Negro.....	39.7	44.7	49.3	61.3	49.4
Jew.....	58.6	69.2	77.0	83.8	72.4
Catholic.....	65.3	74.3	81.5	88.3	77.6
Approx. <i>N</i>	2,279	1,342	1,701	2,392	7,714

NOTE.— χ^2 Negro = 253, γ = 0.245; χ^2 Jew 415, γ = 0.358; χ^2 Catholic = 399, γ = 0.382.

* The question asked was: "If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a —, would you vote for him?"

The answers as originally coded included "no opinion" (approx. 6.1%), but because their pattern adds no additional information they are not included in this table.

† Size of respondent's community or of central city if respondent lives in suburb of large city.

TABLE 2
COMMUNITY SIZE CROSS-TABULATED WITH COMBINED TOLERANCE SCALE*

COMBINED SCALE†	COMMUNITY SIZE				<i>N</i>	%
	Farm or Country (%) (<i>N</i> = 2,279)	Under 25,000 (%) (<i>N</i> = 1,342)	25 to 500,000 (%) (<i>N</i> = 1,701)	Over 500,000 (%) (<i>N</i> = 2,392)		
Would vote for all 3	26.2	36.0	43.4	55.5	3,147	40.8
Vote for 2 of the 3	30.7	29.5	31.5	28.6	2,317	30.0
Vote for 1 of the 3	21.8	20.3	14.2	9.2	1,229	15.9
Wouldn't vote for any.....	21.3	14.2	10.9	6.7	1,021	13.2
Total.....	7,714	99.9

NOTE.— χ^2 = 592; γ = 0.319.

* Percentages add downward.

† Summation of affirmative responses to questions listed in table 1.

As pointed out by a reviewer, controlling for colinear independent variables assumes that the partialled-out factors are more "reasonable" causes of the dependent variable than are the others. In this case, we are making the (educated) assumption that race, region, religion, and socioeconomic status are more well-established causes of tolerance than community size and that the latter is problematic. (In path analysis terms, we are trying to control for all paths other than the direct size-tolerance one.) This assumption must be kept in mind in evaluating the following results.

The size of the sample enables the researcher to control for many variables. Therefore, community size, the separate items, and the combined scale were dichotomized and cross-tabulated. Race, region of the country, religion, and occupation were controlled.⁴ This fourfold control yields sixty-four 2×2 subtables for city size cross-tabulated by each of the items and the combined scale.

Table 3 presents the distribution (for most of the subtables) of tolerant responses on the combined scale for small versus large communities. Percentage differences between the two are also presented for those subtables which had an expected frequency of at least five in each cell.

Fifteen of the sixty-four subtables meet the criteria. The combined χ^2 for the twelve of the fifteen which trended in the hypothesized direction is significant only at the .10 level (in spite of a total N in these twelve subtables of 4,180).⁵ The same analysis performed on the separate items indicates that it is the association with the Negro item which has been most reduced by the controls ($p < .5$). The combined χ^2 for each of the Jewish and Catholic items are greatly reduced although still statistically significant ($p < .005$).⁶

Figure 1 illustrates the result of the controls on the original relationship. It charts the effect of successive controls upon the differences between the percentage tolerant (on the combined scale) in large communities and the percentage in small ones. At each point along the horizontal axis, the subtables resulting from adding another control variable were examined, and the percentage differences of those subtables having an expected frequency of at least five in each cell were averaged. The means and ranges are indicated on the graph. After an initial rise, the trend is for a definite decrease in the association between city size and the combined tolerance scale. (The final point is drawn from table 3.) The pattern is the same for the separate items, although the association with anti-Negro prejudice is lower at all points than are the ones with anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism.

Regression analysis was also performed. A proportional score was

⁴ Community size was dichotomized at 25,000 (closest to the median), the separate items at "yes, would vote" versus "no opinion" and "no." The combined scale was dichotomized at saying "yes" to all three versus objecting to or hesitating to offer an opinion on one or more. Race was divided into white and Negro. (Nonwhites of "other" race, $N = 142$, were excluded from this analysis.) Region was divided into South and non-South; religion into Protestant, Catholic, Jew, and "other and none"; occupation into (a) professional and business; (b) white collar; (c) blue collar; (d) service, labor, and farm.

⁵ Only three of the fifteen subtables are significant beyond the .05 level, and three others trend in a direction opposite that of the hypothesis.

⁶ The χ^2 for the combined scale is reduced from 310 (1 df) to 21 (15 df); for Negro from 167 (1 df) to 12 (13 df); for Jew from 315 (1 df) to 41 (14 df); for Catholic from 275 (1 df) to 35 (10 df).

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE TOLERANT* IN SMALL AND IN LARGE COMMUNITIES†

	WHITE												Negro†		
	Protestant			Catholic			Jewish			Other and None			Protestant		
	Small Town	Large Town	Diff.	Small Town	Large Town	Diff.	Small Town	Large Town	Diff.	Small Town	Large Town	Diff.	Small Town	Large Town	Diff.
South:															
Prof. and business.....	13.6 (154)	12.6 (95)	- 1.0	40.0 (10)	66.7 (9)	\$	0.0 (1)	50.0 (2)	\$	50.0 (2)	33.3 (6)	\$	80.0 (5)	100.0 (5)	\$
White collar.....	13.7 (80)	28.2 (71)	14.5	85.7 (7)	57.1 (7)	\$	100.0 (1)	100.0 (1)	\$	100.0 (1)	100.0 (2)	\$	33.3 (3)	71.4 (7)	\$
Blue collar.....	8.2 (267)	15.4 (130)	7.2	28.6 (21)	36.0 (25)	7.4	..(0)	..(0)	\$	0.0 (7)	0.0 (2)	\$	60.9 (23)	72.7 (33)	\$
Service, labor, farm....	3.3 (211)	7.7 (26)	\$	30.8 (13)	0.0 (4)	\$..(0)	..(0)	\$	0.0 (5)	0.0 (0)	\$	47.3 (146)	62.9 (35)	\$
Non-South:															
Prof. and business.....	46.3 (352)	51.3 (382)	5.0	60.7 (89)	64.7 (269)	4.0	50.0 (10)	70.3 (74)	\$	66.7 (15)	84.5 (97)	\$	0.0 (5)	77.8 (27)	\$
White collar.....	34.5 (148)	37.0 (246)	2.5	66.7 (42)	67.1 (173)	0.4	50.0 (2)	80.0 (20)	\$	42.9 (7)	83.3 (36)	\$	0.0 (1)	86.7 (30)	\$
Blue collar.....	35.4 (505)	41.9 (515)	6.5	57.6 (170)	52.2 (467)	- 5.4	16.7 (6)	63.6 (33)	\$	38.9 (18)	60.6 (33)	\$	90.0 (10)	84.7 (124)	\$
Service, labor, farm....	24.5 (469)	29.6 (108)	5.1	43.0 (107)	42.5 (120)	- 0.5	40.0 (10)	71.4 (7)	\$	33.3 (3)	55.6 (9)	\$	33.3 (6)	80.7 (114)	\$

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses = total N of 6,276.

* Tolerant is defined as answering affirmatively to all three minority candidates. Communities were dichotomized at 25,000.

† Non-Protestant Negroes (N = 76) are not included in the table because of largely

empty cells. Nonwhite "others" are excluded from the analysis (N = 142). Total N of presented table is 6,276.

‡ Percentage difference is not presented because the 2 X 2 subtable did not reach the criteria level of an expected frequency of at least five in each cell.




FIG. 1.—Mean difference in percentage tolerant in large versus small communities at each step in the entry of controls. For definitions of terms, see notes to table 3. *Points* denote the unweighted mean of the differences between the percentage tolerant in large communities and the percentage tolerant in small communities of all subtables generated by controls which have an expected frequency of at least five in each cell. *Carets* represent the range of differences.

assigned each respondent on the basis of his answers to the three questions, excluding any item which might have referred to his own ethnic group.⁷ This score correlated .211 with size of community.⁸ The partial

⁷ In the table analysis, respondents who were members of the critical minority groups were included. However, for each of the three specific questions, when the appropriate control was introduced (i.e., race for Negro interviewees and religion for the others), the respondents in that ethnic group tended to drop out of the analysis because their subtables could not meet the criteria of five cases per cell. (Their answers were too

correlation, however, constantly decreases with the entry of controls into the regression equation. After region, education, religion, income, occupation, and race are entered, the partial is .114 (the first two controls alone reduce it to .133). The same basic pattern holds for the individual items.

Other results are briefly noted: tolerance increases with socioeconomic status, non-Southernness, and non-Protestantism (in conformity with Selznik and Steinberg's 1969 study of anti-Semitism). The data suggest that city size makes a greater difference for nonwhites, non-Catholics, and Southerners (the latter also noted by Selznik and Steinberg).

DISCUSSION

The problem of interpretation is to decide whether the crucial result to be emphasized is that controlling for covariants causes the relationship between community size and tolerance to approach zero; or that, after so many controls, there still remains some association (particularly in the Jewish and Catholic items).

The decision between the conclusions is largely subjective. However, we incline toward the former for the following reasons: (1) Trend. (In this regard, it should be noted that the Negro item, which best approximates a 50:50 marginal distribution, ends up with essentially no association at all.) (2) Not all other things were held equal. That is, particularly in the cross-tabular analysis, other variables, such as income and education, were not controlled. It is fair to assume that persons within the same occupational category (e.g., professional) are likely to be of higher socioeconomic status in the city than in rural areas (the urban surgeon versus the country general practitioner). Therefore, that degree of spuriousness was not controlled. (3) Within-category variance was not controlled. The data as originally coded and analyzed involved large demographic categories (e.g., collapsing big-business executives with small-businessmen). For the same reasons that these variables, as coded,

skewed.) This did not happen for three subtables (two on the Negro item and one on the Catholic), and it was decided to exclude those tables from the analysis. The effect is to minutely *increase* the degree of relationship. In the combined scale tables, since "tolerant" was defined as affirmative answers to all three questions, each of Negroes, Jews, and Catholics were essentially scored on their attitudes toward the other two groups. In effect, the residential distribution of the critical groups was treated as one covariant of community size to be controlled.

* Since the size of the respondent's community was coded in twelve large categories of nonuniform dimensions, an attempt was made to approximate an interval scale for regression purposes by assigning a respondent a city-size value, in thousands, equal to the lower limit of his category (e.g., a person coded as living in a community of one million or more was assigned a value of 1,000). The original ordinal scale of categories had a zero-order correlation with the combined scale of .135.

are correlated with both community size and with tolerance, one would expect that the within-category variance would also be in the direction of creating a spurious correlation. (4) Social context was not controlled. The data show that persons in larger communities are more likely to be surrounded by tolerant people than those in small towns. To the degree to which climate of opinion has an effect, persons will be more tolerant in the city, not because of urban characteristics per se but because of the correlated distribution of population. These points lead us to conclude that had finer-cut data and more controls been possible, the association would have continued approaching zero.

Therefore, it is our tentative conclusion that the second hypothesis—that urban residence has a *direct* effect upon prejudice—has not been supported by these data. As such, it parallels recent cross-cultural findings on urbanism and political participation (Inkeles 1969; Nie, Powell, and Prewitt 1969).

If this conclusion is valid, the problem which remains is that of reconciling it with the Wirth et al. theory. Among the possible explanations (other than that the test was inappropriate) are these four:

(1) The classic theory is wrong. That is, the social-psychological mechanisms suggested by Simmel and others simply do not operate as outlined, at least in generating universalistic attitudes. This is the simplest explanation.

(2) There are countervailing factors not recognized here which increase prejudice in urban areas. Two of these might be intergroup competition in cities with large minority groups, and what might be termed the "Grouch" factor. Part of the classic analysis of urban life is the theory that it leads to anomie (Durkheim 1951), lack of concern for others (Darley and Latané 1968), and perhaps irritability due to the heightened psychic demands of the city (Milgram 1970). Assuming a psychological mechanism such that these facets of urban life generate hostility, and that hostility in turn finds ethnic scapegoats (Allport 1958), one might suggest that the urban experience generates two countervailing and negating influences on prejudice (and that the Wirthian theory is to that degree contradictory).

(3) Another explanation might be termed the "isolation" hypothesis. Ethnographies of city life (e.g., Gans 1962; Young and Willmott 1957) portray large numbers of urban citizens as in but not of the city in the same sense that cosmopolitan professionals are. Surrounded by similar others, they are involved in social relationships not greatly different from their rural antecedents. Thus, Gans uses the term "urban villagers." This explanation argues that the theorized effects of city life at best only apply to a subset of urbanites.

(4) Finally, there is the "disappearing countryside" hypothesis. Cer-

tain writers have suggested that though social-psychological differences did exist at one time between urban and rural areas, they no longer do in the industrial and mass communication network that is modern America (Greer 1962; Martindale 1958; Sjöberg 1964). The megalopolis defines the entire nation. This theory would have some difficulty with the zero-order relationship we have measured and with the political participation studies cited above. However, it would find support in the community size X region interaction (suggested here, and in Selznik and Steinberg 1969). In any event, the theory implies that this paper attempted to measure phenomena essentially, but hardly any longer, existent in the particular sample used.

These explanations are all plausible and cannot be evaluated here. They require much, and notably cross-cultural, research to judge. All we can say at this point is that, while urbanites are less likely to be prejudiced than rural residents, the implication of the Wirth et al. theory that urban life *directly* leads to universalistic attitudes is not supported in the present data.

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Class, Culture, and "Social Structure and Anomie"¹

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Hypotheses derived from Merton's theory of "social structure and anomie" are tested on 240 well-to-do and affluent farmers and 1,031 mostly poverty-level farm workers in Washington. Farm workers consist of Anglo-Americans, bilingual Mexican-Americans, and non-English-speaking Mexican-Americans. Results indicate that disjunction between educational aspirations for children and perceived opportunity is greater among Anglo-American farm workers than farmers. In both classes, however, disjunction is related to normative alienation (normlessness). The relationship appears to depend upon cultural background, since the relationship holds for Anglo-Americans and, less consistently, bilinguals, but not at all for non-English speakers. Results thus suggest that the relationship between aspiration-perceived opportunity disjunction and normlessness transcends class levels but may be specific to a culture which emphasizes an open-class ideology. Hence it is the *cultural interpretation* given to aspiration-perceived opportunity disjunction rather than disjunction per se that may be crucial in normlessness.

One of the most quoted theories in sociology is Robert K. Merton's "Social Structure and Anomie" (1937), which views deviant behavior and deviant attitudes as due to the malintegration of cultural goals and social norms. The most frequently discussed aspect of this theory, as well as its most controversial aspect, is the postulate that when low-status persons aspire to middle-class goals but are denied the opportunity of reaching them, they tend to develop deviant attitudes ("normlessness") and to engage in deviant behavior. Despite the popularity of this theory and the various research efforts that are construed as bearing upon it (Clinard 1964, pp. 243-82), there is precious little direct evidence to support it. Indeed, some critics claim the theory is invalid because goals and aspirations of lower-class groups are lower than those of middle- and upper-class groups (Hyman 1953). Also, studies which show that crime and delinquency vary inversely with class status do not constitute *direct*

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support for the theory, since class differences in deviance may not be systematically related to discrepancies between individual aspirations and perceived opportunity (e.g., see Lander and Lander 1964, p. 132). Moreover, attitudinal measures that have been developed (esp. Srole 1956 and McClosky and Schaar 1965) appear not to measure the precise attitude that is implied in Merton's formulation (see below). In addition, conclusions about the significance of discrepancies between life goals and opportunity have been based on inferential rather than observational data concerning life goals (cf. Meier and Bell 1959, p. 192). Considering the fact that aspiration level may be directly related to social class (see the following: Centers and Cantril 1946; Knupfer 1953; Hyman 1953; Wendling and Elliott 1968; see also, Lipset and Bendix 1959, and Parsons 1953), the validity of such inferences may be questioned.

In an effort to resolve these problems and questions, a study of deviant attitudes (i.e., "normlessness") was conducted on farm workers in the winter and spring of 1966 in Washington. Three ethnic groups were included: native Anglo-Americans ("Anglos"), bilingual Mexican-Americans, and non-English-speaking Mexican-Americans. In addition, a sample of middle- to upper-class farmers was included for purposes of class comparison. A major objective was to determine whether there are class and ethnic-cultural differences in the relationship postulated by the theory. Since results are based on rural populations, conclusions must be viewed accordingly.

SAMPLES

The sample of workers consists of 539 Anglos and 488 Mexican-Americans, 187 of whom could not speak English and hence were interviewed in Spanish. Respondents were selected in a house-to-house survey of low-income housing areas in six (but mostly three) counties and, therefore, do not constitute a probability sample. However, aside from the fact that only male household heads were included, the sample appears not to be biased in any particular way (see Rushing 1968). Four hundred eighty-three (47 percent) are migrants (defined as not living in Washington for at least six months at time of interview), but since no difference exists by residence, results will not be reported separately for residents and migrants.² Farm operators are a probability sample from one county

² Ethnic identity was based on physical characteristics, surname, and ability to speak English. (Use of surname was essential for screening out several American Indians who, because of their physical characteristics and facility with English, could pass for Mexican-American bilinguals.) When interviewers encountered a non-English-speaking worker, they gave his name and address to an interviewer who was fluent in Spanish. Although Spanish was the preferred language for most Mexican-Americans, only those who spoke little or no English were interviewed in Spanish. In translating questionnaire items into Spanish, effort was made to produce a transla-

(see Rushing 1968). Most are rather affluent wheat and pea "ranchers," and all are native white male household heads.

The lower-class status of farm workers is well known. Their median income and education are the lowest of any major occupation in the United States and Washington (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1962, 1963); many are unemployed much of the year, and their inferior housing, inadequate medical care, and high job-related mortality (agriculture ranks next to mining and construction in fatal accidents) have been cited in numerous popular, journalistic, and factual reports (see the following: Steinbeck 1939; Anderson 1940; Koos 1957; U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1960; U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor 1961, 1967; Harrington 1964, pp. 39-60; Allen 1965; Moore 1965; Wright 1965; and Rushing 1968). In the present study, the farm workers' median family income for 1965 was approximately \$3,200 and their median education is less than seven years; by contrast, the median income for farmers was over \$10,200 (29 percent are above \$16,000) and their median education is twelve years. In addition, farmers and farm workers differ widely with respect to other class characteristics, such as class background, interpersonal relations, and organizational membership (Rushing 1968, pp. 276-77). Hence, farm workers make a particularly good group on which to test hypotheses about the lower class. In addition, differences between the three ethnic groups can be analyzed for possible cultural or subcultural variation in the relationship postulated in Merton's theory.

At the same time, farmers and workers are similar with respect to other variables, thus allowing for their control. As noted, members of both samples are male household heads. All respondents work in rural settings, of course, and most have rural backgrounds; 91 percent of farmers and 72 percent of farm workers report their fathers were farmers or farm workers (Rushing 1968, p. 277).

MEASURE OF NORMLESSNESS

There are two general conceptions of normlessness. One is the absence of consensus or a low degree of agreement on the dominant norms of society, such that we speak of a "normless" culture or society; in this sense,

tion that was not so much correct in the formal sense as to be meaningful in the vernacular of Mexican-American farm workers. The original translation was made by an individual who had lived in Mexico for several years and was familiar with the vernacular of Mexican peasants; he had conducted interviews and made translations in connection with other surveys in Mexico and the Southwest United States. In addition, the translation was assessed by one of the study interviewers, a Mexican-American sociology graduate student, who grew up as a member of a migrant farm family in the West.

normlessness is a *societal state*. The other conception focuses on individual attitudes, so that persons who are psychologically alienated from (i.e., reject) the dominant normative order are viewed as normless. (For similar distinctions, see Merton 1964, pp. 225-30, and Yinger 1965, pp. 188-89.) Our concern is with the second conception.

A measure of this conception is problematical because there are so many norms which can be rejected. Consequently, normlessness is conceived here in general terms with no reference to specific norms. It is conceptualized as a tendency not to conform to the *generalized* normative order. In positive terms, we refer to the general tendency to use illegitimate means to further one's self-interest; thus, tendencies toward mental aberration, alcoholism, drug addiction, and similar such compulsions are excluded. This conception is perhaps somewhat narrower than Merton's conception, though certainly consistent with it, since the "withdrawal of allegiance from one or another part of the prevailing social standards [of society] is what we mean, in the end, by anomie [normlessness]" (Merton 1964, p. 218).

Several purported measures of normlessness have been developed. The best known is Srole's scale of "anomia" (Srole 1956). As others have noted, however, this appears not to be a measure of normlessness so much as a measure of despair (e.g., Meier and Bell 1959; Nettler 1965; and Middleton 1963), and as such may approximate a measure of "retreatism" more than a measure of normlessness (Clinard 1964, p. 35). The McClosky-Schaar "normlessness" scale (1965) appears to refer to unpredictability and meaninglessness and to the *effects* of normlessness (as a societal state) more than to normlessness itself (e.g., "with everything so uncertain these days, it almost seems as though anything can happen," "with everything in such a state of disorder, it's hard for a person to know where he stands from one day to the next"); even when items refer more specifically to normative estrangement they seem not to refer to a weak normative commitment so much as to problems encountered in trying to discover what one's commitment should be (e.g., "everything changes so quickly these days that I often have trouble deciding which are the right rules to follow"). The same is true for some of Dwight Dean's (1961) "normlessness" items (e.g., "I often wonder what the meaning of life really is"). In any case, pretests revealed that most items in the McClosky-Schaar and Dean scales were too abstract for many farm workers to respond to meaningfully.² More concrete items

² In a more recent study, Han used a five-item scale of "illegitimate expediency" that is somewhat closer in content to that striven for here (see Han 1968).

were needed. Consequently, the following six yes-no items were formulated (asterisked items were reverse scored).

Is a person justified in doing almost anything if the reward is high enough?

Some people say you have to do things that are wrong in order to get ahead in the world today. What do you think?

Would you say that the main reason people obey the law is the punishment that comes if they are caught?

Some people say that to be a success it is usually necessary to be dishonest. Do you think this is true?

In your opinion, is the honest life the best regardless of the hardships it may cause?*

In your opinion, should people obey the law no matter how much it interferes with their personal ambitions?*

Total scores ranged from 0 to 6, with 6 representing a strong normless attitude. However, the distribution was highly skewed toward the upper end (overall mean for all respondents is 1.31), thus forming a J-shaped curve. Scalogram analysis using the Goodenough technique produced a coefficient of reproducibility of .88 (farmers = .94; farm workers = .87). Item analysis revealed that items discriminate well between high- and low-scoring respondents; with one item excluded, discriminatory power for the two samples ranges between 0.50 and 1.67 (the one exception was 0.38). In addition, the score for each item is rather highly correlated with the total score in both samples; all γ 's are above 0.66.

Since the theory emphasizes aspirations and opportunities, respondents with school-age children (ages six to sixteen) were asked about their aspirations and opportunity for their children's education and occupation. Although 868 farm workers (84 percent) and 210 farmers (89 percent) reported having children, only 455 farm workers (44 percent) and 122 farmers (51 percent) had children in this age range. These respondents provide most of the data for this paper.

CLASS, ASPIRATIONS, PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY, AND NORMLESSNESS

The significance of social class in "anomie theory" is well known, and in fact the theory is sometimes referred to as a "class theory" of normlessness and deviance; a higher level of normlessness and rate of deviance is

* Respondents were instructed to answer each question as "yes" or "no." If the answer was not given immediately, the question was repeated. Then after a short wait, if no answer was given, the interviewer recorded a "no opinion" response for the individual and proceeded with the next question. "No opinion" responses were classified as "yes" (normlessness responses) except for questions that were reverse scored, in which case they were classified as "no."

anticipated for the lower strata because of the limited opportunity available to members of that strata (Merton 1957, esp. pp. 144-46). Consequently, we would expect normlessness to be higher among farm workers than farmers. To eliminate possible nonclass sources of variation, class analysis will be limited to a comparison of farmers and Anglo farm workers.

Differences between the two groups are consistent with the hypothesis: the average normlessness score for farmers is 0.60 ($N = 239$) and 1.16 for farm workers ($N = 539$) ($p < .001$, based on Student t -test [one-tail]).⁵ While this result is consistent with the theory, it is not possible to know if it is due to differences in opportunity; the two classes differ with respect to many variables, at least several of which could conceivably lead to differences in normlessness. Furthermore, it is an open question as to whether there are differences between the two classes in aspiration levels and perceptions of the opportunity structure.

Class, aspirations, and perceived opportunity.—A major controversy about the theory stems from findings that lower-class persons do not aspire to the dominant goals of society to the same extent that middle- and upper-class persons do. Our results are consistent with these findings; 90 percent of farmers have high aspirations (i.e., want a college education for their children as opposed to only high school, trade, or vocational school), in comparison with 63 percent of farm workers ($p < .001$, based on χ^2 , one-tail test). Such results have led some to argue that the theory is not supported (e.g., Hyman 1953). Class differences in goals is not the crucial datum, however. Instead, it is whether “*disjunction* between goals and opportunity among the lower-class strata [occurs with greater frequency] than among the more advantaged upper-class strata” (Merton 1957, p. 174, my emphasis), and if so, whether such disjunction is associated with normlessness. Table 1 indicates that disjunction is more frequent among the lower-class farm workers: for those who want their children to receive a college education, only 19 percent of the farm workers think the opportunity is “very good” and 26 percent think the chances are “not good at all,” whereas corresponding percentages for farmers are 59 and 2.⁶ Although the number of nonaspirants among farmers is quite small, a similar trend is indicated for nonaspirants.

⁵ The median test (χ^2) gives the same result. In most of the analysis below, tests of significance are based on both Student t and χ^2 . In all instances, results are essentially the same (results that are statistically significant at the .10 level by one test are significant at the level or beyond by the other test). Consequently, since relationships can be visualized easier when results are presented by means rather than by percentages or frequency distributions (especially when controls are introduced), most results will be presented for means.

⁶ The perceived educational opportunity question, which was asked immediately after the question on aspirations for children's education, was, “How good would you say your children's (child's) chances are of getting this much education?”

TABLE 1
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS FOR CHILDREN AND PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY IN PERCENT—
FARMERS AND ANGLO FARM WORKERS

GROUP	PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY		
	Very Good	Fairly Good	Not Good At All
Aspirants			
Farmers.....	59 (65)	39 (43)	2 (2)
Farm workers.....	19 (22)	54 (65)	26 (31)
$X^2 = 139.64$ ($p < .001$)			
Nonaspirants			
Farmers.....	75 (9)	25 (3)	0 (..)
Farm workers.....	31 (21)	54 (37)	15 (9)
$X^2 = 8.23$ ($p < .005$)*.			

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses are *N*'s.

* In the analysis for nonaspirants, the "fairly good" and "not good at all" categories are combined because there are no farmers in the "not good at all" category.

TABLE 2
AVERAGE NORMLESSNESS SCORE BY EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS
AND PERCEIVED EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

ASPIRATION	PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY			<i>p</i>
	Very Good	Fairly Good	Not Good At All	
Anglo Farm Workers				
College.....	0.82 (22)	1.03 (65)	1.42 (31)	*
Less than college.....	1.29 (21)	1.16 (37)	1.56 (9)	†
Farmers				
College.....	0.45 (65)	0.77 (45)†	...	<.10
Less than college.....	0.89 (9)	0.50 (3)	...	N.S.

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses are *N*'s.

* Mean for "not good at all" is significantly different from "very good" ($p < .025$) and "fairly good" ($p < .10$).

† No means are significantly different.

‡ Includes two cases in the "not good at all" category.

Disjunction and normlessness.—A question independent of class differences in disjunction is whether disjunction is related to normlessness within the lower class; this is the crucial hypothesis of the theory. Results indicate that it is (see upper portion of table 2); for Anglo farm workers who have college aspirations for their children, normlessness

consistently increases as perceived opportunity decreases, and a less consistent trend is indicated for nonaspirants. Analysis for occupational aspirations and perceived opportunity gives the same results. Farm workers were asked if they wanted their children to be farm workers. Since farm work is such a low-status occupation, the wish for some other job for their children would represent a higher aspiration than the wish that children will enter farm work. Most farm workers (82 percent) have such aspirations. As a measure of perceived opportunity, aspirants were asked, "Do you think your children (child) will end up in farm work?" and responses were classified in perceived opportunity categories as follows: "good" ("definitely no," and "probably no"); and "poor" ("definitely yes" and "probably yes"). As a measure of perceived opportunity, this question applies only to aspirants. This and the fact that there are so few nonaspirants anyway make it impossible to duplicate the analysis for educational aspiration and opportunity exactly. Nevertheless, results indicate the same conclusion, with normlessness increasing as perceived opportunity decreases; average normlessness score for those who perceive their opportunities as "good" is 0.96 ($N = 121$) in comparison with 1.46 ($N = 30$) for those in the "poor" category ($p < .01$, one-tail test). Results consistently support Merton's hypothesis about the dynamics of normlessness in the lower class.

One question remains. This concerns normlessness in the middle and upper classes. Although Merton's remarks are usually made with specific reference to the lower class (e.g., see Merton 1957, pp. 144-45), the theory is more general than this, since it is concerned with the sources of normative alienation and deviance in the United States (Merton 1957, esp. pp. 134-39). In any case, there is nothing in the logic of the disjunction hypothesis that precludes its application to the middle and upper classes. The limited variation among farmers on aspirations and perceived opportunity (see table 1) complicates the analysis, but results in the lower half of table 2 indicate the same pattern as observed among farm worker aspirants. (Again the number of farmer nonaspirants is too small for statistically reliable results.) This finding is particularly significant in light of findings for ethnic-cultural differences among farm workers.

CULTURE AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISJUNCTIONS AND NORMLESSNESS

The significance of culture has been given much less attention than class in writings about the theory, although Merton's consistent reference is to those societies which have a persistent open-class ideology, and specifically to the United States. The cross-cultural perspective of the theory is clear from the following remarks:

There is something peculiar about the emphasis on success in an open-class society. Aspirations for place, recognition, wealth and socially prized accomplishments are culturally held to be appropriate for all, whatever their origins or present condition. To a degree not true of other types of society, people are expected to reach out for worldly success. The emphasis may be assimilated in varying degrees by those occupying different positions in the social structure. Nevertheless, the accent on success is more widespread than in a society where ascribed status dominates. . . . American society comes as close as any in history to arguing that going up in the world is an absolute value. And here we come to an untidy paradox we would do better to acknowledge rather than explain away. Precisely because the opportunity-structure is comparatively open, substantial numbers of men in each social stratum aspire to worldly success. . . . Yet we know that in this same society that proclaims the right, and even the duty of lofty aspirations for all, men do not have equal access to the opportunity-structure. Social origins do variously facilitate or hamper access to the forms of success represented by wealth or recognition or substantial power. Confronted with this contradiction in experience, appreciable numbers of people become estranged from a society that promises them in principle what they are denied in reality. [Merton 1964, p. 218]

In short, blocked opportunities to realize one's aspirations are most apt to lead to normative estrangement in societies which emphasize universalistic goal orientations and achieved rather than ascribed status, and where the ideology of equal opportunity is institutionalized in cultural mythology but not in actual fact. Accordingly, we might expect normlessness to be higher in the American lower strata than in the corresponding strata of societies which place less emphasis on an open-class ideology and universalistic goal orientations and which accord greater legitimacy to the principle of ascribed status.

Although Merton does not explicitly address himself to subcultural differences within the United States, the same rationale for societal differences may be extended to cultural groups within society. Specifically, lower-strata groups whose cultural backgrounds emphasize an open-class ideology should have higher levels of normlessness than groups whose backgrounds emphasize ascribed status. The "native land" of Mexican-Americans is a society in which the cultural ideology concerning equal opportunity differs from that of the United States; certainly such an ideology is not imbedded in the cultural tradition of Mexico (or Latin America generally) to the extent that it is in the United States (Gillin 1955). We would also expect differences between the two Mexican-American groups because of the language difference.⁷ If facility with the

⁷ Although few systematic data are available on the distinctive subcultural characteristics of Mexican-Americans in the United States (see Heller 1968, p. 4), it is commonly accepted that Mexican-Americans do have a distinct subcultural identity. Some claim that the acculturation and assimilation of this ethnic group are especially retarded (National Education Association 1966) and that this is particularly true for non-English speakers, for whom language is "a persistent symbol and instrument

language of a culture is taken as an indicator of cultural assimilation, bilinguals should be more assimilated and therefore more influenced by the cultural mythology of equal opportunity than non-English speakers. Consequently, we would expect normlessness to be *directly* related to cultural assimilation.

This hypothesis conflicts with another equally plausible hypothesis, and one that may also be derived from Merton's theory. The *structure of opportunity* is probably related to level of cultural assimilation, either because of discrimination of society or because of differences in familiarity with the culture. According to this hypothesis, an *inverse* relationship between normlessness and cultural assimilation would be expected.

The following differences between average normlessness scores for the three ethnic groups indicate an inverse relationship (all differences are statistically significant at the .001 level or beyond): Anglos, 1.16 ($N = 539$); bilinguals, 1.59 ($N = 301$); non-English speakers, 2.21 ($N = 186$). Such results are consistent with those reported by Jessor et al. (1968, pp. 244-58), and suggest that ethnic differences in normlessness may indeed be due to differences in the structure of opportunity.

Yet the analysis of ethnic differences in aspirations and perceived opportunity indicates that other factors are at work. Differences in aspirations are slight, and if anything, occupational aspirations may be inversely related to cultural assimilation. Percentages of educational aspirants are: Anglos, 64; bilinguals, 66; and non-English speakers, 57. Percentages for occupational aspirants are: Anglos, 82; bilinguals, 86; and non-English speakers, 90. It is obvious that cultural differences are not due to aspiration level. Nor would they appear to be due to differences in perceived opportunity (see table 3).

Despite the seeming refutation of both the cultural assimilation and structure of opportunity hypotheses, it is possible that both may be partially correct. An alternative hypothesis combines the two. The above quote from Merton (1964, p. 218) makes it clear that the theory is specific to societies which emphasize an open-class system ideology, postulating that when people of such a society are denied opportunity they become normatively estranged from society. This suggests that it is not blocked opportunity per se that is important but the way blocked opportunity is *interpreted*, and that such interpretations will differ depending upon one's cultural background. For Anglo-Americans, low perceived opportunity to achieve goals that society encourages one to aspire to (e.g., college education for children) may lead to normative estrangement; but for persons still assimilated to a culture which empha-

of isolation" (Broom and Shevsky 1946). See also Altus (1949), Ulibarri (1966), and Burma (1970). Others have distinguished between different Mexican-American subcultures (e.g., Moore 1970).

TABLE 3
PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY IN PERCENTAGES, BY ETHNICITY

A. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Group	Very Good	Fairly Good	Not Good At All
Anglos	23 (43)	55 (102)	22 (40)
Bilinguals	18 (26)	64 (94)	19 (28)
Non-English speakers	34 (37)	40 (44)	26 (28)

B. OCCUPATIONAL OPPORTUNITY*

Group	Good	Poor
Anglos	80 (121)	20 (30)
Bilinguals	60 (77)	40 (51)
Non-English speakers	75 (73)	25 (24)

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses are *N*'s.

* Includes only "occupational aspirants," as the perceived opportunity question is meaningful only for those respondents who have occupational aspirations for their children (see text for explanation).

sizes equal opportunity to a lesser extent, such as non-English speakers, this may not be the case. Hence social structure (or perceptions of opportunity structure) and cultural ideology may interact in their effect on normlessness.

In discussing central components of the ethos of Latin American countries, John Gillin states that in these countries, including Mexico, the ethos stresses that "each person is valued because of a unique inner quality or worth he possesses," in contrast to the United States where the culture holds "that the individual merits respect because he has the right to be considered 'just as good as the next person,' or at least because he has the right to 'an equal chance' or opportunity with other persons." Thus, the individual in the United States is valued and respected because "of his *equality* with others—equality, either of right or of opportunity," whereas the individual in Latin America is valued and respected "because he is not exactly 'like' anyone else. He is special and unique" (Gillin 1955, p. 507; my emphasis). This conditions one's perception and reaction to his position in the class structure. The Latin American "realizes that, from the point of view of social structure, he is *not* equal with everyone else, either in position or opportunity. . . . Yet, he, as an individual with a soul in his inner consciousness, does *not have to pay much attention to the unfair distribution of rights and privileges* which the social system imposes upon him. . . . [The Latin American] may rise in the social scale if he has the soul to do so; but at the same

time [he] recognizes and accepts . . . his position in society. *He has no right to expect more*" (Gillin 1955, 511-13; all but first emphasis supplied).

If this is valid, we would not expect most Latin Americans to react to disjunctions between educational and occupational aspirations and perceived opportunity for their children in the same way that most U.S. residents might. The disjunction between these particular aspirations and opportunities is not viewed as contrary to cultural ideology (though the disjunction between the desire to attain and the means of achieving "inner qualities" presumably would be). Such disjunctions are important to the U.S. resident because opportunities in the United States are viewed as being equal; therefore, one has a *right* to expect that they will be equal. To perceive them as otherwise may thus be the basis for withholding attitudinal support for the normative order of a society characterized by an equalitarian ethos.

This rationale may be extended to the three subcultural groups. Although they do not differ very much (if at all) in educational-occupational aspirations and opportunity (such differences are probably more a function of class than subculture), they may differ in their *reactions* to aspiration-perceived opportunity disjunctions. That is, they may differ in terms of the *relationship* between disjunctions and normlessness. We would expect the relationship to hold for Anglo-Americans and perhaps the partially (if not the completely) assimilated bilinguals, but not the non-English speakers.

Results are consistent with this hypothesis. Findings for occupational aspirations and perceived opportunity reveal that normlessness increases as perceived opportunity decreases for Anglo-Americans and bilinguals, but not for non-English speakers (table 4). Results are similar for the educational questions, although the pattern is much clearer for Anglo-Americans (upper portion of table 5) than bilinguals. Results thus support the hypothesis that it is the cultural interpretation given to

TABLE 4
AVERAGE NORMLESSNESS SCORE BY PERCEIVED OCCUPATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY FOR DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS*

GROUP	PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY		p †
	Good	Poor	
Anglos	0.96 (121) †	1.46 (30)	.01
Bilinguals	1.21 (77)	1.96 (51)	.02
Non-English speakers	2.21 (73)	1.63 (24)	.10 ‡

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses are *N*'s.

* Includes "occupational aspirants" only (see * footnote of table 3).

† Based on Student *t*-test (one-tail test).

‡ Opposite direction to prediction.

TABLE 5
AVERAGE NORMLESSNESS SCORES BY PERCEIVED EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY FOR DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS

GROUP	PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY			p
	Very Good	Fairly Good	Not Good At All	
Aspirants				
Anglos.	0.82 (22)	1.03 (65)	1.37 (31)	*
Bilinguals.	1.75 (16)	1.52 (63)	1.94 (18)	†
Non-English speakers	1.65 (17)	2.14 (22)	1.82 (22)	†
Nonaspirants				
Anglos.	1.28 (21)	1.16 (37)	1.55 (9)	†
Bilinguals.	1.30 (10)	1.42 (31)	1.20 (10)	†
Non-English speakers	2.07 (20)	2.68 (22)	2.00 (6)	†

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses are *N*'s.

* Mean for "not good at all" category is significantly different from "very good" ($p < .025$) and "fairly good" ($p < .10$).

† No differences are statistically significant.

aspiration-perceived opportunity disjunction that is crucial rather than the existence of disjunction per se. The finding of a similar trend for the native white farmers (table 2) strengthens this interpretation. Analysis of nonaspirants in reference to the educational questions strengthens it even further. The lower portion of table 5 shows that for nonaspirants, it is only among Anglo-Americans that normlessness tends to increase as perceived opportunity decreases, although the number of cases is too small for statistically reliable conclusions. Perhaps a culture which emphasizes equal opportunity may encourage normative estrangement even when the individual's aspirations are not very high. Hence, given this particular ideology, apparently "anomia (normlessness) of the disadvantaged develops from a disjunction between aspirations which, *even when relatively limited*, cannot be approximated" (Merton 1964, p. 225, emphasis supplied). There is some hint, however, that this is a function of age, as the relationship for Anglo-American nonaspirants disappears when age is controlled (see table 6). Also, for aspirants the relationship is clearest for respondents below forty-five years of age, although those forty-five and over with the lowest perceived opportunity have a much higher normlessness score than the other two categories. No age differences are observed for occupational aspirations-perceived opportunity, however. Moreover, no age differences are observed for farmers or either of the Mexican-American groups.

TABLE 6

AVERAGE NORMLESSNESS SCORE BY EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS, PERCEIVED EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, AND AGE—ANGLO FARM WORKERS

ASPIRATIONS	PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY			p
	Very Good	Fairly Good	Not Good At All	
	45 and Over			
College.....	0.55 (11)	1.18 (39)	1.38 (16)	*
Less than college....	1.07 (14)	1.15 (27)	1.20 (5)	†
	Below 45			
College.....	1.09 (11)	0.81 (26)	1.47 (15)	†
Less than college....	1.71 (7)	1.20 (10)	2.00 (4)	†

NOTE.—Figures in parentheses are N's.

* Mean for "not good at all" is significantly different from "very good" ($p < .05$) and "fairly good" ($p < .05$).

† No means are significantly different.

‡ Mean for "not good at all" is significantly different from "fairly good" ($p < .10$).

CONCLUSION

Results for class differences in disjunction and the relationship of disjunction to normlessness among lower-class Anglo-American farm workers are consistent with Merton's theory. The findings of a similar relationship for farmers and differences between subcultural groups among farm workers indicates that the relationship is neither limited to the lower class nor does it hold under all conditions in the lower class. Results indicate that cultural interpretation is a significant intervening variable in the relationship between aspirations and blocked perceived opportunity.

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The Religious Crusade: Revival or Ritual?¹

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Participant-observer susceptibility to persuasive appeals for increased religious commitment in a recent study suggests that role playing increases the likelihood of persuasion. A field experiment was designed to test the role-playing hypothesis. A contemporary religious crusade served as the experimental stimulus and ninety-two participant-observers served unknowingly as subjects. Findings revealed that the crusade was ineffectual in producing religious change, and that there were no differences between groups of subjects that engaged in differing degrees of role playing.

Religious behavior, as a topic of scientific inquiry, has a peculiar status in sociology as (1) an independent variable whose influence and effects are unclear, and perhaps unknown; and (2) as a dependent variable whose conditions and causal factors are seldom investigated. In regard to the first variable, there is a body of literature inconsistent with Lenski's (1961) findings that the religious factor is a useful predictor variable.² In regard to the second variable (i.e., the impact of secular factors upon religious behavior) there is increasing evidence that the traditional church-sect typology is no longer a useful approach to organizational analysis (Goode 1967; Demerath 1967; Eister 1967).³

The literature which deals with the conditions of religious revivalism is equally inconsistent (Lipset 1959; Lang and Lang 1960; Glock and Stark 1965; Elinson 1965). A number of descriptive studies (Niebuhr 1929; Holt 1940; Pope 1942, 1948; Goldschmidt 1944; Sweet 1920; Boisen 1955) directed attention to the sociological character of religious re-

¹ This research was conducted while I was a trainee of the Behavioral Sciences Training Branch of the National Institute of Mental Health Training Grant program (MH 07827-06). Grateful acknowledgment is made for this support. I also wish to express appreciation to Otto N. Larsen at the University of Washington, who supervised this research.

² There is disagreement as to whether religious behavior is an accurate predictor of voting patterns (Petersen 1962), fertility (Glick 1960; Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell 1959), marital interaction patterns (Moberg 1962, p. 365), educational aspiration and performance (Greeley 1963; Greeley, Rossi, and Westhoff 1964; Bressler and Westoff 1963), and social class (Lazerwitz 1964, pp. 426-39; Demerath 1965; Goode 1966; Demerath 1967; Dillingham 1967). Research in the area of religious behavior reflects frequently contradictory findings because of the absence of available national statistics (Petersen 1962; 1964, pp. 248-70) and methodological problems in the measurement of religious behavior (Demerath 1965).

³ The most commonly cited contemporary studies of the church-sect typology are Yinger (1957), Wilson (1959), Dynes (1955), Glock and Stark (1965), Johnson (1957, 1961, 1963), and Demerath (1965).

vivals at the turn of the century, and interpreted revivalism, variously, as a social-psychological response to cultural shock, economic distress, and social frustration. More recent research suggests that contemporary religious crusades of A. A. Allen, for example, provide a religious solution to problems of illness, poverty, and status deprivation (Elinson 1965). On the other hand, the revivalistic crusades of Billy Graham have been interpreted as mechanisms which crystallize personal identity of middle-class Protestant believers (Lang and Lang 1960, pp. 415-27), or as religious ritual for the already religiously socialized (Whitam 1965).

Whatever the social and ecological circumstances of revivalism, and they have probably changed since the time of Moody and Sunday, considerable ambiguity remains in the sociology of religion literature concerning the effects of revivalism.

Does exposure to revivalism produce change, that is, is revivalism a condition of religious change? Two current methodological practices in the sociology of religion have probably slowed the development of acceptable answers to this question, as well as to others. First, much of the current literature in this area carelessly slides from discussions of belief to practice, or ritual, as indices of religiosity. Thus, there is conspicuous inconsistency in the nominal and operational definitions of the religious factor. A recent review of this literature concluded that "religiosity is apparently not a single dimension. It has various facets which are given various emphases by various social classes" (Demerath 1965). A number of studies have found that the relationship between, for example, religious beliefs and practices is not only complicated, but may be negatively correlated (Demerath 1965). This belief-practice distinction is related to the more general problem of defining the relationship between verbal and nonverbal behavior.

A second practice in the sociology of religion pertains to treatments of religious change. Change in belief has not often been distinguished from change in practice, and all too often investigators have accepted *religious definitions* of change, such as conversion, as the central measure of religious change. Sociologically, however, conversion may be regarded as the "emergence of a new role, outlook, belief, group identification, character or personality" (Moberg 1962). This conception of religious change directs attention to the more general topics of attitudinal and behavioral change, and the social-psychological and social-structural mechanisms which produce such change.

The central concern of the research reported here was to test and specify some conditions under which persons differentially experience certain consequences after exposure to persuasive religious communication in a revivalistic setting. A methodology was incorporated which permits us to distinguish religious belief from practice, and which conceives of religious change in sociological terms. Lang and Lang's (1960) study of a

Billy Graham revival meeting generated the initial interest in such a study.

STUDY OF GRAHAM REVIVALISM BY LANG AND LANG

Lang and Lang (1960) employed forty-four college students to collect descriptive data at a Billy Graham crusade in New York in 1957. The purpose of the study was to describe "*who* the persons were whom Graham attracted and *how*, or by which technique, he appealed to them." Their findings are relevant to the descriptive literature in the area of religious behavior. More important for the present study was a methodological problem they experienced by the unanticipated "mortality" of student observers. Several of their observers failed to complete the observational tasks when they became involved religiously in the meeting and pursued their own spiritual interests. Lang and Lang (1960, pp. 424-25) reported:

Two observers among our own group, who made their decision during the Crusade had been long-time churchgoers. . . . J, the one genuine "convert," i.e., life-changer . . . was so shaken by her experience that no report was forthcoming. J went to the meeting feeling that he [Graham] would have no effect on her. . . . She kept notes during the proceedings. Her notes were primarily concerned with Graham's sermon. She said she gave him her undivided attention. Somewhere in the course of the sermon she decided to step forward. She cannot remember exactly when. The next thing she knew was that she had risen and was hurrying to the main floor to declare herself [a believer]. She felt that this was "right." . . . Her primary reaction was one of fright. . . . The next morning—Sunday—she called two Unitarian churches, intending to attend services; the services had been called off for the summer months.

Two weeks later J felt that she had stepped forward merely out of "curiosity," laughed when she received follow-up literature from the Crusade, and began to view the whole affair as a "lark."

The Langs' interpretation (1960, p. 426) of this development, as well as for thousands of other persons who participated in Graham's meetings as "decision makers" or "inquirers" was that

unlike other campaigns, what is at stake here is not some specific evil to be fought with palliatives, but personal salvation . . . the dramatization evidently plays on certain tendencies, making it effective for some kinds of people. The middle-class person, torn between the simpler, old-fashioned religious prescriptions and the need to accommodate to a mobile society, is unsure of his identity . . . the declaration of faith, the decision to take Christ into one's heart, is somewhat akin to a ritual confession and ritual atonement.

An alternative explanation, particularly for the observers' behavior, might have focused on the dynamics of participation and on how the definition of the situation affected susceptibility to persuasion. That is,

are there circumstances of participation which function as a sufficient condition for susceptibility to persuasive appeals? A small body of research suggests that such circumstances do exist and operate, under certain mediating conditions, to increase the likelihood of persuasion. Klapper (1961, p. 80), for example, notes: "The conversion [change] potential of persuasive communication appears to be intensified under conditions of audience participation, and particularly among persons who are required, regardless of their actual feelings to assume a role sympathetic to the point of view expressed."

To pursue this explanation, the Langs' observational procedures and directives were examined. The crucial question concerned the extent to which the Langs's observers were "required, regardless of their actual feelings to assume a role sympathetic to the point of view expressed." It was found that the Langs did indeed prescribe a definite mode of participation. Observers were asked to "talk to them [members of the audience] as if you were there just like everybody else. Don't forget to take along a Bible or equivalent thereof. . . . Keep to your assignment to record behavior."⁴

Given the observer mortality in the Lang study, and the implications concerning the impact of role playing upon persuasion susceptibility, the consideration of differential mediating or intervening social influences suggests the following questions: (a) What are the effects of role playing in a potentially persuasive situation, and (b) What social factors operate to mediate the persuasive appeals for some persons and not others?

ROLE PLAYING AND PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

The dynamics of persuasion include the influence of processes which operate both inside and outside the communication context. Role playing may be regarded as an "inside" variable in persuasive communication, and a body of literature suggests that role playing is sufficient for attitude change under certain conditions. In several experiments conducted during World War II, Lewin (1958, pp. 197-211) and others found that food habits were more easily changed under conditions of group discussion than exposure to lectures. Various observers have reported impressions that role playing changed the behavior of American soldiers. Myers observed that a number of "chronic kickers" at an Army camp showed improved morale by participating in public speaking courses where they created speeches favorable to Army life (Janis and King 1954).

⁴ The students who participated in the Lang study were not instructed to heed Graham's call to step forward, but were asked to "blend with the audience" (Kurt Lang, personal communication).

Currently, there is a sizable social psychological literature which documents the assertion that "if a person is forced to improvise a speech supporting a point of view with which he disagrees, his private opinion moves toward the position advocated in the speech" (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959). There is, however, considerable disagreement as to the explanation. Two alternative explanations have been suggested. One formulation draws from Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance and asserts that if a person can be induced to behave publicly in a manner that is inconsistent with his private attitudes, he will experience cognitive dissonance. Dissonance may be reduced or eliminated by a change in private attitudes. The pressure to reduce dissonance is considered to be a function of the magnitude of the dissonance (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959). There is some support for this explanation (Kelman 1953; Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; Cohen, Brehm, and Fleming 1958; Cohen 1962).

An alternative explanation follows an incentive (or reinforcement) formulation. It asserts that high rewards or incentives for role playing produce changes in opinions and attitudes, and there is also some support for this explanation (Janis and Gilmore 1965; Rosenberg 1965; Harvey and Beverly 1961). A more recent study concludes that the dissonance explanation is accurate when subjects are permitted to pursue alternatives to the role-playing requirement, and that incentive (reinforcement), theory pertains only to those situations in which compliance is forced (Linder, Cooper, and Jones 1967).

Extension of these experimental studies to the naturalistic situation observed by the Langs requires some interpretation. First, the subjects' mode of participation in role-playing experiments has been restricted primarily to verbal behavior, such as writing an essay or giving a speech. Nonverbal role playing requires considerably more behavioral commitment, and thus may be more powerful in its generation of persuasion suggestibility. Second, application of incentive or dissonance theory to naturalistic settings requires consideration of conditions and variables operating outside the communication context—behavioral history, predispositions, and salience and effect of group norms. The role-playing interpretation of religious change may be extended to include these "outside" influences as "mediating factors" (Klapper 1961). For example, there appear to be distinguishable expectations for religious behavior according to age and sex roles. Women are more religious than men on all criteria of religiosity, and children and the elderly are more highly involved in belief behavior than adolescents or the middle-aged (Argyle 1958). There is also a large literature which suggests that conditions of social deprivation (Yinger 1957; Herberg 1955), ill health (Argyle 1958; Moberg 1962), fear of death (Stouffer 1949; Allport, Gillespie, and

Young 1948), and economic deprivation (Holt 1940; Boisen 1955; Pope 1942, 1948; Goldschmidt 1944; Catton 1957; Demerath 1965) are sufficient for religious change. All of these variables may be taken as conditions which define both the dissonance and incentives in role playing.

The research reported here defined two modes of nonverbal, behavioral role playing, and attempted to test the following hypothesis in a replication of the Langs' study:

HYPOTHESIS: *The more active the role playing, the greater the positive effect of persuasive appeals for increasing religious commitment in belief and practice, particularly under conditions where (a) persons were more religiously involved at an earlier time in their life than at the present; (b) persons perceive close friends and relatives to support positive change in religious commitment; and (c) persons perceive themselves to be relatively underprivileged in economic and physical status.*

PROCEDURE

The methodology of this study may be viewed as a replication of the Langs' study with one central exception—student observers served unknowingly as experimental subjects. The study design utilized two experimental groups and a control group, each with forty-six subjects. One experimental group received verbal instruction for active participant-observation (role playing) at a Graham revival meeting. A second experimental group was instructed to passively participate during observation (role playing). The control group was not involved in participation or attendance at Graham's meeting, but served as a nontreatment comparison group.

All subjects' "religious commitment" was measured at three points in time via self-administered questionnaires—once before exposure to Graham, and twice after exposure at three-week intervals. Lenski's (1961) conceptual and operational definitions of doctrinal orthodoxy, devotionism, associationalism, and communalism were adopted and modified to a five-point Likert scale, although scale values were not summed for an overall scale score. The Twenty Statements Test (TST) was used to measure the salience of religious identification for self-concept. Table 1 shows the intercorrelations between all indicators of the dependent variable.⁵

⁵ Some of the interitem correlations displayed in table 1 are noteworthy. The belief (doctrinal orthodoxy) items (i.e., B, C, D, E, F, and G) have values of relatively the same magnitude and are high (from .50 to .78). The three dimensions of religious practice (devotionism, associationalism, and communalism) are associated with each other and with belief items to varying degrees. In particular, it may be noted that frequency of church attendance (J) is about as strongly related to other dimensions of religious practice as to belief items. The third general dimension of religious commitment, salience of religious identification for self-concept, shows moderate

TABLE 1
INTER- AND INTRACORRELATIONS OF ALL INDICATORS OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT (PEARSONIAN r)

INDICATORS	SELF- CONCEPT	DOCTRINAL ORTHODOXY						DEVOTIONALISM		ASSOCIA- TIONALISM		COMMUNALISM	
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
Self-concept:													
A.....	1.00	.408	.444	.481	.446	.422	.488	.387	.438	.488	.172	.269	
Doctrinal orthodoxy:													
B.....	...	1.000	.682	.709	.506	.546	.637	.566	.584	.387	.066	.248	
C.....	1.000	.738	.602	.642	.697	.522	.635	.500	.062	.343	
D.....	1.000	.636	.597	.674	.674	.707	.539	.076	.368	
E.....	1.000	.691	.708	.470	.484	.445	.070	.435	
F.....	1.000	.687	.365	.503	.525	.054	.405	
G.....	1.000	.462	.503	.532	.107	.324	
Devotionalism:													
H.....	1.000	.685	.475	.016	.239	
I.....	1.000	.536	.104	.375	
Associationalism:													
J.....	1.000	.038	.252	
Communalism:													
K.....	1.000	.304	
L.....	1.000	

NOTE.—These correlations are taken from responses to the first questionnaire: A = Self Concept (TST), B = There is a God, C = God is like, D = God answers, E = Life after death, F = When they are able, G = Jesus was, H = How often pray, I = Decisions, J = Attend, K = close friends, and L = Spouse.

Each experimental group was composed of students from introductory sociology classes at the University of Washington who were invited to participate in an observational study of Graham's revival. Members of the control group, also sociology students from an introductory social psychology course, were unaware of the study and of their participation as experimental controls. All experimental subjects met for an orientation lecture and were told of the sociological relevance of the study and of the importance of their ability to follow instructions for participant-observation. At the close of the orientation lecture, volunteers were assigned randomly to one of the two experimental groups which subsequently met independently for the "treatment" instructions. Volunteers were not told that they were the subjects of the study; nor were they told of the different instructions for the two experimental groups.

Experimental and control subjects were well matched in terms of age, sex, father's occupation, previous exposure to Billy Graham, and religious preference. Between 61 percent and 67 percent of each group was under twenty-one; about one-third of all subjects were male, and over two-thirds of each group reported father's occupation as professional or managerial. Between 89 percent and 98 percent of these students had never attended a Graham meeting. The religious preferences of the students are summarized in table 2.

Observer role playing.—At the second orientation session, volunteers met independently but at the same hour. At this session, volunteers were "trained" to be observers at the Graham meeting. Active participant-observers met with one supervisor; passive observers met with another. Although the instructions for each group were different, the train-

TABLE 2
RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE OF EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS

RELIGIOUS GROUP	ACTIVE		PASSIVE		CONTROL		TOTAL	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Presbyterian.....	11	5	17	8	17	8	15	21
Methodist.....	17	8	20	9	7	3	14	20
Catholic.....	17	8	13	7	4	2	12	17
Lutheran.....	4	2	17	8	13	6	12	16
Congregational.....	17	8	4	2	11	5	10	15
Episcopal.....	7	3	9	4	11	5	9	12
Baptist.....	4	2	4	2	4	2	4	6
Jew.....	4	2	0	0	4	2	3	4
Other Protestant.....	15	7	13	6	17	8	15	21
None or no response.....	1	1	0	0	11	5	4	6
Total.....		46		46		46		138

correlations with all other indicators (from .38 to .48) except for the communalism indicators.

ing procedure was similar—research questions were reviewed, observers' questionnaires were distributed and discussed, instructions for observation were given, and a twenty-minute tape recording of selected segments of previous Graham meetings was played so that all observers would be familiar with the format and style of the Graham meeting.

Active role playing.—The important difference in the training sessions of the two groups was in their instructions for participation. Active observers were instructed to be "totally involved" in the Graham meeting. They were instructed to participate in the progression of the revival meeting and to "play the role of the typical audience member." They were told:

You should freely participate in the singing, praying, and whatever Graham asks you to do. . . . When Graham asks the audience to stand and pray—take the role of the typical member in the audience.

Your role will be defined by Graham. When he asks the audience to bow their heads—bow your head. When he asks the members of the audience to get up and walk forward—you should get up and walk forward. It is very important that you be able to comply with this aspect of the meeting.

If you do not feel that you can carry through with your participant-observation, please tell us now. But understand, that without maximum participation, we will be unable to answer questions about the sociological and psychological processes operative here.

Passive role playing.—In another room, passive participant-observers were instructed to restrict their activity at the Graham meeting to quiet and unobtrusive observation. They were asked to refrain from involvement in the singing, prayers, and in the "decision making" at the close of the meeting. The role of the passive observer was defined as follows:

You are asked to merely sit and watch, recording information on your questionnaire as you are asked . . . so that other things will not interfere with your ability to record accurate and objective information, we are asking you to refrain from any active involvement in any aspect of the meeting such as singing, prayer, or going forward at the end. . . . When Graham appeals to the members of the audience to come forward; your instructions still hold: *Observe*.

After attending the Graham meeting, all observers were asked to report on their own participation. Responses to three questionnaire items constituted a measurement of the relative success in creating the active and passive roles. Table 3 indicates that most active and passive role players did in fact engage in the appropriate nonverbal behaviors.

FINDINGS

The experimental design of the study facilitated before-after comparisons between all three groups on the dependent variable, religious commit-

TABLE 3
OBSERVER PARTICIPATION

ANSWERS	ACTIVE		PASSIVE	
	%	N	%	N
To what extent did you participate in the following phases of the Graham meeting:				
Audience singing.....	76	35	17	8
Prayer.....	70	32	24	11
Going forward at the end of the meeting.....	65	30	0	0

NOTE.—Subjects estimated the degree of their involvement on a five-point scale.

TABLE 4
F-RATIOS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS AND TIME COMPARISONS
ON ALL INDICATORS OF RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT
(TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE)

	Between Treatments (df, 2/135)	Between Times (df, 1/135)	Interaction (df, 2/135)
Salience of self-concept:			
Self concept.....	0.546	0.716	0.775
Doctrinal orthodoxy:			
There is a God.....	0.474	0.252	0.256
God is like.....	1.092	22.194*	3.717**
God answers.....	0.235	0.750	0.480
There is a life.....	1.391	0.089	0.089
When they are.....	1.022	1.990	0.124
Jesus was.....	0.476	4.117*	2.728
Devotionalism:			
Frequency pray.....	2.264	3.439	0.000
Decisions.....	1.036	4.628*	1.157
Associationalism:			
Attendance.....	0.871	7.256*	0.151
Communalism:			
Close friends.....	0.927	0.016	2.930
Spouse agree.....	3.432*	0.384	1.897

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .001$.

ment. Individual subjects within each experimental group were assigned a "change score" on each indicator of religious commitment. The three measures in time permitted analysis of both short-term (one day) and long-term (three weeks) effects.

Table 4 summarizes the overall differences between experimental groups on all indicators of religious commitment and between short-term and long-term differences. On only one indicator is there a statis-

tically significant difference between experimental groups. On four of the twelve items there are statistically significant differences between short- and long-term effects. The data in table 4 show practically no differences between groups, and the hypothesized relationship between degrees of role playing and change in religious commitment is not supported.⁶

The use of multiple indicators of religious commitment facilitates an examination of patterns of change without regard for statistical significance. A simple enumeration of the direction of changes (i.e., positive, negative, and no change) is shown in table 5.

The data show that disproportionately more positive changes occurred for both short-term and long-term effects among members of the passive group. Active role players showed more positive changes than members of the control group. When negative change (lessened religious commitment) is examined, the data indicate that active observers experienced a greater proportion of negative change than passive observers, and passive observers more than members of the control group. When negative changes in long-term effects are examined, however, the pattern corresponds to the regularities observed in positive changes—passive observers show proportionately more negative change than either active role players or members of the control group.

These differences, however, are exceedingly small. The data indicate that the most common consequence of exposure to Billy Graham was neither positive nor negative change, but no change.

SELF-REPORTED CHANGE: PERCEIVED CONSEQUENCES

Three weeks after exposure to Graham, experimental subjects were asked to assess the consequences of their attendance at the revival. Student observers were still unaware of their "subject" role in the experiment. They were asked to indicate the extent to which exposure to Graham had an effect on their own beliefs, religious practices, and self-concept (tables 6, 7). Table 6 shows that most treatment subjects judged Graham to have had no effect on religious beliefs and practices. The subjects' own reports tend to corroborate the questionnaire data—no effect.

An examination of observers' written reports indicated additional consequences of exposure to Graham. A few observers felt that their participation facilitated religious goals. One observer wrote to the experimenter: "I know Jesus Christ as my personal savior and I'm so

⁶ Experimental subjects were also subdivided on the variables of relative orthodoxy of religious background, the extent to which peer groups supported religious change, and perceived high and low physical and economic deprivation. Analysis of variance, not shown here, produced fewer statistically significant differences than would have been expected by chance.

TABLE 5
PROPORTION OF POSITIVE, NEGATIVE, AND NO CHANGE ON ALL INDICATORS
OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE OVER TIME

	ACTIVE			PASSIVE			CONTROL		
	Short		Long	Short		Long	Short		Long
	%	N	%	%	N	%	%	N	%
Plus change...	10.8	60	11.0	13.4	74	11.7	10.3	57	8.6
Minus change.	15.4	85	15.8	15.0	83	20.1	12.3	68	15.6
No change....	73.7	407	73.2	71.6	395	68.1	77.4	427	75.7
									418

NOTE.—Number of Ss in each group: 46.

TABLE 6
SUBJECTS' ASSESSMENT OF OWN BELIEF-BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSES TO GRAHAM

	ACTIVE				PASSIVE			
	Belief		Behavior		Belief		Behavior	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
No effect. . .	73.9	34	84.7	39	71.7	33	84.7	39
Reinforced. .	21.7	10	8.7	4	21.7	10	6.5	3
Created. . . .	4.3	2	6.5	3	6.5	3	8.7	4
N.		46		46		46		46

TABLE 7
SUBJECTS' ASSESSMENT OF OWN SELF-CONCEPT
RESPONSE TO GRAHAM EXPOSURE

	ACTIVE		PASSIVE	
	%	N	%	N
No effect.	56.6	26	80.0	37
Slight change.	34.1	16	19.5	9
Great change.	8.9	4	0.0	0
N.		46		46

NOTE.—Responses to: How has it affected the way you think of yourself?

thrilled that our Soc. class had this assignment so that many souls can hear about the Lord's saving grace. It is truly an answer to Prayer. Thank you so much for the assignment."

Some observers reported that their mode of participation at the Graham meeting influenced the extent to which Graham might have "moved" them. One observer complained that his passive role prevented expression of genuine religious sentiment. He said: "I felt if I hadn't been restricted I may have gone up to be saved." On the other hand, some active observers expressed the same sentiment—that their participation interfered with the generation of serious religious sentiments. One observer reported: "I was not moved. The difference in feeling was because I had to muster the guts to get up there." Several observers, however, reported that they were in fact "moved" by Graham's appeal. The reports of two observers characterize the experiences of several and are reminiscent of observer experiences in the Langs' study. An active observer reported:

At the meeting itself, I felt it would be very embarrassing to walk down in front of these people. Although I was instructed to do so, I think I would have anyway just to affirm my own belief in God.

When returning to the dormitory, I told some of my friends of my participation and my actual feelings and they laughed about it. I was actually offended at the time and defending the cause and becoming quite heated. After a few days of not talking to them, I apologized and thought my actions quite silly.

After returning from the Graham meeting, all observers were asked to check a statement which best described their reaction to the Graham meeting, and to indicate whether they would go to see and hear Billy Graham again, for personal rather than observational purposes. Table 8 indicates, for example, that 64 percent of all observers were "not particularly stirred but thought it was an interesting experience." The differences in reaction between active and passive observers in this table are not statistically significant; the pattern of responses for both groups of observers is similar.

When observers were asked if they would attend a Graham meeting in the future, passive observers were more likely to indicate both yes and no. Table 9 indicates that active observers were more likely than passive observers to view future attendance as a possibility. Again, the differences between active and passive observers are small, and all observer responses contribute to an overall pattern of reaction—mostly negative.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

The principal findings of this study indicate that (1) the hypothesized relationship between nonverbal role playing and persuasion was not

TABLE 8
OBSERVERS' REACTIONS TO GRAHAM

	ACTIVE		PASSIVE		TOTALS	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
I consider the meeting to have been a rewarding and uplifting experience.....	15.0	7	15.0	7	15.0	14
I was emotionally stirred.....	7.0	3	9.0	4	8.0	7
I was not particularly stirred, but it was an interesting experience.....	67.0	31	61.0	28	64.0	59
I was totally bored.....	2.0	1	4.0	2	3.0	3
My reaction to the meeting is negative. I resent what Graham is trying to do.....	9.0	4	11.0	5	10.0	9

NOTE.—Answers to: Which statement best describes your own feelings and experiences as you participated in the meeting?

TABLE 9
OBSERVERS' INTEREST TO SEE GRAHAM AGAIN

	ACTIVE		PASSIVE		TOTAL		SIGNIFI- CANCE*
	%	N	%	N	%	N	
Definitely or probably yes	9.0	4	15.0	7	12.0	11	No $z=0.890$
Possibly	24.0	11	13.0	6	18.0	17	No $z=1.37$
Probably or definitely no	67.0	31	72.0	33	70.0	64	No $z=0.521$

NOTE.—Answers to: If you had the opportunity, would you go to see and hear Billy Graham again—for personal rather than for sociological or other reasons?

* Difference between proportions test; $\alpha = .05$ (one-tail test).

demonstrated; (2) regardless of other variables (e.g. religious background, the existence of group norms prescribing religious change, and perceived deprivation of health and economic statuses), the Graham meeting was ineffectual in changing religious beliefs, behaviors, or religious self-concepts; and (3) when change did occur among student observers, religious commitment was attenuated.

There are at least three alternative interpretations for the findings of this study. First, the findings may be misleading insofar as they suggest that Graham revivals are ineffectual in changing religious behavior. It may be that college populations, such as the one studied here, are (a) unsocialized to the style of Protestantism which Graham presents and are, hence, unable to respond religiously to the "make a decision for Christ" approach (these students may make their religious decisions, if they make them at all, in some other context); and (b) college students may be sufficiently areligious so that exposure to Graham or anyone else has no pronounced effect upon either their verbal or nonverbal religious behavior.

A second interpretation is that Graham does in fact generate religious changes in his audiences, but that the instruments employed in this study were insensitive to them. Systematic measurement remains a core problem in sociology, and the pitfalls which stem from the use of verbal reports of nonverbal events are well known (Deutscher 1966). In this study, measurement of the dependent variable and independent variables (i.e., role playing, religious background, etc.) was accomplished through verbal reports.

A third interpretation—and one favored by me—is that exposure to Graham revivalism does not produce changes in religious behavior, but rather, normatively prescribed "religious experiences" for certain individuals already socialized into this form of religious expression. In

the present study, nine students indicated to the investigator that they "made a decision for Christ" at the meeting. An examination of their religious backgrounds revealed that, in each case, they had been exposed either to Billy Graham meetings in the past, or had attended those Protestant churches which support the Graham movement and incorporate his style of conversion. An examination of the questionnaire data for these subjects showed that there were no changes in the salience of religious identification for self-concept, nonverbal religious behaviors, or in the number and intensity of religious beliefs. This study, like the research of Zetterberg (1952), Tamney (1962), and Whitam (1965), views revivalism of the style practiced by Billy Graham as subcultural tradition whose norms define and prescribe ritualistic religious "conversions," without changing either verbal or nonverbal religious behavior.

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Predictive Measures of Ordinal Association¹

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For selecting and interpreting appropriate measures of association, a "proportional-reduction-in-error" (P-R-E) criterion is useful. However, efforts to give a P-R-E interpretation to measures of ordinal association have not been successful, especially in delineating the "form" or "shape" of ordinal association. An effort is therefore made in this paper to introduce the notion of relevant forms of ordinal association, such as strict monotonic, monotonic, and nonmonotonic associations, and to suggest a few P-R-E measures that would assess such particular forms of association in ordinal data.

When we talk about a measure of association, we mean an index designed to measure the degree to which two or more variables "go together" in some sense. In the loosest sense, any two variables may be said to be associated as long as the two are not statistically independent. In a stricter sense, however, two variables are said to be associated only if they show some patterned covariation. The pattern of our interest may be linear or curvilinear, monotonic or nonmonotonic, to name a few. Although lack of independence can be indicated without any reference to a specific form of relationship, the *degree* of association can be indicated only with reference to a specific pattern of relationship.

Costner (1965) pointed out the importance of making the implied form of association explicit when he advocated the adoption of the "proportional-reduction-in-error" (P-R-E) criterion in selecting appropriate measures of association for sociological research. The P-R-E interpretation, as he cogently argued, will give us not only an exact probabilistic statement about the degree of an association but also a clear indication of the reference pattern of association under consideration. For instance, it is clear from the P-R-E interpretation of Pearsonian r that it measures the *linear* relationship, and that the value of r^2 will reach unity (maximum) if and only if one variable is a linear function of the other (see Kruskal 1958; Hays 1963).

¹ I wish to thank Robert H. Somers for his help and encouragement. My interest in these problems was first stimulated by his work and many ideas developed in this paper can be found in implicit form in his many unpublished papers. I am also grateful to Mary A. Spaeth for her editorial help, which not only improved my English but also clarified my muddled thoughts. Sidney Verba, as the director of the Cross-National Project in Political and Social Change, has provided the financial help and intellectual environment. Finally, extensive comments by an anonymous reader and the editorial suggestions of Thomas W. Pullum contributed much to the improvement of the paper.

Unfortunately, however, no ordinal association has been defined with reference to such *functional* relations, although a major step to that end was taken when Goodman and Kruskal (1954) presented their γ with a clear operational definition and Davis (1964, 1967) and Costner (1965) subsequently reformulated it as a P-R-E measure. We shall show that a more specific indication of the reference function can be made in constructing and interpreting P-R-E measures of ordinal association, and that such specification of reference forms may clarify the kinds of hypotheses we implicitly test with data.

P-R-E INDEX AND REFERENCE FUNCTION

The notion of P-R-E in prediction is an extremely convenient interpretive device for a variety of measures of association (see Costner 1965) and provides us with a basic strategy by which a measure of association can be formulated. In the following, therefore, we recapitulate the basic features of P-R-E, with slight modifications:

1. Consider a situation in which we predict the value of Y (the dependent variable) from X (the independent variable) as best we can, under the following two different conditions: (a) assuming that Y is statistically independent of X , and (b) assuming that Y is a certain function of X , for example, that Y is a linear function of X .

2. Consider also that, for prediction, we have information only on X and the joint distribution of X and Y , including the marginals of Y .

3. Let us also stipulate that the prediction rules and definition of error should be consistent with the measurement levels of the given variables, and that perfect prediction or no error in prediction of Y from X means that Y is some function of X .

4. Then the P-R-E index may be given by:

P-R-E index

$$= \frac{\text{probability of error in (1a)} - \text{probability of error in (1b)}}{\text{probability of error in (1a)}}.$$

The basic idea is that the relative improvement in prediction (or the proportional reduction in error) is indicative of the degree of association between X and Y . But such an index does not measure just *any* kind of association. The magnitude of the P-R-E index reflects the degree to which the relationship between two variables *deviates from statistical independence insofar as it also approaches the particular form of functional relation* assumed in 1b.²

² It is customary to express the P-R-E interpretation in terms of errors in (1) predicting Y *without* knowledge of X , and (2) predicting Y *with* knowledge of X (Costner 1965; Davis 1964; Goodman and Kruskal 1954, p. 741; Hays 1963, p. 324; Wallis and Roberts 1956, p. 280). In our version, one would simply state the same idea in a

A few comments are in order. The concept of statistical independence has a clear operational definition while the concept of "complete association" does not (see McGinnis 1958). Partly due to the relative clarity in the conception of independence and partly due to the emphasis on the test of significance, a measure of association is often thought of as a measure of relative deviation from statistical independence. Such a popular conception of association does not square well with P-R-E indices. It is obvious from the previous discussion, however, that the concept of "no association" does not imply statistical independence, and that the degree of association is indicated by the degree of deviation from a certain type of functional relation. That is, a measure of association takes on a definite meaning mostly from its relation to the concept of perfect association, not the other way around.

Stated somewhat differently, the particular type of reference function to be used as the criterion of perfect association can serve as the embodiment of the implicit hypothesis we are trying to examine. By using a P-R-E measure of association, therefore, we are actually evaluating the hypothesis that the data will exhibit a given type of association or a tendency toward a given type of functional relationship. Consequently, an indication of no association given by a specific index does not necessarily imply lack of another type of association. This is in sharp contrast to the χ^2 based measures, such as Tsuprow's T , Cramer's V , or ϕ (see Blalock 1960), which we normally use to examine a hypothesis no more specific than that one variable is not statistically independent of the other.

Finally, in our formulation of P-R-E, it has been stipulated that a perfect association must imply a functional relation of a specified type. This stipulation may sound too restrictive since there is nothing inherent in the notion of P-R-E to imply such a criterion. This restriction seems useful, however, in giving a more definite meaning to the type of association or hypothesis under consideration. It is proposed that this criterion be used to define a "predictive measure" of association, in the belief that in most instances such measures of association would meet our research needs. However, the imposition of this criterion should not be taken as indispensable to a useful measure of association or as a substitute for the general principle that the operational definition of a measure should be congruent to a given research problem (see Goodman and Kruskal 1954; Somers 1968a).

different way because, under the assumption of independence, one would ignore information on X in predicting Y . The change is made simply to emphasize that what is informative is not that we gain some predictive power by having information on X but that we gain such power by adopting a particular model of association in contrast to assuming statistical independence.

REFERENCE FUNCTION IN ORDINAL DATA

In the general sense, the statement "Y is a function of X" means that for every value (or category) of X (the independent variable), there is one and only one value (or category) of Y (the dependent variable). In prediction terms, it means that, given the value of X, the value of Y is completely determined.³

The specific forms of such functional relations are many and diverse, but only certain general types of functional relations are of particular interest and will serve as criteria of perfect association. For ordinal variables, such types fall into one of the following four categories:

1. Y is a strict monotonic (increasing or decreasing) function of X;
2. Y is a (weak) monotonic function of X;
3. Y is a "polytonic" function of X; and
4. Y is simply an ad hoc function of X.

Simplified examples of each type of function for discrete ordinal data are presented in figure 1. (See McGinnis 1964 for a more rigorous definition of ordinal functions for continuous variables.)

Let us examine each type of function. In figure 1-1, Y is a monotonic (increasing) function of X and vice versa. Given X, Y is completely determined, and given Y, X is also completely determined. In this case, one can say, "As X increases, Y increases," or "The greater the X, the greater the Y."

In figure 1-2, Y is a monotonic increasing (or more accurately, non-




FIG. 1.—Some examples of functional relations in ordinal data. 1-1: Y is a strict monotonic (increasing) function of X; 1-2: Y is a (weak) monotonic (increasing) function of X; 1-3: Y is a "polytonic" function of X; 1-4: Y is an ad hoc function of X.

³ A satisfactory discussion of function involves the notion of mapping between two sets, one of which is usually known as the domain and the other as the range. "A relation is said to be a *functional relation* or a *function* if each member of the domain is paired with *one and only one* member of the range" (Hays 1963, p. 34).

decreasing) function of X , but not vice versa. Given X , the category of Y is uniquely determined. But given the value of Y , for instance, the value of 2, the value of X is indeterminate. Perfect prediction is possible only from one direction. Also note that the familiar proposition, "As X increases, Y increases," does not fit this relationship. A correct description of the situation is rather, "As X increases, Y increases or remains the same." In general, a (weak) monotonic function is not symmetrical; Y may be a monotonic function of X without X being a monotonic function of Y .

In figure 1-3, Y is a function of X . It is a monotonic (increasing) function for one range of X values and a monotonic (decreasing) function for another range of X values. Such relations having more than one directional function will be called "polytonic" functions.

Finally, figure 1-4 shows a functional relation with no regularity in its directional pattern (in a relative sense, of course). Sometimes it may be useful to differentiate this type of ad hoc function from a polytonic function. For convenience, however, we shall refer to both types of functions as "nonmonotonic" when such differentiation is not deemed necessary.

Granted that any one of the functional relations shown above can serve as a criterion of perfect association, our next task is to devise rules of prediction that not only are consistent with the measurement assumptions of ordinal data and definitions of perfect association but also are easily amenable to P-R-E interpretation. To facilitate the discussion, however, we digress briefly to introduce some terms necessary to describe various bivariate information contained in ordinal data.

ORDINAL INFORMATION

Since comprehensive discussion of ordinal measurement is readily available elsewhere (McGinnis 1964; Siegel 1956; Stevens 1946), we shall simply note here that rank or "order" is a relative concept, and its measurement value in itself has no specific meaning except in comparisons. For this reason, it is customary to use a "pair comparison" as the basis for measuring and summarizing ordinal information. For instance, for a given pair of objects (or observations), i and j , their relative value on variable Y can be summarized in one of three possible "orders": $Y_i > Y_j$, $Y_i = Y_j$, or $Y_i < Y_j$. Using this basic comparison, information contained in ordinal variables may be defined as follows: For *ordinal variation*⁴ on Y ,

$$V_y = \sum A_{ij}^2, \quad (1)$$

⁴ For lack of better terminology, we borrow terms used for interval variables. We simply note that variation in interval data can also be expressed in terms of pair comparisons (see Hays 1963; Hawkes 1971). However, the similarity stops at the conceptual level.

where A_{ij} is 1 if $Y_i - Y_j > 0$, 0 if $Y_i - Y_j = 0$, and -1 if $Y_i - Y_j < 0$. And similarly, for *ordinal* variation on X ,

$$V_x = \Sigma B_{ij}^2, \quad (2)$$

where B_{ij} is 1 if $X_i - X_j > 0$, 0 if $X_i - X_j = 0$, and -1 if $X_i - X_j < 0$. In other words, total ordinal variation for a given variable is defined by the total number of possible pairs not tied on a given variable. Maximum variation, therefore, will be achieved if there is no tie in ranking (Kendall 1959; Somers 1962b; for similar strategy in dealing with qualitative variation, see Mueller and Schuessler 1961; Lazarsfeld and Henry 1968).

In a bivariate distribution, nine combinations (3×3) are possible. These can be partitioned into the following five categories as suggested by Somers (1965):

$P_{xy} \dots$ "concordant" $\dots Y_i > Y_j$ and $X_i > X_j$;

$Q_{xy} \dots$ "discordant" $\dots Y_i < Y_j$ and $X_i > X_j$;

$U_y \dots$ "Y-unilateral" $\dots Y_i \neq Y_j$ and $X_i = X_j$;

$U_x \dots$ "X-unilateral" $\dots Y_i = Y_j$ and $X_i \neq X_j$;

$T_{xy} \dots$ "tied on both" $\dots Y_i = Y_j$ and $X_i = X_j$.

Now we can express the total variation on Y and X in terms of the bivariate categories thus far defined as

$$V_y = P_{xy} + Q_{xy} + U_y, \quad (3)$$

$$V_x = P_{xy} + Q_{xy} + U_x, \quad (4)$$

and the total number of all distinguishable pairs (excluding permuted pairs) as

$$(\frac{1}{2})N(N - 1) = P_{xy} + Q_{xy} + U_x + U_y + T_{xy}. \quad (5)$$

Finally, we can define the *ordinal* covariation as

$$V_{xy} = \Sigma A_{ij}B_{ij} = P_{xy} - Q_{xy}, \quad (6)$$

where A_{ij} and B_{ij} are as defined in equations (1) and (2) (see Lazarsfeld and Henry 1968). Examples of calculating these terms are presented in figure 2.

ORDINAL PREDICTIONS AND IMPLIED HYPOTHESES

Since ordinal measurement has no specific value except in comparison, it is customary to predict the relative order of a variable for all possible pairs of objects rather than to predict the specific rank of each object. Granted that this strategy is suitable for ordinal prediction, we are still left with some ambiguities in handling *ties* in ranking. Given no ties in

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	x_1	x_2	x_3	
y_1	a	b	c	B_1
y_2	d	e	f	B_2
	A_1	A_2	A_3	N

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_{xy} &= a(e+f) + b(f) \\
 Q_{xy} &= c(d+e) + b(d) \\
 U_y &= a(d) + b(e) + c(f) \\
 U_x &= a(b+z) + b(c) + d(e+f) + e(f) \\
 T_{xy} &= 1/2 [a(a-1) + b(b-1) + c(c-1) + d(d-1) + e(e-1) + f(f-1)] \\
 V_y &= P_{xy} + Q_{xy} + U_y = B_1(B_2) \\
 V_x &= P_{xy} + Q_{xy} + U_x = A_1(A_2 + A_3) + A_2(A_3) \\
 (1/2)N(N-1) &= P_{xy} + Q_{xy} + U_y + U_x + T_{xy}
 \end{aligned}$$

FIG. 2.—Hypothetical frequency distribution and calculation of various ordinal information.

ranking, for a pair, i and j , we would predict their order on Y to be either $Y_i > Y_j$ or $Y_i < Y_j$, and we would have no difficulty in delineating errors in prediction. However, given the possibility of ties in ranking, such a prediction rule is either incomplete or indefinite about the ties. Davis (1964) and Costner (1965) propose to ignore ties or to exclude them from consideration, thereby basing their prediction strategy on a subset of all possible pairs, while Somers (1968a) introduces certain tie-breaking assumptions (see also Costner 1968). Wilson (1968), on the other hand, introduces a complicated counting rule, which, he admits, does not give us an optimal prediction.

We propose a somewhat different prediction rule in which apparent precision in prediction is sacrificed for the comprehensiveness of the rule. We accept the inherent difficulties in classifying three possible orders— $Y_i > Y_j$, $Y_i = Y_j$, or $Y_i < Y_j$ —into a two-valued system where prediction has to be either correct or erroneous. We predict a weak order—either $Y_i \geq Y_j$ or $Y_i \leq Y_j$ —instead of a definite order— $Y_i > Y_j$ or $Y_i < Y_j$. By doing so we allow the rules of prediction to cover all possible pairs of observations and the definition of error to become self-explanatory.

Specifically, given the first assumption that Y is independent of X , we would predict, regardless of the order on X , that $Y_i \geq Y_j$ for a randomly chosen pair of objects, because under the assumption, information about the order on X would not help us improve our prediction of the order on Y . Such prediction will always be correct if the pair is tied on Y , but will be expected to be erroneous half of the time if the pair is not

tied on Y , because for a randomly chosen pair, the order is as likely to be $Y_i \geq Y_j$ as $Y_i \leq Y_j$ (see Costner 1965). Therefore, given a pair of objects randomly drawn from a given population, the probability of error in prediction under the first assumption would be

$$E_1 = (\frac{1}{2})V_y/(\frac{1}{2})N(N-1) = V_y/N(N-1). \quad (7)$$

Note that this result contains the total "ordinal variation" as numerator. The same rule of prediction and the resultant probability of error would apply to every type of P-R-E index introduced in this paper.

Under the second assumption that Y is a certain function of X , however, the prediction rule for one measure of association should be different from that for another because each type of association reflects an implicitly different type of hypothesis. Consequently, we have to examine each type of association separately, although the general principle of prediction is basically the same. First, let us examine a weak monotonic association, whose reference function is exemplified by figure 1. Anticipating our later discussion, we may also note that what we describe in connection with a monotonic function becomes the basic building block for other ordinal functions as well.

Since we accept the monotonic function as an example of perfect association, we have to find a hypothesis that is consistent with such a conception. To be consistent, the hypothesis should entail no error *if and only if* Y is a (weak) monotonic function of X . Let us examine the following hypothesis: $H_0: Y_i \geq Y_j$, if $X_i \geq X_j$. Every prediction based on this hypothesis, which hereafter will be referred to as a monotonic hypothesis, will always be correct if and only if Y is a monotonic (increasing) function of X ; if Y is not a monotonic function of X , that is, if the relationship is polytonic, nonmonotonic, or nonfunctional, there will always be some error in prediction. Since, however, a linear function is a special case of strictly monotonic function, which in turn is a special case of (weak) monotonic function, the monotonic hypothesis will be consistent with functional forms that are more stringent than monotonic.

The probability of error in prediction under the second assumption, therefore, is:

$$\begin{aligned} E_2 &= [Q_{xy} + (\frac{1}{2})U_y]/[(\frac{1}{2})N(N-1)] \\ &= (2Q_{xy} + U_y)/N(N-1). \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Note that the numerator is based on the total number of "discordant" pairs and pairs with Y -unilateral variation.⁵

Consequently, a P-R-E index based on these probabilities will be

⁵ If one were to employ a negative monotonic hypothesis— $Y_i \leq Y_j$, if $X_i \geq X_j$ —one should replace Q_{xy} with P_{xy} in (8). Since the underlying logic is the same, we shall not discuss the case of negative association.

$d_{y \cdot x} = (E_1 - E_2)/E_1 = [(5) - (6)]/(5)$. Rewriting V_y in the numerator in terms of the constituent bivariate terms in equation (1) and canceling out $N(N - 1)$ from both numerator and denominator, we get

$$d_{y \cdot x} = (P_{xy} - Q_{xy})/V_y = V_{xy}/V_y. \quad (9)$$

The resultant coefficient is exactly the same as Somers's d_{xy} (Somers 1962a), and may be interpreted as the proportion of the total ordinal variation in Y explained by the variation in X . The fact that in terms of prediction, Y should be taken as the dependent variable has been originally noted by Somers (1962a). The monotonic hypothesis is asymmetric, as is the monotonic functional relation, and consequently the resultant coefficient is also asymmetric.

If we were to consider a situation in which we predict X from Y , we would be testing the hypothesis that $H_0: X_i \geq X_j$, if $Y_i \geq Y_j$. This hypothesis will be consistent with a relation in which X is a monotonic increasing function of Y , but not necessarily with a relation in which Y is a monotonic increasing function of X . Since the basic strategy is the same regardless of the direction of prediction, we may simply present the resultant coefficient without going into detail:

$$d_{x \cdot y} = V_{xy}/V_x. \quad (10)$$

Two points seem to require some emphasis. First, these coefficients are asymmetric and based upon a directional hypothesis. Second, a perfect association defined by either one does not imply a strictly monotonic functional relation.

If we have no directional priority in prediction or want to define a perfect association in terms of a strictly monotonic functional relation, we have to devise a new strategy. First note that a strictly monotonic function is consistent with the following compound hypothesis (assuming a monotonic increasing function): $H_0: Y_i \geq Y_j$, if $X_i \geq X_j$, and $X_i \geq X_j$, if $Y_i \geq Y_j$. It is therefore reasonable to adopt a prediction strategy in which we predict Y from X half the time and X from Y half the time, each time using the relevant half of the above compound hypothesis. (See Goodman and Kruskal 1954 for similar strategy in defining the symmetric λ .) The resultant symmetric P-R-E index of strictly monotonic association is:

$$d = V_{xy}/(\frac{1}{2})(V_y + V_x) = 2V_{xy}/(V_y + V_x). \quad (11)$$

This index will be unity if and only if one variable is a strictly monotonic function of the other. This symmetric d may also be seen as a weighted sum of two asymmetric d 's, the weights being proportional to the amount of ordinal variation in each variable: $d = w_1 d_{y \cdot x} + w_2 d_{x \cdot y}$, where

$$w_1 = V_y/(V_x + V_y) \quad \text{and} \quad w_2 = V_x/(V_x + V_y).$$

The three coefficients defined above will always be identical if there are no ties in the rankings, and will show the following relationship if there are ties in the rankings: (the smaller of $d_{y \cdot x}$ or $d_{x \cdot y}$) $\leq d \leq$ (the greater of $d_{y \cdot x}$ or $d_{x \cdot y}$). If the amount of ordinal variation in one variable (or the number of ties in one variable) is the same as that in the other, the three coefficients will be identical: $d_{y \cdot x} = d_{x \cdot y} = d$, if $V_x = V_y$ or $U_y = U_x$. We may note that the occasional symmetry in the P-R-E indices is due to the nature of the measurement, rather than the inherent logic of the indices.

An example of monotonic association is given in table 1, with the appropriate statistics.

INDICES OF NONMONOTONIC ASSOCIATION

For the cases where the hypothesized relationship is nonmonotonic, we have to decompose the hypothesized function into simple monotonic functions. For instance, given the polytonic function shown in figure 1-3, we would decompose it into two parts—one with a monotonic increasing function and the other with a monotonic decreasing function. That is, we would consider the left half of the table (a) apart from the right half

TABLE 1
AN EXAMPLE OF MONOTONIC ASSOCIATION
(ELECTORAL ACTIVITY BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS)

ELECTORAL ACTIVITY (Y)	SES (X)			
	Low	Medium	High	Total
Low.....	515	390	251	1,156
Medium.....	215	272	269	756
High.....	127	209	351	687
Total.....	857	871	871	2,599

$$P_{xy} = 1,024,687$$

$$Q_{xy} = 464,881$$

$$V_{xy} = 559,806$$

$$V_x = 2,251,535$$

$$V_y = 2,187,480$$

$$d_{y \cdot x} = .25591$$

$$d_{x \cdot y} = .24863$$

$$d = .25222$$

$$\hat{d}_{y \cdot x} = .25591$$

NOTE.—This table is based on a cross-sectional sample of the United States. The data were collected as part of the Cross-National Project in Political and Social Change. Some of the findings will be reported in Verba and Nie (forthcoming).

(b). For the pairs coming entirely from one half of the table, we have no trouble in adopting the ordinary rule of prediction with a monotonic hypothesis. However, the polytonic function does not provide us with a solution of what to do with a pair where one element comes from part *a* and the other from part *b*. For such pairs we propose to adopt the best ad hoc prediction rule.

Specifically, we propose the following rules:

1. Examine every subtable consisting in a pair of *X* categories, one coming from part *a* and the other from part *b*. Then examine the direction of relationship for each subtable (*k*) by calculating *P* and *Q* as usual.

2. Make the best monotonic prediction for each such table on the basis of such an examination. That is, predict $Y_i \geq Y_j$ given $X_i \geq X_j$, if $P_k \geq Q_k$; predict $Y_i \leq Y_j$ given $X_i \geq X_j$, if $P_k < Q_k$.

The resultant errors for this portion would be $\Sigma |P_k - Q_k|$.

To recapitulate, given the nonmonotonic hypothesis exemplified in figure 1-3, we would predict in the following way:

1. For pairs falling in the left half of the table (*a*), we would predict: $Y_i \geq Y_j$, if $X_i \geq X_j$.

2. For pairs falling in the right half of the table (*b*), we would predict: $Y_i \leq Y_j$, if $X_i \geq X_j$.

3. For pairs coming one from each part, we would predict according to the best ad hoc prediction rule.

Then, the resultant P-R-E index would be

$$\hat{d}_{y,x} = [(P_a - Q_a) + (Q_b - P_b) + \Sigma |P_k - Q_k|] / V_y, \quad (12)$$

where the subscripts indicate subtables from which relevant pairs are counted. This index will be unity if and only if *Y* is a specified polytonic function of *X*.

We have not discussed yet how to choose an appropriate nonmonotonic function as a reference for a given problem. It would be ideal if our theory were specific enough to indicate the expected form of relationship. In most cases, however, we would have to examine the bivariate distribution before we would know what type of functional form would best fit the data. If we adopt the best ad hoc function as our reference, the calculation of $\hat{d}_{y,x}$ can be modified to allow easy programming for an electronic computer. (See Nie, Bent, and Hull 1970 for computer adaptation of some indices introduced in this paper.) Then the formula can be simplified as

$$\hat{d}_{y,x} = (\Sigma |P_m - Q_m|) / V_y, \quad (13)$$

where P_m and Q_m represent the number of concordant and discordant pairs, respectively, calculated for each subtable *m*, which, in turn, consists of every possible pair of *X* categories. If there are *n* categories in *X*, the total number of subtables would be $(\frac{1}{2})n(n - 1)$. As is the case with

correlation ratios, $\hat{d}_{y \cdot x}$ based on such an ad hoc hypothesis would become meaningless if there were no ties in X rankings, for the index would then always be unity.

Finally, we note that the nonmonotonic index can be used for relationships often described as curvilinear or nonlinear in sociological literature, the most common examples of which are found in the relationships between age and social activities, partisanship and electoral activities, and attitudinal contents and their intensity. (See example propositions in Berelson and Steiner 1964; Milbrath 1965.) An example is given in table 2, with relevant statistics.

SUMMARY

1a. The magnitude of each predictive measure represents a proportional reduction in error of prediction, afforded by adopting a specific hypothesis that is consistent with a particular type of functional relation.

1b. It can also be viewed as the proportion of *ordinal* variation in Y accounted for by the variation in X , when an appropriate prediction rule is used.

2a. $d_{y \cdot x} = 1$ if and only if Y is a monotonic function of X —that is,

TABLE 2
AN EXAMPLE OF NONMONOTONIC ASSOCIATION
(SATISFACTION WITH ONE'S JOB)

INTENSITY (Y)	CONTENTS (X)					Total
	0-2 (Negative)	3-4	5-6	7-8	9-12 (Positive)	
0-2 (low)	11	69	108	66	15	269
3-4	16	43	59	42	16	176
5-6	31	39	42	43	33	188
7-8 (high)	76	56	44	40	85	301
Total	134	207	253	191	149	934

$$P_{xy} = 128,393$$

$$Q_{xy} = 129,191$$

$$V_{xy} = -798$$

$$\left[(Q_a - P_a) + (P_b - Q_b) + \sum^k |P_k - k| \right] = \sum^m |P_m - Q_m| = 101,064$$

$$V_y = 321,537$$

$$d_{y \cdot x} = -.00248$$

$$\hat{d}_{y \cdot x} = .31431$$

NOTE.—This table is adapted from Suchman (1950, p. 247).

if and only if the following hypothesis is always true: $Y_i \geq Y_j$, given $X_i \geq X_j$.

2b. $d_{x,y} = 1$ if and only if X is a monotonic function of Y —that is, if and only if the following hypothesis is always true: $X_i \geq X_j$, given $Y_i \geq Y_j$.

2c. $d = 1$ if and only if Y is a strictly monotonic function of X —that is, if and only if the compound hypothesis is always true: $Y_i \geq Y_j$, given $X_i \geq X_j$; and $X_i \geq X_j$, given $Y_i \geq Y_j$.

3a. $d_{y,x} = d_{x,y} = d = 0$ if, but not only if, Y is independent of X ; that $d = 0$ does not eliminate the possibility of a nonmonotonic functional relation.⁶

3b. $d_{y,x} = d_{x,y} = d = \hat{d}_{y,x} = 0$ if, but not only if, Y is independent of X ; that $\hat{d}_{y,x} = 0$ eliminates the possibility of a nonmonotonic functional relation of the type suggested by our theory.

4a. $d_{y,x} < \hat{d}_{y,x} = 1$ if and only if Y is a nonmonotonic function of X .

4b. $d_{y,x} = \hat{d}_{y,x} < 1$ if and only if the pattern of relationship is monotonic but there is no functional relation of the type suggested by our theory.

4c. $d_{y,x} < \hat{d}_{y,x} < 1$ implies that there is no functional relationship and that some nonmonotonic function is a better “fit” than the best monotonic function.

DISCUSSION

Kruskal (1958, p. 844) suggests that a measure of association should be evaluated on at least three grounds—“simplicity of interpretation, reasonable sensitivity to form of distribution, and relative simplicity of sampling theory.” Our discussion of predictive measures so far has demonstrated, we believe, that the first two criteria have been met by these measures. Regarding the third criterion, we simply mention that the sampling theory for γ developed by Goodman and Kruskal (1963) has been adapted for the monotonic d 's by Morris (1970), with γ - k being identical with $d_{y,x}$ for the bivariate case.

Since our research seldom stops with the examination of bivariate association, it is also important that the same index be applicable for measuring partial and multiple associations. Somers (1963, 1964, 1965) and Davis (1964) have explored the possible uses of asymmetric d 's for partial tables, and with the same logic we can adapt other predictive measures for measuring partial associations, although some unresolved issues still remain (Somers 1968b). Morris (1970) has introduced some new strategies in constructing and interpreting measures of multiple association for ordinal variables and has noted some of the advantages

⁶ See Kendall and Stuart (1961) for similar comparisons between τ^2 and η^2 .

of $d_{y \cdot x}$ (or his γ - k) over other measures in constructing an index of multiple association. A fuller description of partial and multiple associations would require a separate paper.

We shall now compare the predictive measures of monotonic association with the two most popular measures of ordinal association— γ and Kendall's τ - b . As can be seen from the following formulas, they all share the same numerator:

$$\tau\text{-}b = V_{xy}/\sqrt{V_x V_y} = \sqrt{d_{y \cdot x} d_{x \cdot y}}; \quad \gamma = V_{xy}/(P_{xy} + Q_{xy}).$$

The symmetric d and τ - b have the same definitions of complete association and no association. Since τ - b is a geometric mean of the two asymmetric d 's while the symmetric d is a weighted average (see equation [11]), the magnitude of τ - b will always be greater than or equal to that of d . For the moment, τ - b does not have a simple P-R-E interpretation (see Wilson 1968) and therefore lacks a *simple* probabilistic interpretation of its intermediate values.

On the other hand, γ has a simple operational definition (Goodman and Kruskal 1954) and a P-R-E interpretation based on the exclusion of ties (Davis 1964; Costner 1965). The minimum requirement for perfect association in γ is that for pairs *with no ties on either variable*, the order of one variable is perfectly predictable from that of the other. This criterion does not imply a functional relation and can be satisfied by any one of the examples of nonfunctional relations shown in figure 3. Since the meaning of association largely depends on the definition of perfect association, γ and d would sometimes give contradictory information. For instance, examine figure 4. Using γ as the measure of association, we would conclude that there is a lesser degree of association in figure 4-1 than in figure 4-2, while using the symmetric d , we would arrive at the opposite conclusion.

Given such contradictory information about the degree of association, the choice of an appropriate measure of association becomes critical. In theory, we would choose a measure whose operational definition is congruent with the specific research problem at hand, but this principle is often too general to be useful in practice. Therefore, a few practical comments are in order.

3-1				3-2				3-3		
	x_1	x_2	x_3		x_1	x_2	x_3		x_1	x_2
y_1	x			y_1	x			y_1	x	
y_2	x			y_2	x	x		y_2	x	x
y_3	x	x	x	y_3		x	x			

FIG. 3.—Examples of perfect association by γ , where Y is not a monotonic function of X .

Predictive Measures of Ordinal Association

4-1	4-2								
<table border="1"> <tr><td>9</td><td>2</td></tr> <tr><td>2</td><td>9</td></tr> </table>	9	2	2	9	<table border="1"> <tr><td>9</td><td>0</td></tr> <tr><td>10</td><td>9</td></tr> </table>	9	0	10	9
9	2								
2	9								
9	0								
10	9								
11 11 22	19 9 28								
$P = 81$ $Q = 4$ $P + Q = 85$ $V_y = 121$ $V_x = 121$	$P = 81$ $Q = 0$ $P + Q = 81$ $V_y = 171$ $V_x = 171$								
$\gamma = \frac{77}{85} = .906$	$\gamma = \frac{81}{81} = 1.000$								
$d = \frac{77}{121} = .636$	$d = \frac{81}{171} = .474$								

FIG. 4.—Comparison of results using γ and d




FIG. 5.—Possible original relations given finer measurements; - - - shows original shape; — shows cutting points.

First, if we are looking for a pattern of association approximating a Guttman scale—especially for dichotomous variables—the definition of perfect association by γ seems more appropriate than that by predictive measures. Second, if we have evidence that “grouping” error distorts the original relationship *in a particular direction*, γ will give us a more accurate description of the original relationship than d . (See Blalock 1960, p. 232, for similar comments on Q .) For illustration, let us examine the relationship shown in figure 3-3. This could be the result of collapsing variables whose original relationship is shown in figure 5-1. Given finer measurements, the relationship would have been linear. Most of the time, however, we would not have any evidence about such one-sided distortion, and there is no reason why we should not suspect the original relation to be either as shown in figure 5-2, figure 5-3, or some other form.

There is no way of inferring back to the original shape once the categories are collapsed, and no known measure of association is free from the distortions introduced by “grouping” error. In interpreting a given measure of association, one should always remember that it has meaning only

in reference to whatever categories have been used in calculating the measure. Furthermore, it is important to separate the problem of grouping errors from the "crudeness" of ordinal measurements. (See Wilson 1968, p. 341, for a succinct statement on why we should consider "ties" in ranking as valid information.) Given ordinal measurements, we may not be able to specify whether or not a relationship is linear, but a sufficient differentiation can still be made among the different types of functional forms and between functional relations and nonfunctional relations. All the predictive measures of association introduced in this paper assume that the given measurement values are valid, and under this assumption they evaluate various types of ordinal hypotheses. It seems that the symmetric d is closer than γ to our general notion of monotonic association, the limiting form of which can be identified as a strictly monotonic functional relation.

While being concerned about the crudeness of ordinal measurement, we often intentionally collapse given categories into still cruder ones. Such practices are often inevitable in order to simplify the calculation of statistics and table presentation. But the advancement of computer technology and the availability of consumer-oriented program packages (for example, Nie et al. 1970) seem to obviate some of the needs of premature simplification. It is now feasible, at least for a first trial, for one to try out various measures of association on uncollapsed data with a single computer run. Viewed in this perspective, the proliferation of measures of association should be a source of blessing rather than an embarrassment.

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The Multivariate Analysis of Ordinal Measures¹

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Measures of partial association of any order are defined for ordinal measures using the notions of variation and covariation of ordinal measures. They are equivalent to partial correlation and regression coefficients computed on signed differences of pairs of observations. Kendall's τ and first-order partial τ and Somers's d and first-order partial d are special cases of the proposed measures.

INTRODUCTION

The sociological researcher, particularly in survey research, faces two problems when trying to make sense out of data. First, he must face the problem of how to describe association between variables; and second, he must face the problem of how to account for association by inferring causal connections among variables. The problems are compounded by the fact that he is generally working with lower levels of measurement than investigators in other quantitative disciplines. When interval measurements are involved in a data-analysis problem, the highly developed product-moment system of correlation and regression coefficients along with partial and multiple coefficients provides a powerful and versatile solution to the two problems. Correlation and regression coefficients nicely describe linear relationships among pairs of variables, and the systems of partial coefficients can be used to remove the effects of confounding factors to aid in judgments about what variables are causally linked to what other variables. Typically, many of the measures that the sociologist uses are no more than ordinal. For example, he can classify people according to whether they are high, medium, or low on some attribute or in a set of categories varying from strong agreement to strong disagreement with respect to some attitude item. Though he may assign sequential numbers to such categories, the numbers assigned serve only to identify the ordering of the categories. None of the operations of arithmetic except those of *equality*, *greater than*, and *less than* apply to them; and the operations and assumptions of product-moment correlation and regression analysis are inapplicable.

Faced with these difficulties, the researcher may adopt one of several strategies. A common choice is to proceed as if measures were of the interval level. For example, Hodge and Treiman (1968, pp. 536-37) in

¹ I have had helpful suggestions from many people, both known to me and anonymous. Their help is gratefully acknowledged. I am especially indebted to Brigitte Mach Erbe.

analyzing social class identification scored responses as follows: "Respondents identifying with the lower, working, middle, upper middle, and upper class were assigned the scores 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Although such an arbitrary scoring of the class identification variable is not wholly justified, it does allow us to utilize regression techniques which make it possible to summarize relatively complex relationships in a limited space."

In their report, they hedge against the possible distortions introduced by also reporting their findings in tabular form. Although their procedure is a workable one and they handle their analysis well, they are still in an unfortunate situation. They do not completely trust the results of their regression analysis and must report data in the cumbersome tabular form that regression analysis should allow them to dispense with.

Another strategy is exemplified by Borgatta (1968, p. 34): "The seriousness of the assumptions made in choice of statistics used depends upon the nature of the data, and the question is: 'Where should the investigator place his concern?' As a scientist, I would think, one would have to be most concerned with improvement of his measures." He suggests that by attending to his measures the researcher may collect data that make the product-moment assumption tenable.

Few would disagree with Borgatta in principle, but in practice his exhortation becomes difficult to obey. In many (if not most) interesting and relevant areas of social science, crude measures are common along with crude concepts, foggy theories, and makeshift methods of data collection. All of these problems call for much work to be done, and it does not seem that much progress can be made in measurement independently of progress in the other areas. That progress can and will be made is an article of faith to most social scientists, but, in the meantime, there is a need for techniques of analysis which work minimal violence upon less than ideal data and the assumptions appropriate to it.

Numerous alternative strategies for analyzing ordinal data have been proposed, and in recent years much progress has been made. The sociologist now faces an embarrassment of riches in choosing among the various coefficients to describe association among pairs of variables and has a variety of methods at hand for removing or holding constant other variables. Since the method to be presented below is proposed for ordinal measurements, the discussion of the various methods will be limited to those in current use in analyzing sets of ordinal measurements.

The coefficients most frequently used to describe association between ordinal measures are Goodman and Kruskal's γ , Somers's d , and Kendall's τ .² The γ and d coefficients have the advantage of fairly clear

² In this paper τ is used to refer to Kendall's τ -b. Since τ -a is a special case of τ -b for complete ranking, the following remarks are appropriate to it also.

operational interpretations, that is, it is fairly easy to tell what the measures are and what they mean. The justification for τ generally is considered to be more obscure if it exists at all. However, each of the three measures has its partisans, and among them they seem to fill the need for measures of ordinal association in the bivariate case.

The problem of how to account for association by making causal inferences has not satisfactorily been solved. Traditionally, if an investigator wanted to evaluate the degree of association between two variables with a third variable or "test factor" held constant, he would look at the tables showing the relationship between the two variables within each category of the test factor by laying them out in their full grandeur for examination and exegesis. There are practical limitations to the traditional method. With reasonable sample sizes, very often partial contingency tables have case bases that are so small that there is much chance variation among the relationships of the various tables. Further, even with huge samples, partial contingency tables controlled for more than a few variables provide such a large array of tables that they overburden the skill of the most gifted analyst.

A number of strategies have been proposed for single summary measures of partial association. Kendall (1948) has defined a first-order partial τ .³ Somers (1968) has proposed a first-order partial d , and Davis (1967) has defined a first-order partial γ . Davis's partial γ may be extended to a partial coefficient of any order but still faces the problem of too few cases in partial tables when many variables are controlled. Rosenberg (1962) proposed the use of *test-factor standardization* to construct contingency tables with the effects of confounding variables removed. This method, too, encounters problems when a large number of variables are controlled, since the partial tables yield unreliably low frequencies for standardization.

All of these proposed solutions leave much to be desired, and certainly none of them has the power and versatility of the product-moment system. The solution proposed in this paper consists of using the product-moment correlation and regression system on differences between pairs of observations.

VARIANCE, COVARIANCE, AND THE COMPARISON OF PAIRS

On first consideration, the various measures of ordinal association and product-moment correlation and regression seem to rest on very different foundations. The ordinal measures are developed from the notion of comparing pairs of cases, while the product-moment system is thought about in terms of measures for individual cases. However, product-

³ Somers (1955) has proposed high-order partial τ measures. His logic is different from that used in this paper.

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moment correlation and regression may be conceived of in the imagery of differences between observations on pairs of cases. When this is done, some similarities between the two approaches emerge.

It has been pointed out that the variance of a set of observations of an interval measure may be defined as half the mean-squared differences between every possible pair of observations (Kendall 1947, p. 42). That is, for a set of N observations, generating N^2 ordered pairs of observations (including each observation paired with itself), the variance of a variable, X , may be defined as

$$\sigma_X^2 = \frac{1}{2N^2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (X_i - X_j)^2.$$

By expanding the square and summing term by term, this expression quickly reduces to the familiar form

$$\sigma_X^2 = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N X_i^2 - \mu_X^2,$$

where μ_X is the mean of X . (In this discussion, the observations will be considered to be a whole population; thus, the above expression contains N rather than $N - 1$ in the denominator.)

Similarly, the covariance of a set of bivariate interval observations, X and Y , may be expressed as half the mean product of differences of X and differences of Y , or

$$\text{cov}(X, Y) = \frac{1}{2N^2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N (X_i - X_j)(Y_i - Y_j).$$

Again, elementary algebra quickly reduces this expression to the familiar form

$$\text{cov}(X, Y) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (X_i - \mu_X)(Y_i - \mu_Y)}{N}.$$

Thus, the variance and the covariance of a pair of interval measures may be defined without explicit reference to the means of the variables. From matrices of differences of pairs for each variable, one may compute the variances and the covariance without knowing the means of the variables. It directly follows that the product-moment coefficient of correlation may be expressed in terms of differences of pairs.

Daniels (1944) has introduced the concept of the general coefficient of correlation, Γ . For any pair of observations, say the i th and the j th, we may assign a quantity, x_{ij} , to the variable X , subject only to the condition that $x_{ij} = -x_{ji}$. This condition implies that x_{ii} equals zero and that the mean of x is zero. Similarly, a quantity, y_{ij} , may be assigned to

the variable Y , subject to the same constraint. Then a generalized coefficient of correlation, Γ , between X and Y may be defined as

$$\Gamma = \frac{\sum x_{ij}y_{ij}}{\sqrt{\sum x_{ij}^2 \sum y_{ij}^2}},$$

where the sum is understood to extend over all possible ordered pairs.

This generalized definition is easily seen to include the product-moment coefficient of correlation, Spearman's rank coefficient of correlation, and Kendall's τ , according to the procedure of assigning quantities to the pairs of observations. If X and Y are interval measures and if the assigned quantities are $x_{ij} = X_i - X_j$ and $y_{ij} = Y_i - Y_j$, then Γ is the ordinary product-moment coefficient. If X and Y are rankings, and x_{ij} and y_{ij} are defined as the differences between ranks on X and Y , respectively, then Γ is the coefficient of rank correlation. Similarly, if we assign $+1$ to x_{ij} if X_i is greater than X_j , 0 if X_i and X_j are the same, and -1 if X_i is less than X_j , and follow the same procedure for Y , then the general coefficient becomes Kendall's τ .

It is possible to extend Daniels's formulation and to introduce the notions of generalized variation and covariation. Somers (1962b, p. 807) has recognized and discussed these functions as applied to partial orders but, in our view, has been overly cautious in interpreting them.

The generalized covariation between two variables, X and Y , may be defined as

$$\text{cov}(X, Y) = \frac{1}{2N^2} \sum x_{ij}y_{ij}.$$

(Here and subsequently, unless otherwise indicated, the summation is over all ordered pairs of observations.) This quantity represents half of the covariance of the values of x and y assigned to pairs. If X and Y are interval measures and x and y are defined as numerical differences, then the covariation of X and Y is the ordinary covariance of interval measures. If x and y are differences of ranks, then the covariation of X and Y is the covariance of ranks of X and Y . In the case where the value of x_{ij} is $+1$ when X_i is greater than X_j , -1 is assigned when X_i is less than X_j , 0 is assigned when X_i is not detectably different from X_j , and the same procedure is followed for values of y_{ij} , then $\text{cov}(X, Y) = S/N^2$ where S is the familiar quantity formed by counting the number of unordered pairs concordant on X and Y (i.e., the differences are in the same direction) and then subtracting the number of pairs discordant on X and Y . The quantity S appears in the numerator of Kendall's τ , Somers's d , Goodman and Kruskal's γ , and other measures of association between ordinal measures.

The generalized variation of a variable, X , may be defined as

$$\text{var } (X) = \frac{\sum x_{ij}^2}{2N^2},$$

which is half of the variance of the values of x assigned to pairs. Again, if X is an interval measure and if x_{ij} is defined as the differences of X for the i th and j th observations, then the variation of X is simply the variance of X . If x_{ij} is the difference of ranks, the result is the variance of the ranks. (Of course, for a set of N completely ordered observations, the variance of ranks is determined by N .) If X is an ordinal measure, then x_{ij}^2 is 1 if x_{ij} is $+1$ or -1 and 0 otherwise, and the numerator of the variation of X is simply the number of pairs of observations whose members are in different categories of X .

Some of the properties of the variation measure will be stated without proof.⁴ Consider an ordinal measure with c categories or values. The minimum value of $\text{var } (X)$ is zero and is attained when all of the observations are in one category. The maximum value of $\text{var } (X)$ is $1/2[(c - 1)/c]$ and occurs when the observations are distributed equally among the categories. For the case of the dichotomy in which a proportion p of the observations are in the first category and $(1 - p) = q$ are in the second, the variation is pq , which is the familiar expression for the variance of a two-valued population consisting of ones and zeros. Further, note that the variation of an ordinal measure is a function only of the numbers of observations in the various categories and, unlike the covariation measure, is independent of the order in which the categories are arranged.⁵

Somers (1962a, 1962b) has pointed out that the above "ordinal analogs" of variance and covariance may be defined, although he introduces the terms with obvious discomfort and liberal use of quotation marks. However, by using the notions, he is able to interpret Kendall's τ as the product-moment coefficient of correlation between differences of pairs, his own coefficient d_{yx} , as a regression coefficient between differences of pairs, and Goodman and Kruskal's τ as a variance-reduction measure (Somers 1962b, p. 807).

Viewed in the context of the above discussion, it seems that the interpretation of the measures of variation and covariation of ordinal variables is not as strained as Somers believes it to be. The only difference between them and the familiar variance and covariance of interval variables is the rule which assigns numbers to the differences between

⁴ Because of space limitations, a number of the results in this paper are announced without proof. I will make proofs available to the interested reader.

⁵ Since the measure of variation is the same without regard to the order in which the categories appear, it may also be defined for a nominal measure. Somers (1962a) has used this result to interpret Goodman and Kruskal's τ .

pairs. In the case of ordinal measures, only the directions of differences between pairs of observations are taken into account, and their magnitudes are ignored. In a strong sense, the variance and covariance "analogs" of ordinal variables are variances and covariances.

Since the variances and covariances of interval measures may be defined in terms of differences between pairs, it follows that the product-moment system of measures of zero-order, multiple, and partial association may be similarly defined. It further follows that, in the general case, the product-moment system is applicable to comparisons of pairs, regardless of how values are assigned to paired differences as long as $x_{ij} = -x_{ji}$. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to developing, illustrating, discussing, and defending the extension of product-moment correlation and regression analysis to ordinal measurements.

CORRELATION AND REGRESSION WITH ORDINAL MEASURES

Consider two ordinal variables, X and Y , where X is considered to be the independent, or causal, variable and Y is considered to be the dependent, or caused, variable. There are a number of strategies for expressing the amount or degree of association between the two variables. One of these strategies is to consider predicting differences of Y between pairs from differences of X between pairs. To implement this strategy we may introduce a coefficient d_{yx} , which appears in a linear equation which predicts values of differences of Y from values of differences of X , $\hat{y}_{ij} = d_{yx}x_{ij}$, where \hat{y}_{ij} is the estimated value of y_{ij} . No constant is added to the right side of the equation since the means of x and y are zero. The difference between the observed and predicted values of y for the i, j th pair, or the *error* of prediction, may be denoted by ϵ_{ij} and expressed as $y_{ij} - \hat{y}_{ij} = \epsilon_{ij} = y_{ij} - d_{yx}x_{ij}$.

The quantity \hat{y}_{ij} will ordinarily be a fraction, whereas y_{ij} is always $+1$, 0 , or -1 . The notion of predicting y_{ij} to be a fractional quantity may therefore seem arbitrary and strained. If, however, d_{yx} is regarded as the *average* value of y for positive values of x , the imagery should cause no difficulty.

Several methods of estimating the parameter d_{yx} can be imagined. Two will be discussed here. Both yield the same results: the solution for the zero-order regression coefficient of the pairwise differences. One method is to select the value of d_{yx} that minimizes the sum of squares (hence, the variation) of the error term. This solution may be generated by squaring both sides of the above equation, summing over all pairs of observations, and setting the first partial derivative of the sum of squared errors with respect to d_{yx} at zero, yielding $d_{yx}\sum x_{ij}^2 - \sum x_{ij}y_{ij} = 0$, then

$$d_{yx} = \frac{\sum x_{ij}y_{ij}}{\sum x_{ij}^2} = \frac{\text{cov}(X, Y)}{\text{var}(X)}.$$

This is, of course, an ordinary linear regression coefficient between pairwise differences on Y and on X .

An alternative approach to estimation is to require that the errors of prediction be statistically independent of the independent variable, x . This is another reasonable way to state the assumption that the independent variable should be allowed to explain as much as possible of the dependent variable. This may be effected by setting the sum of the products of the error terms and the independent variables equal to zero. This yields exactly the same expression for d_{yx} as the least-squares assumption. The discussion above pointed out (1) that the covariation of X and Y where X and Y are partial orders may be thought of as the number of pairs for which the X and Y differences are of like order, minus the number of pairs for which the X and Y differences are of unlike order, divided by $2n^2$, and (2) that the variation of X may be thought of as the number of pairs that are different on X divided by $2n^2$. Thus d_{yx} may be expressed as the number of pairs with like orders on X and Y , minus the number of pairs with unlike orders on X and Y , divided by the number of pairs that are different on X . Expressed this way it is seen that d_{yx} is the coefficient of association proposed by Somers. Conversely, Somers's d_{yx} may be interpreted as the regression coefficient between differences on Y and differences on X . If the roles of the variables are reversed, that is, if Y is considered the independent variable and X the dependent variable, then the coefficient d_{xy} may be defined as $d_{xy} = \text{cov}(X, Y)/\text{var}(Y)$. The value of d_{xy} is, in general, not equal to the value of d_{yx} . The value of d_{yx} is zero if there is no association between pairwise differences; that is, on the average, no prediction can be made about differences on Y from differences on X . If the value of d_{yx} is $+1$, then there is perfect positive association; that is, the difference on Y is always the same as the difference on X . If d_{yx} is -1 , there is perfect negative association, and the difference on Y is always in the opposite direction from the difference on X . Values between 1 and -1 may be interpreted as measures of the strength of association between the two variables.

The notion of regression of pairwise differences for the two-variable case may be generalized to the multivariate case. In the following discussion, proofs will not be presented since all derivations are identical with those for ordinary product-moment correlation regression. Similarly, little emphasis will be placed on the various formulas and techniques for computing the measures since many textbooks provide thorough discussions of them. It should be emphasized that the preceding statement applies to computing the various coefficients and definitely does not apply to the sampling theory of them.

Consider the problem of predicting the direction of differences of a pair of observations on a dependent variable Y from the directions of

differences in a set of k independent variables, $X_1, X_2, X_3, \dots, X_k$. One way of accomplishing this is to express the differences on Y as a linear combination of the differences on the independent variables, or

$$\hat{y}_{ij} = d_{y1.23 \dots k}x_{1ij} + d_{y2.13 \dots k}x_{2ij} + \dots + d_{yk.123 \dots k-1}x_{kij},$$

where \hat{y}_{ij} is the estimated difference on Y for the i th and j th observation, the initial subscript on the independent variables has been added to identify the variable, and the subscripts of d coefficients follow the usual conventions for partial regression coefficients by listing the independent variables also taken into account. The difference between the observed and predicted values of y_{ij} may be expressed as

$$e_{ij} = y_{ij} - d_{y1.23 \dots k}x_{1ij} - d_{y2.13 \dots k}x_{2ij} - \dots - d_{yk.123 \dots k-1}x_{kij}.$$

As in the zero-order case, two approaches to the estimation of the coefficients may be used. The least-squares solution may be implemented by setting at zero the first partial derivatives of the sum of squared error terms with respect to each of the coefficients. The solution which assumes that the error term is statistically independent of each of the independent variables may be generated by writing expressions for the sums of the products of the error terms with each of the independent variables and setting each of these at zero. Both methods yield the normal equations of regression analysis. In matrix notation, these are:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \text{var}(X_1) & \text{cov}(X_1, X_2) & \dots & \text{cov}(X_1, X_k) \\ \text{cov}(X_1, X_2) & \text{var}(X_2) & \dots & \text{cov}(X_2, X_k) \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ \text{cov}(X_1, X_k) & \text{cov}(X_2, X_k) & \dots & \text{var}(X_k) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} d_{y1.23 \dots k} \\ d_{y2.13 \dots k} \\ \dots \\ d_{yk.123 \dots k-1} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \text{cov}(X_1 Y) \\ \text{cov}(X_2 Y) \\ \dots \\ \text{cov}(X_k Y) \end{bmatrix}$$

These equations may be solved for the unknown coefficients in any one of the standard ways. In the case of two independent variables, the coefficients may be expressed as a function of the zero-order coefficients as $d_{y1.2} = (d_{y1} - d_{y2}d_{21})/(1 - d_{12}d_{21})$ and $d_{y2.1} = (d_{y2} - d_{y1}d_{12})/(1 - d_{21}d_{12})$. Somers (1968) has proposed this first-order partial d and has interpreted it using the imagery of comparing pairs of pairs of observations.⁶ He suggests that higher-order partial coefficients using the same logic may be defined. In the case of more than two independent variables it is most convenient to solve the equations by some method which

⁶ Somers's proposed partial measure is intended only for fully ranked data, i.e., for the case of no ties (Somers 1968, p. 975). The measure proposed here does not require fully ranked data. However, if fully ranked data are assumed, the coefficient proposed here is identical with that of Somers. The proof is not included here since it is quite long and tedious. The interested reader is referred to Kendall (1948, pp. 102-3) for a similar proof. I will make the proof available to interested readers. The similarities and differences between the approach used in this paper and that of Somers will be discussed at length in a subsequent paper.

explicitly or implicitly involves inverting the variation-covariation matrix.

Further, we may introduce the coefficient of correlation between differences on X and differences on Y as

$$\tau_{xy} = \frac{\sum x_{ij}y_{ij}}{\sqrt{\sum x_{ij}^2}\sqrt{\sum y_{ij}^2}} = \frac{\text{cov}(X, Y)}{\sqrt{\text{var}(X)}\sqrt{\text{var}(Y)}}.$$

This coefficient is, of course, Kendall's τ .

A number of relationships may be seen to hold among the various coefficients. Among these are that the product of d_{yx} and d_{xy} is τ_{yx}^2 , which is, in turn, the proportion of the variation of Y explained by the linear regression of Y on X (and also the proportion of the variation of X explained by Y).

From the algebraic relations of the product-moment system, it follows that a partial coefficient of association, $\tau_{yz \cdot z}$, may be defined in the conventional fashion by assuming that the effects of z on x and y have been removed or partialled out by computing the errors of prediction in the regressions of y on z and of x on z and computing the coefficient of correlation between these errors. It follows that the partial coefficient of correlation may be defined as

$$\tau_{yz \cdot z} = \frac{\tau_{yx} - \tau_{yz}\tau_{xz}}{\sqrt{1 - \tau_{yz}^2}\sqrt{1 - \tau_{xz}^2}}.$$

The first-order partial τ was proposed by Kendall (1948), who derived it from the comparison of pairs of pairs. That it is identical with the expression for the ordinary product-moment coefficient of correlation was attributed by Kendall to coincidence. In the context of the present discussion, it is clear that there is nothing at all "coincidental" about Kendall's result and that it necessarily follows from the recognition that τ is a product-moment coefficient of correlation defined on pairwise differences. Kendall's partial coefficient was defined only for completely ordered or ranked variables. In the present context, it is seen that the coefficient is defined for partial orders as well.

By straightforward generalization, we may arrive at partial τ with any number of variables held constant. For example, the second-order partial τ between X_1 and X_2 with X_3 and X_4 held constant may be expressed as

$$\tau_{12 \cdot 34} = \frac{\tau_{12 \cdot 3} - \tau_{14 \cdot 3}\tau_{24 \cdot 3}}{\sqrt{1 - \tau_{14 \cdot 3}^2}\sqrt{1 - \tau_{24 \cdot 3}^2}}.$$

Higher-order partial measures may be computed by using the textbook formulas for partial product-moment coefficients of correlation.

A coefficient of multiple association may be defined in the ordinary fashion as the square root of the proportion of the variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables in the regression equation. It may be computed by any of the methods devised for use with interval measurement. If the variation of estimated differences on the dependent variable around the observed differences is equal to the variation of the dependent variable, then the proportion of variance explained and the coefficient of multiple association are zero. If, on the other hand, the values of the differences on the dependent variable are always exactly predicted by the regression equation, the explained variance and the coefficient of multiple association are one. In practical situations, the coefficient will not reach its upper limit of one. In fact, the upper limit of one is attained in only some embarrassingly trivial circumstances. The problem may be illustrated by considering the case of two independent variables, X_1 and X_2 . In order for observed differences to be predicted exactly, the values of $d_{y1.2}x_{1ij} + d_{y2.1}x_{2ij}$ must equal either 1, 0, or -1 , since these are the only values that the differences on the dependent variable may assume. Now these values only occur in three circumstances:

1. If x_{1ij} always equals x_{2ij} , that is, there is perfect positive association between the two independent variables. In this case, either of the independent variables would completely explain the variation in the dependent variable. Indeed, in the case of perfect association between the two independent variables, the normal equations become insoluble.

2. If the independent variables are perfectly negatively associated. Again, in this case, the normal equations are insoluble.

3. If the independent variables are unassociated and one of the two coefficients is zero, while the other equals one. In this case, one independent variable explains all of the variation, while the other adds no predictive power whatsoever.

In practical cases, the upper limit for the coefficient will be less than one. A formal investigation of the upper limit of the coefficient has not been undertaken as of this writing, but the calculation of the coefficient for various data has convinced me that it is a plausible and useful measure of multiple association. Further results will be reported as the work proceeds.

COMPUTATION OF THE MEASURES

The computation of the various measures may be thought of as consisting of two stages. The first is the computation of the matrix of variation and covariation terms. The second is the computation of the various zero-order, partial, and multiple coefficients from the matrix of the variation and covariation terms. For the latter, any of the standard methods

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which assume that variables are measured in deviations from their means are applicable. The method chosen will depend on the kind of computing machinery available and on personal preference.

The problem of constructing the variation-covariation matrix is not as routine. Since we are dealing with all pairs of observations, the methods of ordinary correlation and regression are not applicable. When computing by hand or with the aid of a desk calculator, it is probably most convenient to construct the zero-order contingency tables of the cross-classification of all pairs of variables and to compute the covariation term for each. If the tables are constructed so that the values of the variable represented by the rows decrease from top to bottom and those of the variable represented by the columns decrease from left to right, S (the number of unordered pairs which show positive association minus the number of unordered pairs which show negative association) may be computed by subtracting the sum over all cells of the cell frequency multiplied by the frequency of observations below it and to the left from the sum over all cells of the cell frequency multiplied by the frequency of observations below it and to the right. This computing method is described in a number of places (see, e.g., Kendall 1948, pp. 45-47). There may be other methods which are more efficient when the computations are programmed for a computer.

To obtain the covariation, S is multiplied by two and divided by twice the square of the total number of observations. This is equivalent to dividing S by the square of the total number of observations. This computation is illustrated in table 1. The variation of each variable may

TABLE 1
COMPUTATION OF VARIATION AND COVARIATION
FOR A 3×3 ORDINAL CONTINGENCY TABLE

Y	X			TOTAL
	High	Medium	Low	
High	n_{11}	n_{12}	n_{13}	$n_{1.}$
Medium	n_{21}	n_{22}	n_{23}	$n_{2.}$
Low	n_{31}	n_{32}	n_{33}	$n_{3.}$
Total	$n_{.1}$	$n_{.2}$	$n_{.3}$	$n_{..}$

$$S = n_{11}(n_{22} + n_{23} + n_{32} + n_{33}) + n_{12}(n_{23} + n_{33})$$

$$+ n_{21}(n_{32} + n_{33}) + n_{22}(n_{33})$$

$$- n_{12}(n_{21} + n_{31}) - n_{13}(n_{21} + n_{22} + n_{31} + n_{32})$$

$$- n_{22}(n_{31}) - n_{23}(n_{31} + n_{32})$$

$$\text{Cov}(X, Y) = 2S/2n^2_{..} = S/n^2_{..}$$

$$\text{Var}(X) = (n^2_{..} - n^2_{.1} - n^2_{.2} - n^2_{.3})/2n^2_{..}$$

$$\text{Var}(Y) = (n^2_{..} - n^2_{1.} - n^2_{2.} - n^2_{3.})/2n^2_{..}$$

NOTE.— n_{ij} refers to the number of observations in row i and column j of the table; $n_{i.}$ refers to the total in row i and $n_{.j}$ to the total in column j . Then, $n_{..}$ is the total number of cases in the table.

be computed by subtracting the sum of the squared marginal frequencies of the variable from the square of the total number of observations and dividing the result by twice the square of the total number of observations. These computations are illustrated in table 1. Note that the division by $2n^2$ could be omitted in all the variation and covariation terms. Whether to omit it is a matter of convenience and taste.

To illustrate the computation and use of the various measures, we will use data from a study of Erbe (1964).⁷ He investigated the relationships among socioeconomic status, organizational involvement, alienation, and political participation. Socioeconomic status was measured by an index combining education, family income, and occupational prestige. Organizational involvement was measured by a scale including number of organizational memberships, self-reported attendance at meetings, reported level of interest in organizations, and office holding in organizations. Alienation was measured with a scale which contained items measuring feelings of powerlessness, normlessness, and social isolation. Political participation was measured by a scale composed of questions about various political activities. Treating political participation as the dependent variable and using Rosenberg's (1962) method of test-factor standardization for the partialling operations, Erbe (1964, p. 213) concluded:

1. In the population studied, socio-economic status and organizational involvement were important antecedents of political participation.
2. Political participation is at least as highly associated, if not more so, with organizational involvement as with socio-economic status. The relative importance of organizational involvement is shown by all subsequent partialling operations.
3. Alienation is of some importance as a predictor at the zero-order, but higher-order partialling raised grave doubt as to whether alienation affects political participation independently of socio-economic status and organizational involvement. Most of its effect seems to be due to the fact that the least alienated (and the highest participators) are also the highest in status and in organizational activity.

The tables of zero-order relationships among the four variables are shown in table 2 along with the variation and covariation measures for each pair of variables. Computing the measures of variation and covariation for the tables yields the following variation-covariation matrix, where *S*, *O*, *A*, and *P* are used as abbreviations for socioeconomic

⁷ These data were kindly made available by Professor William Erbe. Only those respondents who answered all of the questions are used, so the frequencies are slightly different from those published by Erbe (1964).

TABLE 2
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT,
ALIENATION, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

[illegible]

Source.—The data are from a study by William Erbe. Only those 549 cases for which measures are available for all four variables are used. Zero-order contingency tables appear above the diagonal; variation measures are on the diagonal; and covariation measures are below the diagonal.

status, organizational involvement, alienation, and political participation here and in the subsequent discussion:

$$\begin{matrix} & S & O & A & P \\ \begin{matrix} S \\ O \\ A \\ P \end{matrix} & \left[\begin{array}{cccc} .3331 & .1384 & -.1245 & .1005 \\ .1384 & .3327 & -.1048 & .1124 \\ -.1245 & -.1048 & .3331 & -.0790 \\ .1005 & .1124 & -.0790 & .3162 \end{array} \right] \end{matrix}.$$

Note that the variation measures for socioeconomic status, organizational involvement, and alienation are all very close to their maximum possible value of one-third (the maximum value in the case of three categories), which results from the approximately equal frequencies in the categories of the measures. The variation measure for political participation is slightly lower than the rest because of unequal category frequencies.

The zero-order d coefficients may be computed by dividing the covariation term for each pair of variables by the variation of the independent variable. If the independent variables are represented by columns and the dependent variables by rows, the matrix of zero-order d coefficients is

$$\begin{matrix} & S & O & A & P \\ \begin{matrix} S \\ O \\ A \\ P \end{matrix} & \left[\begin{array}{cccc} \dots & .4160 & -.3738 & .3178 \\ .4155 & \dots & -.3146 & .3555 \\ -.3738 & -.3150 & \dots & -.2498 \\ .3017 & .3378 & -.2372 & \dots \end{array} \right] \end{matrix}.$$

Similarly, the matrix of zero-order τ coefficients may be computed by dividing each covariation term by the square root of the products of the variation terms for each variable, yielding:

$$\begin{matrix} & S & O & A & P \\ \begin{matrix} S \\ O \\ A \\ P \end{matrix} & \left[\begin{array}{cccc} \dots & .4157 & -.3738 & .3097 \\ .4157 & \dots & -.3148 & .3465 \\ -.3738 & -.3148 & \dots & -.2434 \\ .3097 & .3465 & -.2434 & \dots \end{array} \right] \end{matrix}.$$

Both sets of coefficients show that alienation is negatively associated with each of the other three variables, and that the other variables are fairly strongly positively interrelated. Following Erbe and considering political participation to be the dependent variable and the rest to be causal, we may inquire about the relative magnitudes of the effects of socioeconomic status, organizational involvement, and alienation on political participation. Both sets of zero-order coefficients show that the strongest correlate of political participation is organizational involvement ($d_{po} = .3378$, $\tau_{po} = .3465$), followed by socioeconomic status ($d_{ps} = .3017$, $\tau_{ps} = .3097$), and then by alienation ($d_{pa} = -.2372$, $\tau_{pa} = -.2434$).

Multivariate Analysis of Ordinal Measures

The zero-order coefficients do not solve the problem posed by Erbe, that is, to evaluate the effects of socioeconomic status, organizational involvement, and alienation considered simultaneously for political participation. Much past research has demonstrated that these zero-order relationships hold, and that there are strong interrelationships among the three independent variables. Inspection of the d or the τ matrix confirms that there are strong intercorrelations among socioeconomic status, organizational involvement, and alienation. To control for these interrelationships, we may consider the dependence of political participation on the three independent variables simultaneously by considering the equation $\hat{P} = d_{ps \cdot oa}S + d_{po \cdot sa}O + d_{pa \cdot so}A$, where \hat{P} stands for the estimated pairwise difference on political participation and S , O , and A represent differences on socioeconomic status, organizational involvement, and alienation. The least-squares solution of the partial coefficients is given by the following set of normal equations:

$$\begin{bmatrix} .3331 & .1384 & -.1245 \\ .1384 & .3327 & -.1048 \\ -.1245 & -.1048 & .3331 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} d_{ps \cdot oa} \\ d_{po \cdot sa} \\ d_{pa \cdot so} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} .1005 \\ .1124 \\ -.0790 \end{bmatrix}.$$

The solution is:

$$\begin{bmatrix} d_{ps \cdot oa} \\ d_{po \cdot sa} \\ d_{pa \cdot so} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} .1662 \\ .2371 \\ -.1002 \end{bmatrix}.$$

All of these second-order partial coefficients are smaller than the corresponding zero-order coefficients. However, the order of the absolute size of the coefficients is the same. The strongest relationship is for organizational participation, followed by socioeconomic status, then by alienation.

Thus, Erbe's findings are corroborated by the present analysis. The most marked deviation from Erbe's results occurs in the case of the relationship of alienation and political participation. After standardizing on socioeconomic status and organizational involvement, Erbe found the d for the resulting standardized table for alienation and political participation to be $-.028$, somewhat closer to zero than our $-.1002$. Erbe's findings cast doubt upon whether alienation has any consequence at all for political participation, while this analysis would lead us to believe that there is a small relationship between the two variables. (To make this statement on more than descriptive and intuitive grounds would require a test of the hypothesis that the relationship is nonexistent in the population from which the sample was drawn. This cannot be done because the sampling theory of the partial measures is unknown. See the remarks on sampling theory below.) The difference between the present result and that obtained by Erbe is most likely due to the fact that Erbe had to

dichotomize alienation in order to provide cell frequencies large enough to be reliable for standardization.

INTERACTION AND NONMONOTONICITY

As in the case of familiar correlation and regression for interval measures, the system of partial coefficients proposed here does not tell everything that can be known or needs to be known about the relationships among ordinal measurements. For example, in all forms of multivariate analysis, the phenomenon of *interaction* sometimes arises. With interval measures, often the value of a dependent variable is not simply a linear function of the set of independent variables but, rather, is also dependent upon particular combinations of values of the independent variables. The same phenomenon is familiar to the survey researcher and takes the form of association in one partial table being greatly different from that in another. The discovery of such a pattern of relationship is often referred to as *specification*.

The measures proposed here assume that differences between pairs of observations on the dependent variable are linear functions of differences between pairs on the independent variables and will not handle the problem of interaction. If interaction is suspected to exist, then a statistical test for interaction will be useful. For discussions of such tests, see Goodman (1970) and the literature cited there. With only a few variables, an inspection of partial tables may be fruitful.

A related problem is that of nonmonotonicity. The measures proposed in this paper assume that the relationships among variables are monotonic. When this condition is not met, the use of the proposed measures can be misleading. The problem is analogous to that of curvilinearity in ordinary regression analysis. In ordinary regression analysis, it is easy to construct models of curvilinearity, but there appears to be no straightforward way to do the same when dealing with ordinal data. When a control variable seems to be nonmonotonically related to either the independent or dependent variables, the most expedient thing to do is to do a separate analysis within categories of the control variable or to use a method which makes no assumption about the ordering of categories of the control variable, such as that of Davis (1967).

SAMPLING THEORY

It is all too common to end discussions of measures of ordinal association with the assertion that the sampling theory of the measures is unknown. Unfortunately, this paper is not an exception. Since the sampling theory is unknown, it is impossible to test hypotheses about the partial measures of association or to establish confidence intervals for their estimates.

However, the sampling theory is not unknowable. It should be possible to extend the sampling theory for the zero-order measures. Kendall (1948, p. 55) has published an expression for the variance of the sampling distribution of S in the null case and a proof of its approximate normality for large samples. Further, simple expressions for the asymptotic variances of τ (Kendall 1948, p. 62) and γ (Goodman and Kruskal 1963) are known.

In any case, it should be emphasized that, although the partial τ and d measures are calculated exactly as ordinary partial correlation and regression coefficients for interval measures, the sampling theory of ordinary partial correlation and regression coefficients is definitely not applicable. The ordinary sampling theory is based on the assumptions of multivariate normality and of independence of successive observations, neither of which is met for the ordinal measures.

CONCLUSION

The proposed measures provide single measures of partial association and provide an attractive alternative to the traditional method used by sociologists of computing measures for each of a set of partial contingency tables and discussing them one by one. Using the traditional method, it is often difficult to make sense of the set of measures of partial association, due to small sample sizes in the partial tables and the attendant large sampling fluctuations of the partial measures. Although the problems of interaction and sampling theory are unsolved, the proposed measures seem to provide a reasonable way of stating "average" measures of association for partial tables.

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Commentary and Debate

HARDGRAVE REPLIES TO THE REVIEWER OF HIS *THE NADARS OF TAMILNAD*

I am responding to the recent (*AJS*, July 1970) review of my book, *The Nadars of Tamilnad*, by Victor Jesudason. While the book has been generally well received in scholarly journals in both the United States and India, it has been highly controversial among the Nadars. I anticipated this when I wrote in the acknowledgments, "Inevitably, some members of the community may take offense at my discussion—but even among themselves, the Nadars are not in agreement about their origins, history, and future. If, in opening the past, I have inflicted pain, I beg forgiveness, for the Nadars, as a community, have earned my greatest admiration and respect" (p. xiv). In reviewing the book, Mr. Jesudason, *who is himself a Nadar*, sees the community in my treatment emerging as "a sordid lot." He attributes this to my reliance on British and missionary sources which he regards as "to say the least, dubious." He chooses to ignore the word of caution in utilizing these sources which I urge (p. ix), as he does the fact that my sources also include some thirty-five caste histories written by Nadars, in both Tamil and English, between 1871 and 1937. In contrast to Jesudason, Andre Beteille, an Indian sociologist who has worked extensively in Tamilnadu, feels that I may have been "a little generous in accepting the Nadars' own accounts" (*The Times of India*, August 30, 1970).

Jesudason next finds inconsistency between my discussion of the caste's rank in the ritual hierarchy and its changing class position. I am unclear as to the point he is trying to make, for the argument of the book (which he does not discuss in the review) involves the dialectical relationship between the two positions. "The demands of deference to new economic status erode the hierarchy of ritual purity" (p. 203). "Political life reflects more of a class than a caste orientation" (p. 206), etc.

Jesudason then questions the five life histories: "One wonders," he says, "to what extent the lives and sentiments are supposed to reflect the Nadar's social and political history!" On page 239, I say, "Each of the individuals, drawn from variant situations and backgrounds, within the Nadar community, represents a distinct type, but the threads which run through each of their lives are intricately tied together, forming the pattern of Nadar history and political culture."

Finally, Jesudason agrees with me that Kamaraj came to political prominence in spite of and not because of the Nadars—although in the review this appears to be his and not my position. He then says,

"Yet Hardgrave claims that Kamaraj's rise is an indication of the transformation of the community." Although the vast majority of the Nadars remain backward and exploited, the extensive differentiation, in terms of education, occupation, and cultural achievement, within the Nadar community (of which Kamaraj is surely an example), provides dramatic evidence of the caste's transformation. I would argue that Jesudason himself, as a Nadar who has achieved academic distinction, provides another prominent example of this process of social change.

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THE REVIEWER REPLIES

I am surprised by Mr. Hardgrave's reactions to my review of his book, *The Nadars of Tamilnad*. In my review I pointed out that Hardgrave did not properly evaluate and then use the British and missionary accounts about the Nadars in constructing the early history of the community. Although he cautions about the sources in the *preface* of his book, the point is that Hardgrave did not exercise caution in the *text* of his book. For pointing this out, Hardgrave charges that I react negatively to his book because I happen to be a Nadar. Since writing the review, I find that the reviewer of the same book in the *Annals* (November 1969, p.208) also makes the observation about Hardgrave's use of the sources of Nadars' early history. Unfortunately or fortunately, Hardgrave cannot accuse that reviewer of being a Nadar.

As a sociologist, reviewing the book for a journal of sociology, I pointed out "the lack of substantial empirical evidences" in the book. To substantiate this, I provided two examples. First, although Hardgrave states that he used a modified TAT, no information is provided in the book about the modification, validation, or scoring scheme of the TAT. Nor does he state how many were tested, how the sample was drawn (if a sample was drawn at all), how the responses were scored and analyzed. Yet five life-histories, drawn on the basis of "modified" TAT, are claimed to represent the *entire* Nadar community. Where relevant information is not provided, one is not able to evaluate the claim that these five life-histories describe "the pattern of Nadar history and political culture." Second, I pointed out that the evidences provided by Hardgrave in the form of a few names of highly placed officials is not evidence *enough* to draw the conclusion that the community has socially advanced. I also stated that one set of adequate evidence may be to point out what percentage of highly placed officials are Nadars. Another set of evidence

may be to show that the Nadars have contributed proportionately more people who "achieved distinction" than warranted by their number in the population of that state. In the absence of such substantial evidences, his "dramatic evidence" is not evidence at all. I am surprised that Hardgrave is unable to grasp this simple and straightforward observation.

Hardgrave claims that his book has been well received except among the Nadars. Parenthetically, I may add that, compared with the review of the book in the *Annals* (November 1969) or in the *Journal of Asian Studies* (February 1970), my review of the book is positive and favorable indeed. Hardgrave seems to attribute the remarks I made in my review of his book to the fact that I happen to be a Nadar and not because I am a social scientist. If social scientists like Hardgrave continue to reduce everything in India to one variable—caste—they will fail to comprehend the multifaceted reality.

VICTOR JESUDASON

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Book Reviews

The Teachings of Charles Fourier. By Nicholas V. Riasanovsky. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. xii+256. \$6.50.

The Illusions of Progress. By Georges Sorel. Translated by John and Charlotte Stanley with a foreword by Robert A. Nisbet and an introduction by John Stanley. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969. Pp. li+222. \$7.50.

Lewis A. Coser

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It is most fitting that Professor Riasanovsky's well-argued and well-researched study of the thought of Fourier appears at this time. While Fourier's contemporary and rival among the precursors of modern socialism, Saint-Simon, was above all the apostle of the new age of production, Fourier's ideas are bound to have great appeal in postindustrial society in which consumption rather than production is likely to preempt much of the attention of social critics. With a little historical imagination, the leaders of contemporary youth movements could see in Fourier a major intellectual fountainhead. Much of the work of Herbert Marcuse and Norman Brown, for example, is rooted in a Fourierist vision. He, like them, believed that all the misery of mankind stems from the suppression of human passions and the thwarting of human potential by a sick acquisitive society. He argued for self-realization in an age in which self-denial dominated the moral scene.

Fourier, a lonely bachelor who spent most of his life traveling as a salesman in a world of commerce he despised and who concocted his Utopian visions in the garrets of Lyons and Paris, was more than a little mad. It is too easy to have one's sport with a writer who announced that, in the age of universal harmony which was about to be born, all the old vicious animal species would disappear and wonderful new servitors of man, antilions and anti-leopards, would make their appearance. Anti-tigers would carry men on land and anti-hippopotamuses would drag their boats. It is difficult to take seriously a man whose bizarre cosmology, partly derived from followers of Mesmer postulated that the planets were living bisexual organisms engaged in copulation. And yet, provided one manages to extract the kernel of amazing social and psychological insights from the husk of absurdities, there emerges a message which is most relevant—to use a much abused word.

Fourier passionately rejected contemporary civilization. He raged against his fallen time. His savage onslaughts against a world in which, he said, greed smothered human impulse and waste of human and natural resources prevented the coming of a world of plenty are unsurpassed. The modern world was seen as a desert of love, and Fourier's doctrine was meant to bring about loving harmony through the liberation of those passions whose suppression disfigured the human condition. Once men

were organized in the intentional communities, the Phalanxes, which he planned with meticulous and obsessive care, they would soon shed all the remnants of the old Adam and be reborn in passionate communion with their fellows.

While much of the early socialist tradition has a somewhat gray uniformity as its hallmark, Fourier's utopia was built on diversity. It was wrong, he argued, to fit men with dissimilar interests and inclinations to uniform tasks. Each was to work in accord with his own inner nature. His discovery of the formula for the correct arrangement of the passions permitted all to follow entirely the inclinations of their nature and yet contribute to social harmony. To the age-old argument of who would do the dirty work in Utopia, he had a ready answer: since children loved to play with dirt, they would be happy to be organized into Little Hordes who would clean sewers with passionate energy. And those men dominated by the "butterfly" tendency, the passion for variety, would be permitted to flutter from woman to woman and from one occupation to another. They would be planting cabbage in the morning and singing in an opera in the evening.

Fourier's influence on the young Marx is well known. It is perhaps less well understood that consumer as well as producer cooperatives, anarchism as well as non-Marxist socialism, owe him a considerable debt. And members of Women's Lib please note that feminism stood in the very center of the thought of a man for whom self-expression for all human beings was the touchstone of the good society.

Fourier's antinomian vision was anchored in the idea that, once thwarted desires were freed from constraint and men brought up in the freedom of the Phalanx, individuals would live in eternal bliss. Had Nero been born in Harmony, he reasoned, he would have become "one of the best butchers in the phalanx of the Tiber."

With Sorel's *Illusions of Progress*, we enter a far different world of ideas. Sorel was deeply marked by Jansenist pessimism, by the idea that modern mankind was mired in sin and moral decay. The looseness of contemporary morals, sexual and otherwise, indicated to Sorel the decay of the social order.

Fourier wrote when the nineteenth century was still young and when, despite the disappointments of the Revolution and its dismal aftermath, men could still cling to the optimistic notions of progress formulated by Condorcet. Sorel formed his ideas at the end of the century, when the shadow of doubt had begun to engulf the optimistic visions of his predecessors. Although he wrote in 1895 that "the ideas of Fourier have remained fully alive in our country; it can be said that out of ten Frenchmen concerned with social questions, nine are incomplete or illogical Fourierists," he himself was a man cast in a very different mold. A gloomy product of the *fin de siècle*, Sorel's mind was set in a pessimistic posture. He predicted irremediable decadence unless through some extraordinary and heroic act the country was saved by the working class pitting itself with harsh vigor against the complacent representatives of the prevailing order.

The ideology of progress, Sorel argued, had stiffened into a defense of the prevailing liberal and social democratic order. It had frozen into a rigid ideology which prevented men from taking heed of appeals to vital, heroic, and extraordinary virtues. Most of Sorel's writings were attempts to slay the monster of optimistic complacency. In contrast, however, to his masterpiece, *Reflections on Violence*, which is a decidedly original work, holding its place not only in the history of ideas but in political sociology as well, *The Illusions of Progress* does not have lasting merit. It is disjointed and turgidly written. Sorel tends to be resentment-laden and given to vituperation in other writings as well, but in this book his hatreds so dominate the writing as to distort his reasoning. What is one to make of an author who can say that "all Descartes did in formulating his rule of methodological doubt was to introduce aristocratic modes of thought to philosophy." A very fine case can be made against the complacencies of the doctrine of progress, especially in its late nineteenth-century version; Robert Nisbet has made it. But Sorel does not manage to do so. In fact, he himself firmly believed in material and technological progress and rejected only those who passively trusted in the workings of benevolent historical trends. He believed in the supreme virtues of those who *act* thus bending the course of history in the desired direction. When he averred that "we cannot do enough to break any connection between the people and the literature of the eighteenth century," he meant to prepare the working class for heroic deeds by which they would conquer the public scene to institute a reign of hard, self-abnegating, and heroic virtues. Fourier is likely to appeal to flower children, Sorel to dour and stern Western followers of Mao.

Riasanovsky's book should stand on the shelves of anybody interested in social theory, the history of ideas, and the contemporary adversary culture. Sorel's work, despite the excellence of the translation and introduction, is probably of interest to specialists only. It says little that his *Reflections on Violence* does not say more cogently.

Politics and Social Structure. By Talcott Parsons. New York: Free Press, 1969. Pp. xvii + 557. \$13.50.

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In a sense, this overpriced collection of seventeen of Talcott Parsons's essays merits little more than passing notice, since the volume contains only one previously unpublished piece and is addressed to scholars in the theoretically underdeveloped field of political science. Included are Parsons's articles on fascism, "controlled institutional change," McCarthyism, the power elite, and the concepts of political power and influence. There is little here that would be new to sociologists who have given even

cursory attention to developments in sociological theory over the last thirty years or so.

From a somewhat different perspective, however, this volume is noteworthy because it includes what Parsons regards as some of his most significant contributions to political sociology, and thus provides an opportunity to review the political thought of the man who is widely regarded as the profession's single most important theorist. The task is somewhat complicated, however, in light of political events which have repudiated so much of Parsons's analysis, on the one hand, and the emergence of a number of critics whose notion of a revolutionary act is an attack on functionalist theory. Understandably, most of the work critical of Parsons has focused upon his major studies—especially *The Structure of Social Action* and *The Social System*. Yet if his political writings had been given greater attention, it might have become more generally understood why his larger works do not merit the attention which has been given them, since these make the weaknesses of the political assumptions and ideas which underlie his Grand Theory quite clear.

Parsons has often been characterized as being moderate and circumspect, almost to a fault. But a perusal of these essays will show that, as he encounters political ideas and interpretations that challenge his conceptions, he abandons the stance of abstract theorist and gentle scholar and brings into play the full panoply of rhetorical devices to discredit such notions rather than deal with them directly—at the risk of forcing a revision of some of his most cherished concepts. This is not as apparent or as necessary in Parsons's general theory; but it suffuses his political sociology. Thus, in "The Mass Media and the Structure of American Society," he writes:

But given the unfavorable conditions of a mass society, man is so alienated that he is unable to resist mass culture. He has, so to speak, no consumer sovereignty, and is compelled to "buy" whatever supply of culture is at hand. This point of view is more or less Marxian in its assumptions; Erich Fromm is one of its leading spokesmen. [P. 243]

The caricature of the position, the attribution of the caricature to a complex body of thought (Marxism), on the one hand, and its personalization (Fromm), on the other, the discarding of precision when it is most needed through the use of the phrases "so to speak" and "more or less," and the italicization of terms that demand explication are endemic features of his political writings, as they are of his larger works. Here, as elsewhere, it is clear that Parsons is far more comfortable writing about structures and processes which have few concrete referents than about events that have an existence apart from the tautological character of his theory.

But caricature, overstatement, and evasion cannot protect even the most abstruse theorists from the rudeness of events. In what must be one

of the most wrongheaded essays on race written in the sixties, Parsons asserts:

The status of the Negro has been morally the most vulnerable feature of American society. If, as there seems to be good hope, this can be dealt with effectively, it can have a most extensive [*sic*] effect on the larger world situation.

This is because the Communist trend has been to redefine the crucial "class struggle" as a struggle not between classes within societies, but between exploiting and exploited societies, with the famous theory of "imperialism." Just as successful Negro inclusion will put the seal on the Marxian error in diagnosing American society, so the United States, with strong Negro participation, indeed leadership, has the opportunity to present a true alternative to the Communist pattern on a world-wide basis, one which is not bound to the stereotype of "capitalism". . . . This subcommunity of our pluralistic society has the opportunity to be the main symbolic spokesman of the possibility of achieving a racially, as well as religiously, nationally, and otherwise, pluralistic world society. [P. 289]

For reasons which seem to have escaped Parsons, black Americans did not seize the "opportunities" Parsons saw open to them; three months before this piece appeared, the Watts rebellion ushered in an era in which the aspirations of black Americans could no longer be used by anti-communist liberals to rationalize American foreign policy. Given his general political orientation, the fact that Parsons would have seen things that way in 1965 is not especially remarkable. That he would in 1969 attempt to defend those views in this volume with the editorial comment that despite "the intensification of conflict . . . I am of the opinion that, though the tension at present, and for some time to come, is more severe than in the cases of the non-Anglo-Saxon groups, that an outcome similar in pattern to that of the latter is probable" (p. 162) reveals how little impact events of the last five years have had upon his thinking, much less his theory.

The inability of Parsons to square his political thought with political realities and the exercise of power is similarly illustrated in his editorial commentary on his essay on C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite*. At a time when the theorists of pluralism have been forced to recast their thinking in light of the lessons of the sixties, Parsons blithely remarks, "It was a matter of considerable satisfaction" that Arnold Rose's "extensive study of the American power system . . . with much fuller empirical grounding than my own, characterized it as mainly decentralized and pluralistic" (p. 159). While the validity of Mills's analysis has been widely debated in the years since its publication, the main conclusion to be drawn from that discussion is, if anything, that Mills underestimated the concentration of political and economic power in the United States. But it is not surprising that Parsons, who concluded his criticism of Mills's work with the remark that "though of course accompanied by a whole range of 'abuses' [note the quotes], the main lines of social development in America are essentially acceptable to humanistic ethic" (p. 202)

and who reduced the difference between his own and Mills's position to one that could be expressed in the then-fashionable language of game theory, finds Rose's work so satisfying. As the only study of recent years which he cites as having some bearing upon his position, it is a telling example of how Parsons marshalls evidence in defense of his ideas.

The qualities of scholarly disinterestedness and abstraction frequently attributed to Parsons are decidedly lacking in the one piece which he wrote which touches upon his own immediate interests and which, as William C. Mitchell correctly observes in his *Sociological Analysis and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967), reveals his political values most clearly. Written after the assault on Harvard by Senator McCarthy, Parsons's attempt to identify the sources of "Social Strains in America" is, in itself, a rather pedestrian presentation of ideas common among liberal academics of the era. The essay's importance is that it reveals Parsons's conception of the forces which can—indeed, must—be mobilized to overcome the "crisis of confidence" precipitated by McCarthyism:

The changed situation in which we are placed demands a far reaching change in the structure of our society. . . . It demands above all three things: The first is a revision of our conception of citizenship to encourage the ordinary man to accept greater responsibility. The second is the development of the necessary implementing machinery. The third is national political leadership, not only in the sense of individual candidates for office or appointment, but in the sense of *social strata where a traditional political responsibility is ingrained* [my italics].

The most important of these requirements is the third. Under American conditions a politically leading stratum must be made up of a combination of business and nonbusiness elements. The role of the economy in American society and of the business element in it is such that political leadership without prominent business participation is doomed to ineffectiveness and to the *perpetuation of dangerous internal conflict* [my italics]. . . . Broadly, I think, a political elite in the two main aspects of "politicians" whose specialties consist in the management of public opinion, and of "administrators" in both civil and military services, must be greatly strengthened. *And along with such a specifically political elite there must also be close alliance with other, predominantly "cultural" elements, notably perhaps in the universities* [my italics]. [Pp. 177-78]

Such is the thought of the putative "value-neutral" profession's major social theorist on a topic about which even Dwight David Eisenhower had a fuller comprehension of the social consequences of the emergence of such a "politically leading stratum."

However, this volume does provide some evidence that Parsons has learned that it might not be such a good idea to continue to express his political views so openly. The single new essay in the book, "Politics and Society, Some General Considerations," is perhaps the most incoherent and obscurantist piece on politics to come out of the academy in the last dozen years or so. Although there are surely some cognoscenti who will find wisdom in this mixture of jargon, sententiousness, half-formed and

unrelated ideas, anthropomorphic concepts, and the dated language of the systems analysts, the main point of the essay is that the essence of the polity is—hold on, now!—power. It is, in short, vintage Parsons.

One is half-tempted to recommend this volume to colleagues who believe that “sociological analysis” and Grand Theory might provide a way out of the current social crisis. It should convince them of the limits of theory divorced from action and perhaps even move some to engage in a theoretically sound social praxis. At the very least, the book might provide an understanding of how contemporary sociology has come to be what it is, having been dominated by such thought for the last two decades. As Professor Mitchell, at whose suggestion Parsons assembled this volume, has noted, “It is not often that many social scientists find a theorist attractive and authoritative on analytic grounds alone; more often there are some shared general values or sentiments underlying the analytical apparatus” (*Sociological Analysis and Politics*, p. 117). Mitchell was referring to Parsons’s interest in Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber; but the observation is certainly equally applicable to the profession’s investiture of Parsons as its major theorist.

Bennett Berger has credited Parsons with the “capacity to corrupt the innocence with which we view those parts of the world that the theory touches” (*Commentary*, December 1962, p. 512). This collection suggests quite a different conclusion. The volume well illustrates why Parsonian theory, like much of the sociology it has fostered, is ineluctably and deservedly fading into the history of social thought, to join other once influential and fatuous constructions of social reality.

Objectivity in Social Research. By Gunnar Myrdal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969. Pp. viii+111. \$1.95 (paper).

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This book attempts to solve what Gunnar Myrdal considers the most fundamental methodological problems facing the social scientist: what is objectivity and how can it be attained? He specifies this by asking how the social scientist can liberate himself from: (1) the heritage of earlier writings containing biased notions, (2) “the influences of the entire cultural, social, economic, and political milieu” (p. 4), and (3) the influence stemming from his own personality.

The solution to these problems is derived from Myrdal’s conception of reality and the mental processes people use to relate to it. He states that man conceives of reality in terms of beliefs, valuations, and opinions. Beliefs pretend to knowledge and are therefore capable of being either true or false; they are intellectual and cognitive. Valuations, though Myrdal never explicitly defines them, do not pretend to knowledge, and are judgments about what is “‘just’, ‘right’, ‘fair’, ‘desirable’, or the op-

posite" (p. 16); they are emotional and volitive. Opinions, which are also never explicitly defined, are beliefs distorted by valuations.

Central to the solution is Myrdal's observation that people hold shifting and contrary valuations and that there are different levels of valuations, the more general ones being the "higher" ones. In everyday life, however, people are opportunistic; they usually operate in terms of "lower" valuations, which are selfish and short range, rather than "higher" ones, which are "universally benevolent and humane" (p. 17). They also tend to rationalize or disguise their lower valuations as beliefs.

Myrdal sees the role of the social sciences to be the correction of false beliefs: "By increasing true knowledge and purging opportunistic, false beliefs in this way, social science lays the groundwork for an ever more effective education; making people's beliefs more rational, forcing valuations out in the open, and making it more difficult to retain valuations on the lower level opposing those on the higher level" (p. 41). He realizes, however, that social scientists are as human as the people they are studying and that they too are opportunistic, tend to rationalize, and can never be free of their own valuations; a disinterested social science has never and can never exist. If this is the case, how then can the social scientist achieve objectivity? Myrdal's answer is that, in the traditional sense, he cannot; the only meaning that objectivity can have is in making explicit the value premises underlying the research. It is at this point that his argument begins to become muddled, for Myrdal tries to develop criteria for the type of value premises which should be used in research; they should be relevant, significant, feasible, and "*valid* for a long future period" (p. 67; my italics). On entering the area of prescribed value premises, Myrdal gets confused; according to his own definition, valuations cannot be judged as to their truth or falsity—the word "valid" is inapplicable to them. Since "the rationalizations of valuations on what we have called the lower level lead to distorted beliefs" (p. 67), Myrdal would like to see social scientists use valuations on a higher level.

Here we come to a basic ellipsis in Myrdal's thinking: he never states why or how higher valuations should lead to less distorted beliefs than to lower ones. If the word "belief" has any meaning, such as the meaning Myrdal gives it, that is, knowledge which is true or false, then "objectivity" in the conventional sense is attainable and one can sensibly talk about distorted beliefs. But Myrdal does not think that this type of objectivity is attainable; all we can hope for is "honesty, clarity, and effectiveness in research" (p. 72). This being the case, all knowledge is distorted by valuations, whether they be higher ones or lower ones, and the task of social science cannot be the correction of false beliefs but only the substitution of one belief for another. This is the conclusion that strict reasoning from Myrdal's premises implies, but Myrdal is far from alone in starting from the realization that knowledge is determined by cultural, social, economic, and political factors and ending by attempting to specify a method of determining what is true (or correcting what is false). Mannheim trod the

same path in *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936), and most attempts to reason within the framework of a sociology of knowledge end here.

Myrdal closes the book with several chapters on what he considers universal valuations: the respect for human life and a belief in basic human equality; he also discusses how the world has fallen short in its attempts to realize them. One universal which he might have added is the need to maintain a belief (even if subconscious) in the existence of an objective reality where beliefs are either true or false.

To evaluate a book properly, one must consider the audience and purpose for which it is designed. Myrdal states that he is addressing himself to an audience of students in the social sciences and that he wants the book to be brief and easy to understand. Instead of having to piece together a consistent and comprehensive philosophy of social science, the student should be able to find a good introduction in this book and then, if interested, go on to further reading. *Objectivity in Social Research* is not ideally suited for such purposes, primarily because there is little discussion of other literature concerned with the same problem and almost all of the references are to other works by Myrdal. As one book among many in a course on methodology or the philosophy of the social sciences, it would be useful in providing a working social scientist's views on a problem which should be of concern to every researcher.

Sociology in the USSR: A Collection of Readings from the Soviet Sources. Edited by Stephen P. Dunn. White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969. Pp. v+281. \$12.50.

Mark G. Field

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One of the more interesting phenomena of the post-Stalin cultural scene has been the development of sociology, anthropology, and other social sciences in the USSR. This development is not, of course, spontaneous; rather, it is carefully controlled and guided by the regime and must proceed within a narrow range of permissiveness. It reflects, in general, the political vicissitudes and ideological trends at work in the larger society, as well as the specific problems the regime faces and wants sociology to help resolve. Thus, the "sociology of Soviet sociology" remains an important area of inquiry in this field.

In the meanwhile, language and communication barriers make it difficult for Western sociologists to know what is being done and published in the USSR. A pioneering role in the translation and the dissemination of Soviet sociological and anthropological materials belongs to Stephen P. Dunn (and his wife Ethel Dunn), who is the editor of two journals of translation, *Soviet Sociology* and *Soviet Anthropology and Archeology*. The book under review is a collection of articles culled from these journals and presented in hard cover. This collection is thus the result of a double dis-

tillation. The first was the original selection of articles for publication in the translation journals. The second was the selection of the present articles for publication in this book. Twenty-two articles (which I assume are representative) appear in the collection and are indirectly indicative of the fairly large volume of work that is being done and published in the USSR. The articles in the collection are presented under the following rubrics: Sociological Theory and Research; Questions of Social and Nationality Policy; Ethnic Processes and Relations; Questions of General Sociological Method; Empirical Methodology and Technique; Demography, Ethnography, and Social Statistics; Empirical Studies of Worker Communities; Rural Sociology and Agriculture; Religion; and Local Government and Administration.

The quality of these articles is uneven, and their substantive contribution to sociological or anthropological theory and knowledge is somewhat limited. At the same time, they provide the reader and the student with a great deal of information on certain limited aspects of Soviet society and culture. I also think that the Western reader will be edified by the very style of presentation and the language used in the articles, which reflect their authors' dedication to Marxism-Leninism in its Soviet interpretation.

However, I am afraid that a great deal of what readers will find will not be very meaningful without at least some knowledge of Soviet society and history. (In a few instances, the editor has provided explanations for the more puzzling passages.) I wonder, though, how anybody not familiar with events such as the process of forcible collectivization pursued by Stalin will interpret the following passage (chosen almost at random): "At the end of the 1920's and in the early 30's, when our peasantry took the path of mass collectivization, upon which the policy of the abolition of the kulaks as a class was based . . ." (p. 91)—since this statement does not agree with the facts. Indeed, during World War II, Stalin reportedly admitted that the collectivization campaign had been a worse ordeal for the USSR than the war itself.

Take this statement from another article: "The friendship and unity of all the peoples of the Soviet land were manifested with tremendous force during World War II" (p. 82). This hardly squares with the well-known facts of the wholesale deportations of entire ethnic populations on the ground that they had been too well disposed toward the Germans. Among these, the best known are the deportations of the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic, all the Chechen and Ingush peoples, and all the Balkars, as Khrushchev reported in his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956.

Some of the articles, on the other hand, provide fascinating glimpses into certain aspects of life in the USSR that are not usually found in the more standard sources. For example: "Workers are no longer searched when they leave the mill" (p. 235). And a description of lumbering in Karelia: "Sometimes (in winter if the snow is deep), a woman is added to dig the snow away from the base of the trees" (p. 239).

The Western reader will also recognize many of the problems and questions that are central to the sociological inquiry of industrializing and industrialized societies. For example, the process of population movement from the rural areas to the urban centers, access to educational opportunity in a society that is stratified and where parents' occupations and general life styles affect such opportunities and eventually the life chances of their children, the implications raised by the existence of a variety of ethnic groups and nationalities with their subcultures and their languages, the impact of industrialization upon family life and the choice of a spouse, and finally the specific problems posed by the survival of fundamentalist religious beliefs and of sectarianism (in a society whose religion is atheism).

In essence, one might say that sociology in the USSR still remains very much a *sociologie d'état*, in some respects still undifferentiated from ideology, philosophy, and propaganda. But I also believe that with time, and with many ups and downs, sociology and social science in general will slowly and cautiously liberate themselves from overt dictation by the regime. Indeed, the progress accomplished since Stalin died is, in a comparative perspective, quite impressive. I think that the editor, and the publisher for that matter, should be congratulated and encouraged to provide more English translations of the work done in the USSR in this area.

Violence and the Struggle for Existence. Edited by D. N. Daniels, M. F. Gilula, and F. M. Ochberg. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1970. Pp. xvi + 451.

Men, Stress and Vietnam. By Peter G. Bourne. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970. Pp. xi + 233.

Hans Toch

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Two books come in search of a common review, and one wonders why. The resemblance, at first glance, is skin-deep. The volumes have the same publisher and a common birth date; the editors of one and the author of the other are psychiatrists affiliated with the Stanford Medical School. But here the efforts part company, both in form and in substance.

Peter Bourne's "Vietnam diary" is a set of essays, charming but discursive. The Stanford violence symposium, on the other hand, is an amazingly monolithic enterprise, which imposes unity of purpose on subjects of diverse origin. Whereas Bourne blithely skips from urine tests to folklore and from travelogue to epidemiological surveys, his colleagues (and their editors) draw on biology, developmental and experimental psychology, cybernetics, public opinion, content analysis, psychodynamics, and the study of collective behavior to define and document a common point.

What the two volumes have in common, however, transcends their divergent aims—a fact about their authors which is of import to social scientists: there is a new breed of psychiatrist abroad in the land, a breed with whom we can successfully and profitably interface.

Bourne's book is in many ways a strange enterprise—so strange as to be a brave venture for a commercial publisher. It is a series of vignettes, or, in the words of its author a recorded set of "personal experiences." It deals with the Vietnam war and offers "a keyhole view of selected facets of our involvement to provide a perspective that is not normally available in the general press coverage of the war." Nor, one might add, is it available elsewhere in book form, in the partisan, polarized views we have come to expect about this subject.

Peter Bourne is a self-labeled "combat psychiatrist." He has a professional and scientific interest in man under stress. He approaches war as a tragically designed real-life laboratory that tests man's capacity to adapt. He also approaches war as a source of physical and emotional problems that call for restorative services and institutions. In the eleven essays that comprise this book, Bourne details his adventures as scientific investigator, healer, and (less easy to define) impressionistic social observer.

Among the essays is a set of biographical sketches of four Vietnamese civilians, each corrupted by efforts to capitalize on war. There is another essay that details the travails of Australian soldiers, who must cope with low status and low collective self-esteem. There are studies of Green Berets and helicopter ambulance crews, who in order to survive, must deny the dangers they face. There are comparative studies of mental disorders, their classification and treatment. These make the best of poor statistics and unknown variables. There is a case study of social engineering and of the reality that defeats it. Finally, there are impressions of modal Vietnamese "national character" and of its link to the war. Throughout, we see the author an ingenious, determined investigator, plotting the 17-OHCS levels of garnered urine. The results of this enterprise (interwoven throughout the book) are unspectacular and testify to strong personal defenses, or to poor physiological indices.

The day after Robert Kennedy's assassination, the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry at Stanford University constituted a Committee on Violence, which comprised twenty-four members. This body was subdivided into task forces and seminars. These small groups dealt with aspects of the violence problem in order to publish findings and recommendations, as well as with the intent of designing a multidisciplinary institute for the study of violence and aggression. The book embodies the first of these aims and ensures the success of the other.

For a symposium, this book is remarkable in several ways. For one, it sticks almost consistently to its theme, that of viewing violence "in the context of man's struggle to adapt to his environment." There are variations in the way these terms are defined, but these seem required by divergent materials and points of view. The thrust remains.

A second surprise is the book's organization, with meticulous concern

for introductions, cross-references, summaries, and interlocking discussions. One infers monumental editing and considerable give and take. The result is informative, thoughtful, and substantial.

The book's defects are minor and are not overly distracting. For one, there is some redundancy, and the reader of the Violence Commission's recent *Crimes of Violence* will find duplication. Occasionally, authors lapse into discursions which show them out of their depth or belaboring the obvious. Two or three chapters seem elementary and flounder a bit. There are even two chapters that may produce a mildly dissonant note.

The last point requires explanation: throughout the book, there is stress on empirically based theory. We find only one lapse of traditional Freudian exegesis and another of clinical case materials. In a fashion, psychiatry thus pays respects to its past. But even here, there is mitigation. The case materials are presented with acknowledged sampling bias, transcend their stress on infancy, and refer to the book's theme. Concepts advanced in the "psychodynamics" chapter (e.g., "secondary aggression," which "refers to hostile or violent behavior that is entirely disproportional or even unrelated to current provocation") may be nonoperational in pure form, but may be susceptible to modified use. And I hasten to add that there are several chapters in the book (such as those on biology and drug use) that are nothing short of good.

My main point, I suppose, is that we have evidence in both volumes of a successful move in American psychiatry toward rich and fruitful inquiry and theory. In these volumes, man is viewed as a coping and adapting being. This view is a plausible one and facilitates communication with other social and behavioral disciplines.

The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military. By Charles C. Moskos, Jr. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. Pp. x+274. \$7.95.

John Lofland

University of California, Davis

Even though modest in length—185 pages of text—this new book by Charles Moskos presents a complex and rather omnibus study of the American enlisted man and, to a degree, the American military. On cursory viewing, the volume appears to consist of eight straightforward and simple chapters: (1) constant and varying "images of enlisted life" in novels, movies, comic strips, and social science since the Second World War, (2) military formal organization and the backgrounds of enlisted men and their attitudes toward military life, (3) typical pressures on enlisted men as subordinates relative to onerous duties, marriage, and social class mixing, (4) distribution of American troops abroad, base-spawned "boomtowns," relations with local women, official indoctrination, and news media, (5) racial segregation and integration of the armed forces and

depiction of the current status of blacks in the military, (6) reformulation of the primary-group thesis of combat motivation based upon several weeks spent with combat soldiers in Vietnam, (7) Vietnam opponent efforts to organize enlisted men and GI attitudes toward peace demonstrators, and (8) assessment of the degree to which military organization is likely to converge with or diverge from American society in the seventies and the proposition of a thesis of the "split-level garrison state"—and much, much more, spread through these eight chapters.

While simple in chapter outline—looking rather like an uninspired term paper lacking a thesis—Moskos's study is complicated and subtle in execution. The individual chapters do not yield easily to short *and* accurate summary; each is almost a little book in itself.

A part of the book's complexity derives from Moskos's data catholicity: military manpower surveys, conventional large-scale surveys, government reports, novels, comic strips, newspapers, the gamut of relevant social science writings, his own small-scale survey, and, most unusual, his own participant observation (as an army magazine correspondent) among combat soldiers in Vietnam, as well as stays with soldiers in several other countries. Not least, Moskos was himself an enlisted man for two years in the early fifties and reports having "enjoyed the comradeship of my fellow soldiers, and [I] even took pride in my eventual duties as a noncommissioned officer in charge of training. . . . I liked the Army while serving in it and I still do" (p. 183).

The text only seems brief. At the back are thirty-six pages of tables, eighteen pages of footnotes, and a thirteen-page bibliography, all of which relate directly to the text. (In addition, for purists, there is a twelve-page index.)

Within the space allotted, I cannot justly summarize or comment upon any of the detailed topics with which Moskos deals. One general observation will perforce suffice.

While I believe this is an excellent book, I am obligated to ask if it is a contribution to sociological knowledge qua sociological knowledge as distinct from the kind of sophisticated and intelligent analysis that is performed by well-educated journalists. (Moskos, indeed, allows his publisher to describe him on the dust jacket as "a sociologist and journalist.") Put most simply, the sociological task is that of offering generalized (1) descriptions of variations in social organization and conduct, (2) explanations of such variations, and (3) consequences of such variations. Moskos does perform one or another of these tasks relative to a variety of aspects of the military. He does so, however, in case-study fashion, without much attempt to provide generalized statements of full ranges of variations, explanations of them and consequences of them. He concentrates upon some states of some variables. These are, nonetheless, indispensable contributions. Or, at least, his eight mini-books could be so if relevant theorists of the main topics extracted those chapters that relate to their generalized and analytic concerns. Thus, the chapter on primary group ties, or lack of them, among combat soldiers has relevance to the general the-

ory of the forms, formation, and consequences of primary groups. But, unfortunately, specialized theorists of the relevant analytic topics will probably never look at this volume, writing it off as merely a book about enlisted men and of interest only to military sociology types and issues-of-the-day partisans. It is in such a manner that the true analytic potential of a work of this kind is rarely realized, to the enfeeblement of the intellectual force of the entire discipline.

One matter of amenity: if the Russell Sage Foundation is going to publish books, it might at least justify text margins, especially in view of the prices of its books.

Les pouvoirs de la télévision. By Jean Cazeneuve. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1970. Pp. 382. (Paper.)

Kurt Lang

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What is special about a society saturated by the electronic media, and where in the long run is it heading? That, rather than the power of video to persuade, to channel consumer preferences, or to mold behavior, is the basic question to which Jean Cazeneuve, professor of sociology at the Sorbonne and research director of the Institut français de presse, addresses himself in the little paperback volume entitled "The Powers of Television."

Some of the content is indeed heady stuff. The images of social change found in the writings of Ferdinand Toennies, David Riesman, and Marshall McLuhan provide a perspective on the general problem. The author's discussion of these and of other writers is by no means uncritical, and he selectively assimilates from each the ideas he finds useful. This is true even of McLuhan, on whom he relies, understandably, more heavily than on others but whose name he consistently misspells in utter disregard, no doubt unconscious, of the conventions of a print culture. McLuhan's "sensory determinism," in particular, does not sit well with him. It is obvious to him, as it should be to others, that the causal connections between changes in communications technology and other social changes are both more subtle and more complex than the simple formula that associates the book and phonetic writing with the domination of the eye and sees in the growth of the electronic media (*read* television) a return to the ear and hence to total immersion. Nor can every change in life style—be it the temporary decline of the type of heroic political leadership represented by Churchill and de Gaulle or the fashion of long hair among boys—which has coincided with the growth of television be attributed to that medium. They are not even unique to the present era but have, in fact, happened before.

The model offered by Cazeneuve considers print, and, for that matter, television, as a means of diffusion as well as communication. What was

unique about the literate culture that developed in the shadow of the printing press was not its appeal to the eye; reading a book in braille or (I would add) transmitting a written message by Morse code does not involve the eye at all, and yet the decoding process is similar to reading. The revolutionary effect of the literate culture was its detachment of the object that the communication was about from the communicating subject; in this way, it destroyed or transcended, whichever one wishes, the immediate context to which social relations in primitive or preliterate societies had been limited. Television obviously does not restore the immediacy typical of the communal forms of existence. It does, however, present the viewer with an artificially or electronically contrived image which gives him the illusion of immediacy. Both the similarities and the differences between the printed and the electronic media are important. Print helped create a new culture, one accessible at first only to the few who were literate, whereas television, as the mass medium par excellence, more even than the tabloid press and radio before, destroyed the monopolies of knowledge built around libraries and lines of transportation.

In this highly condensed rendering of Cazeneuve's ideas, I have employed—inadvertently—some of the concepts used by Harold A. Innes in his comparative studies of communication and by Daniel Lerner in his work on the passing of traditional society. The former was one of McLuhan's main sources of inspiration, and, although Cazeneuve could have found support for his own views in the writings of each, neither name appears in this volume, an obviously minor oversight of interest only to the scholar. More important is that this book, by and large, goes beyond theoretical exegesis and seeks its point of departure for an analysis and prognosis of the long-term effects of television in the findings of empirical research. Insofar, however, as most of the studies relied on were done in Britain and the United States, this review of the literature, highly selective as it is, does not offer anything most readers of this journal do not know already—with one exception, and that is the author's own study based on interviews with a panel of seventy-five eligible voters in the 1969 French presidential election, which he summarizes in some detail.

On the one hand, Cazeneuve reasons from the premise that the mass media in general and television in particular have elevated public opinion as the preeminent agency of social control; on the other, he is clearly aware of the main thrust of the research evidence, which shows the specific effects of the mass media on public opinion to be greatly limited and not usually working in the direction of change. The paradox is easily resolved. The effect of television depends on the social context. When the other influences on which its effect depends tend to reinforce the status quo, the influence of television will be conservative. Its influence will be quite the reverse when change is the order of the day. In either case, television accentuates already existing dispositions.

This may sound familiar, but the point is that, compared with Joseph Klapper, on whom he also draws, Cazeneuve is far more vigorous in his search for situations in which the mass media promote change and is more

willing in his speculations to go beyond the research evidence. Thus, he puts forward some interesting, if not fully substantiated, hypotheses. Among those that caught my attention was one that directly contradicts both the conventional wisdom and most of the research on leadership. He uses findings principally from the Nixon-Kennedy debates and from his own panel study to show that candidate images are, as a rule, far more volatile and subject to change from television than political opinions. In both the above instances, the lesser-known among the candidates (i.e., Kennedy and Alain Poher) were the ones who improved their public image considerably during the campaign. This suggests to Cazeneuve that new ideas are more readily accepted when associated with a new face than with an established leader, provided the exponent succeeds in identifying himself with existing currents of sentiment. Although other equally plausible explanations can be advanced for Kennedy's and Poher's disproportionate gains, the above proposition can easily be tested, and such a test would be worthy of someone's time.

More generally, the exaltation of the new, the search for personalities or spectacles to attract the attention of those weary of the old formulas, the growing sophistication with which producers are forever seeking untapped dispositions within the mass audience, and so forth, will gradually cause the first stage of television, during which its influence is exerted toward homogenization, to be replaced by a second stage of increasing differentiation. Television, so Cazeneuve believes, will always mobilize its public around stereotypes. This does not preclude the marketing of "revolutionary" politics or avant-gardist culture, appropriately packaged into their own stereotypes, as long as there is a demand to be satisfied. The idea that the mass media can, over the long run, help in this way to usher in change is not all farfetched. I cannot, however, go along with the author's faith in the intrinsic incompatibility of television with totalitarian controls. Much the same prognosis could have been (and was) made of radio. The present identification of radio with the "hot" and of television with the "cool" is a McLuhanite trap into which social scientists with a knowledge of the history of the media should not fall.

The Sound of the City: The Rise of Rock and Roll. By Charlie Gillett. New York: Outerbridge & Dienstfrey, 1970. Pp. vii+375. \$6.95.

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University of California, Berkeley

Gillett has produced a descriptive, historical account of popular music and the music industry in the United States and Great Britain for the years 1940-70. By focusing on popular music, especially rock and roll, he reveals many of the salient features of today's youth culture: poetry, escapism, frustration, alienation, romanticism, radicalism, fatalism, tarnished idealism. Drawing primarily on major publications of the music

industry (*Billboard*), published interviews with performers, producers, and managers, and the original music, Gillett presents a seldom considered view of mass culture: the everyday organizational, dramaturgical, and political dynamics that produce, shape, and create popular identities. Mass culture is not an individual production; it is embedded in a network of overlapping and competing social organizations, only infrequently grounded on principles of aesthetics. This Gillett manages to show, despite his romantic commitment to rock and roll music.

To make his research manageable, an ad hoc classification of rock and roll is offered. Drawn largely from the system employed by *Billboard*, this yielded five categories: northern rock 'n' roll (Bill Haley), New Orleans dance blues (Fats Domino), Memphis country rock (Elvis Presley), Chicago rhythm and blues (Chuck Berry), and vocal rock 'n' roll (Orioles). All five styles drew heavily upon contemporary Negro sounds.

Rock and roll rose to national prominence (1954–58), argues Gillett, because for the first time a large segment of the population (youth) demanded a musical sound more appropriate to their circumstances. A more likely explanation, also contained in his analysis, was that the major music companies saw a market and captured it. Still, the white middle-class sound of Sinatra, Crosby, and Fisher (trivia, melodrama, sentimentality) was rejected for a new group of singers and a set of themes more in tune with the experiences of youth. On the scene came Presley and his famous cohort who sang the praises of broken love affairs (also melodrama), boredom with higher education, and the imagined thrill of being free from adult demands.

After tracing the rise of this new sound and showing with convincing detail that for the first time black singers could sing of black experiences and not be covered by whites, Gillett moves to such considerations as: how to make a rock 'n' roll record, how to be an independent recording company, the blues and gospel-based sounds, uptown rhythm and blues, and soul music, and concludes with an analysis of the recent transatlantic sound of the Beatles, Stones, and Animals. He ends on a sour note. His favorite brand of music is dead. Killed by the majors, perverted by white singers, devoured by tasteless singers, rock 'n' roll as it was known during its zenith is never to be again.

Perhaps this is as it should be. Maybe white youth got what they deserved. With their identities mass-produced, just like the records they bought, who could hope for more. In rock's place emerged a new sound, also packaged, but more existential, romantic, and escapist—Dylan, Lennon, Simon, The Band. Like the current political scene, popular music is in a chaotic state. By focusing on the music industry, Gillett has given a mirror of this scene.

While he gives the best and to date most delightful analysis of popular music—he tells us, for example, that Elvis Presley was discovered when he cut a record for his mother's birthday—the study is not without flaws. His devotion to detail leads to contradictions. On page 305 he claims that by 1957 British audiences were conversant with the blues style. Yet on

page 317 he argues that the Stones rose to fame because they offered a *new* sound based on the blues tradition. His failure to seriously consider the dramaturgical elements of musical careers leads to an inability (p. 313) to explain the international appeal of the Beatles.

His analysis is not about the sounds of the city. It is a study of the recording industry and the performers, idols, managers, and charlatans who gave shape to pop music. Rock and roll does not express the urban scene as much as it tells the tragedies of the human relationship, the shifting restlessness of youth, and their wish to rebel against (or escape from) social circumstances largely beyond their control, especially mass education. His treatment of youth as a separate social group is relatively useless and certainly misleading. Shibutani's analysis of reference groups as perspectives would have better suited his problem.

His analytic scheme never rises above the data to the level of sociological-interactive explanations. As a consequence, the interactive relationship between performer, audience, and recording industry remains unexamined. This absence is not peculiar to Gillett. Without exception, it characterizes *all* studies of popular culture.

Too often he assumes a Durkheimian stance toward music. Treating it as a social fact, he holds himself up as the most knowledgeable analyst and is thereby relieved of showing what the music meant to the persons studied. But it is too much to ask of one work that it weave social history with personal and public biography in a way that reveals what the object called rock 'n' roll meant to the persons most intimately involved in its career. Future researchers will do well to begin with that problem.

An Analysis of Malay Magic. By Kirk Michael Endicott. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Pp. 188. \$7.25.

Manning Nash

University of Chicago

Under the twin stimulus of linguistics and French structural anthropology, a genre of secondary analysis of field materials has emerged. The linguistic assumption is that in cultural systems there is a "deep structure," and the structural assumption is that what appears unordered or diffuse is, on close inspection, made up of a number of structural or logical categories. If these assumptions are prosecuted savagely enough, order can be imposed on any body of data, with the anomalies, the ragged edges, and the unassimilated bits of data written off as "being modified or embellished by empirical fact." Of course, the major problem in all of these secondary analyses is that the data are not self-explanatory, and what would really check out the posited order is not more textural material, but further fieldwork testing the validity of the erected order. My major discomfort with secondary analysis is that it tests no hypotheses above and beyond the fact that disparate material can (in one way or

another) be reduced to patterned principles. Furthermore, in social anthropology the controls over what set of principles emerges are not self-evident, relying in great measure on the ingenuity, diligence, and private capacities of the person doing the textual reinterpretation.

Endicott's B.Litt. paper published as "An Analysis of Malay Magic" is a good and fairly productive example of the genre. Going through the basic sources on Malay magic (Skeat, Annandale and Robinson, Cuisinier, Gimlette, and Winsted), Endicott has some perceptive things to say about the order of Malay magic. His treatment of the major idea of Malay magic *semangat* in its bound and free forms covers familiar territory but is probably more complete than the discussions elsewhere. The notions of how Malay magic operates, especially the *bomor* and *pawang* in the trance cure, are more orderly than the sources from which it draws. Endicott uses, thankfully, a minimum of speculation and stays fairly close to his sources.

The conclusions to the book are what can be expected when, from the outset, the goal was a logically ordered set of principles and categories. Endicott says the basic structure of Malay magic is triadic. Ideas and concepts are tripartite, not dual or binary. What such a revelation means in terms of the general and comparative study of magic (or other symbol systems) escapes me. The weak argument that now that we know the triadic structure of Malay magic we can understand how this syncretic structure grew over time is, to me, utterly specious. Nor do I see that knowing about triads facilitates cross-cultural comparison.

At best, this sort of book is a reasonable way to cover the literature, a suitable task for a beginner, and a way of getting ready to tackle the real questions which lie in fieldwork and a different style of theoretical thinking.

Elements of Mathematical Sociology. By Murray A. Beauchamp. New York: Random House, 1970. Pp. ix+110. \$4.95.

Thomas W. Pullum

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The principal intended value of this review is to forewarn persons who might hear of this little book and be struck by its title, that it is not, with maximum likelihood, of any value to them. Much unlike Coleman's *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology*, which advanced the field both substantively and pedagogically, this work has hardly a dash of originality and would be an impossible text at any level.

The three main chapters relate to (a) sets and graphs, (b) Markov chains and game theory, and (c) calculus and symbolic logic. The reader is assumed to know nothing of such tools as summation signs, functions, and the graph of a straight line. Yet inside of a hundred undersize pages, he is allegedly taken to the level of such things as mean passage times in

Markov chains and, yes, Simon's mathematization of Homans. I can imagine no circumstance in which this book would be selected over Kemeny, Snell, and Thompson's *Introduction to Finite Mathematics* or Bartos's *Simple Models for Group Behavior*. Beauchamp also falls short in his effort to show that math models respond well to substantive sociological problems, as indeed he must in so short a space.

In sum, we have a peculiarly patronizing volume with an undefined audience and a coverage which is both cursory and deceptive. Perhaps Random House will find its market with the bookstore browser-dilettante. No, the book with this impressive title has yet to be written.

Demography in Early America: Beginnings of the Statistical Mind, 1600-1800. By James J. Cassedy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. xi+357. \$8.50.

Nathan Keyfitz

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"When the English seized New Netherlands in 1664 and changed its name to New York, they . . . provided, among other details, for the recording of births, marriages, and deaths by the minister or clerk of every parish" (pp. 44-45). Colbert's edict of 1666 called for a precise enumeration of the population of the colony, and "Jean Talon, the Intendant, personally supervised the resulting house-to-house canvass of the area between Montreal and Quebec" (p. 43). These events took place in the same decade as the appearance of John Graunt's *Observations on the Bills of Mortality* in England; colonies were if anything ahead of their respective mother countries in gathering the data on which political arithmetic rested.

But the impulse to establish vital statistics and censuses in America came from European administrators. "The colonies' consistent inability, and occasional unwillingness, to provide as much vital and other data as the mother country wanted, was a frequent source of friction between the two sides" (p. 60). Edward Randolph was among those who helped to make English rule and its statistical inquiries unpalatable; failing to enlist local help on his missions to America, he made his own estimates. Since the population he assigned Massachusetts was "measurably higher than the colonists admitted, it provided England with a new basis for taxation" (p. 62). And where he found indisputably low figures, like the 70,000 to 80,000 inhabitants in Virginia, Randolph criticized the successive governments of the colony for not having done anything to stimulate larger families. He especially blamed the land policy: "Since large tracts were taken up by a few, comparatively little land was left to attract new settlers."

Zeal for record keeping was to be found at the local level among clergymen, and among these, Congregational ministers were especially dis-

tinguished. Puritan orderliness was nowhere more persistent than in the records of souls, reflected in baptisms, burials, and marriages. Such worldly records helped to announce the actions and decisions of the Lord: "To Edward Johnson . . . the population [increases] in Massachusetts between 1630 and 1650 had been certain signs of God's favor towards New England" (p. 103). "God's demographic providence worked in very immediate ways" (p. 105).

If in early times the English administrators made out that their colonists were numerous and, thus, the better to justify taxes, the colonists, by the second half of the eighteenth century, took their large numbers as an argument for self-government. And England began to be antipopulationist as far as the colonies were concerned, seeing that "it was imprudent for Great Britain to stimulate the growth of American population, especially since America was already doubling by propagation every 20 or 25 years" (p. 182). One trouble with the growing population was that "it will be hastening [the colonies] into the very State of Population which will be most dangerous to ourselves, that of peopling large Towns and Cities, which must introduce all Kinds of Manufacturing" (p. 183), wrote "Publicola" in the *General Evening Post* of London.

The grievances of the colonists against the king included that "he has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States" (p. 194). Said the young Charlestown physician David Ramsey, "Our Independence will naturally tend to fill our country with inhabitants" (p. 195). And one of Richard Price's marks of disloyalty to Britain was his "deprecating [*sic*] British population resources while magnifying those of the enemy" (p. 196). All this is reported by Cassedy as "the numerical basis of revolt."

Just when the States needed population statistics most—for recruiting their own troops and raising their own taxes—the disturbance of the Revolutionary War caused statistical deterioration. Churches were burned along with the registers they contained; paper was lacking for preparing bills of mortality; personnel were busy with more immediate aspects of the military struggle.

The new nation finally emerged with a keen sense of the need for statistics. Provision for taking a census every ten years was made in the Constitution itself, the census constituting a rule for determining proportions in the House of Representatives (p. 213). But would not such a rule cause the States to bias their counts upward? If, said Madison in the *Federalist*, "their share of representation were alone to be governed by this rule they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants." On the other hand, "were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would prevail." But "by extending the rule to both objectives, the States will have opposing interests, which will . . . produce the requisite impartiality." Fortunately, statisticians have since discovered more robust ways of avoiding bias than this delicate balance of distortion.

The late eighteenth century saw the new United States launched on its

independent national career. The irregular counts and population estimates of colonial times became national censuses extending in an unbroken series from 1790; the bills of mortality became first state and then national vital-statistics systems. Similar changes occurred also in Europe, but somewhat later: French demographic statistics were modernized by Napoleon, and English ones started with the census of 1801 and the vital statistics of 1837. The New World may have been behind the Old in the more sophisticated branches of science and the arts, but it was ahead in the gathering of data.

Cassedy's style varies from flat to unintelligible. (What does he mean by "the climatic years of the British-French struggle for North America" [p. 162]?) He is no Toynbee or McNeil. But the patient reader will welcome his account of early American populationism and nationalism and how both stimulated the devoted collection of statistical data.

New Developments in Survey Sampling. Edited by Normal L. Johnson and Harry Smith, Jr. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1969. Pp. xvi+732. \$14.95.

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The algebra of symposia is mysterious. If the symposium is a success, the whole should equal a good deal more than the sum of the parts. This occurs when the discussion of individual papers ties them together into some broader framework or clarifies the areas of disagreement. If the published report of a symposium is to be of much value to those who did not attend, it must include these efforts at synthesis. As examples, the symposia reported in *Daedalus* almost always hit the mark.

Using the same criteria, *New Developments in Survey Sampling*, the report of a symposium on survey sampling held at Chapel Hill in April 1968, is a major disappointment. Although the participants included most of the important researchers in sampling theory, and although many of the papers are excellent, the book has been carelessly edited. The individual papers are replete with typographical errors, and in articles by D. S. Robson on "Mark-Recapture Methods of Population Estimation" and L. R. Frankel on the "Role of Accuracy and Precision of Response in Sample Surveys," some pages are out of order. Even more serious, none of the discussion is included, not even the comments of the invited discussants. The basic flaw of the book is that there is no sense of organization and no common theme. The selections might as well have appeared in the *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, except that there they would have been more carefully edited and better printed.

Since the papers are not grouped in the book, the following groupings are mine. There are a series of excellent papers on the general operations of surveys. These include papers by M. H. Hansen and B. J. Tepping of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, T. Dalenius of the University of Stock-

holm, R. J. Jessen of UCLA, P. V. Sukhatme and B. V. Sukhatme of FAO and Iowa State, and W. R. Simmons and J. A. Bean of the National Center for Health Statistics. Of these, the paper by Sukhatme and Sukhatme on "Some Methodological Aspects of Sample Surveys of Agriculture in Developing Countries" was most interesting to me, since it not only dealt with problems rarely encountered in the United States, such as rapidly obsolescent farms but also discussed response biases that are common everywhere.

Another general theme is the discussion of nonsampling errors in surveys. In addition to the papers already mentioned, there are interesting papers by D. G. Horvitz and G. G. Koch on "The Effect of Response Errors on Measures of Association," by J. Neter on "Measurement Errors in Anticipated Consumer Expenditures," a discussion by Frankel of "The role of Accuracy and Precision of Response in Sample Surveys," and the final paper by J. Neyman dealing with sample biases in galactic research. Of particular interest to sociologists are F. F. Stephan's "Three Extensions of Sample Survey Technique: Hybrid, Nexus, and Graduated Sampling" and L. Kish's "Design and Estimation for Subclasses, Comparisons, and Analytical Statistics."

There are technical papers by V. P. Godambe, H. O. Hartley and J. N. K. Rao, V. M. Joshi, N. R. Draper and I. Guttman, W. A. Ericson, J. D. Kalbfleisch and D. A. Sprott, J. Durbin, W. E. Deming, and O. Kempthorne on the basic theoretical problems of estimation and inference, from both a Bayesian and a classical view. Here, particularly, some cross-discussion would have been most helpful in addition to the summary remarks of G. A. Barnard. Finally, there are a series of papers on applications of sampling that vary enormously in quality and level of sophistication.

It may be that the expectations of a limited audience explain the price of this photo-offset book, as well as the omissions and the hasty editing. Unfortunately, readers other than the participants at the conference who are aware of the discussions that took place will not find the book to be as useful as it might have been.

The Little Legislatures: Committees of Congress. By George Goodwin, Jr. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970. Pp. xvi + 284. \$8.50.

Duncan MacRae, Jr.

University of Chicago

Drawing together the research findings of the author and others, this book provides raw material for sociological analysis of Congress and its committees—data on the evolution of committees, their diversity, the flow of personnel through them, and their functioning. It does not actually perform this analysis, however, as Goodwin makes few efforts to generalize or to compare Congress with other social structures. Thus, it will

not attract sociologists to the study of legislatures; but for readers already interested in the subject, it may provoke reflections on topics such as the following.

The title of the book raises the question as to how committees differ from the legislatures of which they are part. The elaborate differentiation of today's Congress into standing committees, with advancement governed by seniority, is *not* uniformly matched in the structure of subcommittees. Some committees have no standing subcommittees; others have numbered subcommittees without regularly assigned functions; still others (e.g., Appropriations) have an elaborate subcommittee structure resembling that of the chamber. Possible explanations of the differences include size and functions performed. It is also interesting that *mixtures* of types of committees or subcommittees within a given parent body are infrequent.

A second major theme illuminated by the book is the evolution of House and Senate. Nelson Polsby has called attention to the "institutionalization" of the House—the development of legislative careers and of a system of norms regulating the internal life of the chamber. With this has come the norm of helping fellow members to retain their seats, as by committee assignments related to their constituencies. Together with the seniority system, these features may have produced a chamber attracting a secondary elite with limited ambitions on the national scene, as C. Wright Mills and Andrew Hacker have shown; responding to lasting, geographically concentrated interests but not electorally sensitive to swings of opinion; developing an accumulated wisdom in the ways of Washington but deficient in technological and organizational expertise. In some of these respects, the Senate has lagged behind the House, presumably because of its smaller membership; but in overloading its members with subcommittee assignments, it has responded to the need for 100 senators to perform legislative functions similar to tasks that 435 House members do. The different weighting of constituency elements in Senate and House is also reflected in different dominant demographic features of committee chairmen's districts in the two bodies.

Goodwin's final chapter on "Reform of the Committee System" reflects a satisfaction with small incremental changes, apparently shared by most researchers who have lived closely with Congress. No doubt, the virtues of the system and of congressmen are more evident at close view; but a comparative perspective—including state legislatures and foreign parliaments—might reveal a wider range of possibilities and the conditions for them.

Representatives and Roll Calls: A Computer Simulation of Voting in the Eighty-eighth Congress. By Cleo H. Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969. Pp. xvii+178. \$7.50.

Susan Schwarz

Dartmouth College

Given the number of studies which have been done attempting to explain the variables affecting voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, it is tempting to think of constructing a model of voting incorporating the results of these studies. This book is an attempt to do this via a computer simulation (for the Eighty-eighth House, 1963-64). The authors incorporate variables such as party affiliation and loyalty, demographic characteristics of districts, competitiveness of districts, regional affiliation of representatives, and previous votes of the representatives into a model which allows each representative to be given a score on each roll call on the basis of how his characteristics match those coded for a roll call. Those representatives with scores that are not strongly positive or negative enter a second part of the model, which gives them probabilities of being influenced by other members. Higher influence probabilities are given to certain other members, such as party leaders, members of the same state delegation, members of the same party, and members of the committee which reported the bill out.

This simulation is used to predict votes on two groups of roll calls, a group involving the federal role question and a group on foreign affairs. The importance of several variables included in the model is tested by running the simulation with certain changes and comparing the results with the original run and the actual votes.

The most interesting parts of the book are these comparisons. Unfortunately, they do not always go far enough, because they accomplish their changes by recoding the roll calls and not by restructuring the simulation model. For example, they create a "just party" model and a "without party" model to test the importance of party in the model. The results are misleading in that they do not really test the importance of party by changing the way the bill is coded because party affiliation is built into the model in many places. If a bill were to be coded as favorable to certain groups that are usually associated with one party and communication among members is determined by party membership, then omitting party sponsorship when coding the bill will probably not affect the simulation result very much. A better, but much more difficult, test of the importance of party in the model would involve rewriting the simulation program to eliminate all party references.

Since these comparisons are tests of the way the roll calls are coded, it is reasonable to ask whether valuable information on roll calls may be obtained this way. The information would be valuable if revised coding made a difference in the simulated outcome (which it does not, in some cases) and if the suppositions and emphases in the simulation program are correct. The previous research on which the model is based is, of

course, not as conclusive in its findings as the model suggests. The research also comes from a number of different time periods, and some variables, such as the importance of presidential influence and the influence of party loyalty and party leadership, may be subject to change over time, depending on particular political circumstances. The validity of the authors' model would have been more convincing if they had tried various forms of the simulations to reflect these uncertainties, or if they had run their simulation for some other sessions of the House. Without such tests, it is impossible to distinguish between errors in the model and mis-coding of the roll calls. The authors see the roll call coding as part of the model; however, trying to decide how congressmen interpret a roll call and trying to decide how they arrive at their voting decisions given certain information are distinct problems. Since the authors chose to experiment with the former and not the latter, they are not really testing propositions about the House.

The value of this book for sociologists may lie more in its attempt to formalize the decision-making process in an organization than in its attempt to contribute to studies of legislative voting behavior. The authors provide a clear summary of the literature they use in constructing the model and a clear statement of the actual simulation process. Although the details of the model are open to question and the testing of the model is incomplete, the process should generate valuable research.

Families against the City: Middle-Class Homes of Industrial Chicago, 1872-1890. By Richard Sennett. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. x+258. \$8.50.

Perry Duis

Washington University

In *Families against the City*, Professor Richard Sennett presents a fascinating historical examination of families in an urban environment. Reduced to simplest terms, the book argues that in Union Park, a declining West Side Chicago neighborhood, two types of family structure developed in the three decades following 1860. One was "intensive," small, close-knit and was characterized by prolonged childhoods; the other, or "extended," type displayed opposite characteristics. According to the authors, the latter variety was more upwardly mobile and better suited to urban-industrial competition.

The idea is interesting, but unfortunately the book falls flat on its face. To begin with, "Union Park" never existed as a cohesive community, but was merely a census enumerator's district, a lifeless statistical abstraction. Nor did this nebulous area bear much resemblance at any time to Sennett's description. The western fringe, for instance, remained fashionable throughout the period. Chamberlin's classic *Chicago and Its Suburbs* (1874) described Ashland Avenue as "foremost among the fancy residence thoroughfares" of the West Side (p. 255), while Morris's *Dic-*

tionary of Chicago and several other World's Fair guidebooks made similar comments nearly two decades later. Pictorial evidence in Mayer, Wade, and Holt's *Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis*, prices in newspaper real estate advertisements, and addresses in directories of the social elite attest to the continuing attractiveness of the area in later decades.

Other sections were run-down, even in the halcyon days of the 1860s. Harrison's *Stormy Years* describes frame shacks in the area, while the railroads nearby to the north and the presence of commercial establishments, including saloons, gave the eastern and southern parts of the district a diverse character, even before the fire. By 1880, sections had declined even further. Stores of all kinds and even home-workshop industries had penetrated all of the east-west streets to within a few blocks of the park. And weekly reports of the Health Department tenement-house inspectors indicate that by 1880 many buildings, especially the rooming houses in the southern tiers of blocks, were unsanitary slums.

This diversity within the Union Park "community" casts suspicion on many of the book's generalizations. Perhaps the elegant homes near the park were really part of a larger section of building types or family types that existed outside the confines of the enumerator's district. The same, in fact, did hold true for the slum sections. In other words, the reader might feel more comfortable with the results had the author isolated areas of homogeneous family types first and then contrasted their characteristics, instead of basing such broad generalizations on such a heterogeneous patch of the city. And because they were arranged in a logical, house-to-house fashion, the undigested census schedules would have been no barrier to a different form of organization.

Other questions about the family remain unanswered or clouded by inconsistencies. For instance, which form was actually typical in the area? Sennett's own statistics indicate that 51.1 percent of the family groups were either single-member or childless; another 19.7 percent had more than four kin members. Thus, only about 30 percent could be of the type that constitutes the major discussion of the book. This seems rather small to justify the sweeping statements it generates.

The book also fails to recognize the importance of geographical mobility. The fact that some young people left not only home but also the area might explain the character of those who remained behind and were counted by the census taker. Upwardly mobile youth moved away by choice to seek their fortunes; the children of the poor left out of necessity. Likewise, a quick departure to escape embarrassment might account for the curiously small number of divorcées in what was supposed to be a caldron of marital tension.

The handling of occupational factors is also open to criticism. The structuring of the trades is arbitrary and inaccurate: artists hardly ranked above skilled artisans, while, as the *Chicago Tribune* of December 31, 1881, put it, the average clerical worker made "less than the common street laborer." Also unmentioned is the fact that few native-born Chicagoans entered the skilled trades, not for social reasons, but because the

vast stream of immigrating craftsmen made the training of apprentices an inefficient source of manpower.

Sennett's attempt to demonstrate historical change with only half an example leads to another set of problems. Instead of using the 1870 schedules (which are more complete than he admits) or the school board censuses, he attempts to substitute snippets of literary sources for the era before 1870 and as substantiating evidence for the later periods. The result is a series of breathtaking errors. For instance, Carter Harrison (who, incidentally, never lived within the boundaries of the district) had a sickly mother and spent enough of his childhood in Germany to describe himself as "German to the core." Both facts might have influenced the future mayor's view of relative parental dominance. Another crucial source is two sentences from an antifeminist humor book, Frank Wilkie's *Walks about Chicago*, which is used to "prove" husbandly docility in the 1880s. Unfortunately, the book was compiled in 1869 from earlier writings and merely reprinted in 1883. Its use is counterproductive to the argument that men lost their standing in the family in later years as compared with the Civil War era. Likewise, uncritical acceptance of a novel like *Sister Carrie* as a historical example is questionable, as is the gross misuse of Frank Lloyd Wright's *Autobiography* (Wright lived in Oak Park, not Union Park, and his marriage was hardly a short-lived quest for security; it lasted eighteen years).

Criticism of such factual errors is more than mere nit-picking. Questionable methodology only amplifies their importance. The author inflates the experiences of a handful of people, such as Harrison or H. C. Chatfield-Taylor, into broad generalizations about family structures and experiences. Later, these are compared with the tract-wide data and recast downward as "typical" individual groups in the comparative periods. By doing this, the author commits a "double ecological fault" and leads himself to unfounded statements and imaginary conversations.

While the research depends so heavily on a few sources, it ignores others, and this leads to yet another unfounded generalization, the decline of primary-group contacts. Not a word, for instance, was said about politics on the ward or precinct level. These organizations, chronicled in detail in the daily press, served an important social function, even in non-machine areas. Nor was any attempt made to trace the movement of church congregations, usually an important indicator of population changes. Furthermore, the newspapers printed weekly lists of marriage license applicants, complete with addresses and ages; examination of these would have revealed much about the perimeters of youthful social contact. Likewise, Sennett ignores social clubs, business, church, and reform organizations, and saloons, over eighty of which could be found in the district in 1880. Nor is there any attempt to relate family changes to the improvements in city transportation and communication to the widening or narrowing scope of human contact.

In conclusion, this book is disturbing. The general idea of family types

is fascinating and the rhetoric at times persuasive. The theory might even be true. But because of the incomplete and, at times, inaccurate research and the errors that range from large to small (the spelling of Halsted Street, for instance), the reader can never tell for sure.

You Owe Yourself a Drink: An Ethnography of Urban Nomads. By James P. Spradley. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970. Pp. viii+301. \$3.95 (paper).

Stations of the Lost: The Treatment of Skid Row Alcoholics. By Jacqueline P. Wiseman. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. Pp. xvii+346.

Leonard Blumberg and Thomas E. Shipley, Jr.

Temple University

There is now a substantive literature on people described as "skid row men," "homeless men," "the chronic police case inebriate," and "tramps." Most studies were assisted by the Urban Renewal Administration or the National Institute of Mental Health. We have heard from Rochester (Pittman and Gordon 1958), Minneapolis (Caplow, Lovald, and Wallace 1958; Lovald 1960; Wallace 1965), Philadelphia (Blumberg et al. 1960; Blumberg, Shandler, and Shipley 1966), Chicago (Bogue 1963), Saint Louis (Pittman et al. 1967; Weber 1967), New York (Bahr 1968), and now San Francisco (Wiseman) and Seattle (Spradley). Dunham's essay (1954) was also done under the impetus of urban redevelopment and should be mentioned.

One issue in the literature is methodological. "Objective" studies (Pittman and Gordon 1958; Caplow et al. 1958; Blumberg et al. 1960, 1966; Bahr 1968; Bogue 1963) largely base their reported work on interview procedures which seek demographic, life history, medico-alcohol-dependency characteristics, and attitudinal materials. "Subjective" studies (Lovald 1960; Wallace 1965), on the other hand, rely heavily on participant observation materials. Wallace argues that the more formal and "objective" method lacks validity because of the status-alienation-hostility gap between skid row informants and investigators.

A second issue in the literature is the presumed attitude adopted by the reporters toward the population studied. "Objective" studies tend to treat the skid row population as a "problem population"; albeit they are sympathetic to their plight, the approach is from the dominant values of our society—sobriety, responsibility, health, stability, and cleanliness, and an optimistic view that man really can influence his future. The "subjective" studies, on the other hand, take the position that there is a skid row subculture and express a sympathetic, understanding, pluralistic approach of the men. Wiseman seeks to reconcile the issues through the argument that professional, legal, and rehabilitation agencies have one

frame of reference while skid row men have another, and that both are "true." However, Wiseman seems to adopt the position that skid row men have been "had" because of the values and technologies of the dominant culture. Spradley handles the matter differently. He uses an ethnographic-linguistic technique and argues that there is a skid row subculture in Seattle but that it is possible for an "outsider" to know and understand it. Neither Wiseman nor Spradley are greatly troubled by the problem of sampling, settling on a lesser population of knowledgeable informants.

A third issue is "how they got that way," a problem that is closely related to the way in which the referent population is conceptualized. Bogue categorizes his respondents into subtypes, each with its own causal syndrome, and concludes that skid row is a residual area for people with problems generated elsewhere in the society and for which our contemporary civilization has accepted minimal responsibility. Dunham argues in terms of the conjunction between an area of specialized services for unattached and highly mobile workingmen into which "undersocialized homeless men" drift and rapidly become assimilated to the life style that prevails there. Wallace argues in terms of ever-increasing isolation from the larger community, increasing deviance from its norms, and, in reverse, recruitment of persons in isolating occupations, welfare clients, and middle-class deviants seeking sanctuary in skid row where they can freely live an alcohol-created life. Finally, Bahr concludes that neither homelessness nor alcohol is the central element but, rather a lack of social affiliation and that this lack of affiliation is long standing, not something that develops by a process of drift away from a central position of similarity to the general population. Wiseman extends the Wallace notion of drift, using exchange theory (see Blau 1964) to argue that the alcoholic who comes to skid row has progressively lost his social margin, that is, lost the tolerance of others for his normatively deviant behavior and the unwillingness of others to undertake complex duties and obligations because the alcoholic's for reciprocity is far below his expectations and the demands of others. Skid row is a region of minimal demand in which small amounts of social credit can be established and used without respect to whatever deficiencies exist in the larger community. Spradley rejects the notion of drift and concludes that the police, the courts, and the jail strip a man of his identity and then teach him the identity, style of life, and survival skills of a tramp. (By inference, this can be extended to other social agencies that have dealings with tramps.) The issues of "undersocialization" "disaffiliation at an early age," and social margin are irrelevant for Spradley because the process is generally applicable to all persons as they are jailed; the more often the experience, the more a person learns his new identity while his other identities become less tenable. The issue here is the probability of a cumulative series of arrests, and Spradley tends to argue that up to some undefined limit, the greater the number of arrests in the past, the more likely he is to be arrested and jailed again; the police are less benign protectors (which is one of the functions indi-

cated by Lovald) than persecutors whose activities pervert the meaning of justice.

A fourth issue is what to do about skid row and the skid row man. Pittman, Gordon, Weber, and their associates focus on a comprehensive treatment program for "alcoholics" as an alternative to the "revolving door" of the jail. Bogue advocates the development of a set of services and facilities targeted at the specific subtypes that he identifies: elderly or disabled men, resident workingmen, migratory workers, "bums," criminals and workers in illegal enterprises, and chronic alcoholics. His proposals for the treatment of skid row alcoholics are comprehensive and dissociated from law-enforcement activities. Blumberg and his associates, at least in the works listed above, advocate a diagnostic and referral quasi-treatment facility that is oriented toward utilization of existing community services and physical relocation off skid row, with appropriate continuing support from social-service agencies to reinforce the move; they also advocate the prevention of certain skid row institutions. Both Lovald and Wallace reject "rehabilitation" as an imposition of values by a dominant element of our society upon a peculiarly helpless minority. Bahr's position is that, if the core of the rehabilitative problem is disaffiliation and reaffiliation, then success with existing skid row populations is likely to be low because disaffiliation has taken place so early in life; more to the point would seem to be identification and therapeutic intervention of the disaffiliated at a much earlier stage in life, before they drift into skid row. Wiseman argues that the skid row man has lost not only his social margin but also his ability to manage the social graces that facilitate the development of "normal" social relationships, in exchange for a "bad biography" as well as a "bad address." Clearly, reentry into the larger community involves the slow accumulation of social margin, learning social graces, slow development of a good biography, and the location of a good address. This is not easily done, especially since some of the hostility between agency and man is attributable, says Wiseman, to the fact that agency personnel ignore the symbiotic relationship between them, and the men perceive that the agency personnel profit immeasurably from the relationship. Thus, the divergent frames of reference stand as an obstacle to most agency efforts to assist the man in reestablishing himself in the larger community. Spradley, finally, not only argues that the civic agencies are ineffective in their efforts to "rehabilitate," but he calls for a halt to present procedures and the acceptance of a pluralistic approach. He briefly alludes to the possibility for treatment of advanced alcoholism as the terminal stages of a chronic illness, but he argues that our society is big enough to permit a few tramps to live their life style, being essentially harmless to others, albeit they may harm themselves.

Wiseman and Spradley, then, both make important contributions to the literature. We cannot refrain from advising the reader that the introductory chapter and the closing section on "strategies of survival" and the methodological appendix in Wiseman's book are theoretically and

substantively denser, and more interesting from a theoretical point of view, than the balance of the material. We also find the use of the pseudonym "Pacific City" a sham when it is readily apparent that Wiseman is writing about San Francisco; by the same token, it is difficult to conceal the fact that "Christian Missionaries" is the Salvation Army. Spradley's book makes no pretense at concealing his own value position, although the data are objectively derived and presented. The opening substantive chapter (chap. 2) is an extensive case history-diary which, while interesting in itself, is badly integrated into the balance of the material. Furthermore, the ethnographical procedures which he uses are poorly explained, although he makes some effort to cope with the problem in the footnotes. Finally, that Spradley sees the "urban nomads" as a subclass of a larger class of oppressed persons in our society who are not permitted to do their "thing" becomes evident in the closing pages of the book. The complexities of equal justice under law and pluralistic freedom to remain outside the melting pot are really problems in political and social philosophy that either should have been developed more fully or should not have been inserted into a work which in other respects is empirically extremely narrow.

Finally, we would be unfair to the authors of these two books if we did not emphasize their primary message: bums, alkys, mission stiff, etc., receive unbelievable treatment in the hands of constituted and informal authority. The muffled screams of the unwashed come through very clearly in these pages.

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Blue-Collar Life. By Arthur B. Shostak. New York: Random House, 1969. Pp. xvi+299. \$2.95 (paper).

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The author limits his inquiry to employed blue-collar Caucasian males in their forties. He commences with two chapters dealing, respectively, with the demographic characteristics of the blue-collar group and a brief historical survey covering four decades. These are followed by chapters on the three main skill-level blocs of blue-collar occupations, the subjective and objective factors in the tasks themselves, and the blue-collar worker as a member of a labor union. In the next four chapters the focus is shifted away from the work situation to discussions of blue-collar neighborhoods, families, sons, and daughters. The final group of chapters examines a number of facets of blue-collar life—leisure, politics, physical and mental health, religion, and retirement. In the concluding chapter the author examines the four questions which he set for himself in the preface: Is the life style of blue-collarites an unequivocal answer to the plight of the nation's poor? Is the working class as well off as others believe? Is the American manual worker truly disappearing as a separate and distinct social, psychological, and political entity? And is there anything that social planning and deliberate social change can contribute to the blue-collar pursuit of the "good life"? The first three he answers in the negative, and in response to the last question he puts forward a number of reforms for consideration.

The main defect of this book is that it lacks any clear-cut theoretical orientation, despite the fact that research into the working class and the American blue-collar worker has both provided a testing ground for general sociological theory and served to generate such theory. Another problem stems from Shostak's neat compartmentalization of subject matter under his chapter headings. He becomes the prisoner of his own orderly arrangement and neglects significant interrelationships. For example, the relationship between alienation, class-consciousness, and political ideology has been an important theme in American writing on the sociology of the blue-collar worker; yet it is ignored by Shostak. Similarly, there is little discussion of the work-leisure polarity, even though brief mention is made of the lack of centrality of work in the lives of blue-collar workers. Although the different skill blocs which make up the blue-collar group are examined in chapter 3, the influence of skill level on other behavioral patterns is largely ignored. Job satisfaction, which many would rate as an important topic in any discussion of blue-collar life, is treated in a cursory fashion. Herzberg's views are accepted quite uncritically, with no mention of recent investigations on multi- or unidimensionality of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

On the positive side, it must be said that Shostak has assembled a massive body of material and distilled it into a relatively small compass. His

prose is readable, and as a reference source the chapter notes are probably worth the price of the book. Some of the chapters, those on blue-collar sons and daughters, for example, are particularly well done. As a conspectus of the field as Shostak has chosen to define it, this volume will be especially useful for teaching purposes, provided that it is supplemented by some rigorous analysis.

Population, Migration and Urbanization in Africa. By William A. Hance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. xiv+450. \$15.00.

Remi Clignet

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After educational planning, family planning is on the verge of becoming the potpourri of scholars concerned with economic development. Potpourri indeed, since scholars are often tempted to recommend the adoption of universal measures without taking into account the specific traits of the context within which they intend to operate. The merit of the present book, which is concerned with the problems of population explosion in Africa, is to avoid many of the pitfalls characteristic of this kind of enterprise.

In order to examine population pressures, one must first assess the quality of the raw materials available, and this is the theme of the first chapter. This data quality control being achieved, it is indispensable to turn one's attention to the basic dimension of the problem at hand, and the author analyzes thereafter the extent and the determinants of variations in the density characteristic of the various territories and regions of contemporary Africa. Having sketched the baseline of the population pressures, the author turns his attention to a systematic evaluation of the dynamic forces affecting the relationship among demographic, economic, and social variables, and chapters 3, 4, and 5 are thus concerned with an investigation of the extent and the determinants of variations in the processes of migration and urbanization throughout Africa. As noted earlier, this strategy enables the author in a concluding chapter to explode current myths and stereotypes both as to the plight affecting Africa in this respect and as to the solution likely to alleviate the problem. He shows contrasts and similarities not only between Africa and other continents but also among various subparts of Africa.

Since I perceive the book as being a good one, I think it appropriate to examine its weaknesses first, so that the review ends up on an optimistic note. As usual in this kind of enterprise, the bibliography is uneven. The author refers, for example, quite frequently to the Ivory Coast, but he does not seem to be aware of the most recent and most adequate publications concerning that country. He does not know, for example, *Cote d'Ivoire 1965*, the study by Louis Roussel which summarizes and synthesizes the regional studies undertaken earlier. Although his bibliography

of French-speaking areas is richer and more complete than is usually the case, his selection of items in this regard seems still to be erratic. In addition, the author either does not like sociologists or he is not aware of the studies they have conducted on African cities. As far as social area analysis is concerned, the author ignores D. McElrath's "Social Differentiation and Societal Scale: Accra Ghana" in *The New Urbanization*, edited by S. Greet et al. (New York, 1968), or J. Abu-Lughod's "Testing the Theory of Increase in Scale: The Ecology of Cairo" in the *American Sociological Review* (April 1969). With regard to individual patterns of adjustment to an urban environment, he does not make any reference to J. Abu-Lughod's "Migrant Adjustment to City Life" in the *American Journal of Sociology* (July 1961) or to the most significant *Townsmen or Tribesmen* (Capetown, 1967) by P. Mayer. Third, the author seems to pass judgment too rapidly as far as attitudinal changes are concerned. There are certainly significant variations both in the direction and in the magnitude of the correlations between fertility rates on the one hand and various indicators of participation on the other (education, occupation, income, etc..) African peoples are not necessarily as uniformly inclined as the author thinks to adopt measures of family planning in urban structures. Finally, to end with a picayune point, the final index is bad insofar as it does not review the items presented in each chapter.

After the bad news, now the good news. As far as Africa is concerned, authors have to sail between two dangers. They may end up writing monographs which will fascinate the fans of the countries studied but leave indifferent the remaining part of the audience. Conversely, they may engage in comparisons which remain too often superficial and fruitless because they are not based on sufficiently hard data. The author avoids these two shortcomings. When he is able to get hard data, he draws fascinating comparisons both between Africa and other parts of the world and among various subparts of Africa itself. Since he is aware of the dangers presented by such comparisons (because of the poor quality of the data involved or the lack of information concerning a crucial variable), he supplements this method with an intensive approach to the problems at hand. In short, after a synthesizing essay on demographic measures, urbanization, and migration, he always shows how the characteristics of the phenomena discussed vary from region to region or nation to nation. In doing so, he is likely to satisfy both traditional and modern Africanists, for he is concerned with showing both the universality and the specificity of the African situation. Finally, although his book is elegantly written, it does not avoid significant theoretical and methodological issues, and with one exception, the author gives accurate references to what preoccupies geographers and, more generally, scholars of urbanization today.

These qualities, it seems to me, should enable the author to gain good standing not only on the American academic book market but elsewhere as well. It is not often that somebody is able to cross geographic and disciplinary boundaries with a minimal loss of information and intellectual seriousness.

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Black and White in the Consumer Financial System¹

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Compared with white families with similar incomes, black families use fewer savings and insurance services, but more kinds of credit, have a smaller total amount of financial resources, and tend to use the less-advantageous types of financial services. Partially responsible for this is their relative lack of knowledgeability about how to rationalize their participation in the consumer financial system. The end result of the inequities of participation documented by this study is to widen the gap of well-being between black and white households.

While some distributive systems decrease relative inequalities of well-being, others tend to operate to make the poor relatively poorer. From this broad perspective, the consumer financial system presently operates to increase inequalities between blacks and whites in our society.

The "consumer financial system" means the mass-marketed complex of financial services offered to individual households by financial institutions. Almost all American households use these services; the amount, growth, and security of the financial resources of households is largely a function of their ability to gain access to such services and use them wisely. The majority of U.S. households presently utilize savings accounts, checking accounts, life insurance, health insurance, property and liability insurance, installment loans, charge accounts, and credit cards. Many also have pensions or retirement plans, home mortgages, stocks or mutual funds, and bonds. These financial services are not new; many existed in some form before the beginning of the twentieth century. The emergence of a mass-based consumer financial system, however, is a phenomenon of the last decade or two, and its impact upon relative levels of well-being in the society has just begun to be recognized.

DIMENSIONS OF INVOLVEMENT

In this investigation, my interest is in differences in the extent and nature of involvement in the consumer savings-credit system beyond inequalities of use associated with inequalities of income. Such differences are important because affiliations with financial institutions serve to mediate

¹ This paper is based upon "Involvement in the Financial System: A Mechanism of Inequality," a Ph.D. dissertation completed at Columbia University in 1969. Terence Hopkins of Columbia and Martin Albaum of the Prudential Insurance Company were most generous with their advice and critiques of the study.

between the income received during a given period of time and monetary resources available for use during that period to support the household's standard of living and strivings for social and economic mobility. That is, the various financial services represent one kind of opportunity structure which households may have differential access to and differential success in manipulating.

Three dimensions of a household's involvement in the consumer financial system were distinguished: the *level* of participation in the financial system in terms of the number of different services used; the *amounts* of financial resources available to the household as a result of these various relationships with financial institutions; and the relative advantageousness of the terms of the specific *kinds* of financial services used. The term "financial position" refers to the sum total of these three aspects of a household's involvement in the financial system.

METHOD

This study is based upon secondary analysis of survey data. Each of the surveys listed below is a representative sample of U.S. households during the 1960s. All of the surveys were conducted with complex weighted samples. This technique makes it possible to include a large enough sample of special groups, such as blacks and upper-income households, to improve the reliability of data on their behavior, while holding the total sample size within financially feasible limits. However, because the "weighted numbers" of respondents used for calculations are inflated far above the actual number of respondents, the traditional tests of significance, such as χ^2 , are inapplicable. It would also be misleading to show the inflated weighted numbers of respondents in tables, and for this reason, they have been omitted. The surveys are: (1) the 1962 Survey of Consumer Finances, $N = 2,117$; (2) the 1967 Survey of Consumer Finances, $N = 3,171$; (3) the 1968 Survey of Consumer Finances, $N = 2,677$; (4) a 1966 survey by the Opinion Research Corporation for the Foundation for Commercial Banks, $N = 1,001$; and (5) a national survey sponsored by the Prudential Insurance Company, 1965, $N = 3,724$.

For each of the above surveys, a copy of the data was purchased for analysis, along with all available information on sampling, coding, and other procedures. The specific items or questions used to construct the indices and variables will be described below. Most of the results reported were replicated using data from a second sample for which similar indicators could be obtained.

LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION

Each form of asset, debt, insurance, or other financial service has its own special advantage or purpose as a means of financial management, and

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represents a relationship with financial institutions into which a household may enter. The pattern or level of involvement in the consumer financial system refers to the network of relationships to financial institutions which a household has at a given point in time, in terms of the number of different types of services used. Thus, indices of the level of involvement in the consumer financial system can be constructed by counting how many different types of services a household is using.

A national sample survey conducted by the Prudential Insurance Company in 1965 included questions on the use of twelve different financial services.² This survey included interviews with 615 blacks who were the male or female head of the household (a number large enough to facilitate multivariate analysis), as well as with 2,889 white or "other" households. Blacks with incomes over \$7,500 were sampled at a rate four times greater than would occur in a simple random sample, in order to facilitate comparisons between upper-income blacks and whites.

Overall, whites tend to use about twice as many types of financial services as blacks (see table 1). This association between race and level of participation is not attributable entirely to the higher income of whites. For all income groups except the very highest, whites use more financial services than blacks in the same income group. The data from this survey do not enable us to say with certainty whether there are differences between wealthy black and white families in the breadth of financial services they are likely to use, because there are only thirty-four affluent blacks in the sample, too few for a reliable estimate.

The test of inequality in the level of participation in the financial system by blacks and whites was replicated with data from the 1968 Survey of Consumer Finances. This survey included a number of different types of loans as well as assets. The results are shown in table 2. In

TABLE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF TYPES OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES BY RACE

Family Income (\$)	Blacks	Whites
Under 3,000	1.2	2.5
3,000-4,999	2.2	3.6
5,000-7,499	3.7	4.6
7,500-9,999	4.4	5.3
10,000-14,999	4.7	6.0
15,000 and over	6.2	6.2
All incomes	2.3	4.4

Source.—Prudential Public Attitude Study no. 5, 1965.

² Group health insurance, group life insurance, association life insurance, pension, individual life insurance, individual health insurance, savings bank account, savings and loan account, checking account, government bonds, common stock, mutual funds.

TABLE 2
MEAN NUMBER OF TYPES OF ASSETS AND DEBTS,
BY RACE AND FAMILY INCOME

INCOME (\$)	NINE ASSETS*		EIGHT KINDS OF CREDIT†	
	Black	White	Black	White
Under 5,000.....	0.9	1.8	0.7	0.6
5,000-7,499.....	1.8	2.4	2.0	1.5
7,500-9,999.....	2.1	3.0	2.0	1.9
10,000-14,999.....	2.6	3.4	2.4	2.1
15,000 and over.....	3.6	4.2	2.6	2.2
All incomes.....	1.4	2.8	1.3	1.5

SOURCE.—1968 Survey of Consumer Finances; $N = 2,410$ white households, 256 black households.

* Checking account, personal life insurance, bank savings account, savings and loan account, credit union savings, stock, mutual funds, bonds.

† Mortgage, installment loan for additions and repairs, auto loan, installment loan for durables, other installment loan, life insurance policy loan, bank credit card, other credit card.

every income group, whites have more types of assets than blacks. (It should be noted that, in this sample, there are only ten black families with incomes of \$15,000 and over. The reverse is true of the number of types of loans, however. It is not usually advantageous to have a large number of different types of loans for small amounts. As discussed below, the larger numbers of loans reported by blacks represent a smaller total amount borrowed (except in the upper-income groups) and tend to be higher-interest loans than those used by whites.

AMOUNT OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES

As a result of continual participation in the consumer financial system, at any given time, each household has a particular amount of financial resources which it is benefiting from or which are available to it. One can quantify specific types of resources and compare them with the amounts of resources available to or used by other households (\$2,000 in savings account, a \$20,000 mortgage, a \$500 "line of credit" on a charge card, or whatever). In assessing relative financial positions on such a service-by-service basis, it is clear that one can say that one group of households has "more," on the average, than another group of households. The total amount of financial resources available to or used by households consists of the sum of these individual amounts.

AMOUNT OF LIFE INSURANCE OWNED

An example of the type of results obtained when amounts of various specific types of financial resources of blacks and whites at various in-

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come levels were compared is shown in table 3. Within any income group, black families owning personal life insurance have smaller mean amounts of coverage than insurance-owning whites at the same income level; the differences shown are not due to the fact that income has not really been "held constant." When mean amounts of insurance owned were examined within twelve narrow income groups ranging from under \$1,000 to \$30,000 and over, the results consistently showed higher mean amounts owned by whites. Neither can the large and consistent differences shown in table 3 be attributed to sampling error; the survey was divided into ten subsamples, making it possible to obtain estimates of sampling errors of the means, using the "jackknife" technique.³ The probability that any of the differences found in table 3 could be attributed to sampling error is less than .01.

Having compared differences in the amount of one resource, let us look at overall differences in amounts of financial resources. The index of the total amount of financial resources constructed from data included in the 1968 Survey of Consumer Finances (2,677 interviews) indicates that the gap between blacks and whites is even larger in terms of financial position (see table 4). In every income group, the total amount of financial resources reported by whites is much larger than that reported by blacks. The differences are especially striking when amounts of assets are compared. Whites with income under \$5,000 have accumulated more financial assets, on the average, than blacks with two or three times as much income. Whites have somewhat larger amounts of outstanding loans except for the upper-income groups. (This indication of the possibility that the differences between upper-income blacks and whites may be negligible is similar to that noted for numbers of types of resources.

TABLE 3
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE INSUR-
ANCE OWNED BY INSURED HOUSEHOLDS,
BY INCOME AND RACE (1965)

Family Income (\$)	Blacks (\$)	Whites (\$)
Under 5,000.....	2,800	4,500
5,000-7,499.....	10,300	13,500
7,500-9,999.....	12,200	14,100
10,000 and over.....	14,500	27,000
Overall average.....	6,200	14,300

Source.—Prudential Public Attitude Study no. 5, 1965.

³ See Howard L. Jones, "The Jackknife Method," in *Proceedings . . . IBM Scientific Computing Symposium—Statistics* (n.d.), for an explanation of this method. It was used because of the small number of respondents included in many of the particular subsamples, when defined by racial category and income level.

TABLE 4

MEAN AMOUNTS OF ASSETS, DEBTS, AND TOTAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES,
BY RACE AND FAMILY INCOME (1967)

INCOME (\$)	ASSETS (\$)		DEBTS (\$)		TOTAL* FINANCIAL RESOURCES (\$)	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Under 5,000.....	178	3,055	509	908	697	3,961
5,000-7,499.....	569	6,393	2,643	2,928	3,321	9,415
7,500-9,999.....	1,168	3,472	3,804	4,613	5,221	8,156
10,000-14,999...	1,066	6,975	6,404	6,389	6,005	13,582
15,000 and over..	3,925	34,084	9,633	9,357	13,700	43,501
All incomes....	518	8,280	2,021	4,181	2,362	12,538

SOURCE.—1968 Survey of Consumer Finances.

* Includes nine types of assets (amounts in checking accounts bank savings account, savings and loan account, credit union account, certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and yearly premium payments on personal life insurance, since cash value of policies was not available) and six debts (outstanding amounts of first and second mortgage on home, remaining installment debts on additions and repairs, cars, durables, and all other installment loans; and amount borrowed on life insurance). Total assets plus debts do not add up exactly to total resources because the calculations are based on slightly different N's due to exclusion of "no answer" codes.

Possible reasons for the greater similarity in the upper-income groups will be discussed below.)

The overall distribution of financial resources resulting from inequality of resources within income groups indicates extreme differences between whites and blacks. Whereas blacks constituted 10 percent of the total 1968 sample of households, they had only 2 percent of the financial resources. When the analysis was repeated using data from the 1962 Survey of Consumer Finances, the results were identical. This would indicate that blacks have made no relative gains at all in the advantages derived from participation in the consumer financial system within those years.

Large differences also persisted when age, broad life-cycle categories, and income were controlled. That is, even when the ages, family situations and incomes of blacks and whites are similar, the black households still have smaller amounts of financial resources than their white counterparts.⁴

⁴ An example of the calculations upon which these conclusions were based follows. For the 1968 Survey of Consumer Finances, the average difference in total resources between blacks and whites in the various income groups weighted by the proportion of respondents in each income group was \$7,620. Age of head of household was then introduced as a simultaneous control factor, using these age groups: under 30, 30-44, 45-64, and 65 and over. The average difference in total resources between blacks and whites in the various age-income groups was \$7,450, weighted for the proportion of respondents in each age-income group. A reduction of the differences from \$7,620 to \$7,450 was not considered to support the hypothesis that age differences between blacks and whites in various income groups significantly help to explain the overall differences found.

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RELATIVE ADVANTAGEOUSNESS OF THE KINDS OF SERVICES USED

A wide range of interest rates and other terms of financial services make utilization of particular kinds of services and institutions more advantageous than alternative kinds. "Less advantageous" might be defined simply as "paying more" for the same amount of benefit and/or "getting less" for the same amount of outlay by the household. The specific details vary; let us catalog the more and less advantageous types of services to obtain a fuller idea of the varieties.

Among savings accounts, the highest rate of interest is paid on "savings certificates of deposit," issued only for fairly large round sums of money. Rates of interest paid by various kinds of savings institutions differ by locality, of course, but the next highest rate is generally available from savings and loan associations, savings banks, or credit unions; the interest rates paid by commercial banks are somewhat lower. Then there are kinds of "savings accounts" which pay very low interest or none at all. These are the "Christmas clubs" and "vacation clubs." The saver puts a regular weekly sum into the account, and at the end of the year, gets it back again. Over a period of years, differences in compound interest rates can make a great deal of difference in the amount of savings available to a household in relation to the amount which was saved. At 4 percent compounded yearly, for instance, it takes over eighteen years for money to double; at 5 percent just over fourteen years; at 6 percent it doubles every 11.5 years.

There are similar differences among other varieties of financial services. There are "special" checking accounts and regular checking accounts; relatively low-interest mortgage loans and life insurance policy loans compared with the rates charged for installment loans on durables; regular U.S. savings bonds sold in small face amounts compared with other kinds of government bonds which have higher interest rates and may be tax-free; regular life insurance versus higher-cost debit life insurance, etc.

It is hypothesized that those financial services used by blacks tend to be the less-advantageous kinds—savings forms returning poorer interest and capital gains and lower yields on the average than the forms owned by whites; loans costing higher rates of interest, and insurance costing more per dollar of protection. Evidence is fairly sparse to test this hypothesis, because of the small number of black users of specific types of services included in most of the available surveys, but it is available for types of savings accounts and life insurance. Table 5 indicates that, among households having one or more savings accounts, blacks are more likely than whites to have their savings deposited entirely in commercial banks, rather than having an account with the savings institutions which tend to pay higher rates of interest.

TABLE 5
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS HAVING A SAVINGS
AND LOAN OR CREDIT UNION ACCOUNT,
AMONG HOUSEHOLDS HAVING ANY SAVINGS
ACCOUNT, BY RACE

Spending Unit Income (\$)	Black (%)	White (%)
Under 4,000.....	17	24
4,000-7,499.....	20	43
7,500-9,999.....	24	56
10,000 and over.....	*	49
All incomes.....	21	43

SOURCE.—1962 Survey of Consumer Finances; $N=2,117$.

* Sample size too small for reliable results.

More complete data are available for life insurance, and here the differences in relative advantageousness of the kinds of services used show more sharply. Calculations based on data from the 1965 Prudential survey described above show that the black household has an average of \$36.00 of personal life insurance for every dollar spent, while the white household has an average of \$64.00 for the same yearly premium expenditure. Why should this be? One reason is that in the past, many companies would sell only industrial or rated policies to blacks, types of insurance which are more expensive for a given amount of coverage. By 1970, this practice has been largely eliminated, but many blacks still own such policies.

Today, blacks are more likely to have debit insurance than whites. Premiums for debit insurance are collected by the agent in person on a weekly or monthly basis. Although the premium for debit insurance may be the same as for an ordinary policy of the same type and amount, it was not until recently that term riders were widely available for debit policies. Thus the white family is likely on the whole to have more personal insurance coverage per premium dollar than the black family, because it is more likely to own regular ordinary and term insurance and less likely to own industrial or debit insurance or rated policies. This explanation is supported by the data in table 6, which show that when the preferred collection method is controlled, the overall \$28.00 difference between blacks and whites is reduced to \$20.10 among those preferring debit insurance, and \$21.40 among those preferring the mail-pay method of regular life insurance.

When income (strongly associated with the likelihood of having a "rated" occupation for which extra premium charges are made) was controlled in addition, the differences between blacks and whites were reduced still further

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TABLE 6

MEAN AMOUNT OF PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE COVERAGE OBTAINED
PER DOLLAR OF ANNUAL PREMIUM PAYMENTS, BY RACE
AND PREFERRED METHOD OF PAYMENT

Preferred Collection Method	Blacks (\$)	Whites (\$)	Total (\$)	Difference*
In person (debit)	30.30	50.40	47.30	20.10
By mail (ordinary)	50.40	71.80	70.90	21.40
Total	36.00	64.00	61.60	28.00

SOURCE.—1965 Prudential survey; includes only households owning personal insurance and reporting premium payments.

* Difference when standardized by white income distribution: personal collection, \$19.40; mail payment, \$12.10.

SUPPORTING PROCESSES

This brings us to the question of how the inequalities which have been documented came about and are maintained. Undoubtedly, the various financial institutions have engaged in discriminatory practices (perhaps inadvertently rather than purposely) which have the effect of limiting the access of blacks to financial services and of encouraging them to use the less-advantageous forms. Various pieces of information suggest that banks and other financial institutions simply do not tend to build a proportionate number of their branches in ghetto areas, whereas small loan companies charging high interest rates are in low-income and ghetto areas. Similarly, most advertising about the advantageous types of services is done in magazines and newspapers noted for a large readership among the white middle and upper classes. However, there are also patterned differences between blacks and whites on the demand side. Blacks are less knowledgeable than whites with comparable income levels about the nature of the consumer financial system and how to manipulate it to their benefit. For instance, we have seen that blacks are more likely than whites to be paying more for their life insurance, partially because they are more likely to own debit insurance. An effort by life insurance companies to force debit insurance on blacks in order to increase their profits can hardly be inferred from this. As shown in table 7, blacks on any income level are more likely than whites to *prefer* personal collection of premiums (debit insurance).

A general index of knowledgeability about the consumer financial system was constructed from data included in a 1966 national survey by the Opinion Research Corporation ($N = 1,001$). Eleven questions were selected for the index which probed the respondent's knowledge of the functions and characteristics of a wide variety of financial services and institutions including mutual funds, municipal bonds, commercial bank savings accounts, and life insurance. The questions consisted of state-

TABLE 7
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS PREFERRING PERSONAL COLLECTION OF LIFE INSURANCE PREMIUMS TO MAIL PAYMENT, BY RACE AND INCOME

Income (\$)	Blacks (%)	Whites (%)
Under 5,000.....	73	46
5,000-7,499.....	61	39
7,500-9,999.....	46	32
10,000 and over.....	41	19
All incomes.....	67	37

SOURCE.—1965 Prudential National Survey.

ments with which the respondent could agree or disagree, or say that they did not know if the statement was correct. "Cheaters" could give answers which made them look more knowledgeable than they actually were by guessing, but this was discouraged by instructing the respondents that "if you don't know the correct answer, it is better to mark 'don't know' than to guess." The overall "knowledgeability score" was constructed for each respondent simply by assigning one point for each correct answer. Table 8 shows that most Americans are fairly ignorant about our financial institutions, according to this measure; the mean and the median scores both were about 3. However, blacks have an even lower level of knowledgeability about the consumer financial system than whites. There were no affluent blacks included in this sample, so we do not know if differences in financial knowledge exist in the upper-income class.

It cannot be overemphasized that these findings relate to present levels of knowledge about various kinds of financial services and institutions, not to "intelligence." Access to knowledge of this type is cur-

TABLE 8
MEAN KNOWLEDGEABILITY SCORE
BY RACE AND INCOME

Income (\$)	White	Black	All
Under 2,000.....	1.8	1.6	1.7
2,000-3,999.....	2.7	2.3	2.5
4,000-5,999.....	3.4	3.2	3.4
6,000-7,999.....	3.8	3.1	3.7
8,000 and over.....	4.7	2.9	4.6
All incomes.....	3.6	2.6	3.1

SOURCE.—1966 Survey by Opinion Research Corporation; *N* = 1,001, maximum score is 11.

rently left almost entirely to the private sphere—discussions with family or friends, reading advertisements or literature prepared by financial institutions, and “sales talks” by insurance salesmen or stock brokers. Evidently blacks are not being exposed to as much information about the consumer financial system as whites through such informal or profit-oriented sources. The only level of formal education where such information is likely to be acquired is the college economics or business course, and blacks are much less likely than whites to have gone to college and have such courses. This aspect of the inequalities discovered is amenable to direct action. Consumer education in the use of financial services could be introduced at the junior high-school level and through community programs. This would make it equally available to all, regardless of income, race, or social class.

To the extent that the differences between affluent blacks and whites may be somewhat blurred, one may refer to the same set of supply and demand forces for explanation. Affluent blacks are likely to have as much formal education, if not more, than their white counterparts, and to live a style of life more similar to affluent whites than to lower income blacks. Many live in integrated or predominantly white neighborhoods, with convenient branch offices of banks, brokers, and insurance companies. They are also likely to be exposed to the same types of advertising media as their white neighbors.

IMPLICATIONS

As Lee Rainwater (1969) points out in an issue of *Trans-Action* devoted to the American underclass, “Social scientists have failed to recognize that one of the crucial problems for understanding modern industrial society is to know what resources are necessary in order for a person to behave in ways that will allow him to become a full member of that society. What has become clear in the past decade is that the *relative* deprivation of the underclass goes to the heart of their marginality and alienation.”

Without the financial services which increase and protect accumulated resources and make it possible to balance income with needs over the family life cycle, a household is not a full and equal member of the mass consumption society, nor is it obtaining equal benefits from the income it receives. The blacks in the ghetto who cannot obtain fire and casualty insurance at reasonable rates know this, and the welfare mothers who have marched for the right to have charge accounts know this. We have seen extensive evidence which consistently shows that blacks suffer relative deprivation in the accumulation and use of financial resources. Inequality of financial resources has a kind of “multiplier effect” upon

Race, Maternal Authority, and Adolescent Aspiration¹

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The present paper tests the prevalent hypotheses that the matriarchal character of black families is associated principally with father absence from the home and that a matriarchal family structure has detrimental educational consequences for black males. Within the limitations imposed by the samples, the results lead to the tentative rejection of these hypotheses. Among blacks, the authority of mothers tends to be stronger in intact than in broken families. Furthermore, maternal authority in the household and identification with a female role model do not appear to have the negative consequences on educational aspirations and school performance for black adolescent boys which have been attributed to them. Black mothers and their children have the same or higher educational aspirations than white regardless of the fact that the black adolescents tend to identify more closely with their mothers. The lower educational attainment of blacks must be sought in other factors within and outside the family which make it difficult for black adolescents to translate educational aspirations into educational achievement.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written in recent years about the disorganization of black families, the matriarchal structure of these families as compared to white, and the negative educational consequences of these family patterns on black adolescents, more specifically, boys. According to these interpretations, the relinquishing of responsibility by fathers and the increased prominence of mothers are assumed to contribute to the poor academic achievement and low interest in educational matters of black boys and to the redirecting of the mothers' educational ambitions to their daughters (Moynihan 1965; Bronfenbrenner 1967).

The arguments linking low educational achievement of black males to matriarchy have involved two major assumptions: (1) in mother-headed

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families, absence of father from the household deprives black boys of a male role model and leads to their lower educational aspirations and achievement (Bronfenbrenner 1967); (2) in the matriarchal black family girls receive much greater encouragement from their mothers to continue their education (Moynihan 1965). Young (1964, p. 25) writes, "Historically, in the matriarchal Negro society, mothers made sure that if one of their children had a chance for higher education, the daughter was the one to pursue it."

These causal links between family structure and educational interests are derived from indirect evidence. Results from psychological studies of the personalities of white boys reared in father-absent homes are used to suggest that the high rate of mother-headed families among blacks has unfavorable educational consequences for black boys (see, e.g., Pettigrew 1964; Bronfenbrenner 1967). And, indeed, several large-scale studies based on national samples or on the census have found that both white and black males reared in broken families complete fewer years of schooling than those in intact families (Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan 1967; Folger and Nam 1967). The educational discrimination of black mothers in favor of daughters is inferred from educational statistics indicating higher levels of completed education for black women than for black men (see, e.g., Moynihan 1965).

Neither assertion—that black families are more matriarchal than white families or that a matriarchal family structure has detrimental educational consequences—has been subjected to adequate empirical investigation. Furthermore, the concept of matriarchy as applied to black families is ambiguous and ill-defined. The term has been used alternately to refer to (1) a family structure in which the man is absent and the family unit is headed by a woman, or (2) a type of family interaction characterized by maternal dominance over other family members, whether the family is intact or broken. With rare exceptions (L. Rosen 1969), the referent for the concept is unspecified, and often interactional characteristics are inferred from structural indicators.

Adequate testing of the hypotheses linking family structure and educational achievement requires that educational aspirations of black mothers and educational interests and achievement of black children be considered as a function of the interaction patterns of their families. The present paper is an attempt to begin to provide empirical data on this question. The following two issues are examined:

1. The nature of family interaction among comparable black and white families in intact and in mother-headed families.

2. The educational consequences, particularly educational aspirations, of these family patterns for adolescents and their parents. (Since the sample is limited to high school students, the data are relevant to educa-

tional aspirations rather than post-high school educational attainment.)

The data are taken from a larger study of adolescents (Kandel et al. 1968; Kandel and Lesser 1969*a*, 1969*b*). While the original study was not designed specifically to study black family patterns, it provides an opportunity to do so, since one of the schools sampled included black as well as white students, and data were collected about family interactions as well as on the educational interests of mothers and adolescents.

METHOD

Sample

The sample includes (*a*) adolescents from a large ($N = 1,683$) working-class urban comprehensive high school, with a 20 percent black student body, located in the middle eastern United States and (*b*) their mothers. Structured questionnaires were administered in the spring of 1965 to all students present in the school the day the study was conducted. In addition, self-administered, structured questionnaires were mailed to the students' mothers. Sixty-eight percent of the mothers returned their questionnaires.

In the extent of disorganization of family structure, this sample of black families is typical of urban black families in the United States. The proportion of black broken families (35 percent) is very close to that reported by the 1960 census (35.1 percent) for black children under eighteen residing in urban areas (Moynihan 1965; see also, Rodman 1969; L. Rosen 1969). The most striking differences between the black and white samples pertain to the structural characteristics of these families (table 1). The black sample contains a smaller proportion of intact families (65 percent), with both mothers and fathers residing in the household, than the white sample (82 percent). Of the white families, 13 percent are broken and are headed by the mother as compared to 29 percent of the black families. In both racial groups, 2 percent of the families are broken and are headed by the father. A very small percentage of adolescents of either race (3 percent, white; 4 percent, black) report neither parent living at home.

While separation was responsible for the majority of black mother-headed families (71 percent), death of the father accounted for 42 percent of the white broken families.

Black parents are more likely to have been born outside the state (in all likelihood in the South) and to have lived in the state for a somewhat shorter length of time (table 1). A higher proportion of blacks are Protestant.

These samples of black and white families differ least on socioeconomic characteristics. Most of the fathers are engaged in blue-collar occupa-

TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BLACK
AND WHITE FAMILIES SAMPLED

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS	WHITE		BLACK	
	%	N	%	N
Intact families.....	82	1,125	65	269*
Mother works.....	46	1,163	55	262*
Mother high school graduate.....	25	1,065	34	242
Father high school graduate.....	20	999	26	204
Father's occupation:				
Professional.....	4	1,120	4	240
Managers, officials.....	9	1,120	7	240
White collar.....	7	1,120	6	240
Skilled.....	42	1,120	32	240
Unskilled.....	38	1,120	51	240
Family income \$5,000 or less.....	22	441	33	73
Mother born in state.....	65	899	48	176*
Father born in state.....	59	870	44	162*
In community 10 or more years.....	69	912	52	178
Protestant religion.....	60	885	81	166*

* Differences between black and white significant beyond .05 (χ^2 test). The N's vary because of different nonreply rates to different questions.

tions and represent a lower-class background. However, a greater proportion of black fathers are engaged in unskilled as opposed to skilled or semi-skilled occupations.² The white families command higher incomes. Black mothers are more likely to have achieved a higher educational level and are also more likely to be working (table 1).

The limitations of the sample must be stressed. Since the sample was not initially selected for the specific purpose of making a comparative study of family relations among blacks and whites, certain subgroups, for example, middle-class blacks, have very few cases. Analyses which involve introducing more than two variables reduce the number of cases, especially among broken families, to very low levels. Thus, the small size of the subsamples of broken families and the proportion of middle-class families precluded the examination of family patterns in broken families with both sex of child and social class held constant at the same time.

Measures of Family Patterns

Adolescents were asked about patterns of interaction with each of their parents, covering the following dimensions of family behavior: parental

² A higher proportion of black mothers and students than white did not answer the question about father's occupation. For example, the proportion of no-answers among black mothers is 33 percent as compared to 13 percent among whites. Whether these are families in which the father is actually unemployed is unknown.

Maternal Authority and Adolescent Aspiration

authority, communication between parent and child, parental support, affective quality of the relationship, and identification.

Patterns of decision making between parent and adolescent were used as indices of type of parental authority and were measured by two five-response category items, one for the mother and one for the father.³ The exact text of each question is:

How are most decisions made between you and your mother? (Check one)

1. My mother just tells me what to do
2. She listens to me, but she makes the final decisions herself
3. We make the decision jointly
4. I listen to her, but I make the final decision
5. I just decide what I will do myself

In the second question, father is substituted for mother. Three types of parental power have been defined:

Authoritarian: The parent regulates completely the adolescent's behavior and makes all final decisions (Alternatives 1 and 2)

Democratic: The final decision is made jointly by the child and his parent (Alternative 3)

Permissive: The adolescent has more influence in the final decision than his parents (Alternatives 4 and 5)

The other questions were of the type illustrated below:

How close is your relationship with your mother/father?

1. Extremely close
2. Quite close
3. Moderately close
4. Not particularly close
5. Not at all close

In the present study, matriarchy has been viewed from two perspectives:

1. Structural: the father is absent and the family is headed by the mother. A family was defined as intact if both parents were reported to be living in the household. No distinction was established between biological father or stepfather.

2. Interactional: the mother is the most authoritarian and significant parent in relation to the child, even when the father is present. The position of the mother in the family was assessed with respect to: (a) patterns of decision making between parent and adolescent; and (b) the affective importance of the mother relative to the father, that is, how close is the adolescent to each of his parents, how frequently does he turn to each of them when he has a problem, and how much does he identify with each of them.

³ The items are modifications of questions developed by Elder (1962).

FINDINGS

Family Relationships in Black and White Families

a) *Parental Authority toward Adolescents*

A most striking difference between the black and white families in this sample is the greater authoritarianism of black mothers of girls in intact families (table 2). Thus, 66 percent of black girls in intact families report that most decisions between themselves and their mothers are reached unilaterally by their mothers, compared with only 40 percent of white girls. The differences for boys are much smaller. Furthermore, in contrast to white mothers, black mothers are consistently more authoritarian toward their children in intact than in broken homes. Again, the differences are larger for girls (31 percent) than for boys (15 percent). Far from occurring in mother-headed families, it is among the *intact* families that the highest frequency of black authoritarian mothers appear.

As regards fathers, no racial differences appear in the proportion who are authoritarian (table 2). However, comparison of rows 1 and 3 indicates that, with their daughters, black fathers have less authority over their children relative to their wives than those in white families.

With the exception of boys from unskilled-laborer families in intact families, the greater authoritarianism of black mothers is observed in each social class⁴ (data not presented).

b) *The Intact Family and Closeness to Parents*

Further differences emerge between the family relationships of the black and white adolescents in our sample, which illustrate the ascendancy of

TABLE 2
PARENTAL AUTHORITY BY SEX, RACE, AND TYPE OF FAMILY

TYPE OF FAMILY	PERCENTAGE WITH AUTHORITARIAN PARENT			
	Boys		Girls	
	White	Black	White	Black
Mother in intact families.	48%	57%	40%	66%*
Total N.	396	70	453	73
Mother in mother-headed families.	43%	42%	42%	35%
Total N.	67	26	65	34
Father in intact families.	52%	57%	53%	53%
Total N.	384	60	439	70

* Differences between white and black for each sex significant beyond .05 level (χ^2 test).

⁴ Respondents were classified into three broad groups on the basis of father's occupation: (1) middle class (includes professionals, managers, and white-collar workers); (2) skilled and semi-skilled workers; and (3) unskilled laborers.

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the mother in intact black families. Results for intact families are discussed in this section and for broken families in the following.

In addition to patterns of decision making, other patterns of family interaction were examined: the extent to which adolescents talk problems over with their parents, the extent to which they rely upon each parent for advice, the degree of closeness to each parent, the enjoyment of doing things with each parent, and the degree to which the adolescent wants to be the same kind of person as his mother or his father. The results were analyzed separately for boys and girls, holding social class constant. The detailed patterns of parent-adolescent interaction in intact white and black families are presented for boys and girls separately in Appendix tables A1 and A2. Summary results appear in table 3.

The overall conclusion is that, in these intact families, black boys are closer to their mothers than are white boys; white boys are consistently closer to their fathers. Furthermore, while white boys feel more positive toward their fathers than their mothers on many dimensions of interaction, in no case is this so for black boys.

Table 3 presents the extent to which black adolescents of each sex exceed whites in favoring mother over father on each of the five family patterns under consideration.⁵ The percentage differences presented in

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE ADOLESCENTS SHOWING EXTENT TO WHICH BLACKS EXCEED WHITES IN FAVORING MOTHER OVER FATHER ON EACH OF FIVE FAMILY PATTERNS BY SEX*

Family Patterns	Boys	Girls
Talking most problems over with parent.....	6	1
Depending on parents "quite a bit" or "very much" ..	14	2
Feeling "extremely" or "quite" close to parent.....	22	4
Enjoying doing many things with parent.....	37	9
Wanting to be like parent in most ways.....	16	22
Average percentage difference.....	19	7.6

* This table is based on Appendix tables A1 and A2. The following computations were carried out to obtain the results presented in this table: (a) Percentages in Appendix tables A1 and A2 were standardized (Rosenberg 1962), that is, weighted, according to the social class distribution of the black sample. Percentages presented under each family pattern for both races were multiplied by the following standardizing weights: middle class 0.17, skilled 0.32, unskilled 0.51. For each family pattern, by sex and parent, the three resulting percentages were added. (b) For each family pattern, the difference between percentages for mother and father was computed for each sex and race group. Positive percentage differences indicate the extent to which mother is favored over father, by each sex and race group. (c) Percentage differences of mother minus father for whites were subtracted from percentage differences for blacks. These differences of differences are presented in table 3. Positive differences indicate the extent to which blacks exceed whites in favoring mother over father.

⁵ The following procedures were used to produce the results in table 3. From the data in Appendix tables A1 and A2, for each family pattern, the extent to which each racial group favored the mother over the father was computed. For example, with respect to closeness to parent among black boys, the proportion reporting feeling "extremely"

table 3 are consistently positive, indicating that blacks are more likely than whites to favor mother over father on the particular family dimension under consideration. The differences are much larger for boys than for girls.

The detailed data in Appendix tables A1 and A2 indicate that these results come about because of two complementary processes in intact families: the greater closeness of black boys to their mothers and their greater distance from their fathers. Thus, black boys are more likely than white boys to depend upon their mothers for advice, to feel extremely or quite close to them, and to enjoy doing things for them. Black boys are also somewhat more likely to take their problems to their mothers and to want to be the same kind of person as their mothers. In many instances, black boys are not only more likely to interact positively with their mothers than white boys, but they are also more likely to interact more positively with their mothers than with their fathers.

In contrast, white boys feel closer to their fathers than black boys, are more likely to enjoy doing many things with their fathers, and want to be like their fathers in most ways. Even when he is present in the household, the black father is perceived as less of a role model by the black adolescent than is the white father by his son. The proportion of white boys who would like to model their fathers is higher than the proportion who would like to model their mothers. Among blacks, the proportion who want to be like their fathers is smaller. The differences are small, but it is relevant that the percentages are higher for the mother than for the father. With regard to enjoying doing things with the parent, white boys express again greater closeness with their fathers than with their mothers. This is not so for black boys. There is, thus, in intact families, greater closeness with the father among white boys.

The racial differences in parental relations are much smaller for girls than for boys, but there remains greater involvement with the fathers among white than among black girls, more communication from the girl, and greater desire on the part of the girl to be like her father in white families.

Thus, white fathers appear to play a more significant role in relation to both boys and girls. Even when black fathers are present in the house-

or "quite" close to mother was subtracted from the parallel percentage for the father. A positive percentage difference indicates greater closeness to mother than to father. For each pattern, the percentage differences of mother minus father for whites was then subtracted from the percentage difference of mother minus father for blacks. These percentage differences were computed after standardizing the occupational distribution of the white sample on the black (Rosenberg 1962). Since the black group has a larger percentage of unskilled workers than the white group, standardization allowed control for the possible effects of unequal occupational distributions on family patterns in the two racial groups.

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hold, they are perceived as less of a role model by black adolescent boys than white fathers are perceived by their sons. It is in the contrasting pattern of closeness and identification of white boys with their fathers and of black boys with their mothers that the dominant position of the mother in intact black families is clearly exhibited. While the white male is able to identify with his father and use him as a role model, the black male is more likely to turn to a female role model. It is in the intact family in which both parents are present that the dominance of the mother in black families and the lesser salience of the father becomes explicit.⁶

c) The Mother-headed Family

In broken families, racial differences appear in the relationship of both boys and girls to their mothers. The data are presented in table 4.⁷ The pattern of greater closeness of black boys to the mother, previously observed in intact families, appears also in these broken families. The racial differences are more pronounced with respect to girls. Table 4 shows that black mothers have a consistently closer and more intense relationship with their daughters than white mothers on many dimensions of family life. Black daughters feel better able to discuss their problems with their mothers than do white daughters; they are more likely to depend upon their mothers for advice, to feel extremely close to them, to enjoy doing things with them, and to want to be the kinds of persons their mothers are. A comparison of the data in table 4 with those in Appendix table A2

TABLE 4
INTERACTIONS WITH MOTHER BY SEX AND
RACE IN MOTHER-HEADED FAMILIES

PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS WHO:	Boys		Girls	
	White	Black	White	Black
Talk most problems over with parent.....	36%	23%	42%	62%
Total N.....	67	26	64	32
Depend on parents "quite a bit" or "very much" ..	56%	55%	56%	70%
Total N.....	54	20	50	23
Feel "extremely" or "quite" close to parent.....	57%	78%	57%	74%
Total N.....	67	23	61	31
Enjoy doing many things with parent.....	29%	38%	41%	58%
Total N.....	66	26	64	33
Want to be like parent in most ways.....	30%	44%	48%	61%
Total N.....	67	23	63	31

⁶ A similar interpretation of the role of the father and mother in the socialization of black children has been made by David Gottlieb (1969) in a study of educational aspirations of poor white and black adolescents.

⁷ Although the cells have few cases and the small *N*'s prevented statistical differences from appearing, the percentage differences seem worth mentioning.

suggests also that the absence of the father from the household brings about greater distance between mother and daughter in white families than in black. As a result of this differential impact of father absence, black girls in broken families are closer to their mothers than the whites.

Educational Consequences of Family Structure

As noted earlier, the matriarchal character of the black family is thought to be a major deterrent to the educational interests and intellectual achievement of black children. But what are, in fact, the educational consequences of different types of family patterns and, in particular, maternal authority for black mothers and their children? Does a family constellation in which the mother plays a dominant role have the negative educational consequences which have been attributed to it? The conclusions are tentative, but the findings do not indicate that such a family structure per se has necessarily negative educational consequences⁸ for black adolescents, at least at the high school level.

The possible influence of family structure on maternal aspirations, on the one hand, and on the educational behavior of adolescents, on the other, was examined.

a) Maternal Educational Aspirations and Family Structure

The data indicate that black mothers have very high educational aspirations for their children, irrespective of type of family. The evidence is twofold and consists of (1) the levels of maternal aspirations in black as compared to white families, and (2) the lack of relationship between aspirations and family structure.

1. *Level of educational aspirations of black and white mothers.*—Black mothers have consistently higher aspirations for their children, both sons and daughters, than white mothers (see table 5).⁹ Since maternal educational pressures are closely related to maternal aspirations (Kandel and Lesser 1969a), black sons are not subject to less maternal pressure to continue their education than are white sons. The proportion of mothers who report that they have strongly encouraged their sons to go on to college is higher among blacks (60 percent) than among whites (48 percent). (It is even higher for girls: 59 percent among blacks vs. 30 percent among whites.) At the same time, the data do reflect the greater emphasis which

⁸ The consequences examined in this paper are not educational achievement as represented by higher education actually achieved following graduation from high school, but aspirations and school performances while in high school.

⁹ These results confirm the findings of other investigators (Bloom, Whiteman, and Deutsch 1965; B. C. Rosen 1959). Elder (1970) also reports that, with social class controlled, black adolescents are more likely than white adolescents to report that their parents want them to attend college.

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TABLE 5
MOTHERS' EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS, BY
RACE, SEX, AND TYPE OF FAMILY

TYPE OF FAMILY	PERCENTAGE OF MOTHERS WITH COLLEGE ASPIRATIONS	
	White	Black
Intact:		
Boys.....	78%	90%
N.....	276	49
Girls.....	50%	86%*
N.....	290	52
Mother-headed:		
Boys.....	74%	77%
N.....	46	22
Girls.....	60%	94%*
N.....	40	31

* Differences between black and white significant beyond .05 level of probability.

black mothers place on an education for their daughters as compared to whites. Black mothers have educational aspirations for their daughters which are as high or even higher than those for their sons. This is in contrast to white families in which maternal aspirations are consistently lower for girls than for boys. For example, in intact families, 50 percent of white mothers aspire for their daughters to go on to college as compared with 78 percent for their sons; among the black families, 90 percent of boys' mothers and 86 percent of girls' mothers aspire to college for their children.

Thus, while there is evidence that black mothers have high educational aspirations for their daughters, this is not to the detriment of the sons as can be seen from a comparison with the aspirations of white mothers for their children.

When social class is introduced as a control variable, the number of cases in certain cells becomes very small. Yet, the data suggest that the greater aspirations of black mothers as compared to white exist at all social class levels with the one exception of middle-class boys where aspirations for boys are the same among blacks and whites. Aspirations do not decline with decreasing socioeconomic status (table 6). They are not even consistently lower among mothers who did not answer the question about their husbands' occupations, some of whom can be assumed to belong to households where the husband is unemployed¹⁰ and where financial resources are extremely scarce.

¹⁰ This assumption is based upon the observation that the no-response rate to the occupation question was much higher than to the question immediately preceding or following it.

TABLE 6
MOTHERS' EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS BY RACE,
SEX, AND SOCIAL CLASS*

RACE AND SEX	PERCENTAGE OF MOTHERS WITH COLLEGE ASPIRATIONS			
	Middle	Skilled	Unskilled	No Answer
Boys:				
White.....	88%	76%	74%	74%
Total N.....	61	96	117	46
Black.....	88%	82%	96%	79%
Total N.....	8	11	24	28
Girls:				
White.....	52%	55%	46%	56%
Total N.....	54	130	110	34
Black.....	100%	81%	90%	88%
Total N.....	9	16	31	6

* Based on mothers' report of educational aspirations and social class.

Since these maternal aspirations are specified by the mothers themselves and are not perceptions of aspirations reported by the adolescents, these data provide strong supporting evidence for the prevalent assumption that black mothers stress educational goals for their daughters, but the data do not indicate that this is a detriment to their sons, unless the sons react negatively to the relative discrimination.

2. *Maternal aspirations and family structure.*—Black mothers' emphasis upon the educational achievement of daughters has been assumed to derive from the disorganization of black families and a resulting matriarchal structure. The relationship between matriarchy and maternal aspirations was investigated in two ways: by relating maternal aspirations (a) to intactness of the family and (b) to maternal patterns of authority toward their children.

As shown by table 5, aspirations of black mothers for daughters are similar whether the family is intact or broken; aspirations for sons are higher in intact than in broken families. However, in broken families, black mothers' aspirations are higher for daughters: 94 percent aspire to college for their daughters compared with 77 percent for their sons. This is the only group of mothers that holds lower aspirations for boys. While white mothers in broken homes have higher aspirations for their daughters than those in intact families, their aspirations are nevertheless higher for their sons.

Contrary to the hypothesis put forward in the literature on black families, maternal educational aspirations are not related to maternal authority in the household, an interactional indicator of maternal dominance. Authoritarian mothers, whether black or white, do not hold the

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highest educational aspirations for their daughters (see table 7). Authoritarian and democratic mothers have similar aspirations for their children.¹¹

While the data confirm that in mother-headed black families mothers are more likely to stress a higher education for their daughters than for their sons, the data do not support the hypothesis that maternal authority per se in the black family is associated with lowered maternal aspirations for sons as compared to whites.

b) Family Processes and Adolescents' Educational Behavior

Besides maternal aspirations, the educational consequences of family structure were also examined in relation to the adolescent himself. We investigated whether black boys who come from broken families, those who come from families with authoritarian mothers, or those who have closer interactions with their mothers than with their fathers have lower educational aspirations and lower school performances than those who have an adequate male role model. Recent evidence strengthens the particular argument that authoritarian families negatively affect the educational aspirations of adolescents. Thus, Elder (1963) and Rehberg et al. (1970)—using a measure of parental authority similar to the one used in this study—have shown that adolescents with authoritarian parents have lower educational aspirations than adolescents with democratic parents who provide the child with an opportunity to participate in the making of decisions which affect him. The extent to which this relationship would

TABLE 7
MOTHERS' EDUCATIONAL ASPIRATIONS BY MATERNAL
AUTHORITY, RACE, AND SEX^a

SEX	PERCENTAGE OF MOTHERS WITH COLLEGE ASPIRATIONS					
	White			Black		
	Authori- tarian	Demo- cratic	Permis- sive	Authori- tarian	Demo- cratic	Permis- sive
Boys.....	75%	82%	69%*	89%	87%	83%
Total N.....	130	136	52	37	16	12
Girls.....	49%	55%	53%	88%	93%	97%
Total N.....	154	138	30	43	28	8

^a Based on mothers' report of educational aspirations and maternal authority.

* Differences among authority patterns significant at .05 level (χ^2 test).

¹¹ The relationship between maternal authority and aspirations is smaller among mothers than among adolescents (see table 9). To the extent that there is *any* relationship at all, the trends for mothers are in the direction of those found for adolescents: highest educational aspirations appear in families with democratic mothers (see also Elder 1963; Rehberg, Sinclair, and Schafer 1970).

also apply to black adolescents, and more specifically black boys, is unknown.

The following hypotheses were tested:

Black boys in intact families have higher educational aspirations and higher academic performance than boys in mother-headed families.

Black girls in mother-headed families have higher aspirations and higher school performance than black girls in intact families.

Adolescents in families with authoritarian mothers have lower aspirations than adolescents in democratic families.

Black boys in intact families, who have closer relationships with their mothers than with their fathers, have lower educational aspirations and lower academic achievement than boys who experience a strong male role model.

The following indicators of educational interests and performances were considered:

Educational aspirations, as reported by the adolescent

Self-reported grades (quartile standing)

Number of hours spent studying (as reported by the adolescent)

IQ score (quartile standing from school records)

Most recent English grades (from school records)

Class rank in senior year (from school records)

The results suggest a lack of relationship between indices of matriarchy and the academic behavior of adolescents, whether black or white.

Before examining the relation of adolescents' aspirations to family structure, it should be noted that the racial differences in aspirations among adolescents parallel those observed among mothers. Educational aspirations are higher among black than white boys from intact families, and strikingly higher among all black girls (see table 8). These findings are consistent with those of other investigators. Black adolescents are consistently found to have aspirations which are as high or higher than those of whites (Antonovsky and Lerner 1959; Coleman et al. 1966; Gottlieb 1964, 1969; B. C. Rosen 1959; Sexton 1963; Stephenson 1957; Wilson 1967).

Intactness of the family bears some relationship to the level of aspirations of black adolescents but no relationship to academic performance. As shown by table 8, there is a slightly higher tendency for black boys and girls from intact families¹² to aspire to college. No difference appears in the aspirations of white male adolescents; white girls have slightly higher aspirations in broken families, paralleling the trend observed among mothers. However, the sex and race differences in levels of aspirations are much greater than those introduced by intactness of the family.

¹² On the basis of a much larger sample, Coleman et al. (1966) and Wilson (1967) report no relationship between intactness of family and levels of aspirations.

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TABLE 8 -

ADOLESCENTS' EDUCATIONAL PLANS AND ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
BY SEX, RACE, AND TYPE OF FAMILY

PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS:	Boys				Girls			
	White		Black		White		Black	
	In- tact	Bro- ken	In- tact	Bro- ken	In- tact	Bro- ken	In- tact	Bro- ken
Who plan to go to college.....	64%	63%	74%	65%	29%	37%	80%	69%
Total N.....	291	49	57	17	327	46	51	29
Who say they are in the top quarter of their class.....	14%	19%	16%	18%	14%	11%	12%	10%
Total N.....	437	75	90	33	475	70	81	42
Who actually rank in top quarter of their class (senior year).....	19%	18%	15%	20%	36%	17%	14%	8%
Total N.....	136	28	33	10	146	18	22	12
With IQ scores in top quartile of school.....	32%	46%	7%	9%	30%	29%	10%	9%
Total N.....	439	76	94	33	481	70	82	44

Furthermore, among both blacks and whites, intactness of family is unrelated to level of school performance.¹³

In line with the results of other investigators (Elder 1963; Rehberg et al. 1970), the data suggest that adolescents' educational aspirations are highest in democratic families in which the mother shares her power with the adolescent in the decision-making process (see table 9). It must be stressed that the differences in certain groups are small and are rarely significant. Interestingly enough, the differences between authoritarian and democratic patterns are smallest among girls in black families. However, the most notable finding in table 9 is that, with the exception of the small group of black boys in permissive families, black adolescents have higher aspirations than whites, even when patterns of maternal authority are controlled for. Race is a much more important determinant of aspiration levels than maternal authority.

Levels of educational interests and school achievement are unrelated to patterns of parental interaction indicative of maternal dominance relative to the father. In order to identify more precisely dominance of the mother relative to the father in the adolescent's life, the data on

¹³ Other investigators have also failed to find a difference in school performance of adolescents from intact and broken families (Burchinal 1964; Nye 1957; Parry and Pfuhl 1963). (Note that table 8 presents data on only three indicators of school performance.)

TABLE 9
 ADOLESCENTS' EDUCATIONAL PLANS BY MATERNAL
 AUTHORITY, RACE, AND SEX

SEX	PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS WITH COLLEGE PLANS					
	White			Black		
	Authori- tarian	Demo- cratic	Permis- sive	Authori- tarian	Demo- cratic	Permis- sive
Boys.....	62%	68%	65%	71%	88%	60%
Total N.....	148	109	48	34	16	10
Girls.....	22%	40%	24%*	77%	81%	71%
Total N.....	140	154	55	39	21	7

* Differences among authority patterns significant at .05 (χ^2 test).

interaction with the mother were combined with those for the father in intact families. The adolescent's joint relationship to his parents was examined in three areas of interaction: decision making, closeness, and wanting to be the same kind of person as the parent. Each family variable was first divided into two categories, representing low or high interaction with the parent on that variable. Maternal and paternal patterns were then combined to give a fourfold classification of joint parental relationship. For example, the joint maternal and paternal relationship with respect to closeness includes: (1) adolescents who are very close to both parents; (2) adolescents very close to their fathers, not close to their mothers; (3) adolescents very close to their mothers, not close to their fathers; (4) adolescents not close to either parent. The assumption is that families of boys in which the mother is more authoritarian than the father, in which the adolescent is closer to his mother than to his father, and wants to be like his mother rather than his father are matriarchal and do not provide strong male role models.

Adolescents' levels of educational aspiration, school performance, or interests in studies are not higher among black boys who are closer to their fathers than to their mothers (table 10)¹⁴ or who identify with their fathers more than with their mothers (data not presented). These results require that we subject to careful empirical scrutiny many implicit assumptions about the negative role of maternal dominance on the educational behavior of black adolescents.¹⁵

However, the limitations of the data and the tentative nature of the

¹⁴ This lack of relationship could perhaps be explained by the fact that underachieving adolescents have already dropped out of school by the time they should have been in high school and therefore do not appear in the sample.

¹⁵ Similarly, L. Rosen (1969) was unable to confirm many of the hypotheses linking matriarchy to delinquency among black males.

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TABLE 10
ADOLESCENTS' EDUCATIONAL PLANS BY DEGREE OF
CLOSENESS TO PARENTS, SEX, AND RACE

PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS WITH COLLEGE PLANS	CLOSENESS TO PARENTS*			
	Both Parents High	High Father, Low Mother	Low Father, High Mother	Both Parents Low
Boys:				
White.....	65%	65%	73%	61%
Total N.....	126	26	33	64
Black.....	86%	2%	77%	83%
Total N.....	14	2	13	6
Girls:				
White.....	39%	32%	32%	28%
Total N.....	126	19	69	69
Black.....	78%	...	91%	82%
Total N.....	19	1	11	11

* Based on a cross-tabulation of the following two questions:

How close is your relationship with your mother/father?

1. extremely close
2. quite close
3. moderately close
4. not particularly close
5. not at all close

High closeness = 1-2; low closeness = 3-5.

findings must again be emphasized. This paper deals with educational aspirations and not actual educational achievement. While educational aspirations have been found to be highly correlated with post-high school educational attainment (e.g., see the follow-up study by Sewell and Shah 1968) and aspirations have frequently been used as indicators of achievement (see Rehberg et al. 1970 and the studies cited therein), the relative levels of aspirations observed in our samples of adolescents do not correspond to the actual educational achievements of blacks and whites. Black adolescents do not generally proceed as far in their schooling as white adolescents (Blau and Duncan 1967; Coleman et al. 1966; Duncan 1967; Folger and Nam 1967). Furthermore, the evidence from national studies is that, for both black and white, a broken family background represents a handicap with respect to educational achievement (Blau and Duncan 1967).

At their present levels, the aspirations of black parents and adolescents are clearly unrealistic and, as suggested by Katz (1967), may reflect an element of wishful thinking.¹⁶ Indeed, we find that aspirations of black

¹⁶ Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend (1969) have recently proposed a psychological interpretation to account for the unrealistic levels of aspirations among black youths. Extrapolating from studies on achievement motivation (e.g., Atkinson 1966), they suggest that the extremely high level of aspirations of blacks represents defensive behavior in the existence of low need achievement and great fear of failure.

students are less likely than those of whites to be formulated in relation to levels of ability. The association between IQ and aspirations is lower among blacks (.086 for boys, .122 for girls as measured by $r\beta$) than among whites (.270 for boys, .245 for girls) (see also Wilson 1967). Among the adolescents planning to go to college, fewer among blacks (23 percent) than among whites (49 percent) were enrolled in a college preparatory program. Similarly, Coleman et al. (1966) report that blacks, more of whom aspired to college, less frequently than whites had taken any concrete steps to investigate particular colleges: a lower proportion had communicated with a college or had read a college catalog. Katz (1967) proposes that black adolescents have internalized high educational values and goals but not the behavioral mechanisms requisite for attaining them, and as a result "the relationship between verbal expressions of the standards and actual performance will tend to be an inverse one" (Katz 1967, p. 175).

Black parents have the same high educational goals held by their children. The factors which contribute to the lower educational attainment of blacks are those which make it impossible for the black adolescent to translate his educational aspirations into actual educational attainment. These factors may be found in the family. Black mothers with high aspirations may not know how to translate them into behavior that promotes achievement.

However, the relevant factors may be found outside the family, in the limited opportunities and the obvious inequities created by society at large and particularly the schools. The recent dramatic increase in the enrollment of blacks in New York colleges following the institution of an open enrollment policy is testimony to the ability of blacks to take the first step toward translating their educational goals into behavior once barriers created by society against their advancement are removed. Whatever its origins, the large discrepancy between aspirations and achievement is a source of frustration and demoralization for black adolescents (Katz 1967; Elder 1970).

CONCLUSION

Within the limitations imposed by the small size of our sample, several conclusions are reached.

While mothers appear to exercise greater authority toward their girls in black than in white families, it is among the intact, rather than the broken, families that these racial differences appear most strongly. Maternal dominance in intact families expresses itself in various ways: black mothers are more likely than white mothers to make decisions unilaterally for their daughters; black boys are closer to their mothers and more

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distant from their fathers than white boys. In broken families, black girls are much closer to their mothers than are white girls. Black mothers and adolescents have higher educational aspirations than whites. These racial differences persist regardless of intactness of family, type of maternal authority, or maternal ascendancy in intact families.

Bronfenbrenner (1967), in an evaluation of the sources of educational inadequacy experienced by Negroes, especially Negro boys, stresses the impact of paternal absence in Negro families: these youngsters from fatherless homes are raised in a feminizing environment, lack a proper role model, and experience a confused sex identity. The data presented in this paper suggest that the "matriarchal" and "feminizing" character of the black child's familial environment may be even more extensive than suspected, since greater maternal authority and identification with a female role model are characteristic even of intact black families where the father is present. There appear to be pervasive cultural patterns which characterize black households irrespective of structural integrity or socioeconomic level of the family.

As far as aspirations are concerned, these family patterns do not have the negative consequences on aspirations which have been attributed to them. The black family has successfully transmitted high educational aspirations to the adolescents. Yet, these high aspirations are not reflected in the levels of education actually attained by blacks. We have not excluded the possibility that the family, in addition to institutions outside the family, plays a role in the limited ability of black adolescents to translate their high educational aspirations into actual educational achievement.

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APPENDIX TABLE A1
PATTERNS OF BOYS' INTERACTIONS WITH PARENTS BY
RACE AND SOCIAL CLASS IN INTACT FAMILIES

PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS WHO:	WITH MOTHER				WITH FATHER			
	White		Black		White		Black	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Talk most problems over with parent:								
Middle.....	33	75	46	11	32	74	33	9
Skilled.....	36	137	21	14	35	133	25	12
Unskilled.....	35	146	44	27	43	144	42	26
Depend on parent "quite a bit" or "very much":								
Middle.....	45	58	71	7	49	57	50	6
Skilled.....	44	69	54	11	40	98	60	10
Unskilled.....	42	110	60	20	44	110	37	19
Feel "extremely" or "quite" close to parent:								
Middle.....	65	74	80	10	57	71	22	9*
Skilled.....	68	136	64	14	61	128	54	12
Unskilled.....	63	145	74	27	65	144	52	25
Enjoy doing many things with parent:								
Middle.....	35	75	36	11	50	74	...	9*
Skilled.....	27	137	50	14	43	133	25	12
Unskilled.....	27	143	52	27*	46	145	42	26
Want to be like parent in most ways:								
Middle.....	37	75	46	11	45	71	33	9
Skilled.....	36	135	29	14	47	129	33	12
Unskilled.....	32	145	41	27	47	144	36	25

* Difference between white and black significant beyond .05 level (χ^2 test).

APPENDIX TABLE A2
PATTERNS OF GIRLS' INTERACTIONS WITH PARENTS BY
RACE AND SOCIAL CLASS IN INTACT FAMILIES

PERCENTAGE OF ADOLESCENTS WHO:	WITH MOTHER				WITH FATHER			
	White		Black		White		Black	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Talk most problems over with parent:								
Middle.....	56	73	50	8	16	69	0	8
Skilled.....	53	189	41	22	10	179	14	21
Unskilled.....	53	150	50	34	17	146	6	34
Depend on parent "quite a bit" or "very much":								
Middle.....	69	60	66	6	51	61	50	6
Skilled.....	72	152	62	13	32	151	30	13
Unskilled.....	69	117	78	23	44	118	43	23
Feel "extremely" or "quite" close to parent:								
Middle.....	72	72	63	8	58	70	28	7
Skilled.....	71	184	50	22*	46	176	30	20*
Unskilled.....	69	149	73	34	50	140	50	34
Enjoy doing many things with parent:								
Middle.....	49	73	50	8	28	67	12	8
Skilled.....	50	188	32	22	26	179	18	22
Unskilled.....	47	150	62	34	27	146	24	34
Want to be like parent in most ways:								
Middle.....	57	72	62	8	40	70	29	7
Skilled.....	60	188	59	22	30	175	25	20
Unskilled.....	60	150	65	34	31	141	15	34

* Difference between white and black significant beyond .05 level (χ^2 test).

Ethnic Relations in Israel¹

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Israel's ethnic relations can be best described in terms of two major relationships: (1) between European and non-European Jews; (2) between Jews and non-Jews (predominantly Arabs). Data about these relationships is drawn from several studies carried out in Israel during the period 1966-68. The main conclusions of the analysis are: (1) Relations between European and non-European Jews are asymmetrical; European Jews serve as a positive reference group for non-Europeans. While there is considerable prejudice against non-European Jews, the attitude of non-European Jews toward Europeans is usually favorable. (2) Ethnic hostilities between Jewish communities are tempered by a sense of interdependence in the face of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors and by the high rate of economic and social mobility in Israel. (3) The outlook for full integration among Jewish ethnic groups seems favorable. An overwhelming majority is both expecting and welcoming such integration. (4) Jewish-Arab relations are developing in an unfavorable direction. Both the external conflict and internal processes seem to intensify mutual hostility and mistrust. (5) Relations among Jews and between Jews and Arabs are closely interconnected. For Jews of Middle Eastern origin, the Arabs are a negative reference group. The oriental Jews' hostility and prejudice against Arabs (which were found to be more intensive than that of European Jews) seem to be an expression of their desire to be fully accepted in Israeli society.

INTRODUCTION

Students of Israeli society are sometimes so fascinated by unique characteristics that they fail to relate their studies to similar situations and processes elsewhere. Through this failure, two vital benefits are lost: social problem solving in Israel is not stimulated by ideas from abroad, and Israel is not used as a social laboratory in which sociological knowledge (deriving predominantly from studies made in America) can be reconsidered.

In the case of Israel, ethnic relations, like almost any social topic, must be discussed in relation to the overwhelming problem confronting Israel: the all-involving conflict with the surrounding Arab world. No simple cause-effect relationship can be postulated between the external struggle

¹ The author would like to thank S. N. Eisenstadt and S. Herman of the Hebrew University for their guidance and encouragement. The loyal and resourceful assistance of Nira Davis is gratefully acknowledged. Limitations of space prevent me from mentioning individually my many young Jewish and Arab colleagues who worked under extremely tense and difficult conditions to make this study possible.

and internal structure. Clearly, Israeli society in general and ethnic group relations in particular are deeply influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the other hand, there is obviously a feedback; social features which developed during two decades of external struggle have by now become actively engaged in this struggle. The characteristics of the opponents and the nature of their conflict have become parts of one undividable system.

On a more specific level, we should note that Israel's ethnic relations can be best described and analyzed in terms of two major relationships: (1) between European and non-European Jews (the latter will be referred to below as "Orientals"); (2) between Jewish and non-Jewish (predominantly Arab) citizens. This is admittedly an oversimplification. Both the European and the non-European Jewish groups are divided into many subgroups which differ in language, level of education, income, life-style, and many other characteristics. The non-Jewish population is also ethnically subdivided. (One non-Jewish group [the Druzes] are well known for assuming a position favoring the Jews and opposing the Arabs.)

Although the division of the Israeli population into three groups (European Jews, Oriental Jews, and Arabs) does not correspond to demographic reality, this simplistic division does organize meaningfully the complex ethnic attitudes and relationships. (Tables 1 and 2 give the actual distribution of Jews and Arabs.)

Popular images of ethnic differentiation always embody crude categorization. In this way the three "blocs" emerged in the minds of most Israelis. In private conversation, newspaper articles, and even in the parliament, "Europeans," "Orientals," and "Arabs" are referred to as the three main components of Israeli society.

RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEANS AND ORIENTAL JEWS

The most remarkable feature of this relationship is its tranquility. Apart from one isolated incident in which shops were looted and a few passersby attacked, there were no ethnic riots during Israel's two-decade history. All attempts to establish ethnic political parties failed. While one to three representatives of such parties occupied seats in the first, second, and third Knesset (Israeli parliament), in the last four elections no ethnic party was even in existence. (It should be noted that Israel has a multi-party system, in which about ten to fifteen parties, most of them very small, compete for the 120 seats in the Knesset.)

This tranquility is astonishing if one considers that almost all leadership positions in the country are occupied by Europeans, that European per capita income is about twice that of Orientals, and that the European

TABLE 1
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION IN ISRAEL*

Country of Descent	Percentage
Jewish citizens of European descent:	
USSR.....	13
Poland.....	17
Rumania.....	11
Bulgaria, Greece.....	4
Central Europe (Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia).....	6
Western Europe (Britain, France, Benelux, Spain, Italy) ..	2
Other European countries.....	1
Total.....	54
Jewish citizens of American descent:	
USA, Canada.....	0.5
South and Central America.....	0.5
Total.....	1.0
Jewish citizens of Asian descent:	
Iraq.....	11
Yemen, Aden.....	6
Turkey.....	4
Iran.....	2.5
Other Asian countries.....	2.5
Total.....	26.0
Jewish citizens of African descent:	
Morocco.....	9
Algeria, Tunisia.....	3
Libya.....	2
Egypt.....	2
Other African countries.....	0.5
Total.....	16.5

SOURCE.—Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, p. 43.

* Total Jewish population: 2,500,000.

TABLE 2
NON-JEWISH GROUPS IN ISRAEL IN 1967

Group	Population
Muslims.....	287,000
Christians.....	71,000
Druze and others.....	33,000
Total.....	391,000*

SOURCE.—Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, p. 45.

* Includes the population of East Jerusalem, about 66,000.

cultural tradition and style of life dominate the society. A careful analysis will show that the relation between these two segments of the Jewish community in Israel is the product of a rather complicated balance of forces, some disintegrative, driving the ethnic groups apart, others integrative. The outcome of these countervailing forces is not a simple positive relationship but rather a sensitive equilibrium in which a sense of mutual responsibility and common loyalty coexist with covert hostility and underlying tensions.

Factors Impeding the Integration of Jewish Ethnic Groups

Dissimilarity.—Compared with other countries, the variation between Jewish ethnic groups in Israel seems to be extremely great: although all Jews have the same religion, they differ in all other aspects: language, dress, and they relate differently to each other and have a variety of socialization patterns and family structures. An extreme example is that there are some Jewish mountain tribes that emigrated from inland Morocco and Tunisia. The term "primitive society" would not be an exaggeration. Even the men were illiterate. They lived in caves in Morocco; some of them dug new caves for themselves in Israel, using their houses for storage space. Their religious beliefs and practices include many archaic superstitions. By contrast, American and western European Jews belong to the most advanced middle class of their Western societies. This is admittedly an extreme example, for most Orientals are much closer to a modern style of living, and many Europeans left environments only in the beginning stages of modernization, such as the rural Ukraine.

Considerable overlap between ethnic background and economic and demographic characteristics.—In Israel, issues which would be defined in ethnically homogeneous societies as class differences have implicit ethnic elements. The majority of Europeans emigrated prior to 1949 (the last large group of European immigrants were survivors of the holocaust who came immediately after the state was established), while the overwhelming majority of Orientals arrived after 1949. Those who came first had the opportunity to obtain most of the prestigious positions as well as to occupy the more desirable housing. New-founded towns and villages in the south or far north are predominantly Oriental, while the best neighborhoods in cities such as Tel Aviv and Haifa are predominantly European. The advancement to leadership positions is quite selective. In political positions (mayors of towns, local labor union leaders) in which leaders are directly accountable to their constituents, Orientals are found in increasing proportions. They are less prominent in national politics, although it has become customary to reserve two seats in the government and about thirty seats in the Knesset for Oriental representatives (who

are never officially identified as such.) There is not one Oriental in the high ranks of the army, and very few have influential academic positions.

Emigration to Israel is perceived as emancipation from minority status.—Jews are known to be extremely sensitive to any indication of prejudice or discrimination. One of the main incentives for emigration to Israel is the attempt to rid oneself of an inferior status and to become part of a dominant majority. For the Oriental Jew in Israel, immigration has only created new frustration because they have not become a part of the dominant group in Israel's ethnic stratification. "In Morocco, we were considered Jews, and here we are called Moroccans," is a frequently heard complaint.

The cultural resemblance of Orientals and Arabs.—The majority of non-European Jews in Israel originated from Arabic-speaking, predominantly Moslem societies. They were naturally influenced by Arab and Muslim culture, and they incorporated many of its elements into their own social and individual behavior. There exists in Israel a certain contempt and hostility toward everything which symbolizes the Arab world. Arab music is never broadcast on the radio; Arab art is not displayed, and most people would feel uneasy if they spoke Arabic in public places. While no one identifies Oriental Jews with the external Arab enemy, it is important that much of the cultural heritage and life style of Oriental Jews is explicitly rejected, not only by Europeans, but also by the central institutions of Israeli society.²

Factors Promoting the Integration of Jewish Ethnic Groups

The cultural and ideological factor.—In *American Dilemma*, Myrdal (1962) points out that most Americans subscribe to a full integration of Negroes (and other ethnic groups) into the mainstream of society. One could say that Israel is even more committed ideologically to absolute and egalitarian integration of all Jewish subgroups.

The dominant political ideologies in Israel are socialism in its several versions and liberalism. There is no conservative party in Israel, and no discriminatory ideology toward any Jew has ever been promulgated. The horrible confrontation between the Jewish people and the racist Nazi regime made reference to "natural superiority" or any official announcement of prejudice distasteful to most Israelis.³

In addition, the central role which Jewish religious symbols play in Israeli culture and education has a unifying effect. Obviously the mean-

² Egyptian films are a noteworthy exception.

³ K. Katzenelson (1964) is an exception to this rule. Here the author tried to develop an ideology of European superiority. His book, however, was violently denounced by all segments of the public. I cannot recall one favorable response to the book.

ings which Israelis of different backgrounds attach to mythological events like the Exodus from Egypt or to rituals like fasting on Yom Kippur are quite different, but whatever the nature of observance, the same symbols are meaningful to everyone.

Zionist ideology adds another dimension. Zionism sets forth a special interpretation of Jewish history in which Jews are considered to owe allegiance to each other rather than to the nations in which they live as a minority.⁴ Israel addressed itself directly to integration, proclaiming it as one of the most important assignments on the national agenda. Inter-marriage between different ethnic groups is not only accepted but highly valued. Teachers, physicians, and social workers are encouraged to settle among people they serve, and signs of prejudice are denounced not merely as unethical but as unpatriotic.

Socioeconomic factors.—While the overlap between socioeconomic status and ethnic background aggravates ethnic relations, dynamic developments in the Israeli economy and stratification system contribute to ethnic integration. It should be kept in mind that Israel's short history is a period of rapid expansion. The Jewish sector in Palestine increased four times in population, but other resources, for example, land, capital, expertise, and power expanded even more. The absorption of immigrants was and still is considered to involve some sacrifice by the absorbing society, as if the inhabitants were sharing their homeland with the newcomers. However, economic surveys show that, indeed, in the fifties, the old-timers actually increased their standard of living more than did the immigrants. The gap diminished in the sixties. In any case, established Israelis of predominately European origin did not lose economically in sharing with the immigrants but actually prospered in the process; due to the enormous increase in resources, the economics of ethnic relations in Israel was not a zero sum game.⁵

⁴ S. N. Herman (1970) has systematically investigated the degree to which Jewish and Zionist values have been successfully taught. Herman's empirical findings indicate that a definite majority of Israeli youth has a strong and positive Jewish identity and a sense of responsibility and attachment toward other Jews all over the world. This evidence contradicts the conclusions influenced by the insightful although unsystematic observations of scholars such as Spiro (1967) and Friedman (1967).

⁵ G. Hanoch (1961) and R. Klinov-Malul (1969), two Israeli economists, both established and interpreted these facts through an interesting exchange. Hanoch reported that the income gap between immigrants and old-timers was increasing over time and explained this tendency by the growing income differentiation between manual workers and professionals. He predicted that, if no far-reaching measures were taken, social and economic gaps would increase and find political expression. Klinov-Malul cited later findings which indicated that after 1958 income gaps were gradually decreasing. Responding to this challenge, Hanoch (1969) offered a new explanation: the growing gap in incomes should be understood as a result of the increase in the untrained labor force. (This increase is not exactly synonymous with immigration, as a year or two usually elapses between the arrival of immigrants and their full participation in the

The gain of Jews of European origin from the influx of Oriental Jews was not only economic. As the newcomers took over the lowest positions, more powerful and rewarding roles opened up for the old-timers. Furthermore, the establishment of the state with all of its branches and agencies (army, foreign office, public health, and state-sponsored science) provided new careers for which the better-educated and more-experienced Europeans were the favored candidates.

The national security factor.—Israel's involvement in its short history in a fierce struggle for survival has obviously had a unifying effect.⁶ This unifying effect can be subdivided into three components. (1) *Interdependence of fate*: It is clear that military defeat is perceived as a threat to the interests of all Israeli Jewish ethnic groups. (2) *A common goal*: While interdependence of fate may be passive, like the dependence of a whole village on rain, it can also be active. A common interest can be achieved by coordinated efforts. This kind of active interdependence is even more unifying if individuals or groups feel that their survival depends upon their cooperation. (3) *An outlet for aggression*: If the common goal happens to be the defense against a common enemy, an additional unifying element exists—antagonistic and aggressive impulses now have a legitimate outlet and target.

Theoretically, it seems reasonable to claim that Israel has a good chance to avoid the explosive consequences that can result from ethnic differences. This notion is based on three postulates. The tendency toward ethnic integration is increased if (1) a body of cultural symbols exists with which everyone can identify; (2) if societal resources are in a state of rapid expansion; (3) if a threat originating from a common enemy is perceived. While this summary contains an optimistic prediction, it also indicates the price a society is likely to pay. A full evaluation of this price is beyond the scope of this paper. I should like only to hint at it in a very general sense.

The unifying function of religious and national symbols might lead to an overemphasis of these symbols beyond the level that most individuals

labor market.) Unskilled labor and skilled labor are complementary factors of production. Therefore, salaries for unskilled workers decreased relative to incomes of more professional workers. This tendency was less marked in the sixties when the increase in unskilled labor supply leveled off. In addition to that, more young immigrants achieved better training. While income differentiation between professionals and non-professionals still increased somewhat, this tendency was more than offset by more advanced skills attained by the immigrants so that the overall gap between immigrants and old-timers tended to decrease (but see original exchange in Eisenstadt 1966).

⁶ J. T. Shuval (1962) raised the following considerations: Whether the threats expressed by several Arab leaders to destroy Israel and kill or expel its citizens were real or propagandistic is irrelevant for our purpose. The unifying function is due to the perceived threat, whether real or not.

would consider appropriate. Politically, this is likely to effect those groups most closely identified with these symbols, to diminish the status of those not associated with these symbols, and to reduce their participation in public life.

A society may become "addicted" to the continuous growth of resources—immigration, manpower, land, or, most important, capital. A pause in growth may create severe intergroup problems along with the economic problems.

Finally, the position of a society toward its enemies and opponents might tend to harden beyond what would have been expected on the basis of rational self-interest.

Of course each of these problems is likely to arouse resisting forces which are just as deep-rooted in Israeli society and culture. Nevertheless, these are potentialities of which anyone concerned about Israeli society should be aware.

RELATIONS BETWEEN JEWS AND ARABS

It is a commonplace that the relationship between Israeli Jews and Arabs as ethnic groups has to be understood in the context of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli Arabs do not deny their familial, cultural, and religious ties to the belligerent Arab states; they are enemy-affiliated minorities. There also exist some unique circumstances shaping the relations between the two peoples. First, Arabs in Israel are a recent minority. Until 1948, there was statistically a clear majority of Arabs in Palestine, although they had no sovereign power. While a minority within Israel's borders, Arabs constitute the overwhelming majority in the surrounding region. They are a minority without a political and cultural elite, a village population which had been accustomed to following the leadership of towns such as Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus, and Beirut. The 1948 war emptied some of these towns and severed the connections with the rest. The resulting lack of trained and accepted leadership increased the vulnerability of the Arabs to Jewish economic and cultural influence.

While Arabs feel a deep resentment against the Jews, they are also attracted to them by a combination of cultural and practical motives. Palestine was not merely the meeting place of two national movements but also of two different life-styles. The modern and sometimes socially innovating Jewish sector confronted a largely rural and traditional community. While they are perceived as the main source of the Arabs' misfortunes, Jews have provided many Arabs with the only access to an advanced technology, broadened consumption, and modern political ideologies.

Arab attitudes toward Jews and the State of Israel vary according to

the degree of modernization achieved. The more traditional rural Arabs who are still organized in extended families controlled by "elders" or patriarchs view Jews mainly as bearers of a foreign way of life, as a threat to the harmony and integration of their community.

As long as the village community is left alone to pursue its own course, and Jews neither interfere in internal affairs (even in demonstrating different kinds of behavior) nor impede the immediate economic interests of the village, a *modus vivendi* with a Jewish regime can be found. The traditional village of the Middle East has known and outlived many regimes and has developed mechanisms for coping with them while preserving its own unique structure. This is not to imply that relations between Jews and the traditional elements are, or ever have been, idyllic. But being a small, dense, and extremely active society, the Jews did interfere in the internal life of the Arab village. Some interference was unintentional, such as displaying a modern way of life to the villages. Some was deliberately designed to bring modernity to the Arab village. Although Jewish authorities did try to cooperate with the traditional ruling elite, the impact of Jewish modernity brought about a gradual erosion of the authority of the elders.

The younger, modernized Arabs were much less concerned with the stability of traditional rural society, being themselves engaged in conflict with the traditional leadership. There is no disagreement between these Arabs and most Jews that the modernization of the Arab village is both desirable and inevitable. The only dispute is over the speed of the modernization process and the proper means to encourage it. But while the cultural element in the dispute concerning these young and progressive elements is relatively de-emphasized, the political conflict is considerably aggravated. The young educated Hebrew-speaking and European-dressed Arab whose tradition and religious symbols of identity have been eroded is, nevertheless, not admitted into Jewish society. As a result, the need has emerged for new symbols of identity. This new identification must be broad enough to include the shared experience and interests of Arabs all over the country and sufficiently narrow to differentiate Arabs from Jews. An extreme nationalistic ideology satisfied both these needs. Thus, as modernization proceeded, the cultural and economic conflict between Arabs and Jews weakened while the political conflict was reemphasized.⁷

The attitude of Jews toward Israeli Arabs is obviously dominated by the struggle against the Arab world. The actual ties of Israeli Arabs to the external enemy are, however, exaggerated by some psychological factors. Israeli Arabs are weak and easily selected scapegoats toward which aggressive impulses can be channeled. Israeli Arabs are the first non-Jews

⁷ Elsewhere, I (1970) present a detailed discussion of these trends.

to live under Jewish domination during the 2,000 years of Jewish history. Some of the historical fear, mistrust, and resentment toward the Gentile ("goy") is undoubtedly transferred to the Arabs. This tendency was especially marked among Jews of Middle Eastern descent who, until recently had been dominated by an Arab majority. Mistrust toward Israeli Arabs was also exaggerated sometimes by Jewish authorities in order to justify some of the measures taken against the Arab population (the military rule and the confiscation of more than 40 percent of Arab land). Thus, while defending the military rule in the Knesset, Ben-Gurion announced his "understanding" of feelings of animosity on the part of Israeli Arabs, saying that he would feel the same if he were in their position.

Finally, Arabs were regarded by Oriental Jews as a negative reference group, the kind of people, society, and culture one should get away from in order to be fully accepted in the European-dominated mainstream of Israeli life.

During the years 1962-67, the position of Israeli authorities toward the Arab population was considerably liberalized. This can be attributed to a combination of motives: commitment to democratic values (reinforced by increasing pressure by Israeli intellectuals), sensitivity to external public opinion, and tranquility on the borders. As a result, military rule and other limitations on free movements were abolished. But the frequency of hostile and prejudiced attitudes among the population-at-large remained almost unchanged. Jewish hostility toward the Israeli Arab was increased by the rapid succession of fear before the 1967 war and contempt immediately afterward. This negative turn in Jewish public opinion was soon reinforced by Arab belligerent activities in which some Israeli Arabs collaborated.

For Israeli Arabs, the violent confrontation between Israel and the Arab world in 1967 was a fatal blow to their carefully balanced identity. The widespread belief among Israeli Arabs that they could and should maintain a neutral position in the conflict between their country and their people was shaken. When communication between Israeli Arabs and their relatives and former friends in the occupied territories was reestablished, the Israeli Arab assumed at first the role of a guide by virtue of his long acquaintance with the Jews and with Israel. But a few months later, the positions of the guide and the guided were reversed. The leadership of West Bank towns such as East Jerusalem and Nablus reestablished its traditional authority, and many Israeli Arabs felt themselves once again integrated into a wider Arab community; the pressure on those Israeli Arabs who wanted to retain some impartiality became almost unbearable. For many young Arabs, this agonizing dilemma existed, not merely on the ideological level, but on the practical one as well. Because of their superior knowledge of Israeli geography, language, and

customs, Israeli Arabs were often the focus of outside pressure to participate in these raids. Every time such a collaboration is discovered, Jews express mistrust and outrage toward the entire Arab community, and the generalized hostility in turn discourages those Israeli Arabs who still want to remain loyal. In this way, the investments of good will which have been made by both parties in the last eight years are gradually lost in a vicious cycle of suspicion, terror, oppression, and retaliation.

METHOD AND DATA

The findings are based on several studies carried out in Israel before and after June 1967. The purpose of the studies was to delineate the structure of ethnic relations. Due to the unexpected occurrence of the war, we had the rare opportunity to test, by replicating some of our procedures, the impact of the outburst of violent conflict on the values and attitudes of both Jews and Arabs. Briefly, the projects on which we drew are:

1. A study of ethnic identity and relations among Jewish ethnic groups (Peres 1967, 1968a). The sample included 675 secondary school students of both sexes and fifty-one of their parents. Sampling procedure: 117 secondary schools were selected at random. Written questionnaires were administered to 50 percent of all eleventh graders (ages 16–17). Since the questions were too numerous, two different questionnaires had to be used. For this reason the *N* in the various tables may vary. Almost all items in these questionnaires were “closed ends.”

2. A study of ethnic attitudes among residents of Tel Aviv (Peres 1968b). Four hundred and fifty adults were interviewed; 200 of them were interviewed twice (winter 1967 and winter 1968) and 250 only once (winter 1968). The sampling procedure was an ecological cluster sampling (certain blocks were randomly selected) with an over-representation of low-status neighborhoods in which more Jews of Oriental background are likely to live. The interviewing was based on a questionnaire which might be described as “open-ended.” No preformulated categories were read to the subjects, but once a response was given it was coded immediately. In cases of doubt, the respondent was asked (*after* giving his spontaneous reply) which of the categories would best fit his answer.

3. A study of ethnic attitudes among Israeli Arabs (Peres 1970), carried out in the summer of 1966 and the fall of 1967. The sample of 500 respondents was also clustered. First, eight predominantly Arab settlements were selected according to the following strata: religious affiliation, degree of urbanization, region, and size. Then residents of these settlements were selected according to the following categories: (1) high school students (ages 14–18; *N* = 200); (2) parents of these students (ages 35–70; *N* = 100); (3) working youth (ages 14–18; *N* = 100); (4) young

adults (ages 20-35; $N = 100$). The interviews were performed by the open-ended method mentioned above.

The main problem which confronted me in all these studies was the problem of objectivity. An investigator studying ethnic relations in his own society is often identified with his group of origin. In times of political tension, he may also be suspected of collecting information for intelligence purposes. We tried to minimize the detrimental effect of these fears and suspicions (there is no way to eliminate them) by employing two principles: (a) the groups studied were represented in the investigating team throughout the project; (b) great caution was taken to ensure the confidentiality of the data, even at the risk of weakening the principal investigator's control over field work procedures.

Among students of the Hebrew University we were able to find members of different Jewish groups as well as Moslem and Christian Arabs willing to cooperate in the project. Arab interviewers performed the bulk of the interviewing of Arab respondents, but some of them also took part in every other activity of the research team, from the initial design to the final report. Confidentiality was insured by omitting the clearly identifying information. Interview reports in the Arab section did not include names or addresses, which made it impossible for the investigator to follow up the interview or check on the work of the interviewers. Among Jewish respondents, the level of suspicion was much lower, and names and addresses could be recorded.

FINDINGS

Not all the situations, relationships, and processes which were alluded to in the Introduction can be substantiated by the findings. First of all, since these findings relate to perceptions and attitudes, power relations and economic dependencies were not observed directly. Admittedly, the validity of attitude indicators is always somewhat questionable. Even in this study, we have evidence that irrelevant factors like the interviewers' nationality or attitude affected individual responses. Nevertheless, there are some good reasons to believe that the overall trends revealed by tables 3-6 indicate attitudes of various Israeli ethnic groups toward each other.

Relations among Jewish Ethnic Groups

Social distance.—The more intimate and binding the social relationship in which one would agree to participate with another person, the smaller the social distance from this person. Typical examples of social distance items are the readiness to marry or live in close proximity with members of a different ethnic group⁸ (see Matras 1965).

⁸ As on the same block.

TABLE 3
ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIAGE AND SHARED NEIGHBORHOOD
WITH ORIENTAL JEWS (RESPONDENTS: EUROPEAN
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS)

Item	Definitely Agree	Agree	Agree but Prefer Own Neighborhood	Disagree	N
Marriage.....	15%	24%	39%	21%	143
Neighborhood.....	23%	40%	35%	2%	143

SOURCE.—Peres 1963a.

TABLE 4
ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIAGE AND SHARED NEIGHBORHOOD
WITH EUROPEAN JEWS (RESPONDENTS: ORIENTAL
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS)

Item	Definitely Agree	Agree	Agree but Prefer Own Neighborhood	Disagree	N
Marriage.....	30%	51%	16%	2%	195
Neighborhood.....	30%	55%	11%	1%	195

SOURCE.—Peres 1963a.

TABLE 5
ATTITUDE TOWARD MARRIAGE AND RENTING A ROOM TO AN ORIENTAL
JEW (RESPONDENTS: TEL AVIV ADULTS, EUROPEAN)

Item	Definitely Agree	Agree	Agree but Prefer Own Group	Disagree	N
Marriage.....	37%	20%	19%	24%	204
Renting a room.....	37%	30%	7%	16%	204

SOURCE.—Peres 1965b.

TABLE 6
ATTITUDE TOWARD MARRIAGE AND RENTING A ROOM TO A EUROPEAN
JEW (RESPONDENTS: TEL AVIV ADULTS, ORIENTAL)

Item	Definitely Agree	Agree	Agree but Prefer Own Group	Disagree	N
Marriage.....	85%	10%	3%	3%	239
Renting a room.....	65%	25%	5%	5%	239

SOURCE.—Peres 1965b.

Tables 3, 4, and 5 reveal considerable social distance between Jews of European and Oriental descent, and the majority of respondents had at least some reservations about involving themselves "too closely" with the other group. It is remarkable, however, that only a small minority expressed clear antagonism to a close involvement, which suggests the existence of a powerful norm against the exclusion of other Jewish groups. While private preferences for intra-ethnic contacts are admitted, it does not seem permissible to elevate these preferences to a principle.

Social distance between Europeans and Orientals is asymmetrical: Orientals accept Europeans more than vice versa. This result is particularly evident when comparing tables 5 and 6. The outstanding difference between tables 3 and 5 and tables 4 and 6, respectively, was unanticipated and scarcely explainable. The questions about marriage asked in both studies were identical, and questions about neighborhoods were similar. Nevertheless, the distribution was quite different. This difference may be attributed to the different mode of interviewing (the interview vs. the questionnaire), to different location of the subjects (Tel Aviv vs. the entire country), or to age differences (high school students vs. adults). At present, we are unable to isolate these factors. In considering the validity of these distributions, note, however, that the percentage of those European high school students who definitely accepted intermarriage with Orientals exactly equals the percentage of mixed couples in the entire population of Jewish married couples (see Matras 1965, tables 2 and 5).

By using similar social distance questions, we found that, among Europeans from different countries of origin, social distance is considerably smaller than the above-mentioned distances, while, among Orientals of different countries of origin, it tends to be even larger than the distance between Oriental and European Jews.

In interviews or in written comments added to questionnaires, some respondents tried to explain their attitudes. Refusal to intermarry with Orientals is usually justified on grounds of a cultural gap or a different mentality, rather than explicitly in terms of racial inferiority. Typical reactions would be, "I prefer to marry somebody of my own background because of the importance of having the same mentality," or "I wouldn't want to have a cultural gap in my family," or, more specifically, "I can't see myself married to a man who wants to have about twelve children."

Sometimes prejudicial overtones are revealed while arguing for a favorable attitude: "I will marry the one whom I love, even if he is Oriental." Most Orientals accept intermarriage; some even prefer it. One outspoken respondent said, "I wouldn't only agree, but would even prefer it [to marry a European]. First of all, if I marry a girl of my own community, this will not contribute anything to bringing the communities closer.

Second, I believe marriage with a European would result in better children."

Stereotypes and prejudices.—The possible specific indications of generally prejudiced attitudes are many. In order to diminish the arbitrariness of selecting a few of them, we chose two very broad items, one claiming that unfavorable evaluations of Orientals are, according to Allport's well-known term, "earned," that is, reflect reality. The second claims that, although the current backwardness of non-Europeans may be reduced, it can never be totally abolished.

In order not to employ only abstract stereotypes, we added a concrete claim (that Oriental neighborhoods are dirty), which is also well known in the literature on prejudice and stereotypes. In order to overcome possible reluctance on the part of respondents to express prejudiced attitudes, we added the phrase, "Some people say," to each claim. This was also intended to disengage the interviewer from these prejudiced statements. Our pretest indicated that none of these stereotypes was attributed to Europeans, so we had to use a special item which stated that Europeans are emotionally "cold and unresponsive—the shortcoming most frequently ascribed to Europeans in our preliminary unstructured interviews.

Table 7 shows that prejudice against Orientals is, on the average, as

TABLE 7
PREJUDICE AGAINST ORIENTALS

Question	Ethnic Group	Definitely Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N
Some people say that, for prejudices to be abolished, Orientals must rid themselves of their shortcomings. What's your opinion?	Orientals	26%	17%	34%	23%	246
	Europeans	23%	20%	39%	18%	204
Some people say that, even though Orientals may progress a lot, they will never reach the level of Europeans. What's your opinion?	Orientals	18%	16%	30%	37%	246
	Europeans	8%	17%	39%	35%	204
Some people say that neighborhoods where Orientals live seem always to be dirty. What's your opinion?	Orientals	27%	38%	21%	14%	246
	Europeans	20%	39%	29%	12%	204

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

strong among Orientals as among Europeans. This might be interpreted as a certain degree of self-contempt on the part of the Orientals, probably originating from an acceptance of European prejudices.⁹ It should be remembered, however, that many Orientals think of *other* Orientals (not only different individuals but different subgroups) when expressing this kind of prejudiced attitude (table 8). (This tendency will be discussed later in detail.) Table 8 shows that even the relatively mild allegation against Europeans is rather rare; only a quarter of the Orientals express prejudice, and Europeans reject it altogether. Thus the asymmetry which was found in analyzing social distance recurs here. Europeans are perceived by Orientals more as a guide or reference group than as an "oppressing majority."

Feelings of interdependence.—In most studies of ethnic relations, negative aspects are carefully explored, while such positive feelings as mutual attraction and interdependence somehow escape the attention of the interviewers. In most studies, the most extreme positive attitude a respondent could have is to regard people of a different background "simply as human beings," that is, to disregard their ethnicity. Our findings indicate that in Israel social distance and prejudice are at least partially balanced by a sense of interdependence and by the desire for a fully integrated society in the future. When asked whether it would be better for the country if there were fewer of the other group, a clear majority of both Europeans and Orientals said "no."¹⁰ Again, the Orientals' attitude toward the Europeans was more favorable than vice versa. Some of the justification referred to the need to have more Jews in Israel, whatever their background. Some, however, referred to characteristics of the other group which seemed constructive.

"If the Europeans hadn't founded this country, we would have had nowhere to come," one Oriental woman said. Another simply stated,

TABLE 8
PREJUDICE AGAINST EUROPEANS

Question	Ethnic Group	Definitely Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N
Some people say that Europeans are emotionally cold and unresponsive. What's your opinion? . .	Orientals	13%	14%	26%	47%	246
	Europeans	3%	8%	41%	48%	204

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

⁹ Shuval (1966) reports on the actual manifestations of self-rejection.

¹⁰ R. M. Williams (1964, p. 410) adapted this item as an indicator of prejudice.

"We need the Europeans; they are the brain." A European respondent said, "The Orientals coming in their great numbers saved the state and its European old-timers. If they hadn't come, we would be now a negligible enclave in an Arab ocean."

The desire for integration.—Ethnic attitudes should be analyzed in the context of their time perspective. Are current characteristics and relationships perceived as enduring and permanent, or are they flexible, developing toward a more egalitarian (or possibly less egalitarian) solution? Many observers view prejudice as an attitude not only negative but rigid, as an expression of an eternal truth for the past which will continue to apply in the future.

Since, in Israel, the common historical root (ancient Israel) is always emphasized, the notion of inherited inferiority is extremely rare. Ethnic differences are perceived as cultural, acquired in the various societies of exile. When considering the future, most Israelis view ethnic differences as something which can and should eventually disappear. Table 9 indicates that a majority disagrees with the prediction that Orientals will never be able to close the gap between themselves and the Europeans. Tables 9 and 10 summarize the responses to these questions: "In your opinion, is it desirable that the present differences between ethnic groups

TABLE 9
ATTITUDES TOWARD DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JEWISH
ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE FUTURE

Ethnic Group	Differences Should Remain as They Are	Differences in Tradition Should Remain	All Differences Should Disappear	Total
Orientals.....	2%	24%	75%	195
Europeans.....	2%	34%	64%	143
Total.....	3%	28%	70%	338

SOURCE.—Peres 1968a.

TABLE 10
EXPECTATIONS ABOUT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ETHNIC
GROUPS IN THE FUTURE (20 YEARS)

Ethnic Group	Differences Will Remain as They Are Now	No Substantial Differences Will Remain	No Differences Will Remain	Total
Orientals.....	13%	44%	42%	264
Europeans.....	19%	58%	23%	204
Total.....	16%	50%	33%	450

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

in Israel should disappear?" and "Do you think that twenty years from now differences between ethnic groups will disappear?" Our subjects tend both to expect and endorse the reduction of inter-ethnic differences. These responses do not lend any support to the notion that Orientals in Israel are "forcefully Westernized."¹¹ As a matter of fact, Orientals are slightly more eager to abolish differences, while Europeans are slightly more concerned about preserving ethnic traditions.

We encouraged interviewees to elaborate the kinds of ethnic tradition they would like to preserve. The positively evaluated differences were almost always stated: "Everybody can keep his traditional life-style at home. In public places, however, an individual should behave just like everyone else." But even at home, special traditions are endorsed in peripheral or aesthetic issues: "We have some old and extremely nice folkways. It would be a pity to lose them." Another typical quotation is, "Why shouldn't everybody keep his own tradition, as long as he doesn't interfere with other people's rights?" As already emphasized, even this partial nostalgia is a minority attitude. The majority of Orientals want complete assimilation and explicitly cite the Europeans as a desirable model. "I wish we Persians could overcome all our superstitions and be more like the Europeans—educated, industrious, and clean." Others urge the development of a new tradition which would be national and non-ethnic: "I hope a new and unified Israeli tradition will emerge."

Jewish Attitudes toward Arabs

Hostility and social distance.—The levels of hostility and social distance increase considerably when Arabs are mentioned. Actually, it was difficult to formulate differentiating questions. During the pretest, the overwhelming majority of the sample tended to concentrate in the negative categories of each question. In some cases, we tried to add another extremely negative category, so that degrees of hostility toward Arabs could be differentiated. Tables 11, 12, and 13 reveal the severity of anti-Arab feelings.

Perhaps the most interesting finding was a tendency for Orientals to be more hostile than Europeans toward Arabs. At first, this discovery seems to be astonishing. It might have been assumed that the Orientals, with close ties to the Arab culture, could serve as mediators between European Israelis and Arabs. However, this is clearly not the case.

Many Oriental respondents sought to explain their negative feelings toward Arabs by referring to previous unpleasant experiences under

¹¹ M. Seltzer (1967) stresses the argument that Orientals are Westernized against their will and that their specific culture is deliberately destroyed. He implies that the majority of Orientals want to preserve ethnic differences. However, he fails to present any data to that effect.

TABLE 11
SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM ARABS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
ORIENTAL AND EUROPEAN RESPONDENTS

Item	Ethnic Group	No Data	Definitely Agree	Agree	Agree but Prefer a Jew	Do Not Agree	Strongly Disagree	Total
Readiness for marriage...	Orientals	1	0	2%	6%	24%	67%	192
	Europeans	0	0	11%	13%	29%	56%	139
Readiness for friendship...	Orientals	2	0	4%	23%	34%	38%	192
	Europeans	1	3%	10%	27%	32%	27%	139
Readiness for neighborhood...	Orientals	2	1%	7%	32%	27%	32%	192
	Europeans	0	4%	12%	32%	27%	25%	139

SOURCE.—Peres 1968a.

TABLE 12
PREJUDICE AGAINST ARABS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
ORIENTAL AND EUROPEAN RESPONDENTS

Item	Europeans	Orientals
It would be better if there were fewer Arabs.....	91%	93%
Every Arab hates Jews.....	76%	83%
Arabs will not reach the level of progress of Jews.....	64%	85%
Disagree to rent a room to an Arab.....	80%	91%
Disagree to have an Arab as a neighbor.....	53%	78%
Total.....	204	246

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

TABLE 13
SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM ARABS: A COMPARISON BETWEEN
ORIENTAL AND EUROPEAN RESPONDENTS

Question	Ethnic Group	Agree	Agree but Prefer Own Group	Disagree	Total
To marry.....	Orientals	11%	5%	84%	246
	Europeans	9%	11%	79%	204
To rent a room.....	Orientals	6%	4%	91%	246
	Europeans	13%	7%	80%	204
To have as neighbor....	Orientals	12%	9%	78%	246
	Europeans	26%	21%	53%	204

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

Arab domination. This explanation seems insufficient to account for the extreme hostility revealed in the findings. The antagonism of Orientals toward Arabs should be seen in the context of their present illusion as well as a result of past experience. The Orientals feel that they must reject the remaining traces of their Middle Eastern origin to attain the status of the dominant European group. By expressing hostility to Arabs, an Oriental attempts to rid himself of the "inferior" Arabic elements in his own identity and to adopt a position congenial to the European group which he desires to emulate.

If this line of reasoning is correct, then those Orientals most resembling Arabs should be more hostile than others. With this hypothesis in mind, we instructed the interviewers in our second study (Peres 1968b) to record the degree of resemblance of each Oriental respondent to Arabs on two criteria: appearance and accent. Table 14 shows that hostility (as expressed in the agreement to two prejudicial statements) increases slightly when resemblance to Arabs (as reported by the interviewers) increases. While these findings are not statistically significant, they do seem to be rather consistent. The slightness of the differences may stem from a ceiling effect: the ratio of anti-Arab prejudice is high in all the categories of resemblance to Arabs and therefore cannot increase greatly. If we accept this as an indication of the validity of our hypothesis, we may conclude

TABLE 14
PREJUDICE AGAINST ARABS AMONG ORIENTALS ACCORDING
TO THEIR RESEMBLANCE TO ARABS

DEGREE OF RESEMBLANCE	QUESTION AND RESPONSE					N
	Arabs Understand Only Force		Arabs Will Not Reach the Level of Progress of Jews			
	Agree	Dis- agree	Agree	Have Res- ervation	Dis- agree	
Do not bear resem- blance to Arabs:						
By accent.....	84%	15%	79%	7%	13%	42
By appearance...	87%	13%	77%	7%	17%	35
Bear some resem- blance to Arabs:						
By accent.....	83%	14%	84%	6%	10%	105
By appearance...	83%	17%	84%	5%	11%	143
Bear resemblance to Arabs:						
By accent.....	89%	11%	89%	2%	9%	99
By appearance...	91%	9%	89%	3%	8%	68

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

that hostility between Arabs and Jews of Middle Eastern origin exists, not in spite of, but partially because of their many similarities.

Effects of the Six-Day War.—As a result of the Six-Day War, social distance and hostility toward Arabs increased even more. Table 15 shows an increase in four out of five indications of anti-Arab attitudes between 1967 and 1968. It is noteworthy that these data were collected before Israeli-Arab participation in terror raids became known. As you may recall, most Arabs adopted a passive neutrality during the war. Small fringe groups performed very ineffective anti-Israeli activities, while other small groups expressed their loyalty to Israel by actively helping in the war effort. At the time, the latter received much more publicity than the former. It may thus be concluded that the behavior of Israeli Arabs had no effect on the increase of Jewish hostility. This hostility resulted from the overall political situation rather than from local interaction. Generally speaking, the position of an enemy-affiliated minority is endangered when a violent clash breaks out, whatever their attitudes or actual behavior might be. The situation of the Israeli Arab seems to be no exception to this rule.

Arab Attitudes toward Jews

Social distance.—Table 16 reveals that considerable rejection of social contact with Jews does exist among Israeli Arabs. Note that "friendship" is consistently conceived as less binding than neighborhood, as more respondents accept friendship than neighborhood. Some respondents explained that friendship is selective and individual; you can choose your friend personally, but not your neighbor, and neighborhood also involves the entire family. Many Arab respondents, while being quite prepared to have contact with Jews, were anxious not to allow any such contacts to

TABLE 15
NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD ARABS BEFORE AND AFTER THE 1967 WAR

QUESTION	YEAR	
	1967	1968
It would be better if there were fewer Arabs.....	80%	91%
The Arabs will never reach the level of progress of Jews..	62%	76%
Every Arab hates Jews.....	73%	80%
Disagree to rent a room to an Arab.....	80%	86%
Disagree to have an Arab as a neighbor.....	67%	67%
Total.....	200	450

SOURCE.—Peres 1968b.

TABLE 16
SOCIAL DISTANCE FROM JEWS

Israeli Arabs	Agree to Make Friends with Jews	Agree to Live in Jewish Quarter	Agree to Live in House with Jews	N
All respondents.....	58%	42%	30%	464
Students.....	53%	42%	31%	181
Parents.....	69%	36%	22%	98
Young adults.....	57%	44%	36%	90
Working youth.....	56%	44%	32%	95

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

the female members of their families.¹² In an Arab rural environment, most people live in their own homes, which are built by or for the family. A family rarely changes its home during the lifetime of one generation. The lack of cars and telephones and the confinement of the women and younger children to the home intensifies contact with nearby residents. Thus, neighbors are extremely important.

On the other hand, "friendship" is offered freely to every casual acquaintance. A villager is expected to invite almost every person he meets to eat or at least have coffee with him. If such an invitation is accepted, both men will define themselves as "friends," and will exhibit a pleasant although uncommitted attitude toward each other. This friendship is less selective and less personal than in Western societies.

If these arguments are valid, then we should predict that traditional parents would be more inclined than their more modernized sons to make friends with Jews but *less* inclined to accept Jews as neighbors. Table 16 substantiates this prediction. While the rejection of social contact with Jews is, as I have said, considerable, it is significantly lower than the Jews' rejection of Arabs. Again, we observe asymmetry in the relations between a dominant and a minority group. The minority member may feel that he may gain by interaction with the majority, while majority members will tend to exclude outsiders because, among other things, they are perceived as potential competitors.

Attitudes toward the State of Israel.—Attitudes which Israeli-Arabs display toward Israel as a political entity seem to constitute a much more severe problem than do their attitudes toward Jews as individuals. Even societies with a long tradition of institutionalized dissent seem to confront a dilemma if dissenters come to question the legitimacy of the

¹² Note that all our Arab respondents were male. Early attempts to interview Arabs of both sexes failed almost completely. A typical reply a female interviewer received when asking to see one of a respondent's four daughters was, "Sorry, but I have no daughters."

society's very existence or the validity of its ultimate values. This dilemma is particularly severe if the society has recently been established and if its continuous existence is not absolutely secure.

As table 17 shows, the right of Israel to exist is not absolutely accepted by our Arab sample. The interesting category is, of course, "Yes, with reservations." The main reservations concern (as one might expect) Israel's treatment of the Palestinian Arabs. About half of those who chose this response explicitly mentioned repatriation of the refugees as a condition for Israel's right to exist. Others emphasized mainly the granting of full first-class citizenship to those Arabs now residing in Israel. Comparing the subgroups in the sample, the most striking difference is between students and parents. (The parents are the fathers of the students who were interviewed, so that the differences cannot be attributed to different family background.)

The tendency of the young Israeli-educated Arab to display extreme nationalistic and sometimes hostile attitudes (revealed also in tables 18 and 19) calls for special attention. Note that these young people are relatively similar to their Jewish counterparts in most nonpolitical respects, a similarity which draws them closer to Jewish individuals. They are also

TABLE 17
HAS THE STATE OF ISRAEL A RIGHT TO EXIST?

Israeli Arabs	Yes	Yes, with Reservations	Refuse to Answer	No	N
All respondents.....	31%	49%	4%	16%	470
Students.....	24%	49%	3%	24%	192
Parents.....	54%	41%	2%	3%	96
Young adults.....	25%	61%	4%	10%	89
Working youth.....	29%	44%	6%	20%	93

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

TABLE 18
DOES THE SUBJECT FEEL MORE "AT HOME"
IN ISRAEL OR THE ARAB STATES?

Israeli Arabs	In Israel	Neither	In One of the Arab States	N
All respondents.....	37%	15%	48%	462
Students.....	31%	12%	57%	188
Parents.....	54%	18%	27%	92
Young adults.....	35%	18%	47%	88
Working youth.....	36%	11%	53%	94

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

TABLE 19
ARE THE ARABS BOUND TO WAGE ANOTHER WAR?

Israeli Arabs	Yes	Yes, If Militarily Possible	Yes, If Israel Stays Put	No	N
All respondents.....	35%	4%	15%	46%	460
Students.....	45%	4%	13%	38%	189
Parents.....	21%	3%	9%	66%	86
Young adults.....	30%	2%	19%	48%	89
Working youth.....	34%	4%	22%	40%	96

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

much better equipped (and more positively motivated) to live among Jews. The traditional village became too small for the wider perspectives and higher aspirations of these young Arabs, so some of them sought acceptance into the Jewish community, but were soon rebuffed. Their experience discouraged others. The second possible alternative for expanding an individual's horizons beyond the confines of the village would be an identification with the surrounding Arab world. Table 18 indicates that students, and to a degree other young people, feel relatively more "at home" in an Arab country, while parents tend to feel more comfortable in Israel.

The impact of the war.—The impact of the war on the Arab population in Israel should be understood in the light of the expectation of any Arab victory by the overwhelming majority. The Arab defeat thus shocked them almost as much as it did the Arabs across the border (see table 20). The humiliation of defeat could be met only with new pride, and the despair of the defeated Arab populations aroused stronger sympathy and loyalty. Thus we observe in table 21 that the war served to increase the Arabs' hatred rather than their respect for the State of Israel. While table 21 deals with the respondent's perception of a change over time, the change is better recorded by comparing responses to identical questions posed to Arab respondents before and after the war. Table 22 indicates that *more* Arabs now feel at home in the Arab world and fewer feel at home in Israel. Similarly, according to table 23, fewer Arab respondents tend to see their future as positively bound with Israel.

CONCLUSION

Ethnic relations do not exist in a vacuum, but are interwoven with other facets of social structure and environment. This general perception is specifically true about Israel, a country in which some ethnic problems

TABLE 20
EXPECTED RESULTS OF THE WAR: WHEN THE WAR
BROKE OUT, WHO DID YOU THINK WOULD WIN?

The Arabs	No One	Israel, but a Less Deci- sive Victory	Israel	N
67%	18%	5%	9%	457

SOURCE.—Peres 1970

TABLE 21
THE PERCEIVED INFLUENCE OF THE WAR ON THE ARABS' ATTITUDE
TOWARD ISRAEL: HOW, IN YOUR VIEW, DID THE WAR INFLUENCE
THE ARABS' EVALUATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL?

Attitude	Rose	Remained the Same	Fell	N
Respect.....	43%	17%	40%	299
Despair.....	52%	34%	13%	282
Hatred.....	73%	23%	4%	291

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

TABLE 22
FEELING MORE AT HOME IN ISRAEL OR IN AN ARAB
COUNTRY BEFORE AND AFTER THE JUNE WAR
(HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS ONLY)

Attitude	1966	1967
More at home in Israel.....	62%	31%
No difference.....	14%	12%
More at home in an Arab country..	23%	57%
N.....	117	188

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

TABLE 23
POLITICAL FUTURE PERSPECTIVES, BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR: WHAT
WOULD YOU LIKE THE FUTURE OF THE ISRAELI ARAB TO BE?
(HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS ONLY)

Response	1966	1967
They will become part of the Jewish public.....	6%	...
A separate but equal people within the state of Israel..	81%	53%
They will be in a separate state of their own.....	13%	17%
An Arab state will arise in the <i>entire</i> territory of Pales- tine.....	Not asked	19%
N.....	116	191

SOURCE.—Peres 1970.

seem to be very close to solution while others may be close to explosion. This contrast can be explained in fact by the distinctive functions which the Oriental Jews and the Arabs perform for Israeli society.

After the diminution of European Jewish immigration to Israel, the mass immigration from the Middle East reestablished the young state's movement toward its declared goals. Orientals occupied the vacant land and houses abandoned by the escaping Arabs, joined Israel's armed forces, and provided a sound justification for mobilizing economic, cultural, and political aid from world Jewry. In short, Orientals contributed to Israel's survival and progress in ways that Israeli Arabs were in no position to do. Even the most moderate and loyal individuals among them could not fully identify with the country's Zionist zeal, with its commitment to Jewish immigration, and, most important, with its struggle against the Arab world. These different backgrounds were further polarized when the three main ethnic groups (European Jews, Oriental Jews, and Arabs) began to interact. The Orientals aspired to full integration into the mainstream of Israeli life. This meant a movement away from their Middle Eastern (that is, Arab) background and toward the dominant European group. Arabs became for the Oriental Jews a "marking-off" group which symbolized everything resented and dispensable in their own background. The threat of surrounding Arab hostility became a catalyst for increasing unity among Israeli Jews, while the nonviolent but intense hostility against the Arab minority was a negative manifestation of this otherwise encouraging unity.

From the Arab minority's point of view, the need for full participation in the country's social, economic, and political life became more urgent, while the prospects for such participation did not increase. Thus, the most dynamic and competent individuals who might have been the pioneers of integration under different circumstances became the most outspoken advocates of political hostility. One of the most tragic aspects of the conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors is that the two groups who could be potential mediators—the Israeli Jews of Middle Eastern background and Arabs of advanced Israeli education—are the least motivated to strive for reconciliation.

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Intellectual Achievers: A Study of Eighteenth-Century Scotland¹

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Eighteenth-century Scotland produced many important intellectual leaders. Study of the lives of the individual achievers as well as the parishes in which they were born and educated indicates that education was the key to achievement and that most of the achievers came from urban areas, were born into the upper middle class, attended university, and lived longer than the average person. In sum, the eighteenth-century Scottish achiever seems to resemble his twentieth-century counterpart in many ways.

Throughout history there are societies and peoples which seem to have periods of great intellectual achievement and contribute eminent men in numbers substantially out of proportion to their population. Coming readily to mind are such societies as Athens during its Golden Age, Renaissance Florence, Elizabethan England, seventeenth-century Holland, and the German- or Yiddish-speaking Jews of the late nineteenth century and first part of the twentieth century. There are many others. Historians have long been interested in trying to explain these spurts of creativity, but even when they have concentrated on a particular society or time period such as the Renaissance (Ferguson 1948) they have not always been able to agree on answers, let alone answers which might hold for more than one society or period.

Historians have not been the only group interested in trying to explain why some societies seem to produce more than their share of men of genius, as witnessed by the rapidly growing literature on creativity (Ghiselin 1952; Bloom 1964; Kagan 1967; Coser 1969). The anthropologist A. L. Kroeber (1944) held that, since biological proclivity to genius was probably randomly distributed in populations, the differential rate of accomplishment from one period to another or between societies must necessarily be related to cultural factors. Florence Kluckhohn (1961) attempted to distinguish the value systems of various cultures as they related to achievement. David McClelland (1961), a psychologist,

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adopted the cultural answer, relating achievement themes in the literature of a society to its economic development.

The cultural approach, however, leaves some questions unanswered. Why do certain societies develop a need for achievement or produce a climate in which achievement is favored? Undoubtedly, social structural variables must also be investigated. Here sociologists have made important contributions, although they have generally addressed themselves to the question of economic development rather than intellectual achievement (Weber 1930; Parsons and Smelser 1956; Smelser and Lipset 1964). More closely related to this research is a pioneering study by Joseph Schneider (1938). He examined the backgrounds of eminent Englishmen born between 1400 and 1850 and found that social class origins were related to the type of achievement of the individual. It seems that the best way to approach the problem is to use an interdisciplinary approach.

As a start it was decided to do an in-depth study of one society during the period of its greatest intellectual achievement. To do such a study, it was necessary that there were sufficient source materials readily available, that there was more or less accurate information about the size of the population and other social and economic data, and that the society was small and compact enough to be studied in detail. The society that most satisfied the requirements was Scotland in the eighteenth century. The eighteenth century was the Golden Age of Scottish intellectual achievement, with Adam Smith, David Hume, James Watt, Robert Burns, Sir Walter Scott, James Mill, James Boswell, and numerous other figures active during the period.

On the other hand, Scotland before the eighteenth century had produced few men with more than local reputations. By the end of the century, however, Scotland had forged ahead in many realms of scholarship and learning—science, medicine, imaginative writing, creative art, and technology. Her universities were known throughout Europe and America, and her poets, novelists, artists, philosophers, historians, scientists, physicians, and engineers were among the most innovative and prominent in Europe. Edinburgh, the capital of Scotland, came to be known as the Athens of the North.

At the same time, Scotland had a background of poverty. In the seventeenth century, it was regarded as one of the poorest countries in Europe. By the end of the eighteenth, it had begun to emerge as an industrial and commercial leader in Europe. How did an economically underdeveloped country manage to move to the forefront of the European intellectual and economic scene? Did an increase in prosperity work to increase intellectual achievement, or were there more subtle

relationships? In effect, what caused the transformation of Scotland from a cultural backwater to a position of intellectual leadership?

In general, the answers given by historians can be categorized as: the effects of population growth, the introduction of industrialization, the improvements in agriculture (Stirling 1906; MacDonald 1937; Campbell 1965), and the 1707 Act of Union with England (Linklater 1968), and the influence of John Knox's Presbyterian reforms in education (Pryde 1962; Davis 1964). Growing urbanization and the development of a larger middle class must also be considered as contributing to the achievements of the century.

A two-step methodology was used; both the innovative men and the areas they grew up in were studied. First, a comprehensive sample of eminent men were selected through a survey of standard reference works in the history of science, medicine, engineering, literature, art, and so forth. This list was then compared with those men included in the *Dictionary of National Biography (DNB)* (1885-1901) who achieved eminence in intellectual fields; we eliminated most of the military leaders or political figures whose accomplishments in reaching high office alone led to their being included in the *DNB*. We also eliminated large numbers of religious figures who were important in the administration of the Scottish church but were not necessarily important as innovative intellectual leaders. The result was a population of 375 individuals (364 men and eleven women). Biographical studies were done for each of these, in an attempt to determine where they were born, where they were educated, their social class background, their level of education, their place in the family constellation, and so on.²

It was found that the 375 subjects in the eminent population had been born or educated in 175 of the 938 parishes in existence in eighteenth century Scotland. Only 104 parishes had eminent people educated within their boundaries. This allowed some comparisons between contributing parishes, but a second step was included to extend the study somewhat further. A random sample of seventy-one noncontributing parishes were drawn as a control group from the various volumes of Sir John Sinclair's *Statistical Account of Scotland* (1791-99), giving a total of 246 parish units, approximately 25 percent of the total number of parishes in existence.

Although the parish was a religious unit, for elementary educational purposes it was also a political unit, and most of the available statistics for eighteenth-century Scotland are for parish units. Some parishes were classed as royal or ducal burghs, which suggests an urban character, although burghs varied in size and some so classified were little more than

² A total of 200 works were consulted, including manuscript sources. These are much too numerous to list in the references.

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villages. In the sample, forty-nine (20 percent) of the areas were listed as burghs; that is, the parish either had a self-governing burgh within its boundaries or it was encompassed within a burgh. An attempt was made to describe each parish in terms of its population (including changes during the century), the state of industrialization or of agricultural reform, the nature of elementary education, the prosperity of the parish, and other features.

Space does not permit us to report all of the findings in the study, but some of the conclusions regarding the parish data, including population, economic development, and the nature of the educational system, have been reported elsewhere (Bullough 1970). It was found that a significant factor in predicting which areas of Scotland would produce eminent men was the educational system of the parish. Though urbanization, prosperity, and union with England were important, as was the incipient Industrial Revolution, the greatest results were achieved in those parishes which were able to apply some of the new sources of revenue to the expansion of the school system or to encouraging the growth of specialized teaching in the parish school system.

What kinds of backgrounds did the individual achievers have in common? Here, there were some significant findings. In light of the findings about contributing parishes, it was evident that one of the hypotheses of the study should be that there would be a greater chance for an individual to achieve intellectual eminence if he was born in an urban or suburban parish. In fact, only twelve individuals (3 percent) were born in parishes with less than 500 people. The median population of the parishes in which eminent people were born was approximately 2,800, and this was much larger than the average for Scottish parishes of that time. The importance of urbanization (in eighteenth-century terms) as a factor in intellectual achievement is emphasized by the finding that 117 subjects in the sample (31 percent) were born in parishes of over 8,000 people, a size which would have established them as major cities. Though parish population turned out to be a significant factor in the background of the achievers (Pearson's contingency coefficient = .235), population per se is not the only index of urbanization. To gain a better picture of the birthplaces of eminent men, we set the parish into the context of the shire (or county), the next largest unit of government. Only eleven individuals (3 percent) were born in shires with less than 5,000 population, and in fact a total of only twenty-five came from shires with 10,000 or less population. The population median for the shire in which eminent people were born fell between 60,000 and 80,000, and when it is noted that only six of the shires had more than 60,000 people it seems apparent that those Scots born in the more populous districts would have a greater chance of achieving intellectual eminence, particu-

larly since the total population of those shires under 60,000 was much greater than those over that figure.

Another indication of the nature of the parish is its geographical size, that is, the number of square miles included in its confines. There were several parishes in the highland districts of Scotland which stretched over several miles along both sides of a river valley or of a mountain ridge. Since most parishes at best had only a single parish school, it was hypothesized that the eminent individuals would come from those that were the most compact. When parish size was examined, it was found that 107 individuals (28 percent) were born in parishes of less than four square miles. The median size of the parish in which eminent people were born was under ten square miles. Some of the larger parishes of thirty-five square miles or more were eighteen miles or more long and less than two miles wide. In sum, the data indicate that a compact parish with a concentrated population would be most likely to be the birthplace of eminent men and that an urban background is a factor most of the eminent men had in common. Even the highest density, however, was not very great, and at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Scotland had a little over 1 million people in 938 parishes encompassing 20 million acres of land. Edinburgh, the largest city, had only 30,000 inhabitants.

RELIGION

Scotland was primarily a Presbyterian country in the eighteenth century. There were some dissenting Protestants and a number of Catholics, but Catholics in particular worshiped under severe disabilities. On the other hand, the Presbyterian church was somewhat factionalized, with an established church and various free or covenanting Presbyterian churches. Actual religious affiliation of the parents could be established in only about 55 percent of the cases, although it is safe to assume that the overwhelming majority of those who were unidentified belonged to the established Presbyterian church simply because members of the dissenting, Catholic, Episcopal, or covenanting families were likely to be specifically identified as such.

Only three individuals in the sample (less than 1 percent) were born into Catholic families, a percentage somewhat smaller than the estimated 3 percent of the population who adhered to the Catholic faith. The lower percentage is indicative both of the difficulties a Catholic had to overcome in attending a school and earning a living and of the nature of the Catholic schools. The few Catholic schools which did exist were mainly covert or undercover institutions, and their main purpose was to recruit and educate priests to serve the Catholic population. Comple-

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cating these difficulties was a geographical factor—the Catholics were most likely to reside in the more inaccessible and less populated parts of Scotland.

Episcopalians, another religious minority, had a somewhat easier time, particularly in the areas near royal garrisons where the Crown had built Episcopal churches. Moreover, since Episcopalianism was the established church in England, in social terms, its adherents were more likely to be of higher status, at least before the Scottish Rebellion of 1745, which was in part led by adherents of the Church of England. It has been estimated that prior to 1745 at least half of the Scottish nobility belonged to the Episcopal church, and about 14 percent of the ministers in Scotland were classed as Episcopalian. Nevertheless, only twenty individuals (5 percent) were born into Episcopal families.

Double that number, forty individuals (11 percent), came from various kinds of dissenting Presbyterian or other Protestant families. This is probably because even though the dissenters were harshly regarded by the established church, they very often held considerable political power. All the larger towns of Scotland had dissenting or covenanting Presbyterian congregations.

Religious affiliation of the achiever as an adult could be identified in 206 cases (55 percent), but as in the case of the religion of the family, it can be assumed that the overwhelming majority of those whose affiliations were unidentified belonged to the established Church of Scotland. Since achievement often coincides with a breaking of tradition and since the Church of Scotland was the dominant normative force in that period, it was hypothesized that a number of achievers who were born into the established church would not remain members as adults. Ninety-six individuals (26 percent of the total sample) can be definitely identified as belonging to something other than the established Presbyterian church, a 50 percent increase over the number who were born into dissenting or other families.

It was also hypothesized that the achievers would run into other kinds of conflict with the value system of the time, although this proved difficult to measure. Nevertheless, some sixty-three (17 percent) were identified as being involved in some sort of difficulty with the law, mostly over religion or politics, although some were also charged with what we now regard as felonies.

SOCIAL CLASS

The high correlation between socioeconomic status and educational attainment is well documented in contemporary literature (Coleman et al. 1966; Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb 1944; Haverman and West 1952; Floyd, Halsey, and Martin 1957). Though such studies have con-

centrated on contemporary America or Europe, some of the methods utilized might also be applied to the eighteenth century, providing social class can be defined as meaning those aggregates of individuals who occupy broadly similar positions on a scale of prestige. Historical definitions, however, are somewhat more difficult to make than others, but the four-step categorization developed by Richard Centers (1949) proved useful. It was based upon a "lower class" of unskilled workers, a "working class" of manual workers in semiskilled and skilled occupations, a "middle class" of white-collar workers and professionals, and an "elite" differentiated from the middle class not so much in terms of occupation as of wealth and lineage. For this study the categories were upper, upper middle, lower middle, and lower.

In Scottish terms, it can be said that the upper class was made up of the hereditary nobility and the lairds reckoned noble by Scottish heraldic usage. The upper middle class was made up of ministers (the most prestigious nonnoble group in eighteenth-century Scotland), tackmen (holders of leased land who did not farm but sublet the land to tenants), some of the untitled landowners (particularly the heritors, those liable for public assessment), professionals, such as lawyers and physicians, businessmen of wealth and success, military leaders (all officers), university teachers, and so forth. The lower middle class included small businessmen, skilled artisans, yeoman farmers, local teachers, and some white-collar workers, such as clerks. The lower class included all laborers, tenants, and skilled workers in the highlands (who were regarded as servants of the laird), as well as those who were regarded as outcasts by the society of the time. It should be emphasized that some occupations changed status, such as tackmen in the highlands, during the course of the century, and this was taken into account in the classification. The social class of the achievers was based upon the class into which they were born and was determined by the social status of the father, although information was also sought about the status of the mother. It is a commentary on the status of women in the eighteenth century that in a very large proportion of cases it was impossible even to find the name of the mother let alone any information on her social background.

The majority of the achievers, 55 percent, were born into upper-middle-class families. Comparatively few (8 percent) were born into the nobility or upper class, and it was concluded that upper-class status tended to discourage the type of schooling associated with intellectual achievement, since its members already had a secure position in society. This corresponds with the earlier findings of Schneider (1938) for England. Some 27 percent were born to the lower-middle or working-class families and only 10 percent to the lower class, the group which made up the overwhelming majority of the population (probably 90 percent).

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OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF THE FATHER

In order to further study background factors, information on the occupation of the father was tabulated. The parental occupation most conducive to producing eminent children was that of minister. A total of sixty-five (17 percent) of the sample were sons (or daughters) or ministers. Next to ministers, the most significant occupational group was lairds or landowners (a group classified in this study as upper or upper middle class). A total of fifty-nine (16 percent) were major landholders in some way or another.

Sons of lawyers also tended to have an advantage in achieving eminence, and twenty (5 percent) of the sample had fathers who were lawyers, advocates, or jurists. University professors also tended to have eminent children, and fifteen (4 percent) of the sample were sons of university professors. Teachers on the lower level, though much more numerous, were not so likely to have eminent children, and only five (1 percent) of those included in the study were sons of teachers in parish schools, academies, or other lower-level educational institutions. Physicians and surgeons fathered nine (2 percent) of the children included in the study. Contributing more in total numbers than the physicians and surgeons, although much less so in proportion to their total population, were tenant farmers, who had fifteen (4 percent) of their sons and daughters included in the sample. Another thirty-four (9 percent) were sons of merchants, grocers, or fathers who were engaged in a trade or craft, and eleven (3 percent) were children of notaries, civil servants, or government officials.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Achievement in itself seemed to be related to upward mobility. As the data in this study were analyzed, however, it became apparent that there was not so much a sudden leap from one generation to another in intellectual achievement but, rather, a slow building process that took place over several generations. Where the families of individual achievers could be traced back several generations, it was often found that intellectual advancement had begun with the grandfather acquiring some modicum of schooling, perhaps even becoming a schoolmaster, the son becoming a minister, and the grandson achieving intellectual eminence.

FAMILY BACKGROUND

The importance of home environment on achievement has been the subject of several studies (Coser 1969; Goertzel and Goertzel 1962), and it was postulated that certain family factors might have influenced intellectual achievement in the eighteenth century. All of the kinds of information available today for such studies were obviously not available in the

eighteenth century. Some hints, however, can be gathered from the biographical data available to us. Does a child raised by his own parents tend to achieve more readily than one who, through the death of his parents or for other reasons, is shunted off to an institution or to relatives? In attempting to answer such questions, we found it possible to speak with assurance for only about half of the sample. Of those on whom information could be obtained, the overwhelming majority were raised by their own parents and most of the rest were raised by one of their parents. Nineteen individuals (4 percent) were raised by relatives and only three (1 percent) in institutions. In the light of the mortality figures in eighteenth-century Scotland, it would seem safe to say that an individual was more likely to attain intellectual eminence if both parents survived until he reached adulthood. Conversely, it would appear that fewer people in the sample were raised by relatives or in institutions than would have been predicted for the population as a whole, but the difficulty, if not impossibility, of obtaining the data gives only tenuous proof for such an assumption.

A similar paucity of information hampers the finding of the birth order of the persons in the sample. Past studies tend to indicate that it is the oldest or youngest child who becomes the achiever (Altus 1966; Bayer 1966, 1967; Gordon and Gordon 1967; Kammeyer 1967). There has been little verification of such a hypothesis in historical context, and as a result, a determined effort was made to establish the place in the family order of each individual subject. Adequate information was found on 227 individuals (60 percent) of the sample although not in the form used in current research into the subject. Nevertheless, it was possible to determine whether a particular individual was the oldest son or daughter or the youngest son or daughter, although it was not always possible to determine whether a subject was the oldest or youngest child. The birth orders of what must have been middle children were almost impossible to place. With these qualifications, the results for eighteenth-century Scotland tend to verify those found by modern researchers. A total of 109 individuals were the oldest, the oldest son, or the oldest daughter, or approximately 50 percent of those about whom we could gain information. Conversely, forty-eight were the youngest child, the youngest son, or the youngest daughter, or nearly 25 percent of those for whom information was available. The rest of the achievers must be classed as middle children of one sort or another.

Birth order is obviously more important in large families than in smaller ones, since the middle child in a family of twelve is much more likely to be overlooked than in a family of three. In spite of the difficulties of source materials, it was possible to find the family size for some 169 individuals (45 percent) of the sample. Twenty-four (6 percent) were only

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children, and another sixty-four (17 percent) had only one or two siblings. On the other hand, twelve individuals (3 percent) had eleven or twelve siblings, and eight (2 percent) had thirteen or more. The median number of siblings in the entire sample was three or four.

AGE AND ACHIEVEMENT

One of the surprising findings about the individual achievers was their age at death. It would seem obvious that one of the basic requirements for attaining eminence would be to live into adulthood, but it was not anticipated that so many in the sample would live so long. The earliest age at death was twenty-four, for a poet. The longest lived was 112 at death. The median age at death of the achievers in the sample was in the seventy to seventy-nine age group, although is is much closer to seventy than to seventy-nine. See table 1 for the distribution of the age at death of the achievers. This is quite different from the population median of Scotland at that time. In the 1755 census compiled by Alexander Webster (Kyd 1952), the median age of the total Scottish population was in the decade twenty-one to thirty and was fairly close to twenty-five. Even by the end of the century, the life expectancy of a five-year-old child can be estimated to have been under fifty years (Bullough et al. 1970). Table 1 shows the age at death of the 365 achievers on whom information was available compared with the age distribution of the total population in 1755.

OCCUPATION

Many of the individuals included in the study are regarded as major innovators in their fields—James Hutton in geology, John McAdam in

TABLE 1
AGES AT DEATH OF ACHIEVERS COMPARED WITH THE AGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF SCOTLAND IN 1755

ACHIEVERS' AGES AT DEATH			POPULATION DISTRIBUTION		
Age Range*	Number	Percentage	Age Range*	Number	Percentage
Under 30	3	1	30 and under . . .	768,922	61
30-39	8	2	31-40	175,202	14
40-49	29	8	41-50	134,701	11
50-59	46	13	51-60	94,840	7
60-69	93	25	61-70	58,911	5
70-79	107	29	71-80	25,659	2
80-89	69	19	81-90	6,495	...
90 and over	10	3	91 and over	587	...
Total	365	100	Total	1,265,380	100

* Exactly comparable age ranges were not available.

road building, Andrew Bell in education, David Hume in philosophy, Adam Smith in economics, and others. Even considering the fact that eighteenth-century Scotland witnessed radical changes in society and the beginnings of many new occupational areas, it would seem that individuals entering new or emerging fields would be personalities willing to break with the past and perhaps more likely to achieve eminence. In Scotland at that time, it was the norm for a son to follow the same occupation as his father. In fact, in such cities as Glasgow, with a more or less closed-guild system, it was economically advantageous to do so, since only sons or sons-in-law of the guild masters could gain membership in the guild. In the rural areas there was even less choice of occupation, since the overwhelming majority of the population earned their living by farming.

The nature of the surviving source materials prevented us from identifying the occupation of the father of forty-four individuals (12 percent) in the study, but among those whose fathers could be classified, the majority did not follow in the footsteps of their fathers. Some 225 individuals (60 percent) were in occupational groupings different from their fathers', which, in the light of the time, seems an exceptionally significant ratio. Moreover, those who did follow their fathers' occupation were usually in such fields as university teaching, law, medicine, and the ministry. It is not at all clear, however, whether the occupational change is due to the growing urbanization of Scotland and the rapid growth of towns or whether eminence in any age comes in part from the opportunity to enter a newly developing field. It might well be that the eminent achiever is less conservative than his contemporaries in venturing into a new field.

By far the largest number of eminent men in the sample were physicians or surgeons. Fifty-one (15 percent) were physicians and eight (2 percent) surgeons, or a total of fifty-nine; medicine was a field in which the eighteenth-century Scots took European leadership.

As indicated in table 2, however, occupations did not necessarily correlate with the area or specialty in which the individuals achieved eminence. Only fourteen of the thirty-five ministers, for example, achieved eminence in the field of religion, and sixteen of the thirty-four lawyers made their reputations in law. The discrepancy is greatest in the case of university professors, where only six are remembered for their contributions to education. The total numbers and percentages of those who achieved fame and the various fields in which they made their reputations are cross-tabulated in table 2 with the occupations of the achievers.

MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND WOMEN

Somewhat surprisingly, a total of forty-eight (13 percent) of those included in the study never married. Since, in 1801, the first year for which

CATEGORY OF FAME

OCCUPATION	Medicine and Science	Law	Religion	Politics and Military	Letters and Education	Engineering and Technology	Architecture and Arts (Poetry, Drama, and Painting)	Business and Economics	Others and Overlapping Categories	Total	Percentage
Physicians and surgeons	43	1	4	1	1	...	9	59	16
University professors...	19	4	7	...	20	1	6	57	15
Ministers.....	1	...	14	...	5	...	1	...	14	35	9
Lawyers, advocates, and judges.....	1	16	...	6	4	1	6	34	9
Teachers (nonuniversity).....	1	12	1	2	...	3	19	5
Engineers, mechanics, millwrights, and metalworkers.....	1	...	14	1	...	2	18	5
Artists, painters, and engravers.....	2	...	15	17	5
Publishers, printers, booksellers, and editors.....	10	...	4	2	1	17	5
Classical scholars, historians, and antiquarians.....	1	...	10	3	14	4
Poets and dramatists...	1	...	11	...	2	14	4
Novelists, biographers, and writers.....	2	...	1	...	8	2	13	3
Military officials.....	1	2	...	3	5	11	3
Physicists, chemists, geologists, mineralogists, hydrographers, mathematicians, and astronomers.....	6	1	1	...	1	2	11	3
Politicians, civil servants, and officials...	6	2	1	1	10	3
Merchants, grocers, tradesmen, etc.....	...	1	...	1	3	1	2	8	2
Bankers and businessmen.....	1	1	1	1	...	1	2	7	2
Botanists, arboriculturists, and naturalists.....	5	1	6	2
All others (each less than 2 percent).....	...	1	5	...	11	...	8	25	7
Total.....	80	23	23	17	88	20	46	8	70	375	104
Percentage.....	21	6	6	5	23	5	12	2	20	100	...

accurate statistics are available, there was a ratio of 117.6 females to 100 males (in part because of migration), bachelor status was not due to any lack of marriage mates (Kyd 1952). Moreover, sixty-two (17 percent) of the sample had two or more wives, some indication of the higher mortality rate for women. Once married, the achievers tended to have fewer children than their parents, with a median of two to three instead of four to five. Still, thirty-three (9 percent) had ten or more children. The children of the eminent achievers tended not to reach the levels their parents did. Only thirty-two (9 percent) had children who were or could have been included in the study (if the time period had been extended), although seventy-four (20 percent) had children who achieved enough importance in their own right to be included in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

Women in eighteenth-century Scotland had great difficulty in asserting themselves in any serious intellectual pursuit. The whole educational system was designed for the male, and almost all the learned professions denied admission to women. In the light of these conditions, it would seem remarkable that eleven (3 percent) of the sample were women. The majority of these were of high-social-class origin, and only three were from the middle or lower middle class. Most of them were educated at home by a private tutor, and they were most likely to achieve eminence in the literary field. The chief exception was Mary Fairfax Somerville, who was a scientist of some reputation although even she acquired part of her reputation on the basis of translations she did from French. She was the only woman in our study who in any sense competed in a male world.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

The key to much of the study was the hypothesis that education in itself was important in explaining achievement. In terms of the individual achievers, this hypothesis was verified. Only nine persons, three of whom were women, lacked formal schooling, although it was not possible to state with any degree of certainty just what kind of elementary schooling another 105 (28 percent) had. Forty-six individuals (13 percent) were educated privately, by their parents, by a tutor, or through some other such arrangement. The rest had some kind of formal elementary education either in a parish school or in a town grammar school.

The significance of education becomes even more apparent when the length of formal schooling is considered. A very high proportion of the sample turned out to be university graduates or to have attended the university for part of their training. It was possible to identify the educational level of 326 persons in the sample; of these, 76 percent (248) had

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some university education and 39 percent (127) had graduated from the university.

In examining university education in somewhat more detail, it seems apparent that university training was more important in achieving eminence for those born in the lower middle and lower classes than for those born in the upper or "elite" group. This is indicated in table 3. In effect, the general trend in the eighteenth century was the same as in the mid-twentieth: upper-middle-class parents tended to send their children to the university, and from this background the greatest number of eminent achievers came. Some members of the lower and lower middle classes also attended the university, but the number who completed their education was proportionately not as high as in the upper middle class. One of the reasons they did not complete their university training was because a special graduation fee was imposed and large numbers of students who were eligible for the degree never paid the fee necessary to graduate.

It should undoubtedly be emphasized that the very nature of intellectual achievement as defined in this study put emphasis upon university training. Still, in terms of general categories, eminence in several fields was not necessarily dependent upon university training. Seventy-three percent of those in medicine and science were university graduates, and an additional 17 percent had some university training. In law, 95 percent of those achieving eminence in the field attended university, although only 11 percent are definitely known to be university graduates. In religion, 95 percent of those achieving eminence attended university, although only 62 percent are known to have actually graduated. Even in letters, 87 percent of those classified as eminent attended the university, while 43 percent of the engineers and inventors did so. In this last case, those who had attended only elementary school outnumbered the university-trained people. This is also true in arts and business. In fact, in the field of fine arts, 10 percent had no schooling whatsoever.

TABLE 3
SOCIAL CLASS OF PARENTS COMPARED WITH ACHIEVER'S
LENGTH OF SCHOOLING (N=302)

ACHIEVER'S LENGTH OF SCHOOLING	SOCIAL CLASS OF PARENTS			
	Upper	Upper Middle	Lower Middle	Lower
None.....	3 (13)	1 (1)	3 (4)	2 (2)
Some.....	4 (17)	30 (18)	23 (35)	10 (35)
Some university.....	12 (52)	64 (38)	20 (30)	6 (21)
University graduate..	4 (17)	75 (44)	20 (30)	11 (38)
Total.....	23 (99)	170 (101)	66 (99)	29 (101)

NOTE.—Percentages are given in parentheses; $\chi^2 = 29.89$ with 9 df; $P < .001$; and Pearson's contingency coefficient $< .3001$.

SUMMARY

An overall profile of the Scottish achiever of the eighteenth century would indicate that he was born in an urban parish. His parents belonged to the Church of Scotland, lived in the midlands (the section centered around Glasgow and Edinburgh), and could be classified as upper middle class. The subject had three or four siblings, but he himself was probably the oldest. He attended the local parish school and from there went on to the university. As an adult he married, had two or three children, became a part of the upper middle class if he had not been born into it, and lived to be approximately three score and ten years of age. In sum, the eighteenth century Scottish achiever seems to resemble his twentieth-century counterpart in many ways.

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Jewish Student Attitudes toward Interreligious and Intra-Jewish Marriage

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A classification of Jewish university students into Reform and Conservative showed a marked difference in their attitudes toward interfaith and intra-Jewish marriage. Reform Jews were more willing to make interfaith marriages than were Conservative Jews. Students of both branches were more reluctant to marry Catholics than Protestants, and both were more willing to marry persons of no faith than either Catholics or Protestants. In intra-Jewish marriages, attitudes showed that Reform Jews were more willing to marry Conservative than Orthodox Jews, whereas Conservative Jews were more willing to marry Orthodox than Reform Jews. Interpretations are suggested.

Most studies of interreligious marriage in the United States are limited to three broad categories—Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish—with only an occasional breakthrough to take account of finer classifications within these religions. Greeley (1970) offers a breakdown for certain Protestant denominations which supports the position that the United States is a denominational society so far as Protestantism is concerned: marriages tend to be intradenominational as well as intrareligious within the broader categories. In common with most other studies, Greeley's does not distinguish among the three branches of Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Data on Judaism reported here are not comparable with Greeley's Protestant data, since they are based on premarital attitudes. Nevertheless, they support the general concept of Greeley's article, the need for finer religious divisions to further understanding of intermarriage.

The data come from a questionnaire study made in the spring of 1966 of attitudes of undergraduate university students toward dating and marrying members of specific other religions. Questionnaires were secured from Jewish students by mailing them to all Jewish students enrolled in a large middle-west state university,¹ supplemented by questionnaires from Jewish students enrolled in selected courses in a nearby private urban university. A 60 percent response was secured from the mailed question-

¹ The state university does not record religion of students but gives students cards at registration on which to state their religion for the benefit of religions with campus programs. The names and addresses of Jewish students were secured from the campus Hillel counselor.

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naires. The students identified themselves as Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform. Unfortunately, not enough responses were secured from Orthodox students to discover their attitudes. The affiliation of the 40 percent of the students who did not return the questionnaire is unknown. Since the questionnaires were returned anonymously, follow-up was not feasible.

This article makes three approaches to the need for specificity in studies of interreligious marriage based on data from the questionnaire study. It presents differences in attitudes of the Reform and Conservative Jewish students to marrying out of their faith, marrying into specific other religions, and marrying into another branch of Judaism. Differences between male and female attitudes are also noted.

According to the study, attitudes toward marrying into another faith differ between the Reform and Conservative Jewish students. Table 1 shows the greater willingness of Reform than of Conservative Jewish students to marry into another faith than their own. It also shows that male students in each branch are more willing than females to make an interfaith marriage. This simple table demonstrates the need in any study of Jewish interreligious marriage to distinguish both between subgroups and between males and females.

With regard to students willing to marry out of their faith, consideration should be given to the religion into which they are willing to marry, since marrying out of one's religion is also marrying into another religion or into a nonreligious population. The data on attitudes toward interreligious marriage were drawn from a Dating-Marriage Scale, resembling a social distance scale, whose six categories are indicated by the headings in table 2. The categories run from complete rejection of marriage into a specific religion to willingness to become converted to that religion to make marriage possible.

TABLE 1
ATTITUDES OF REFORM AND CONSERVATIVE
JEWISH STUDENTS TOWARD MARRYING
OUT OF THEIR FAITH

Branch of Judaism	Would Not Marry Out (%)	Total N
Reform:		
Male.....	42.9	84
Female.....	51.4	107
Conservative:		
Male.....	60.8	102
Female.....	79.1	110

Table 2 introduces three variables: the branch of Judaism, specific other religions, and sex. For this sample of students, several generalizations and possible explanations follow.

Table 2 makes possible a comparison of differences of attitudes between Reform and Conservative Jews, male and female, toward dating and marrying Catholics, Protestants, and those of no faith. An inspection of the column headed "Total of Cols. 1, 2, 3: Endogamy" shows the general pattern of attitudes. Conservative Jewish students, both male and female, were more adverse to marrying into any of the three groups than were Reform students. In making the comparison, lines 1 and 2 should be compared with lines 7 and 8, lines 3 and 4 with lines 9 and 10, and lines 5 and 6 with lines 11 and 12. The differences are not all equally significant, however, as measured by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-tailed test of statistical significance. For male Reform and Conservative Jews, the difference between their attitudes toward marrying Protestants is significant at the .05 level, toward Catholics at the .01 level, and toward those of no faith at the .05 level. For female Reform and Conservative Jews, the difference in their attitudes toward marrying Protestants is significant only at the .10 level; toward marrying Catholics and those of no faith the statistical significance does not attain the .10 level. In other words, Reform and Conservative males are more discriminating in their attitudes than are females.

Table 2 also indicates that both Reform and Conservative students have much less aversion to marrying persons of no faith than toward marrying either Protestants or Catholics. One might speculate whether the person without a declared faith seems less of an obstacle to rearing children as Jews than a person who acknowledges affiliation with Catholicism or Protestantism and who might wish to rear the children in his faith.

Table 3 goes a step further in precision of intermarriage relationships; it shows the percentage of Reform and Conservative Jews, male and female, who would consider marrying into other branches of Judaism. The mode for each distribution is at the point of making no requirements for marriage into either of the other two branches. In each case this mode is under 50 percent. The significance of the table lies in the comparison of students who would make conversion or rearing of children a requirement for marriage and those who would themselves convert to another branch of Judaism to make marriage possible. Reform Jews feel closer to Conservative than to Orthodox Jews, as shown by greater willingness to convert to Conservative Judaism. Conservative Jews, the middle one of the three branches, feel a closer alliance to Orthodox than to Reform Jews, as indicated by the greater willingness of males to marry Orthodox than Reform Jews without making requirements and of females to con-

TABLE 2
ATTITUDES OF JEWISH UNIVERSITY STUDENTS TOWARD MARRIAGE WITH CATHOLIC
AND PROTESTANTS AND PERSONS OF NO FAITH (%)*

Branch of Judaism	Attitudes toward (1)	Not Date (2)	Date, Not Marry (3)	Marry If Mate Converts (4)	Total of Cols. 2, 3, 4: Endogamy (5)	Marry If Rear Children as Jews (6)	No Require-ments (7)	Jew Would Convert (8)	Total N (9)
Reform:									
1. Male.....	Protestant	0	15	30	(45)	41	13	1	83
2. Female.....	Protestant	5	19	26	(50)	35	13	2	105
Reform:									
3. Male.....	Catholic	2	18	33	(53)	42	6	0	82
4. Female.....	Catholic	8	23	27	(58)	29	13	0	105
Reform:									
5. Male.....	No faith	2	10	20	(32)	54	13	1	83
6. Female.....	No faith	3	10	22	(35)	54	8	4	104
Conservative:									
7. Male.....	Protestant	5	19	42	(66)	23	11	0	102
8. Female.....	Protestant	12	19	36	(67)	27	4	2	109
Conservative:									
9. Male.....	Catholic	6	18	52	(76)	17	7	0	101
10. Female.....	Catholic	15	21	36	(72)	24	4	0	108
Conservative:									
11. Male.....	No faith	8	11	34	(53)	36	10	1	101
12. Female.....	No faith	10	11	24	(45)	51	4	0	108

* The level of significance of differences was tested by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-tailed test. The difference in attitudes toward Protestants between Reform and Conservative Jewish students is significant at the .05 level for males but only at the .10 level for females. The difference in attitudes toward Catholics between Reform and Conservative Jewish students is significant at the .01 level for males; for females

the difference is not significant even at the .10 level. The difference in attitudes toward persons of no faith between Reform and Conservative Jewish students is significant at the .05 level for males but is not significant for females even at the .10 level.

TABLE 3
ATTITUDES OF REFORM AND CONSERVATIVE JEWISH STUDENTS TOWARD INTRA-JEWISH DATING AND MARRIAGE (%)^{*}

Branch of Judaism	Attitudes toward	Not Date	Date, Not Marry	Marry If Mate Converts	Marry If Rear Children In "My" Branch	No Requirements	Respondent Would Convert to Another Branch	Total N†
Reform:								
Male.....	Orthodox	2	2	9	35	45	7	81
Female.....	Orthodox	1	7	5	16	49	23	103
Reform:								
Male.....	Conservative	1	...	2	25	47	25	77
Female.....	Conservative	...	1	1	6	47	45	102
Conservative:								
Male.....	Orthodox	1	4	13	19	46	16	94
Female.....	Orthodox	1	7	6	10	39	37	104
Conservative:								
Male.....	Reform	...	1	16	33	35	15	94
Female.....	Reform	6	27	40	27	101

^{*} The Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-tailed test was used to evaluate the differences between attitudes. The difference in attitudes of Reform Jewish male students toward Orthodox and Conservative Jews was barely significant at the .10 level; for females the difference was significant at the .01 level. Among Conservative students the

difference in attitudes toward Orthodox and Reform Jews was not significant for either males or females.
† The totals are less than in tables 1 and 2 because of failure of some students to reply to the question.

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vert to Orthodoxy. In all combinations, females are more adaptable to intra-Jewish marriage as shown by their greater willingness to convert.

Suggestions are sometimes made among Jews that the three branches should merge. The disparity of willingness to intermarry between the two branches (one may surmise the three) creates doubt about the feasibility of merging, since 2-18 percent of students would not marry into another branch or would require conversion to their branch to make marriage possible, and an added 6-35 percent would require rearing of children in their own branch of Judaism.

Some questions may be raised whether the differences shown in this study are based on religious differences or whether they may be due to differences in social class, urban-rural backgrounds, or the generational level of the Reform and Conservative students. It is true that these three variables influence marriage attitudes and later choice of mate. However, the samples of Reform and Conservative students in this study were very similar with respect to these variables.

Both Reform and Conservative students were essentially urban dwellers, from one metropolitan area. Only 5 percent of the Reform and 3 percent of the Conservative students resided in cities of less than 10,000, and 25 percent of each group lived in cities of 10,000 to one million, with 69 percent and 72 percent in cities of a million or over.

In educational status, the fathers of male Reform students ranked slightly higher than the fathers of Conservative students: 41 percent and 47 percent, respectively, had no more than high school education; 31 percent and 40 percent had some college education or were graduated; and 27 percent and 13 percent had some graduate work up to and including the doctor's degree. These levels of education placed both groups of students in the range of the middle class. Female students came from the same background.

The male students were upwardly mobile. Their educational aspirations outranked the achieved educational level of their fathers: 30 percent of Reform and 25 percent of Conservative students aspired to college graduation; 37 percent and 47 percent planned for graduate work, usually for a master's degree; 33 percent and 27 percent would go beyond the master's degree, with the majority aiming for a doctor's degree. The students were definitely upwardly mobile, the Reform Jews slightly more so than the Conservative.

The generational level of the students with reference to the time their ancestors entered the United States might be expected to influence attitudes toward intermarriage. For the country as a whole, Reform Jews represent an earlier entrance into the United States than Conservative Jews; therefore Reform students might be expected to have a longer family history of acculturation to American culture than the Conservative

Jews. Answers to the query "On your father's side, which was the first generation to come to the United States?" yielded the following responses: the student was foreign born in 2 percent of both Reform and Conservative groups; the father was the original entrant for 15 percent of Reform and 14 percent of Conservative students; grandfather for 60 percent and 72 percent; and great grandfather or earlier, 24 percent and 13 percent. The great majority in both branches were at least second generation in the United States.

Each of the above background findings may contribute to the difference in attitudes toward intermarriage between Reform and Conservative Jews, presumably toward greater secularity of attitudes among Reform students. However, general discussions of Reform and Conservative Jews suggest other influences not covered in the questionnaire (Blau 1966; Sklare 1955): the greater tendency of Conservative Jews to live in Jewish neighborhoods with more opportunity for the formation of Jewish friendships among children; their continued allegiance to the traditional Jewish values and rules, among them strict endogamy; and more intensive socialization of children into these values.

The differences between Reform and Conservative Jews could be expanded in two directions: toward more liberality of attitudes toward intermarriage among secular Jews (Goldstein and Goldscheider 1968, p. 164), and toward more avoidance of intermarriage among Orthodox Jews. Unfortunately, the present study did not yield students in these categories. The two branches included, however, demonstrate the need for a finer classification of Jews into subgroups for an understanding of intermarriage.

These findings and speculations are somewhat in contrast to Greeley's (1970) tentative speculations that denominationalism in marriage "is rooted in the American belief that religious differences between husband and wife are not good for the marriage relationship or for the children of the marriage . . . reinforced by the fact that it is simpler and more convenient for everyone in the family to belong to the same denomination." His example for the latter is that "one need not worry about two sets of contributions to the support of one's church."

COMMENTS

The material here presented has limitations. It is not based on a completely random sample of Jewish students at the two universities, the numbers are small; Orthodox Jews are not included; and there is no assurance that the attitudes during undergraduate years are indicative of later marriage. Nevertheless, in view of the scarcity of data on the three branches of Judaism, this report indicates that definite differences regard-

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ing interfaith and intra-Jewish marriages exist and merit further study. The data also give support to Greeley's contention that America is still very much a denominational society.

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Some Like It Hot: Social Participation and Environmental Use as Functions of the Season¹

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Utilizing data from a sample of housewives in metropolitan Toronto who were interviewed both in February and in June of the same year, this paper brings out the existence of seasonal volatility both in organizational participation and in interpersonal relations, a situation accorded little attention in the sociological literature. The pattern of shifts in personal interaction indicates greater elasticity according to season in northern climates in use of macroscopic environment, as compared to immediate environment, and some grounds for devoting greater attention to planning for winter conditions in the immediate environment.

The explanation and clarification of sociological phenomena have been assisted by the treatment of space as a variable—as a determinant of various types of behavior (e.g., Whyte 1963, chap. 25), as a factor limiting but not determining components of traditional action systems (e.g., Michelson 1970b), and as a medium, the use of which reflects and demonstrates established cultural patterns (e.g., Sommer 1969). Space has been defined at three levels: (1) proximate environment—within buildings and rooms (e.g., Hall 1966; Sommer 1969); (2) macro-environment—beyond the residential area outward to the city as a whole (e.g., Bell 1958; Abu-Lughod 1960; Michelson 1967); (3) immediate environment—roughly the area abutting the residence within about a block (e.g., Festinger et al. 1950; Caplow and Forman 1950; Kuper 1953; Merton 1948; Whyte 1963, pp. 381–82).²

In this paper, attention will focus on levels of environment, not on the

¹ The work reported here was conducted under a research contract given by the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (Canada) to the Centre for Urban and Community Studies of the University of Toronto. I am indebted to the principal investigator, A. J. Diamond, architect, for his interest in the sociological substudy. Much of the responsibility for the study methodology goes to the twenty-two students enrolled in 1967–68 in my graduate seminar in urban sociology; the analysis presented here, however, is my sole responsibility. I am grateful to Joanne Hershoran, Paul Reed, Janet Lytle, Carole Cox, Geoffrey Cooke, Olusola Avoseh, William Babachuck, and particularly Jonathan Caulfield, for their assistance at various stages of the project. Interviewing services by RECON Research Consultants Ltd. are gratefully acknowledged, as is the cooperative assistance of Brian Forrest. Helpful comments on earlier drafts were offered by Charles Tilly, Barry Wellman, Joseph Lennards, Rainer Baum, Harry Nishio, Trudi Bunting, John Hitchcock, and Rex Lucas, as well as by *AJS* editors. An earlier draft of this paper was presented to the 1969 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California.

² The term “neighborhood” implies an elastic concept with unpredictable subjective contents. For some it means immediate environment, for others something much

relationships within any particular level. The findings reported are serendipitous in that the study from which they resulted was designed primarily to assess hypotheses about the immediate environment but produced data which shed unexpected light on the relationship between this and macro-environment.

The research was commissioned by an architect who sought sociological data as a design input. Since a vital aspect of home environment is outside space (cf. Fried and Gleicher 1961; Hartman 1963; Michelson 1966), and since its social utilization varies greatly in northern climates according to the time of year, the study design was sensitive to seasonal factors. The architect who plans for an unchanging social situation ignores reality, although our impression was that, except in the most extreme climates, the public chooses housing on the basis of summer conditions, despite the small percentage of the yearly weather that it represents. We therefore gathered similar data at two different times of year.

Sociological literature provides virtually no clue as to seasonal shifts in patterns of interaction or participation, or in the relationship of such shifts to physical setting. Although authors frequently compare rates of participation between places, classes, and so on, they rarely state at what time of the year their interviews were conducted, or consider what effect this might have. The closest we have seen sociologists come to this question are (1) that certain activities take place at ritual occasions written into the calendar (Klapp 1959), and (2) that school vacations influence the activities of children (Lundberg et al. 1934, chap. 4). These are questions quite apart from the influence of regularly shifting weather conditions customary in northern climates.

This paper will focus on seasonal differences as a possible intervening variable with respect to social participation and primary interaction (both highly conventional sociological variables), differences which will shed light on the nature and relevance of macro-environment. Results stemming from the primary intent of this study are reported elsewhere (Michelson 1970a).

RESEARCH DESIGN

A sample of 173 married women with children living at home in metropolitan Toronto was interviewed originally at the end of February 1968, which included the coldest week of the winter; reinterviews were held during the last week of June that year, warm summer weather occurring mostly before the mass exodus to vacation areas. The first interviews

broader; for others a social, not spatial, phenomenon; and for still others it does not exist at all (cf. Keller 1968; Lee 1968). The term "neighborhood" is used eclectically in this paper as synonymous with the immediate environment simply because we used the word in order to "communicate" with respondents; despite its imprecision, it does connote an area far different from the other levels mentioned.

were conducted by graduate students, the second by professional interviewers.

This sample was stratified according to residential area, which built into the study workable categories of residential environment. The four areas—all at suburban locations considerably removed from the city center—varied in several ways: housing type (single family, town house, maisonette);³ access to open space (private, public); access to community facilities such as stores and schools (immediately at hand, driving distance away); and tenure (owner, renter). While related, these distinctions did not coincide exactly in the areas chosen for study.

Although varying in these several ways, the sample was planned to be relatively homogeneous in SES and family composition by selecting housing units of approximately equal monthly cost (about \$180–\$220 a month), inside space (large apartments, small homes) and number of bedrooms (three and four). Data on occupation of head of household and income confirmed this intention. Only 2 percent of the families had incomes under \$5,000 a year, and only 16 percent earned over \$10,000. Although nearly 80 percent of the husbands had completed a college preparatory course, only 17 percent had a B.A. or higher degree. In over 80 percent of the cases, the number of children was between two and four; 74 percent of the children were between the ages of one and twelve. Furthermore, in accordance with the architect's wishes, sampling was from predominantly WASP areas.⁴

The June follow-up resulted in 130 completed interviews. Virtually all attrition was a consequence of subsequent moves or absence from home during the ten-day period allocated for the second phase of interviews; refusals were minimal. Comparisons of winter with summer activity are based only on those who were interviewed twice.

HYPOTHESES

Our expectations relevant for the present discussion involved three questions: (1) What kinds of activity and interaction characterize these people? (2) How does this vary by season? (3) What does this say about levels of environment?

³ In the local jargon, a town house is a low-rise multiple dwelling whose occupant's entrance is directly to and from the outdoors; the maisonette is a one- or two-story multiple dwelling where access to the dwelling units is from a central hallway.

⁴ Once an address was selected (randomly within a given area), an alternate was chosen in case a household did not have children living in the home. Preselected alternate households were also substituted for vacant homes or refusals. The number of alternates was limited by the supply within strata, and the total of 173 households represented 75 percent of the original sampling frame. It does not, however, represent a bias in the various selection criteria.

Seasonal Effects on Social Participation

In order to understand fully behavioral changes from season to season, there must be a basic behavioral pattern to consider. Studies have graphically demonstrated that the occupants of different areas of cities exhibit markedly different activity patterns and interpersonal relations. These variations, which reflect differential weighting of roles, each of which has activity and interaction components, are often called "life-styles."

Therefore, as a first step in assessing the "behavior baseline" of the present sample, we had specific expectations about the life-styles of mid-suburban families. On the basis of a wide variety of studies taking into consideration SES, housing location, and family composition (cf. Bell 1958, 1968; Young and Willmott 1957; Bott 1957), we hypothesized that the families' daily lives would strongly reflect nuclear family pursuits relatively close to home and would weakly reflect commercialized recreation or cultural activities. This would be consistent with Bell's hypothesis of suburban "familism" as opposed to center-city "consumerism" or "careerism" (Bell 1958).

Second, we hypothesized specific shifts in social interaction from winter to summer as follows:

- a) Contact among propinquitous friends and relatives will increase in summer since informal, outdoor exposure among neighbors will increase with warm weather. In colder weather, spontaneous interaction declines in favor of more formal, planned contacts.
- b) In warm summer weather, people will increase their contact with friends at the relative expense of contact with kin, given the elastic, voluntaristic nature of friendship ties. This expectation is based on the premise that "blood is thicker than water," or that cold weather inhibits contact less among relatives than among friends.
- c) As a corollary of (a) it was expected that the distance between those whose relationship includes mutual aid will decrease in the summer.
- d) Use of the neighborhood will increase in summer, also due to the increased spontaneity warm weather encourages.

Implied by these hypotheses is a more general one that warmer weather not only induces greater contact among people sharing the immediate environment but also that this *level* of setting for contact is more significant relative to the macro-environment in people's lives during summer than during winter.

FINDINGS

A. Life-Style

As an indication of the life-style broadly characterizing this sample, table 1 shows the percentage of respondents reporting at least minimal

TABLE 1
MINIMAL PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES (IN %)

Activity	% Participating in Activity	Total Codable Responses*
Complete participation:		
Shop for sundries.....	100	114
Shop for groceries.....	100	116
Watch television.....	100	130
Pleasure reading.....	100	128
Telephoning.....	100	130
Majority participation:		
Shop for clothes.....	97	101
Sew or knit.....	87	130
Attend parties or suppers in the home...	68	127
About 50 percent participation:		
Attend church or synagogue.....	53	128
Sports (attendance or participation)....	52	127
Eat in restaurants.....	48	126
Low participation:		
Employment.....	42	130
Attend associations or meetings.....	38	125
Attend movies.....	29	125
Take educational courses.....	23	129
Arts and crafts.....	21	130
Play musical instruments or sing.....	12	130
Attend plays or concerts.....	12	126

* The total number of respondents was 130, but the number of codable responses varied per question.

participation in each of a number of activities. In this case minimal participation is defined as "at least several times a year or more" for non-intense activities and at least an hour in a typical week for intense activities. Minimal participation had to be reported in only one of the two interviews to be considered here.

The data strongly support our expectations that this is a home-based, "familistic" sample, particularly in comparison with previous studies (cf. Tomeh 1964; Greer 1956; White 1955; Reissman 1954). Greatest participation in a discretionary activity is in parties or suppers in the home; a large proportion of this sample does so frequently. Attendance at such discretionary activities as formal associations, movies, educational courses, and cultural presentations is relatively low.

B. Seasonal Variation

1. Participation in selected activities was analyzed in categories centering around the following midpoints (for nonintense activities): (a) once a week or more, (b) once a month, (c) once a year or less. The last category was regarded as containing people inactive with respect to a

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given activity. Similar categories based on hours per week were made for intense activities. Shifts in participation were deemed as having occurred if a person moved from one category to another. Table 2 indicates the extent of increased or decreased participation from winter to summer among those participating at any time in the activities listed in table 1.

The amount of change is considerable and highly dependent on the nature of the activity concerned; this cannot be dismissed as a reflection only of potentially low reliability from one interview to the next. The least amount of change occurs with respect to activities which are either nondiscretionary or in which few respondents participate, and the greatest is among activities which are clearly discretionary.

In general, more activities suffer net decreases in participation from winter to summer than the reverse. The single greatest decrease among these women is in employment, with almost five times as many lightening this load as adding to it. This is not, however, accompanied by a general increase in the pastime activities inventoried here.

TABLE 2
NET SHIFTS IN FREQUENCY OF PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES
AMONG AT LEAST MINIMAL PARTICIPANTS FROM
FEBRUARY TO JUNE 1968 (IN %)

Activity	Increased Participation	Decreased Participation	Net Shift	N*
Increased participation from winter to summer:				
Sports (attendance or participation).....	52 %	24 %	+28%	66
Attend church or synagogue.....	28	12	+16	68
Pleasure reading.....	35	22	+13	128
Decreased participation from winter to summer:				
Employment.....	11	52	-41	54
Arts and crafts.....	30	59	-29	27
Take educational courses.....	31	52	-21	29
Attend associations or meetings...	23	41	-18	47
Telephoning.....	17	32	-15	130
No marked change from winter to summer:				
Shop for sundries.....	3.5	3.5	0	114
Attend movies.....	30.5	30.5	0	36
Shop for clothes.....	24	23	+ 1	98
Shop for groceries.....	6	8	- 2	116
Attend parties or suppers in the home.....	26	29	- 3	86
Eat at restaurants.....	30	34	- 4	61
Attend plays or concerts.....	33	40	- 7	15
Watch television.....	23	31	- 8	130
Sew or knit.....	27	18	+ 9	113
Play musical instruments or sing..	27	40	-13	15

* N in this table represents the number of respondents with at least minimal participation in the given activities at one or both interview points.

The greatest single increase in activity in the summer is with sports. This almost undoubtedly involves outdoor participation, since the major form of indoor spectator sport—hockey—in Toronto comes during the colder months.

Decreasing participation is all with respect to indoor activity. This would be consistent with the hypothesis of an increase in activities utilizing the immediate outdoor environment. While an increase in church-going does *not* support the hypothesis, its explanation may lie in its semi-obligatory character which may become more pressing in the absence of meetings of other formal organizations or of inclement weather. Pleasure reading may increase in the summer months because it is easily portable to outdoor locations, given the time to do so; however, there is no way of substantiating this from the data gathered.

In any case, the data show that social participation is more seasonally volatile than sociological literature has acknowledged. More light can be shed on behavioral shifts from winter to summer and their connection to levels of environment by investigating our more specific expectations on the frequency of differing types of interpersonal contact.

2. The more specific hypotheses concerning interpersonal contacts are stated in both absolute and relative terms. With respect to the former, our rather simplistic expectation that the immediate environment would be more of a meeting ground in summer than in winter was borne out by the data. Approximately 10 percent more people saw nearby friends or relatives at least once a week (more typically several times a week) in the summer than in the winter. Not surprisingly, 60 percent of the sample met their neighbors outside in the summer, while only 42 percent did so in the winter.

Nonetheless, any such finding of absolute change in a given kind of contact from season to season does not necessarily bear on the question of seasonal changes in the relative *significance* of one or another level of environment to people. For that, one must analyze interrelations among individuals' locational and relational contact patterns simultaneous with seasonal considerations.

Since data on frequency of contact (like that of activities) was pre-coded according to ordinal categories, and since each type of contact had a different initial set of frequencies based on individual differences in the availability of significant others, concise measurement of change in the relationship of different types of contact to each other over time must be nominal in nature. To test the hypotheses concerning changes in the relative frequency of personal contacts varying by location and by relation, a crude but consistent measure was devised. For each respondent, we asked whether at Time 1 (winter), the frequency or number of any one type of contact (e.g., seeing friends inside the neighborhood) was the

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same, greater, or lesser than that of another type (e.g., seeing friends living outside the neighborhood). The dimension of time was then added by assessing whether the initial balance remained or reversed in specified directions when similar data from Time 2 (summer) was introduced. Although qualitative in nature, this measure shows the critical changes in relationship encountered by the individuals in this aggregate from season to season. Results derived from this measure of relative frequencies of contact appear in table 3.

Our hypothesis about the relative decline of contact with kin seems contradicted. As the weather became warmer, the number of people who, within their neighborhoods, saw their relatives as much or more than their friends, when this had not been the case during the winter, rose sharply. More people experienced this trend "toward relatives" than experienced the opposite. This may be a function of the fact that only a small percentage of people had relatives living in the immediate environment and that the initial balance in favor of friends made a net change to the contrary more likely statistically. However, the same relationship occurs when viewing contact with friends and relatives living outside the immediate environment; people who started to see relatives more frequently than friends with the onset of summer were again found more numerous.

Nevertheless, to reflect fully a greater significance of the immediate, outdoor environment in summer, both relatives and friends "inside" should gain in frequency not just absolutely but *at the expense* of their counterparts "outside." But, as table 3 demonstrates, the relative shift of activity was in a more outward direction. More people had the balance of

TABLE 3
CHANGE OF BALANCE IN LOCATION AND TYPE OF PERSONAL
CONTACTS, FEBRUARY TO JUNE 1968 (IN %)

LOCATION OR TYPE OF DOMINANT PERSONAL CONTACT	TYPE OF CHANGE			
	A	B	No Change	N
Frequency visit <i>friends inside</i> neighborhood vs. <i>relatives inside</i> *.....	12%	19%	68%	130
Frequency visit <i>friends outside</i> neighborhood vs. <i>relatives outside</i> *.....	19	27	54	130
Frequency visit <i>relatives inside</i> neighborhood vs. <i>relatives outside</i> †.....	6	15	78	130
Frequency visit <i>friends inside</i> neighborhood vs. <i>friends outside</i> †.....	22	23	55	130
Number of <i>friends inside</i> neighborhood vs. number of <i>friends outside</i> †.....	15	23	62	130

* A = change from relatives to friends; B = change from friends to relatives.

† A = change from outside to inside; B = change from inside to outside.

their interpersonal contact changed from inside to outside the immediate environment in the summer, whether friends or relatives were considered.

Although the above findings are with respect to frequency of interaction, similar results would be expected with respect to the number of friends living inside and outside one's neighborhood. If the immediate, outdoor environment is more a part of a person's life in summer than in winter, good weather should be the occasion of a proportionately greater increase in people reporting the balance of their friends living within their immediate environment. Yet again, the opposite was found; more people had the number of their friends change from greater "inside" to greater "outside" in the summer.

In short, all expectations of seasonal shifts in the locational balance of interpersonal contact based on exposure provided by the immediate, outdoor environment were unsupported. Although differences were at times small, the reverse relationship occurred consistently. These unexpected results continue when the notion of function is added to that of frequency and amount of contact.

We expected, for example, that people's use of their own neighborhood would increase in summer, yet the percentage of those who denied using areas in the neighborhood, but outside the house, for any purpose increased from 22 percent to 28 percent from February to June. In addition, as might be expected from the data on interaction, the percentage of people who stated that they used their neighborhood for "visiting neighbors and the like" decreased from 8 percent to 2 percent ($N = 124$). This is further substantiated by answers to the question, "How many people in this neighborhood do you know and say hello to?" While 62 percent of the respondents ($N = 128$) cited the same number during both interviews, only 14 percent gave a larger number in June than in February, while 23 percent cited fewer.

Thus although the sheer frequency of local contacts might increase from winter to summer, their relative significance may decrease.

The remaining hypothesis with which we began concerned the distance between a respondent and those relied upon for assistance in emergencies and crucial functions; it was upheld in part. This distance decreased for slightly more people than it increased. Twenty-one percent indicated less distance, 18 percent more distance, and 51 percent no change.

Nonetheless, acceptance of this hypothesis must be tempered by the fact that the distance from a respondent to the person she says she "knows best" in her area increased more frequently than it decreased from February to June (17-13 percent).

That assistance in an emergency alone among all the relationships studied, turns slightly inward during the warmer months can be explained in terms of the neighboring function. As Keller sums up the ex-

isting literature, one of the prime functions of the proximate neighbor is that of supplying such assistance (Keller 1968). Indeed, neighbors typically fear to have their relationship become highly personal lest it turn sour and ruin a valuable mutual aid relationship. Since warmer weather does put neighbors together more frequently in absolute terms, it is not surprising that the distance from a respondent to the person to whom she turns in an emergency would decrease in summer even though average distance traveled to friends, relatives, and others increases at the same time.

While these findings are serendipitous and unsystematic, they report in consistent, although not dramatic, fashion the declining importance of the immediate, outdoor environment for these middle-class, suburban, "familistic" women from winter to summer;⁵ and they indicate the increasing importance of more macroscopic levels of environment.

In this perspective, it would appear that the rigors of winter inhibit use not only of immediate environment but even more so that of macro-environment. The permeability of macro-environment appears to improve to a much greater extent in the warmer seasons than does that of the immediate environment. For example, although people may come in contact with their immediate neighbors more easily in summer than in winter, they find that their ability to visit friends across town is improved to an even greater extent. As a result, the latter type of interaction increases more significantly than the former.

Since few of the families in this sample had second cars, the seasonal appeal of public transportation to housewives may be a factor along with the uncertainty of planning family automobile trips in winter weather. But service is available in all these areas, and it is reliable, modern, and

⁵ I have not stressed statistical tests in this presentation. Nonetheless, a statistical interpretation may be made of these findings for those wishing to evaluate the data with a standard yardstick despite drawbacks. We can easily ask whether it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that the observed number of changes in the modal direction is not sufficiently greater than the number that would change in that direction, assuming that an equal number changed in each direction. One simply computes a Z-score with N = the number of persons changing in both directions and $p = q = .5$ (see McNemar 1955, pp. 50-52). As one suspects from the simple percentages in table 3, probabilities of differences that great in one direction by chance alone are relatively low but not conclusive: .08, .10, .01, .40, and .08, respectively. My argument, however, is that, though serendipitous and undramatic, they are consistent. Should one wish statistical investigation of this assertion, Fisher's test of the significance of series of tests, which utilizes the exact probability of each, is in order (see Martin 1970, pp. 42-43). In the case of table 3, the overall probability of a trend in the direction found is between .01 and .001 ($\chi^2 = 25.960$; 10 df), rejecting the null hypothesis. This high level of statistical significance is maintained with the inclusion of the complementary data on change stemming from "How many people in this neighborhood do you know and say hello to?" and how far the neighbor lives whom the respondent knows best ($\chi^2 = 35.62$; 14 df). Even when the one opposite trend is included (although it can be soundly explained), the significance of the trend remains unchanged ($\chi^2 = 38.09$; 16 df).

not exorbitant in cost. However, at these suburban locations, service is relatively infrequent, and the waits involved are considered extremely unpleasant in the chill of winter.⁶

What this implies is that the immediate environment plays a more crucial role in the women's lives in winter than in summer. If partly cut off from the larger part of metropolitan surroundings in winter, a woman is forced to a greater extent to find companionship and service in the more immediate area—even though this might still be more difficult in winter than in summer.

This suggests that the popular standards for designing and choosing a local area might be turned 180 degrees but for the warm-weather biases of consumers at the moment of selection. In northern climates, the local neighborhood might well be geared to maximize winter rather than summer use if both uses could not be simultaneously maximized.

It is neither possible nor desirable to generalize to a larger population what these data on white, suburban, middle-class mothers with "familistic" life-styles demonstrate. Nonetheless, the pattern by which our original hypotheses about environment were rejected is highly suggestive of the importance of macro-environment in the lives of those people thought most dependent on immediate environment. Although it is without question premature to herald the onset of "community without propinquity" (Webber 1963)—the notion that close personal relations can exist in cities even though the persons involved are not geographic neighbors—it is clear that the macroscopic level of environment is important for the present sample and that its permeability is related to weather conditions more than that of the immediate environment; both interaction and activity are consequently affected.⁷ In any case, the concept of "community without propinquity" is more complex than has been previously suggested.

That these seasonal variations play such a role in human interaction and activity is relevant both for the environmental designer faced with the satisfaction of human needs and for the sociologist who must account for the range of factors which make intelligible his statistics.

⁶ Central-city residents may react in dissimilar fashion, since in many cities (Toronto included) public transit service is more frequent and less costly in central areas, and, in any case, more people and services are at hand due to higher densities and greater land-use mixtures. Furthermore, it would appear that people lower in the socioeconomic ladder are more local in their orientations, although sweeping generalizations are unwise.

⁷ The stature of "community without propinquity" seems increased if, in fact, blood does not run thicker than water. The data here suggest people maintain their cross-town friendships more assiduously than comparable kin relations during the cold, inconvenient winter months.

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Another Look at the Burgess Hypothesis: Time as an Important Variable

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The concentric circle theory of E. W. Burgess and some contradictory evidence derived from other cross-sectional analyses of the socioeconomic structure of cities is reexamined here with a longitudinal approach to assess the influence of time on the emergence of a pattern of socioeconomic status distribution within cities. The application of a Markov Chain to changes in the socioeconomic characteristics of tracts from 1940 to 1960 suggests a general evolutionary process. Although not evident in cross-sectional analysis, there is a trend toward a direct relationship between socioeconomic status and distance from city center even within cities which show an inverse cross-sectional relationship at present.

The organizational form of the urban community has received much attention over the years from sociologists and human ecologists. The literature abounds with descriptions of the socioeconomic structure of particular cities (Cressey 1938; Duncan, Sabagh, and Van Arsdol 1962) and generalizations concerning the structural consequences of urban growth (Schmid 1958; Duncan and Duncan 1957; Sharp and Schnore 1962). A most widely accepted notion concerns the gradual decentralization of population as urban growth proceeds (Schnore 1957). Coupled with this temporal change in the population form¹ of the urban area is a spatial shift in the socioeconomic structural form of the area, with higher-status people residing in the metropolitan ring and lower-status people living closer to the center of the city (Burgess 1924; Schnore 1963).

The notion that urban communities become socioeconomically stratified into this particular spatial pattern is generally attributed to Burgess (1924), and there has been a considerable amount of research since Burgess's original paper which either supports or refutes his concentric circle theory (Alihan 1938; Davie 1937; Quinn 1940). Burgess illustrated how the city expands by a series of concentric circles, which he numbered to designate both the successive zones of urban extension and the types of areas differentiated in the process. The illustration represented an ideal construction of the tendencies of any town or city to expand radially from its central business district and included five concentric zones: "the loop (I); an area of transition encircling the downtown area (II); a zone

¹ Boulding (1956) makes the useful distinction between population growth, "creation or depletion of a variable," and structural growth, "changes in relations between interrelated parts of the aggregate."

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of workingmen's homes who have escaped from the area of deterioration (III); beyond this is the residential zone of high-class apartment buildings and single-family dwelling units (IV); and still farther out beyond the city limits is the commuter's zone (V)" (Burgess 1924).

Critical research has pointed out several shortcomings in the generality of the Burgess theory with respect to describing the socioeconomic structure of an urban community at a particular point in time (Alihan 1938). Quinn (1940) points to the need for considering ecological-time cost rather than linear distance to account for noncircular patterns. Davie (1937) suggests that the zonal pattern is nonexistent in New Haven, Connecticut, noting instead a pattern which includes a number of varied socioeconomic classes in any given circular zone. Schnore (1963), in a comparison of the socioeconomic status of central cities and rings, concludes that older urbanized areas generally conform to the Burgess zonal pattern but that newer² cities in the South and West have the opposite configuration, with lower SES population overrepresented in the rings and higher SES populations overrepresented in the central city. Schnore argues that age of city rather than size is the important variable making for this difference, the newer cities having developed under a different regime of technology—different types and quality of housing and the age of the automobile—enabling business and industry to "leap frog" the interior residential zones which in previous times would have turned to low-income slums.

Schnore (1963) goes on to point out that Burgess originally conceived his zonal hypothesis as a growth model which dealt with the *process* of urban structural development and not as a static or cross-sectional representation of urban spatial structure. This well-taken point puts most of the critical analysis of Burgess's theory in a questionable position since, in most cases, the theory is supported or faulted on the basis of a cross-sectional analysis of a particular city or group of cities at a particular point in time, ignoring the crucial idea that cities *tend* to become organized in a particular way over time. That is, the socioeconomic structure of urban areas must be viewed as a process, in constant change, and the trend is the important variable to contend with, not only for the validity of the Burgess theory but for understanding the development of organizational form in the urban community regardless of the form.

The Burgess theory, and the contradictory evidence of Schnore, is reexamined here in a longitudinal analysis to determine if time creates an inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and distance from the city center. The method enables an exploration of the dynamics of structural growth, focusing upon the changing relationship between socioeconomic status distribution relative to the center of the city and the

² "Newer" in terms of year when the city first reached 50,000 population.

passing of time. Thus, a reformulation of the Burgess theory, with explicit focus upon the process of structural development, would postulate an increasingly apparent direct relationship between socioeconomic status and distance from the center of the city with the passing of time.

DATA

The selection of cities for analysis was limited to those which were tracted in 1940, 1950, and 1960, with at least twenty tracts in 1940. Selection was limited by the possibility of constructing comparable tract boundaries for the three census years (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1940, 1950, 1960).³ It should be noted that "city" in this investigation refers primarily to the areas which were tracted in 1940 and excludes most of the newly tracted areas in 1950 and 1960. However, certain newly tracted areas in 1950 were included in the analysis when their inclusion tended to make the irregular perimeter of the 1940 tracted area more circular in form. Furthermore, the use of a 1940 base does not necessarily imply only the central city, since Dallas, Hartford, and Minneapolis had some suburban area tracted in 1940. Thus the connotation of "city" here refers neither to the politically defined central city nor to the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined in 1960 but to the area bounded by the furthest outlying tracts in 1940 setting a roughly circular perimeter for the area. A few tracts which were grossly incomparable over time were excluded from some cities.⁴

Three cities shown by Schnore (1963) to have higher socioeconomic status in the central city than the ring satisfied the criterion for inclusion, and five cities with the expected pattern of lower SES in the central city were chosen to represent different parts of the country. The cities selected, along with an indication of whether they exhibited a direct (*D*) or inverse (*I*) relationship between SES and distance from city center, are shown in table 1.

³ The requirement of comparable areal boundaries for tracts or combined tract units is necessary for a rigorous longitudinal design, so that changes in the SES of tracts over time are not artifacts of boundary alterations. The seemingly studied villainy of local census boards in altering tract boundaries leaves precious few cities that can be analyzed longitudinally over three census years.

⁴ The cities of Hartford, Rochester, and Minneapolis-St. Paul are treated as the 1940 tracted area, and no tracts were deleted on the basis of noncomparability. For Milwaukee, fourteen tracts which were defined in 1940 were deleted from analysis because in 1950 these tracts combined the 1940 area with annexed territory. Eight tracts newly defined in 1950 were added since they tended to fill in irregular indentations arising from the 1940 tract delimitations. The area analyzed for Denver is the 1940 tracted area plus two tracts which were newly defined in 1950. For the city of Portland, one 1940 tract was deleted (44) and one tract newly defined in 1950 was added (61). Twenty-eight newly tracted areas were added to the 1940 base for Houston, with no tracts being deleted, and thirty-three tracts were added to the 1940 base for Dallas while nine tracts delimited in 1940 were deleted from analysis.

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TABLE 1
SELECTED CITIES BY REGION
AND 1960 SES PATTERN

City and Region	SES Pattern*
Northeast:	
Hartford.....	D
Rochester.....	D
North-Central:	
Milwaukee.....	D
Minneapolis.....	D
South:	
Houston.....	I
Dallas.....	D
West:	
Denver.....	I
Portland.....	I

* D = direct relationship between SES and distance to center of city in 1960 city-ring comparisons of Schnore (1963, unpublished appendix); I = inverse relationship between SES and distance to center of city in 1960 city-ring comparisons of Schnore (1963, unpublished appendix).

Tract median number of years of school completed was chosen as the index of socioeconomic status for two reasons. First, Schmid (1950) and Schmid et al. (1958) found median education to be most highly correlated with other indicators of socioeconomic status for both 1940 and 1950.⁵ Second, the investigations of city-ring SES differentials by Schnore (1957, 1963, 1964) which suggest that age of city has an important influence upon these differentials utilize median education as the SES indicator. In cases where a tract was subsequently broken into parts, a median education was computed for the reconstructed tract by weighting each part by its number of inhabitants.

METHOD

As an ideal test of the statically interpreted Burgess formulation, it would be best to divide each city into five zones delimited by social area analysis and observe changes in the five zones over time. This approach would, of course, raise the same problems of lack of fit to an ideal type that have been previously documented. But the crucial hypothesis here concerns

⁵ The magnitude of the correlations in Schmid's research between median education and mean rental value in 1940 (mid-rank $r = .87$) and median income in 1950 (mid-rank $r = .68$) across tracts strongly indicates that substantive findings based upon median income indicators rather than median education indicators of SES would be highly similar. Very similar substantive results would also be expected utilizing an occupational indicator of SES as indicated by the high correlations between median education and percentage professional in 1940 (mid-rank $r = .79$) and in 1950 (mid-rank $r = .82$).

the dynamics of the Burgess formulation—that cities tend to develop a social morphology over time and that the trend of the developmental process is toward a direct relationship between SES and distance from the center of the city. Thus, viewing the process as continuous, it would be ideal to treat distance as a continuous variable and analyze the “wave” of low-SES movement outward toward the periphery of the city over time. However, the cross-sectional nature of the census material and the discrete nature of tracts as reporting units make it necessary to treat the process of redistribution and distance from the city center as discrete.

Given cities which have relatively comparable tract boundaries from 1940 to 1960, the question arises: how many concentric zones can be delimited such that (1) all tracts in a particular zone are about the same distance from the center of the city, (2) each zone contains around twenty tracts so as to avoid problems of percentaging on too small a base, and (3) all cities analyzed have the same number of zones for purposes of comparability? The greater the number of zones delimited, the better the approximation to a continuous notion of distance. However, with half of the cities selected it was possible to delimit only three concentric zones. That is, since cities are of finite radius and are composed of a finite number of tracts, only a certain number of zones of tracts which are contiguous and roughly the same distance from the city center can be delimited. Three zones were also delimited in the four more expansive cities for purposes of comparability by dividing the area into three zones of roughly equivalent radius. Thus, the choice of number of zones is based upon methodological considerations of a best approximation to continuous distance rather than any theoretical notions of socially homogeneous zones.

The implications of this particular procedure in zonal delimitation should be clear: the dynamics of the Burgess notion concerning the emergence of a SES gradient will be supported to the extent that zones closer to the central business district exhibit a trend toward lower SES than adjacent zones further from the city center.

The trend in change over time in SES characteristics can be analyzed by using a stochastic process called a Markov chain (Kemeny and Snell 1960). After dividing each city to be analyzed into three concentric zones, longitudinal observations were made for each tract in each zone using data for 1940, 1950, and 1960. A matrix of transition probabilities was calculated separately for each zone in each city. If a given tract is characterized by a median education above that of the city at one point in time, then it is in State 1; if it is characterized by a median education below that of the city, then it is in State 2. The matrix of transition probabilities, then, gives the probability of going from one state to another or remaining in the same state over a period of one decade. For example, the transition probability matrix, P , for Zone II of Houston (table 2) indi-

Time as a Variable for the Burgess Hypothesis

TABLE 2
CALCULATION OF TRANSITION PROBABILITY MATRIX
FOR ZONE II OF HOUSTON

1940-50 Shifts					1950-60 Shifts				
1950				1960					
1940	A*	B*	Total	1950	A	B	Total		
$t_{4-5} =$	A	4	1	5	$t_{5-6} =$	A	4	2	6
	B	1	16	17		B	1	17	18
	Total	5	17	22		Total	5	19	24†
All 1940-60 Interdecade Shifts									
					Time $t+10$ Years				
					Time t	A	B	Total	
$t_{4-5} = t_{4-5} + t_{4-6} =$	A	8	3	11					
	B	2	33	35					
	Total	10	36	46					
1940-60 Transition Probability Matrix									
					Time $t+10$ Years				
					Time t	A	B	Total	
Transition probability matrix					A	.73	.27	1.00	
= t_{4-6} percentaged by rows = $P =$					B	.06	.94	1.00	

* A = above the city median education; B = below the city median education.

† Note the addition of two tracts to Zone II as newly tracted in 1950, one above the city median education and one below the city median education.

cates that the probability of a census tract below the city median at one census date going to above the city median at the next census date is .06, of staying below the city median .94; whereas the probability of a tract above the city median staying above the median over a decade is .73, and the probability of its dropping below the median is .27. The use of the city median as a basis of comparison operates as a control on the effect of the general trend toward higher median education in all zones from 1940 to 1960.

Two assumptions must be made in applying a Markov chain to a

change over time: (1) that the transition probability matrix remains constant over time, and (2) that the probability of being in state j at time t is dependent only on state in time $t-1$ (Kemeny and Snell 1960, pp. 24-25). In this case, then, it is assumed that the rate at which lower-status tracts become characterized by above- or below-average SES people remains constant over time and that the probability that a tract will be characterized by an above- or below-average SES at one census year is dependent only upon its SES characteristic in the immediately previous census year.

Mechanisms, implicit in the model, are that a tract rising above the city median education from one census date to the next is indicative of upward social mobility of stable residents, higher-SES people moving in, or lower-SES people moving out, and vice versa if the tract drops below the city median. The transition probability matrix, P , represents the trend in the process of SES shifts as effected by an aggregate of causal variables related to SES increase and decrease of a tract (Kemeny and Snell 1960, p. 25). The magnitude and direction of this aggregate of causal variables are indicated by the equilibrium vector of the matrix, which represents the probability of being in a particular state after a long period of time and, therefore, the proportion of tracts expected to be above or below average at some future time on the basis of present trends. Since the probability of being in state j at time t (given by P) is dependent only upon the state in time $t-1$, the probability of being in state j at time $t + n$ is independent of the starting state where time $t + n$ is the point at which equilibrium is reached (Kemeny and Snell 1960, p. 26).

FINDINGS

Table 3 gives the proportion of tracts above the city median education in each of three zones for 1940 and 1960, and at time of equilibrium for each of the eight cities. Bearing in mind that median education attainment level is the single but best indicator of tract SES, the equilibrium distribution is a convenient measure for summarizing the process of SES redistribution within each city over the previous twenty years. It gives the proportion of above-average tracts (and below average by subtraction) which would exist in each zone if the process were to continue into the future under the assumptions of the Markov model.

On the basis of recent trends of change in SES, five of the eight cities analyzed would conform perfectly with the hypothesis that SES varies directly with distance from center of the city given a long period of time. Among these are three which showed a direct relationship in 1960 (Rochester, New York; Minneapolis; and Milwaukee), and two which were shown by Schnore (1963) to have an inverse relationship (Houston and Denver). Interestingly enough, two of the three remaining cities (Hartford and Dallas) which did not conform to the hypothesis were of the ex-

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pected pattern in 1960. At this point we can only speculate concerning the reasons for these exceptions. The very low proportion of high-SES tracts in any zone in Dallas may indicate that high-SES people are concentrating in areas lying outside the perimeter of the 1940 base area defined herein as the city of Dallas, which seems reasonable, since Dallas is growing at a very rapid rate.⁶ In the case of Hartford, Zones I and II are relatively close in the proportion of above-average-SES tracts expected, and Zone III shows a definite expected concentration of high-SES tracts. Portland, Oregon, showing an initial inverse relationship, shows concentration of high SES expected in Zone II, with low-SES concentrations expected in Zones I and III. These exceptions could reflect the crudeness of the measurement in terms of zone boundary delimitations, for if Zones

TABLE 3
PROPORTION OF TRACTS ABOVE THE CITY MEDIAN
IN EDUCATION BY CITY, ZONE,
AND DISTRIBUTION

City and Distribution	Zone I	Zone II	Zone III
Expected Pattern			
Milwaukee:			
1940.....	.33	.45	.69
1960.....	.16	.24	.63
Equilibrium.....	.05	.13	.56
N*.....	(89)	(98)	(126)
More Pronounced Direct Relationship			
Minneapolis:			
1940.....	.32	.42	.45
1960.....	.20	.33	.50
Equilibrium.....	.03	.23	.77
N.....	(88)	(72)	(84)
Rochester:			
1940.....	.33	.31	.65
1960.....	.11	.25	.71
Equilibrium.....	.00	.00	.87
N.....	(36)	(72)	(68)
Denver:†			
1940.....	.20	.47	.86
1960.....	.10	.40	.83
Equilibrium.....	.00	.37	1.00
N.....	(40)	(39)	(19)

* Number of interdecade shifts upon which the equilibrium distributions are based.

† Note that Schnore's city-ring comparison showed overrepresentation of high SES in the central city, whereas this breakdown of Denver into zones shows the expected pattern in 1960.

⁶ Dallas showed a 130 percent increase from 1940 to 1960. The only other city with greater than 60 percent increase over the twenty years was Houston; but Houston is politically more extensive than its concentrated population, with the whole county incorporated as Houston.

TABLE 3—*Continued*

City and Distribution	Zone I	Zone II	Zone III
Reversal to Expected Pattern			
Houston:			
194062	.23	.26
196041	.21	.35
Equilibrium00	.18	1.00
N	(58)	(46)	(23)
All Very Low			
Dallas:			
194013	.59	†
196007	.30	.60
Equilibrium05	.14	.00
N	(30)	(45)	(20)
High in Zone III; Zones I and II Fairly Close			
Hartford:			
194025	.53	.60
196033	.42	.60
Equilibrium36	.26	.63
N	(24)	(38)	(20)
Low in Zone I; Least Conformity to Expected Pattern			
Portland:			
194043	.57	.29
196038	.57	.29
Equilibrium20	.64	.35
N	(57)	(28)	(34)

† The area comprising Zone III of Dallas contained only five tracts in 1940, three of which were above the city median in education.

II and III were combined into single zones in Portland, Hartford, and Dallas, they would reflect the expected direct relationship at equilibrium. This combination of Zones II and III would result in "City-Ring" type comparisons.

The interesting point is that in no case was an inverse relationship expected. That is, it appears that the factors which were involved in producing concentric zonal patterns in the older northern and northeastern cities have not been radically supplanted by new forces operating to produce an opposite, or entirely different, pattern in the newer cities of the South and West. The evidence suggests that time is indeed an important variable; but its importance lies in the time required for the process to develop a zonal structure rather than in differences in technological regimes operating on different cohorts of cities.

CONCLUSIONS

The use of the Markov model has not been that of predicting what SES distributions will look like in the future; rather it is a device for comparing recent trends on the basis of their long-run consequences. Even with the crudeness of the measurements used here, with respect to zone boundary delimitations and use of tract medians as observations, it is evident that longitudinal analysis of urban structural development can reveal trends which are not immediately apparent in cross-sectional analysis. Perhaps more research in this direction, with more refined measures and an emphasis upon process rather than structure, may lead to more fruitful discovery and explanation of rational patterns of organization in the urban scene.

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Retesting the Burgess Zonal Hypothesis: The Location of White-Collar Workers¹

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Seventeen U.S. metropolitan areas are analyzed individually to determine support for two principal propositions of the well-known Burgess hypothesis: white-collar persons are decentralized in American cities, and the decentralization is greatest in the largest and oldest places. Only a slight tendency is found for the proportion of white-collar workers to increase with linear distance from the central business district in most metropolitan areas. Much of this distance-white-collar relationship may be explained by the spatial location of other population groups, such as Negroes and married couples with children, and by housing types, such as single unit, roomy, sound, and new. Tendencies for white-collar decentralization are indeed greatest in the oldest places. And this relationship may also be explained by the differential location of population groups and housing types in old versus new cities.

Ernest W. Burgess in his well-known 1923 article on "The Growth of the City" argued that blue-collar workers, individuals without spouses, blacks, and ethnic groups would live most frequently in the central parts of cities. The opposite types of groups—white-collar workers, married couples with children, whites, and native Americans—would be found most often on the outskirts. Burgess further argued that these patterns, particularly for higher-status groups, would become clearer as cities aged and grew in size.

Since publication of the "Burgess hypothesis," numerous conflicting claims have been made about its accuracy, particularly in reference to the location of socioeconomic status, including occupational groups. But to date, as far as I know, no one has used the same methodology to determine for a large number of cities whether occupational groups are actually distributed differently by mile distance zones in relationship to the central business district (CBD).

In this paper, I investigate the empirical relationship between linear distance from the CBD and the spatial location of white-collar as opposed to blue-collar workers. The patterns in seventeen standard metropolitan areas (SMSAs) will be analyzed individually, with the use of 1960

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census tract data. I then test two models, consistent with the Burgess arguments, which might account for the decentralization of higher-status groups. Finally, I determine how white-collar decentralization is related to metropolitan area age or period of historical development.

THE PROBLEM

Burgess presented his arguments on the growth of cities in terms of a concentric-zone model. Using Chicago as an example, he described five zones: the first zone consisted of the CBD itself, which was occupied primarily by homeless men. In the second zone, poverty-stricken ethnic and racial groups lived. Rooming-house districts would also be found there. Beyond this zone were located stable workingmen's families, generally second-generation ethnic groups. Zone 4 was a residential area containing exclusive single-family dwellings and "high class" apartment areas. Finally, the fifth zone was a rather ill-defined commuters' zone. Burgess argued that these zones would become increasingly well-defined or the city would differentiate as it aged and grew in population size. Burgess was most explicit about this differentiation in regard to occupational groups, although it is possible to find both implicit and explicit arguments in this work about differentiation in regard to all four population types. If one attempts to conceptualize the Burgess argument in terms of a model of general proximity of population groups to the CBD, it is clear that upper socioeconomic status (SES) groups would be found on the outskirts while racial and ethnic groups would be found near the center. The argument for the location of types of families is much less clear, although it is apparent that individuals without spouses would live near the centers of cities while couples, presumably with children, could be found on the outskirts. The argument about the location of families was more clearly stated in Burgess's later work (1963, p. 68).

The most serious empirical challenge to the Burgess hypothesis has been made by Homer Hoyt (1939), who argued that high-SES groups primarily locate in a sectoral or axial pattern in relationship to the CBD. Hoyt's evidence was based on the spatial location of high-rent districts, which are not necessarily the same as high-SES districts, although a correlation clearly exists. Hoyt's findings are not necessarily incompatible with the Burgess argument. One may find *both* concentric and sectoral location tendencies for higher-status groups.

More recently, emphasis has been placed on the evolutionary nature of Burgess's argument in regard to the location of SES groups. The foremost exponent of this interpretation, Leo F. Schnore (1965, pp. 201-17), has empirically shown that the hypothesized Burgess model is often not validated when central-city-suburban status differences are considered. Nevertheless, higher suburban SES status has been found most often in

the largest and particularly the oldest metropolitan areas. There is some question whether these findings may be at least partially an artifact of the location of central city boundaries, which differ in "old" as opposed to "new" cities. Schnore and Winsborough (1969) further extended this analysis by showing that some of these "age" and "size" effects are actually due to other characteristics of the metropolitan area, such as the housing stock, the functional base, and the racial composition. Hopefully, urban ecologists will increasingly move in Schnore's direction, toward "explanation" rather than simple description of spatial patterns. This paper may be seen at least partially as an extension of Schnore's work, but it uses a more refined measure of location than the crude city-suburban distinction.

One group of urban researchers, known as factorial ecologists, has further extended Schnore's work by arguing that SES variables vary concentrically only in the largest and oldest places, but family characteristics vary concentrically, regardless of the size and age of places. This argument is based on analysis of numerous individual factorial studies of cities, both American and foreign. A thorough review of this literature is provided by Rees (1968):

Given these previous research findings, I shall suggest two different "theories" which might account for the decentralization of white-collar persons in American metropolitan areas. While Burgess was very vague about causal interrelationships in his hypothesis, we believe these "theories" are basically compatible with his formulations. One theory will be known as the "population" model, the other as the "housing" model.

The population model suggests that higher-status groups may be decentralized in American cities because they are disproportionately white, native American, and married couples with children. In other words, the decentralization of whites, native Americans, and married couples with children would produce the decentralization of higher-status persons. Of course, alternate theories could suggest, say, that native Americans are decentralized because of their higher status. Without reporting the results here, we can say that very little support was found for other population models. The higher SES of whites, native Americans, and married couples is suggested by a variety of data. The higher status of whites as opposed to Negroes needs no documentation. Elsewhere (Guest 1970) I have shown that married couples with children are higher in SES than individuals without spouses. In Burgess's day, it was clear that first- and second-generation Americans were lower in status than third-generation or native Americans. However, this relationship today may be highly dependent on locality and specific ethnic groups. Taeuber and Taeuber (1967) point out that the average occupational status of U.S. immigrants has generally been increasing over time.

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To test this "population" hypothesis, we would want to look at the effect of linear distance from the CBD on the spatial location of higher-status groups when the interrelationships among the population characteristics have been controlled. Using multiple regression analysis, we would run equations with distance, racial, family, and ethnic characteristics as independent variables and the SES character of the tract as the dependent variable.

The empirical test of this model has problems revolving around the use of aggregate (or ecological) data to make individual inferences. Let me explain by an example. If we find a negative correlation of percentage Negro with percentage white-collar over census tracts, the result would hopefully indicate that Negro populations tend to be lower in SES than white populations. However, the correlation may result from lower-status whites living in black areas. Thus, the ecological correlation could result conceivably from the properties of the white, not the black, population. Hopefully, comparable data on individuals for a large number of individual cities will be made available soon. More likely, we shall have to wait some time; as a result, I am committing the "ecological" fallacy, due to a lack of alternatives. I believe that my "ecological" correlations are generally compatible with what would be found on an individual level.

The second, "housing," model would be based on the distribution of housing by its structural soundness, age, single-unit character, and rooms per dwelling. Once again, aggregate census-tract characteristics would be used. It is clear from Burgess's various articles on the city that he conceived of the location of different population groups as at least partially a function of the distribution of types of housing. Higher-status persons may be decentralized because the larger housing, in terms of number of rooms and single-unit character, is also decentralized. Higher-status persons might not only have a "taste" for this type of housing but would also be financially able to afford it. Since Burgess believed that neighborhoods declined in their general SES level over time, neighborhoods of older housing—generally found near the city center—should have disproportionately lower-status residents. Finally, it is possible to detect in the work of Burgess the notion that the central parts of cities deteriorate or become structurally unsound and repel higher-status persons.

A test of this model would involve the regression of distance from the CBD and the four housing variables on the proportion white-collar for each census tract. If the partial regression effect of distance dropped to zero, it would appear that most of the decentralization of higher-status groups could be "explained" by the differential spatial location of types of housing.

If these two models are correct, they may help us explain how city age and size affect the relative decentralization of higher-status groups. White-collar persons may be most decentralized in the oldest places because whites, native Americans, and married couples with children are also most decentralized in these places. White-collar persons may also be decentralized in the oldest places because single-unit, roomy, sound, and new types of housing are also most decentralized in these places.

The paper will now turn to methodology—how the sample of metropolitan areas was selected and how the variables were operationalized. The Burgess hypothesis will then be tested in four ways: (1) by looking at the zero-order correlations of population characteristics with distance from the CBD over the seventeen metropolitan areas; (2) by looking at the relationship between distance and the proportion white-collar when the location of racial, ethnic, and family groups has been controlled; (3) by looking at the relationship between distance from the CBD and the proportion white-collar when the distribution of housing by its number of rooms, single-unit character, soundness, and age has been controlled; and (4) by looking at the effect of the metropolitan area age on the relative decentralization of the higher-status groups.

METHODOLOGY

The seventeen metropolitan areas were selected nonrandomly from the four principal U.S. census regions to represent a variety of city sizes and ages. The places tend to emphasize manufacturing in their economic bases and do not have unusual racial compositions for their regions. By census definition, metropolitan areas generally include central cities of at least 50,000 population, the surrounding county, and other counties which are socially and economically integrated with the central city. The sample places generally do not have unusual shapes or geographies, which means they are probably an unrepresentative sample of U.S. metropolitan areas. But they generally are the types of places where the Burgess hypothesis would be most expected to hold, since his arguments were based on a conception of the typical city as flat and relatively circular. These findings might not be valid for a truly random sample of U.S. metropolitan areas, since a large number have distorted topographies.

Almost all census tracts were included in the samples from the seventeen places. Tracts were generally eliminated if more than 5 percent of the population was institutionalized or the total population was less than 100 persons. Data on housing and population were drawn from tables P-1, P-3, and H-1 of census-tract reports (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1961).

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The sample SMSAs by region are: Northeast: Boston, Buffalo, New Haven, Rochester; South: Atlanta, Birmingham, Charlotte, Houston; North Central: Akron, Cleveland, Detroit, Flint, Fort Wayne; West: Albuquerque, Denver, Phoenix, Seattle.

Population variables were operationalized in the following manner:

Occupation.—The percentage white-collar of employed males, occupation reported. Census white-collar occupations are: professional, technical and kindred workers; managers, officials, and proprietors; clerical and kindred workers; sales workers.

Ethnicity.—The foreign-stock population was taken as a percentage of the total population. Foreign stock includes first- and second-generation residents of the United States. Third-generation persons would be considered as native Americans.

Race.—The percentage Negro in each tract provided a highly skewed distribution, because most census tracts have very few Negroes and a few have almost all Negroes. To normalize the distribution, the variable was operationalized as the natural logarithm of the percentage Negro.

The ethnic and racial composition of the metropolitan areas varies greatly. In the South, Negroes comprise at least 20 percent of the population, while elsewhere, particularly in the West, they form smaller proportions of the population. The foreign-stock population is particularly concentrated in the North Central and Northeastern regions. Our analysis generally does not include nonwhite Orientals and such minority groups as Spanish Americans and Puerto Ricans. These groups are important only in the western metropolitan areas and Houston. We removed them from the analysis so that the same variables would be used in all metropolitan areas.

Familism.—To determine the basic dimensions of family status, the principal-components statistical procedure—a form of factor analysis—was performed on the correlation matrix of six types of households for each metropolitan area. This procedure produced a basic dimension of family status which was very similar to that suggested by Burgess. Neighborhoods could be characterized by the presence of married couples with children as opposed to individuals without spouses.

Of the six household types included in the factor analysis, four types basically followed the "life cycle" of married life. They were (1) Young Couples, male spouse under forty-five but without children under eighteen at home; (2) Young Families, male spouse under forty-five with children under eighteen at home; (3) Old Families, male spouse over forty-five with children under eighteen at home; and (4) Old Couples, male spouse over forty-five with no children under eighteen at home. The other two types were: Primary Individuals, generally persons living

by themselves; and Single Heads, person living in a family arrangement with relatives but without a spouse present.

In all seventeen metropolitan areas, the first extracted factor basically included Young and Old Families (married couples with children loading in one direction), while Primary Individuals and Single Heads (individuals without spouses) loaded in the other direction. Factor scores were generated for each metropolitan area by using the factor loading as a validity coefficient. Each variable's score for each census tract was multiplied by the validity coefficient. The scores for each variable were then summed to provide a total tract score. A positive score indicated disproportionate numbers of individuals without spouses, while a negative score indicated disproportionate numbers of married couples with children. The production of these factors and operationalization of the household types are described elsewhere (Guest 1970) in more detail.

Housing variables were operationalized as follows: the age of housing was the percentage of housing units built after 1940 and the size of housing or rooms as the percentage of units with at least five rooms. Percentage single unit and sound were operationalized according to the standard census definitions. Non-sound housing is rated as deteriorating or dilapidated.

Distance was determined by drawing one-mile concentric zones from the approximate geographic center of the CBD (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1966). Each tract was placed in its most appropriate one-mile zone. In some SMSAs, the outer zones were collapsed into one zone because the census tracts extended for more than one mile.

LINEAR DISTANCE

In this section, I shall first investigate the relationship between linear distance from the CBD, on the one hand, and the occupational, family, ethnic, and racial variables on the other hand. I shall then test the "housing" and "population" models to explain the location of socioeconomic groups. The population model involves the regression of distance from the CBD, and the family, the ethnic, and the racial variables on the proportion white-collar as the dependent variable. The housing model involves the regression of distance from the CBD, housing age, housing structural soundness, housing single-unit character, and housing space or rooms on the proportion white-collar as the dependent variable. The summary correlation coefficients of the variables in the two models are presented in table 1. The relationship between linear distance from the CBD and the proportion white-collar is shown in table 2 for each metropolitan area.

As table 2 indicates, linear distance from the CBD tended to correlate positively with the proportion white-collar over the sample of metro-

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TABLE 1

MEAN CORRELATIONS OF VARIABLES IN POPULATION AND
HOUSING MODELS OVER SEVENTEEN SMSAs, 1960

A. POPULATION MODEL

	Distance	Race	Ethnicity	Family	Occupation
Distance.....	...	-.334 (.159)	-.241 (.219)	-.693 (.074)	.183 (.218)
Race.....	-.201 (.253)	.406 (.120)	-.420 (.129)
Ethnicity.....097 (.234)	.232 (.348)
Family.....	-.243 (.123)
Occupation....

B. HOUSING MODEL

	Distance	Sound	Age	Units	Rooms	Occupation
Distance.....285 (.208)	.605 (.139)	.674 (.163)	.463 (.187)	.183 (.218)
Sound.....486 (.076)	.356 (.162)	.564 (.141)	.577 (.089)
Age.....621 (.189)	.424 (.319)	.359 (.115)
Units.....627 (.181)	.216 (.204)
Rooms.....550 (.137)
Occupation....

NOTE.—Standard deviations are in parentheses.

politan areas. In twelve of the seventeen areas, distance from the CBD was matched by increasing proportions of white-collar workers, although the correlations were generally quite low. The highest correlation, .538 for Cleveland, meant that less than 30 percent of the variance in the proportion white-collar could be explained by linear distance from the CBD. The square of the correlation coefficient indicates the proportion of variance in one variable which is explained by another. An unsuccessful effort was made to obtain higher correlations with the proportion white-collar by using nonlinear measures of distance, such as logarithmic and quadratic functions. In general, these measures were poorer predictors than linear distance, although log distance worked approximately as well.

Table 2 also indicates the proportion white-collar predicted for various one-mile distance zones. The value at the center shows the predicted proportion white-collar in the first mile distance zone. The gradient indicates the change in the proportion white-collar for each additional

TABLE 2
HYPOTHETICAL VALUES AT CENTER, GRADIENTS BY DISTANCE FROM
CENTER, AND CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PROPORTION
WHITE-COLLAR FOR SEVENTEEN SMSAs, 1960

Metropolitan Area	Value at Center*	Gradient†	r‡	Mean§	SD
Northeast:					
Boston.....	33.01	1.99	.359	42.99	17.81
Buffalo.....	29.64	1.04	.175	35.90	16.94
Rochester.....	30.76	3.86	.428	39.86	16.60
New Haven.....	34.05	4.16	.339	43.26	17.67
North Central:					
Detroit.....	24.53	1.26	.249	35.70	29.10
Cleveland.....	14.87	5.15	.538	37.02	21.43
Akron.....	25.11	3.13	.315	34.02	17.74
Flint.....	30.57	-1.08	-.120	28.12	13.12
Fort Wayne.....	39.10	1.42	.203	42.51	12.57
South:					
Houston.....	41.79	-0.13	-.015	41.02	24.52
Atlanta.....	36.20	1.82	.205	44.81	25.26
Birmingham.....	32.83	-0.33	-.038	31.42	21.13
Charlotte.....	36.36	3.44	.259	45.88	24.89
West:					
Seattle.....	53.65	-1.31	-.292	44.63	16.65
Denver.....	36.30	2.30	.291	47.11	21.00
Phoenix.....	44.24	-0.55	-.072	41.13	21.84
Albuquerque.....	35.27	2.64	.281	45.31	21.52

* Value at center indicates the predicted percentage white-collar in the first mile distance zone from center of the CBD.

† Gradient indicates the predicted change in the percentage white-collar with each additional mile distance zone from the CBD.

‡ Correlation coefficient (r) indicates the correlation between linear distance from the CBD and the proportion white-collar.

§ Mean indicates the average proportion white-collar over all census tracts in the metropolitan area.

|| SD indicates the standard deviation or dispersion of the proportion white-collar over the census tracts.

mile distance zone. These figures also indicate that most metropolitan areas show little differentiation between their centers and outskirts.

In keeping with the Burgess hypothesis, Negroes, ethnic groups, and individuals without spouses were also found centralized while whites, native Americans, and married couples with children were decentralized. On the average, the family variable had a $-.693$ correlation with distance from the CBD; the average correlations of the ethnicity and race variables were $-.241$ and $-.334$, respectively. Negroes and individuals without spouses were centralized in all seventeen places, while the foreign-stock population was centralized in fourteen and slightly decentralized in three metropolitan areas. Since the average correlation of the distance variable with the proportion white-collar was $.183$, the metropolitan areas appear least differentiated spatially in regard to occupational groups.

The results of the multiple regression analysis for the "population"

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and "housing" models are presented in table 3. In interpreting the results, it should be remembered that the zero-order correlations between distance from the CBD and the proportion white-collar, reported in table 1, also indicate the standardized regression effect of distance on the proportion white-collar. The standardized partial regression effects of the variables other than distance are presented primarily because the unstandardized coefficients for the race (expressed in logarithms) and the family (expressed in factor scores) variables do not have easily understood substantive interpretations. However, the standardized coefficients should be interpreted with care, since the distributions of the variables differ across the sample of metropolitan areas. The standardized coefficients of distance will be used, since we are interested in total measures of differentiation for each metropolitan area that are independent of the distance in miles from center to outskirts.

As table 3 indicates in regard to the "population" model, the standardized partial regression effect of distance, once the other population characteristics are controlled, was less than the zero-order effect in thirteen of the seventeen places. Over the sample of metropolitan areas, the average standardized regression effect dropped from a zero-order

TABLE 3
STANDARDIZED PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR DISTANCE, RACE
ETHNICITY, AND FAMILY VARIABLES IN PREDICTION OF PROPORTION
WHITE-COLLAR FOR SEVENTEEN SMSAs, 1960

Metropolitan Area	Distance	Race	Ethnicity	Family	R ²	df*
Northeast:						
Boston.....	.223	-.149	-.160	-.050	.161	413
Buffalo.....	.136	-.424	-.203	.171	.168	119
Rochester.....	-.135	-.543	-.331	-.203	.371	132
New Haven.....	.437	-.205	-.006	.309	.185	56
North Central:						
Detroit.....	.222	-.017	.257	-.055	.141	756
Cleveland.....	.663	-.164	.091	.261	.348	350
Akron.....	-.011	-.305	.336	-.259	.365	87
Flint.....	-.030	.147	.761	-.276	.517	66
Fort Wayne.....	-.080	-.458	.346	-.395	.434	52
South:						
Houston.....	-.103	-.362	.163	-.094	.184	183
Atlanta.....	.168	-.373	.544	-.002	.620	180
Birmingham.....	-.068	-.400	.472	-.009	.558	98
Charlotte.....	.062	-.210	.693	-.227	.849	67
West:						
Seattle.....	-.669	-.382	.083	-.456	.363	236
Denver.....	.075	-.364	.166	-.239	.272	173
Phoenix.....	-.226	-.405	-.065	-.180	.244	132
Albuquerque.....	.424	-.123	.592	.179	.451	56
Mean.....	.064	-.279	.220	-.090	.367	...
Standard deviation....	.300	.177	.322	.222	.192	...

* df = degrees of freedom.

.183 to a partial .064. Thus, much of the distance-white-collar relationship could be attributed to the location of other population groups. However, there were some notable exceptions, such as Cleveland, to this general finding. The regression equations suggest that white-collar persons are decentralized primarily because whites and married couples with children are also disproportionately decentralized. In general, ethnicity centralizes white-collar persons, since foreign-stock areas are positively related to the proportion white-collar but negatively related to distance from the CBD. Ethnic areas were lower in status in the Northeastern metropolitan areas, for poorly understood reasons. The generally higher status of ethnic areas, although not their centralization, is inconsistent with the Burgess argument.

The testing of the housing model led to results more consistent with expectations. One would expect that housing variables might predict socioeconomic-group location, since they correlated positively with distance from the CBD, particularly the single-units and housing-age variables. As table 4 shows, the effect of distance on the proportion white-collar was reduced in fifteen of the seventeen metropolitan areas when the spatial locations of housing types were controlled. While the

TABLE 4
STANDARDIZED PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR DISTANCE AND
HOUSING VARIABLES IN PREDICTION OF PROPORTION WHITE-
COLLAR FOR SEVENTEEN SMSAs, 1960

Metropolitan Area	Distance	Sound	Age	Units	Rooms	R ²	df*
Northeast:							
Boston.....	-.189	.450	-.040	.556	-.078	.512	413
Buffalo.....	.114	.440	.053	-.122	.298	.360	119
Rochester.....	-.050	.411	.477	-.264	.222	.452	132
New Haven.....	-.291	.233	.002	.303	.262	.243	56
North Central:							
Detroit.....	.118	.219	.291	-.287	.271	.206	756
Cleveland.....	.260	.249	.198	-.263	.317	.394	350
Akron.....	.091	.221	.620	-1.001	.851	.682	87
Flint.....	-.240	.559	.066	-.358	.475	.570	66
Fort Wayne.....	-.161	.338	.262	-.274	.661	.562	52
South:							
Houston.....	-.017	.181	-.010	-.631	.868	.699	183
Atlanta.....	-.013	.344	-.174	-.493	.949	.693	180
Birmingham.....	-.230	.267	.092	-.295	.657	.702	98
Charlotte.....	-.010	.022	.073	-.492	1.033	.751	67
West:							
Seattle.....	-.264	.219	.150	-.298	.487	.418	236
Denver.....	.140	.356	.048	-.416	.626	.534	173
Phoenix.....	-.007	.323	-.124	-.243	.650	.610	132
Albuquerque....	-.060	.248	.071	-.208	.591	.611	56
Mean.....	-.048	.299	.121	-.282	.538	.524	...
Standard deviation	.161	.125	.202	.339	.297	.165	...

* df = degrees of freedom.

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average zero-order effect of distance was .183, the partial standardized regression effect was $-.048$. The distributions of white-collar persons in relation to the CBD may be almost completely explained statistically by housing age, soundness, single-unit character, and number of rooms. Cleveland was the only metropolitan area where distance showed a strongly positive relationship with the proportion white-collar after the housing variables were controlled.

From the regression equations, reported in table 4, it is clear that the best general predictor of the proportion white-collar was the spatial or rooms variable. Contrary to expectations, the single-units variable generally had a negative partial relationship with the proportion white-collar. Once the distance and other housing variables were controlled, white-collar persons were disproportionately found in areas of multiple-unit housing. Thus, it appears that the distribution of single-unit housing, independent of its other characteristics, is a factor centralizing white-collar persons. Consistent with expectations, the soundness of dwellings was a positive predictor of the proportion white-collar. Deterioration of neighborhoods does seem to be a force repelling white-collar persons. The housing-age variable also generally had an effect consistent with expectations, but in many places the relationship was quite weak. In any case, these partial regression effects should be interpreted with care. Some housing variables, such as the rooms and the single-unit variables, may be practically interchangeable because of their high correlation. The partial effect of one, controlling for the other, may have little substantive interpretation.

Let us now turn to the effect of urban characteristics such as age and population size on the relative decentralization of the higher-status population.

CITY AGE

On a cross-sectional basis, it is possible to determine the association of metropolitan "age" with the relationship between distance and the proportion white-collar. "Age" will be correlated with the zero-order and the standardized regression effects of distance on the proportion white-collar. These standardized regression effects of distance on the proportion white-collar will be known as "white-collar decentralization." Analysis of the unstandardized distance-white-collar coefficients generally indicated the same results as analysis of the standardized coefficients. In essence, I shall be using regression coefficients for the distance-white-collar relationship as dependent variables in another correlation or regression analysis.

I should note that the zero-order regression coefficients of distance on the white-collar variable did not consider the interrelationships among

the white-collar, population, and housing variables. The partial relationship, of course, did take this into consideration.

Admittedly, the use of regression coefficients as dependent variables in further regression analysis is a risky business. Those who have better measures of the overall relationship between distance and the proportion white-collar for individual cities are urged to supply and test them.

Burgess was concerned about what happens to population differentiation as a metropolitan area both ages and grows in size. Asking the question separately is somewhat redundant, since the two are highly related. Our measure of age correlated .571 with population size. Since population size showed little relationship with urban differentiation in regard to white-collar groups, I shall drop it from the analysis.

Age was operationalized as the census year in which the central city reached 50,000 population. Metropolitan areas which reached this status before 1890 were coded as 2; between 1890 and 1910 as 1; 1920 and later as 0. Streetcars were first used extensively in the period around 1890. After 1920, automobiles became popular. Both means of transportation permitted greater deconcentration of housing and population, since travel time to the CBD was shortened.

City age correlates with the degree of decentralization for most of the population and housing characteristics. City age correlates $+.504$ with white-collar decentralization; $.185$ with family status decentralization; $-.177$ with ethnicity decentralization; $-.519$ with race decentralization; $+.440$ with sound decentralization; $.681$ with single-unit decentralization; $.366$ with new housing decentralization; and $.268$ with rooms decentralization. Thus, in general, the older the metropolitan area, the greater the decentralization of white-collar workers, white Americans, sound housing, single-unit housing, new housing, and roomy housing. Family decentralization and ethnic decentralization have very little relationship to metropolitan age. In general, then, these results support Burgess's notion of urban differentiation over time.

Since housing decentralization seems to be more related to metropolitan age than population decentralization, we would expect age to be a better predictor of the partial distance-white-collar relationship in the housing than the population model. This is true. The age of the metropolitan areas has a $.185$ correlation with the decentralization of white-collar workers when the location of housing types is considered. Thus, white-collar workers are only slightly more decentralized in old metropolitan areas once the location of housing is considered. The age of the metropolitan area has a $.318$ correlation with the decentralization of white-collar workers when the location of other population groups is considered. Thus, the effect of age on white-collar decentralization is reduced from the situation in which location of other population groups

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was not considered. But there is still a slight tendency for the oldest metropolitan areas to have the greatest decentralization of white-collar workers, even when the location of other population groups is considered.

While the procedure produces confusing results conceptually, it is possible to run both the population and the housing variables together with the distance variable for each metropolitan area against the proportion white-collar. The confusion arises from the difficulty in providing a substantive interpretation to the regression effects of the housing and population variables when their relationships with each other are controlled. But if one runs these equations, it is possible to obtain the standardized partial regression effect of distance on the proportion white-collar when the distributions of housing and population are controlled. This new measure of white-collar decentralization has a $-.043$ correlation with metropolitan age, indicating that all of the greater decentralization of white-collar workers in older areas may at least be explained statistically by the distribution of population and housing variables.

SUMMARY

I have found some tendency, generally slight, for the proportion white-collar to increase with linear distance from the CBD in twelve of seventeen metropolitan areas. Thus, the so-called Burgess hypothesis appears to be a fairly accurate description of the spatial patterns of most cities in our sample, but most of the variance in occupational status among census tracts is left unexplained.

Two models, consistent with the Burgess arguments, were then tested to explain the relationship between distance and proportion white-collar. We found the "population" model to be a poorer predictor than the "housing" model of white-collar location in the city. In regard to the population model, white-collar persons are decentralized because whites and married couples with children are decentralized. Interestingly, the centralization of foreign-stock population generally seems to centralize white-collar persons. The housing model suggested that white-collar persons are decentralized in cities primarily due to the decentralization of sound and roomy, and possibly newer, housing. Single-unit housing, which is decentralized, actually had a negative effect on the proportion white-collar when distance and other housing variables were controlled.

Consistent with the Burgess hypothesis, white-collar persons are most decentralized in the oldest metropolitan areas. However, most of this relationship appears due to the location of housing types and population groups in older versus newer areas.

Obviously, this paper has relied on relatively crude measures of distance-socioeconomic-group location. Different socioeconomic measures

might produce contrasting results, although my perusal of the literature and fragmentary empirical analysis suggest otherwise.

In the future, I would hope to specify and test more detailed models of how cities differentiate over time in their population and housing characteristics. Given the increasing accumulation of census-tract data over time, this type of project is readily feasible. Some recently developed statistical techniques for longitudinal analysis, such as path analysis (Duncan 1966), might be particularly helpful in developing these models.

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Commentary and Debate

COMMENTS ON BOYLE'S "PATH ANALYSIS AND ORDINAL DATA"¹

Boyle (1970) has made a significant contribution to the literature in showing how to use dummy variables in path analysis as a device for investigating scale characteristics. However, if path analysis is applied in causal analyses without provision for unmeasured "underlying" variables, there is an implicit assumption that the causative variables are measured without error (i.e., perfect reliability and validity). When each scale unit of an independent variable is treated as a category in Boyle's procedure, no measurement error corresponds to no errors of placement into categories. If there are placement errors, then the observed scale category may not correspond to the "true" scale category, that is, the dummy variable set used by Boyle to code the scale units for an independent variable would correspond to an observed set of fallible variables which are indicators of an underlying set of "true" dummy variables. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among true and observed dummy variables for a four-unit scale, residual arrows corresponding to errors of placement into that scale category. The number of observed dummy variables (D_a, D_b, D_c) is one less than the number of scale units or categories, and the true dummy variables (T_a, T_b, T_c) are shown as nonindependent because inclusion in one category necessarily involves exclusion from another category. Since dummy variables are dichotomous, the product moment correlations among these variables are ϕ coefficients. Application of path principles to figure 1 shows that the system is underidentified since there are only three correlations among observed variables as compared with nine unknowns (three correlations among errors, three correlations among true dummy variables, and three reliabilities). One solution to the underidentification problem is to use at least three experimentally independent indicators of the independent variable, each of which has the same number of scale categories. For example, in the case of three independent indicators each of which has four levels (i.e., categories), the resulting path diagram would include three "observed" dummy variables (e.g., D_{a1}, D_{a2}, D_{a3}) for each "true" dummy variable (e.g., D_a), the placement errors for a given category on one measure being independent of placement errors in the same or different categories for the other two measures. A path

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


FIG. 1.—Path diagram showing relationships among true and observed dummy variables for a four-unit scale.

analysis of this diagram shows that the system is overidentified (36 observed correlations vs. 21 unknown correlations and path coefficients). When the usual dummy variable coding is used (Decomposition II in Boyle's table 1), the correlation (ϕ) between any two true dummy variables is a function only of the true proportion in these categories:

$$\phi_{T_a T_b} = \sqrt{\frac{P_a P_b}{Q_a Q_b}}, \quad (1)$$

where $\phi_{T_a T_b}$ is the correlation between T_a and T_b , P_a is the true proportion in category a , P_b is the true proportion in category b , $Q_a = 1 - P_a$, and $Q_b = 1 - P_b$.

It follows from equation (1) that if the correlations among the three true dummy variables are identifiable, then the proportions of the true classification in each category may be identified. The variance of a dichotomous variable is equal to the proportion in that category times the proportion not in that category (e.g., $V_a = P_a Q_a$), and the mean is equal to the proportion in that category (e.g., P_a). The variances and the correlations could be used to calculate covariances or unstandard-

ized regression weights as desired. A dependent variable (Y) may be added to the path diagram, path analysis principles again allowing us to find the equations for the unstandardized regression weights on each of the true dummy variables. When the second type of dummy variable coding in Boyle's table 1 is used, the true regression weights represent the difference between the true Y mean of the group coded "1" in that dummy variable and the true Y mean of the reference group. When Boyle's (1970) first type of dummy variable coding (Decomposition I in table 1 of Boyle's paper) is used, then the true regression weights represent the true difference between successive category means, that is, a test of the equal interval assumption under "effect" scaling. This analysis indicates that one of the reasons that the observed regression weights may differ from one scale category to the next is that the degree of measurement error may differ at different points on the scale.

The analytical model discussed above would still apply if the observations consisted of three independent sorts into a set of nominal categories. In this case the analysis is equivalent to an analysis of variance with fallible group information, and the problem is whether the true group means really differ, that is, whether the regression weights for the true dummy variables are all zero.

In passing it might be noted that for overidentified models of the type discussed above, a procedure for estimating the parameters of the model is needed. As Goldberger (1970, p. 25) notes: "the path analysis literature offers no guidance on systematic estimation of overidentified models." Because the distribution of variables (true and observed) is multinomial, the function to be minimized (Mote and Anderson 1965; Cochran 1968, pp. 647-48) for estimation purposes is a χ^2 involving observed and hypothetical ("expected") probabilities. The dummy variable path analysis equations therefore must be translated into probability functions to obtain estimates in overidentified models. In our opinion, path analysis is useful in this type of problem because it helps deal with questions of identifiability, and it is easier for the researcher to conceptualize the relationships among variables.

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FURTHER COMMENTS ON BOYLE'S "PATH ANALYSIS AND ORDINAL DATA"¹

One of the more important contributions of Boyle's paper (1970) is his extension of the work of Borgatta (1968) and Labovitz (1967, 1970) on the consequences of assuming equal intervals for supposedly ordinal data. For example, his presentation of the source of distortions in regression and correlation coefficients via "zigzag" regression lines is a clear conceptual explanation of Labovitz's empirical findings. Thus, Boyle effectively advances the argument that distortions resulting from the use of parametric statistical techniques, and their attendant equal-interval assumption, may not be as serious as once was thought. Our comments on Boyle's paper primarily focus on some errors in his treatment of dummy variables in path analysis and on his proposals for recalibrating measures. We also attempt to extend and clarify some key statements in the paper.

On the Use of Dummy Variables in Path Analysis

In his second major section, Boyle illustrates the use of dummy variables as dependent, independent, and intervening variables in path models. Such use allows one to examine the detailed workings of the model that would be hidden by more summary methods. This section is stimulating in the possibilities it reveals for additional analytic techniques, although Boyle makes a few rather simple statistical mistakes which undermine the validity of some of his suggested procedures. In the following section, we shall attempt to correct these mistakes and show the resulting implications for the use of dummy variables in path analysis.

Boyle frequently employs dummy variables as dependent variables in certain regression equations. As the econometricians have long known, using restricted variables as dependent variables in a regression equation

¹ This paper was initiated as a presentation to the seminar of the Methodology Training Program at the University of Wisconsin. We would like to thank especially Robert M. Hauser, Donald J. Treiman, Hal H. Winsborough, and Arthur S. Goldberger, and also Richard T. Campbell and David R. Heise, for their helpful comments and advice. Computing funds were made available through National Institute of General Medical Sciences grant GMO-1526.

can create some statistical anomalies. Specifically, it is quite possible that observations with extreme values on the independent variables will have predicted values outside the range of a dichotomous dependent variable. That is, observations may be predicted to have values greater than 1.0 or less than 0.0 on the dependent dichotomy. Obviously, such predictions are interpretively meaningless. Although a number of ad hoc procedures have been proposed to deal with this problem, one of the more widely accepted is "probit analysis." This analysis, in effect, flattens the regression curve at both ends of the dichotomous range, thus insuring that all predictions do indeed fall within the range of 0.0–1.0 (see Goldberger 1964, pp. 250–51). Rather than belabor this point, we simply advise the reader that the use of dichotomies as dependent variables creates special statistical problems that should be carefully considered.

In his section dealing with the use of dummy variables as independent variables, Boyle makes a rather simple but serious statistical mistake, which he builds into a series of erroneous statements, culminating in the false conclusion that "the operation of adding together paths through dummy variables *implicitly* assumes an effect-proportional interval scale for the parent independent variable" (p. 473). For the sake of simplifying our presentation, we will quote Boyle's complete statement on this point:

As before, the translation to dummy variables completely determines them and taking account of the difference in units, the effect of each CIS variable on its dummies is .50. Then applying path operations to get the total effect of, say, research choice (RC) means, in essence, taking the arithmetic mean of the effects of RC_1 and RC_2 . But since these coefficients are actually the slopes of the zigzag regression line of research choice on alienation, this averaging procedure is equivalent to *making* the zigzag line straight by altering the interval scale for company encouragement [research choice?]. This follows from the earlier discussion of zigzag regression lines. Thus the operation of adding together paths through dummy variables *implicitly* assumes an effect-proportional interval scale for the parent independent variable.

One consequence of this is that we will not necessarily get the same results for an independent variable when we assume equal intervals and when we use dummy variables. This is evident in figure 4, where the estimated effects of the CIS variables are compared using both methods. [P. 473, emphasis in original]

We propose to demonstrate, both logically and empirically, that almost every assertion made in the above excerpt is either incorrect or misleading. In contrast to Boyle, our conclusion is that the effect of an ordinal variable on some dependent variable is in *no* meaningful way made effect-proportional by the translation through the dummy variable decomposition, and, in fact, that this use of dummy variables has, if prop-

erly done, absolutely *no* effect on the original relationship. We shall then show that, despite this conclusion, Boyle's treatment of dummy variables as intervening variables, like his discussion of dummy dependent variables, remains essentially correct.

It appears that Boyle's initial statement is the key to his errors. He states: "As before, the translation to dummy variables completely determines them, and taking account of the difference in units, the effect of each CIS variable on its dummies is .50." It is actually very unclear to us exactly what he is saying in this sentence. First, it is obvious that the parent variable does not completely determine its dummies when they are taken separately. In fact, as we soon show, the true regression of a dummy on its parent variable is a nonlinear regression. This makes complete determination impossible in the context of *linear* regression with which we are dealing. Alternatively, Boyle may mean that the *set* of dummy variables is determined by the parent variable. Although such an assertion is correct, its only implication is that the sum of the paths from the parent variable to its dummies must equal 1.0, a proof we present later. This fact, however, in no way dictates the specific values the individual path coefficients must assume. In short, there is nothing in this first sentence which logically leads one to assign values of .50 to the two paths in question.

In the face of this ambiguity, we investigated the problem empirically with a data set collected immediately following the black student strike at the University of Wisconsin in the spring of 1969. Of the information collected, five variables will be used in this analysis for heuristic purposes only. (For a substantive analysis of these data, see Lyons, forthcoming, 1971.) The variables are political position, attitude toward student power, identification with the strikers, attempt to obtain information, and boycotting classes.²

To be consistent with Boyle in this analysis, we utilized an ordinal trichotomy, "identification with the strikers" (ID), as an independent variable (coded 0, 1, 2, in the same manner as Boyle's "research choice"),

² Information was taken from a 2 percent systematic sample of the student body. The variables are defined as follows: political position (POL): "With respect to other students at the UW, my own political views are: radical left (1), left of center (2), moderate (3), right of center (4), very conservative (5)." Student power (SP): "How important is the cause of enhancing 'student power' to you?: very important (1), important (2), somewhat important (3), unimportant (4)." Identification with strikers (ID): "Regardless of the extent of your active participation in the demonstrations: (a) did you feel a general identification with the protestors? (b) with the anti-strike?: a only (2), neither a nor b, or both a and b (1), b only (0)." Attempts to obtain information (INF): "How closely did you follow developments during the first week of demonstrations?: up-to-the-minute (1), at least 4-5 times per day (2), 2-3 times per day (3), about once a day (4), little attention (5)." Boycotting classes (BOYCOTT): "Did you *deliberately* miss any classes at any time out of sympathy to the strike?: yes (0), no (1)."

and "attempt to obtain information" (INF) as a dependent variable. Our first analysis uses *ID* as an independent variable operating through its dummies *ID*₁ and *ID*₂ (coded ordinally by Boyle's Decomposition I), with no other independent variables in the model. The results are given in figure 1. Three findings are immediately apparent: (1) the empirically derived path-regression (unstandardized) coefficients from *ID* to its dummies are not .50, but rather .569 and .431, respectively; (2) the sum of the two coefficients is 1.0; (3) the effect of *ID* on *INF* is the same whether we assume an equal-interval scale for *ID* or allow it to operate through its dummies. We shall now analyze logically the implications of these empirical findings.

The reason why the coefficients are not .50 is actually very simple.




FIG. 1.—Path-regression analysis using dummy variables as independent variables: (a) assuming equal intervals for *ID*; (b) applying empirical path-regression coefficients to paths from *ID* to *ID*₁ and *ID*₂; (c) using Boyle's procedure of assigning .50 to paths from *ID* to *ID*₁ and *ID*₂.

Since the values of the dummy variables are fixed at 0 or 1 for given values of the parent variable by the method of decomposition, the only source of variation in the regression of either dummy on the parent variable is the relative sizes of the latter's categories (see Appendix A). Figure 2 presents graphically how these path-regression coefficients are obtained. As was stated previously, the true regression of each dum-




FIG. 2.—Graphic representations of the unstandardized regression of an ordinal decomposition (X_1) on the parent variable (X): (a) the regression of X_1 on X ; (b) the regression of X_2 on X . Each dot represents multiple data points, in this case each representing the same number of observations.

my on its parent variable is nonlinear. The coefficient we obtain, then, is the least-squares estimate of the best-fitting straight line through these points. The regression lines in figure 2 were drawn given the assumption of equal frequencies in each category. To the extent that the category sizes are unequal, the regression line will be pulled toward the points representing the largest number of observations. This is a consequence of the least-squares requirement of minimizing the sum of the squared deviations from the regression line. Given the preceding discussion, we find Boyle's procedure of assigning .50 to the paths in question completely arbitrary and unwarranted.

As we asserted earlier, and as was supported by our second finding, the sum of the paths from the parent variable to its dummies is equal to 1.0. The proof that this must always be the case is relatively simple and is given in Appendix B. In path analytic terms, this situation is illustrated by figure 3. Since $c = d = 1.0$ as a function of the ordinal decomposition procedure, and the regression of a variable on itself must be 1.0, it then follows that $b_1 + b_2 = 1.0$.

The third finding from our analysis is that, in contrast to Boyle, we get the same effect of *ID* on *INF* whether we assume an equal-interval scale for *ID* or allow it to operate through its dummies. However, there is an important difference between our model at this point and the model Boyle presents (though this has no bearing on the previous discussion): we are dealing with the effect of an ordinal variable, through its dummy decomposition, on a dependent variable, with no other independent variables in the model; Boyle's model, on the other hand, controls for the simultaneous effects of other independent variables on the dependent variable. This means that Boyle's estimate of the effect of an ordinal variable through its dummies is, in general, different from the effect that would be calculated in the absence of other independent variables. As we shall illustrate, the meaning of these effects may be markedly differ-




FIG. 3.—Path model for the effect of a variable on itself through its dummy variable decomposition.

ent, depending on the model used. We shall discuss each of these models in turn.

The two models in question are represented in figure 4 by diagram *b* (*Model I*) and diagram *d* (*Model II*—analogous to Boyle's analyses). Since Boyle does not differentiate between these models, we can assume he intends his discussion to be general to both of them. His conclusion that "the operation of adding together paths through dummy variables




FIG. 4.—Path-regression analyses illustrating the effect of *ID* on *BOYCOTT*: (a) using *ID* as an interval scale; (b) tracing *ID* through its dummies; (c) using *ID* as an interval scale with *SP* also effecting *BOYCOTT*; (d) tracing *ID* through its dummies with *SP* also effecting *BOYCOTT* (analogous to Boyle's analyses); (e) tracing *ID* through its dummies, but with *SP* "effecting" ID_1 and ID_2 , as well as *BOYCOTT*; (f) using *ID* effect-proportionally rescaled on *BOYCOTT* (ID'), with *SP* effecting *BOYCOTT*.

implicitly assumes an effect-proportional interval scale for the parent independent variable" (p. 473), however, is rejected for both models. In contrast to Boyle, we shall show that an ordinal variable's effect in *Model I* is, in fact, an equal-interval effect, not an effect-proportional one, and that its effect in *Model II*, using Boyle's procedure, is neither equal-interval *nor* effect-proportional. Our discussion begins with some general observations on the operation of dummies in *Model I*, and then shows how this is altered for *Model II*. Note that comments refer to unstandardized (path-regression) coefficients only.

Boyle states that by adding the two path products from *ID* through its dummies to *INF*, one obtains the simple arithmetic average of the paths. Further, he asserts that this averaging procedure is equivalent to *straightening* the zigzag line segments. However, rather than the simple arithmetic average of the two paths, the correct procedure yields a *weighted* average—the weights being the empirically derived path-regression coefficients for the regression of each of the dummies on the parent variable, as we have shown above. Note that the two methods give the same result only in the case where these two empirical path-regression coefficients are each .5 (or when the regressions of the dependent variable on each of the dummies are equal). Thus, Boyle's results are distorted to the extent that his category sizes are not equal.

With respect to his second assertion, that the averaging procedure straightens out the zigzag line segments, Boyle is simply incorrect. Neither Boyle's nor our own (weighted) averaging procedure straightens out these segments in any meaningful way. Figure 5 presents graphically the regression of *INF* on *ID* (an example of *Model I*). In this diagram, we present both the zigzag lines (regression segments) and the regression line assuming equal intervals. By taking the regression-weighted average of the two paths from *ID* to *INF* we are, in essence, fitting a straight line to the category means, not straightening out the category means. What our regression-weighting procedure does is weight the regression segments represented by the dummy variables in the same manner as is done automatically when a single regression line is fitted to the means predicted by the parent variable. That is, the presence of the parent variable in the *Model I* path diagram reproduces the linear prediction made in the simple linear or "equal-interval" regression. Thus, when no other independent variables are considered (*Model I*), the effect of an ordinal parent variable is seen to be unaffected by the translation through its dummies—that is, the procedure maintains any nonlinearity in the ordinal variable; it does not rescale the ordinal variable effect proportionally.

This, however, is not the case for *Model II*, where additional independent variables enter into the prediction of the dependent variable.




FIG. 5.—Graphic representation of the linear regression of *INF* and *BOYCOTT* on *ID*, also showing the separate effects of *ID*₁ and *ID*₂ on *INF* and *BOYCOTT*.

What we wish to reproduce here is not the zero-order interval effect of the parent variable on the dependent variable, but this effect net of the effects of other independent variables in the model. Figure 4 illustrates this concern for our data. We see immediately that we cannot reproduce the net interval effect of *ID* on *BOYCOTT* (diagram *c*) by simply summing the products of the two paths through *ID*₁ and *ID*₂ (diagram *d*). The reason for this apparent anomaly is fairly straightforward. To the extent that *ID* and *SP* are correlated, *SP* produces confounding effects

in the system at two points: (1) in the regression of *BOYCOTT* on ID_1 and ID_2 , and (2) in the regression of ID_1 and ID_2 on ID . However, in diagram *d* we remove only the first source of *SPs* confounding effects. By removing the second source as well (diagram *e*), we are able to reproduce exactly the net interval effect of ID on *BOYCOTT*. (The path-regression coefficients from ID to ID_1 and ID_2 in diagram *e* are $b_{X_1, X \cdot Z}$ and $b_{X_2, X \cdot Z}$, respectively.) It is clear that when other independent variables included in the model are *not correlated* with the parent variable, the effect of the parent variable through its dummies is identical with the zero-order interval effect, as in *Model I*. (Appendix C gives proofs for these findings for both *Model I* and *Model II*.)

The additional result from diagram *f* in figure 4 also makes clear that, contrary to Boyle, neither *Model I* nor *Model II* necessarily assumes an effect-proportional scale for the parent independent variable. Boyle evidently failed to realize that he in fact presents data in his article that refute his "effect-proportional" assertion. If his .5 weighting procedure does in fact implicitly assume an effect-proportional scale for the parent variable, as he maintains, then we can expect it to produce an effect equal to the effect obtained by using only the recalibrated parent variable. A comparison of diagrams *a* and *b* in figure 6 (from Boyle's figures 4 and 5*b*, pp. 474, 475) reveals that the effect of his X_4 on X_1 , through X_4 's dummies, is equal to .307, whereas this result is .204 when he uses the recalibrated X_4 .

Interestingly, it *would* be possible for Boyle to "reproduce the equal-




FIG. 6.—Path-regression analyses illustrating the effect of X_4 on X_1 ; (a) using Boyle's procedure of assigning .50 to paths from X_4 to RC_1 and RC_2 ; (b) using X_4 effect-proportionally recalibrated on X_1 (X_4'). Unmarked arrows represent other independent variables controlled for.

interval effect," that is, to reproduce its numerical value, by recalibrating his variable X_4 . The fact is there is an inexhaustible set of values that may be assigned to the categories of an independent variable, *all* of which represent an acceptable effect-proportional rescaling on a single dependent variable. That is to say, there is an inexhaustible variety of ways to differentially stretch or contract the intervals of the independent variable and still keep their sizes proportional to their effects on some given dependent variable—to straighten out the regression line. This infinite variety of effect-proportional scales is simply the result of the infinite variety of linear transformations one can apply to any given effect-proportional scale, still retaining the same proportional effects.

Table 1 presents four of the possible legitimate effect-proportional recalibrations (straightenings) of ID using *BOYCOTT* as the recalibration criterion (cf. fig. 4b). Note that only *standardized* (path) coefficients remain unaffected by the specific effect-proportional recoding when ID' is used as an independent variable (but that both standardized and unstandardized total effects are stable when ID' is used as an intervening variable). This illustrates the fact that *virtually all magnitudes* of unstandardized (path-regression) effect-proportional coefficients of the same sign³ are possible when a single dependent variable is regressed on an independent variable for which it has been used as a recalibration criterion. The point illustrated is that unstandardized coefficients are highly sensitive to metric (the particular rescaling); standardized coef-

TABLE 1
ILLUSTRATIONS OF STANDARDIZED AND UNSTANDARDIZED EFFECTS
USING ALTERNATIVE EFFECT-PROPORTIONAL RECALIBRATIONS
FOR ID (ID') (TWO MODELS)

CALIBRATION OF ID'	$ID' \rightarrow BOYCOTT$		$POL \rightarrow ID' \rightarrow BOYCOTT$	
	Stan- dardized	Unstan- dardized	Stan- dardized	Unstan- dardized
a) 0, 1, 2 (ID).....	-.534	-.323	.261	.135
b) 0, 1, 5.6.....	-.573	-.106	.272	.140
c) 0.783, 1, 2.....	-.573	-.488	.272	.140
d) -1, 0, 4.6.....	-.573	-.106	.272	.140
e) -9, 1, 46.....	-.573	-.011	.272	.140

NOTE.—a = the original calibration of ID ; b-e are alternative versions (linear transformations) of the effect-proportional recording of ID , using *BOYCOTT* as the recalibration criterion.

³ All segments, too, must have the same sign, an important qualification that will be discussed shortly. If all regression segments are of the same sign, that is, if the relationship is monotonically increasing or decreasing, it is possible to keep the required constant proportional sizes among the intervals and produce graphically every arrangement of means from a nearly vertical one (very contracted intervals) to a nearly horizontal one (very expanded intervals) (see table 1 for a partial illustration).

ficients are completely insensitive. So, although Boyle's derived effect necessarily coincides with *one* of the infinitely possible unstandardized effect-proportional outcomes—and so does our technique—it is certainly an arbitrary one and it would make no sense to compare it, as Boyle (incorrectly) asserts he is doing in his figure 4 (p. 474), with other outcomes (e.g., equal-interval effects). In fact, as we have discovered, it makes no sense to speak of “the” unstandardized effect-proportional effect of an independent variable. Given this inherent arbitrariness of metric for effect-proportional rescaling, perhaps the most attractive, though no more or no less interpretable, rescaling is the one that produces an unstandardized zero-order coefficient of 1.0. This rescaling is achieved by simply assigning the predicted (conditional mean) dependent variable values to each of the corresponding independent variable categories.

We stated earlier that rejecting Boyle's assertion regarding the implicit effect of using dummy variables as independent variables has no bearing on his discussion concerning the use of dummy intervening variables. This might seem curious, since Boyle bases his later assertion, in part, on the validity of the former. The key consideration, however, is that *no* procedure which averages the effects of the dummy variables is involved when they are used as intervening variables, though it is possible to “insert” the parent intervening variable, and thus weight the dummies to reproduce exactly the equal-interval effect. This is illustrated in figure 7, where diagrams *a*, *b*, and *c* represent Boyle's procedures and support his assertion that the use of dummy variables as intervening variables is equivalent to using an effect-proportional scale for *ID*. Diagrams *d* and *e*, on the other hand, show how the reinstitution of our (weighted) averaging procedure, by including the parent variable *ID* into the system, essentially transforms the effect-proportional scale for *ID* into an equal-interval scale.

Before concluding this section of our comments, we should point out a circumstance encountered in our analysis, and in Boyle's, that places an important restriction on the procedure of recalibrating into an effect-proportional scale. Returning to our example using *ID* and *INF*, we note (fig. 1) that the effect of ID_1 on *INF* is $-.675$, whereas the effect of ID_2 is $+.132$. What this shows is a *nonmonotonic curvilinear* relationship between *ID* and the variable *INF*. As can be readily seen in figure 4*a*, there is no way to stretch or contract the scaling of *ID* to straighten out the line segments and still preserve the original order inherent in *ID*. In fact, the only way to straighten out the line segments would be first to interpose categories 0 and 1 of *ID* and then to rescale them into an effect-proportional scale—a procedure impossible to justify if one has previously assumed the original order. Note, from Boyle's analysis, that




FIG. 7.—Path-regression analyses illustrating the effect of using dummy variables as intervening variables: (a) Boyle's using of dummy variables as intervening variables; (b) recalibrating *ID* into an effect-proportional scale (*ID'*); (c) using dummy variables to determine *ID'*; (d) inserting *ID* to return the effect-proportional result to that of an equal-interval scale for *ID*; and (e) using an equal-interval scale for *ID*.

two of the CIS variables (*CE* and *ST*) are nonmonotonically related to work alienation in their *net* regression coefficients (see Boyle's fig. 6, p. 477). We must assume from the simple fact that Boyle was able to use work alienation as an effect-proportional recalibration criterion for *CE* and *ST* (p. 476) that he did not use these net coefficients to recalibrate, and that this curvilinearity does not exist for the regression of work alienation on either *CE* or *ST* taken separately. This is by no means obvious, however, since Boyle's illustration of the effect-proportional recalibration of *RC* (p. 475) *does* utilize the net coefficients from the regression of work alienation on the full set of CIS variables! We shall make

further observations about Boyle's suggestion for using dummy variables as a guide to recalibration in the final section of this comment.

Concluding this section, we might point out the implication of this discussion for the use of dummy variables in path analysis. Boyle states, correctly, that the use of dummy variables as dependent variables is basically redundant since such use produces an equal-interval scale effect. We find, in opposition to Boyle, that the same may be true for the use of dummy variables as independent variables when the parent variable precedes the dummies,⁴ though this is by no means always the case. (At any rate, Boyle's use of dummies as independent variables does not, as he maintains, assure the derivation of a meaningful effect-proportional result.)

It might appear, then, that a dummy variable decomposition contributes to a path analysis only when employed as a set of intervening variables. However, such an assessment would be unjustified. As Boyle's analyses illustrate, a dummy decomposition may be an informative way to dissect the operation of a variable in *any* position in a path model. The result might be the confirmation of an originally assumed equal-interval or linear effect for the parent variable, or it might serve to unmask distortions (e.g., curvilinearity) among the separate effects of the parent variable segments. This latter point (which Boyle also recognizes on p. 479) is intended as a caveat against presuming that for a given set of data "the empirical dangers of assuming equal intervals are not great" (Boyle, p. 461). A more sober conclusion is that we can profit from dummy variable analysis in *finding out* whether the linear assumption for a particular pair of variables is acceptable.

Further Elaborations on the Use of Dummy Variables in Path Analysis

The second part of this comment is not directed at errors in Boyle's paper, but instead examines two important issues regarding the use of dummy variables in path analysis. Both issues, the use of standardized versus unstandardized coefficients, and the use of ordinal versus nominal coding, deserve more attention than they are afforded by Boyle. We also make some observations on the desirability of effect-proportional re-scaling as a general analytic technique.

Standardized coefficients.—Curiously, Boyle's only reference to stan-

⁴ It should be pointed out explicitly that we are talking about a weighted average of the dummy variable regression coefficients when we speak of the effect of a set of dummy variables on a dependent variable. Our assertion is in no way contradictory to the well-known fact that the R^2 obtained when using dummy variables as a set of predictors in a single equation (and without the parent variable considered) will always be greater than or equal to the R^2 obtained when assuming equal intervals, for each of two parent variables.

standardized path coefficients in relation to dummy variables is his comment that a recalibration based on a dummy variable analysis may change the value of the standardized path coefficient associated with the recalibrated variable (pp. 471, 475). He does not discuss his rationale for using *only* path-regression (unstandardized) coefficients to specify the effects to and from dummy-coded variables, even though much if not most path analyses in the literature utilize standardized coefficients. A justification for Boyle's choice of unstandardized coefficients is actually quite simple, though its implications are important to understand.

A standardized coefficient tells us the predicted standard deviation unit change in the dependent variable for a change of one standard deviation unit in the independent variable, controlling for any other relevant independent variables. This means that the standard deviation of each variable plays a major part in determining the magnitude of a standardized path coefficient. Thus two dummy variables might have equivalent unstandardized paths to some third variable, but, because they have different variances,⁵ their standardized paths will not be equivalent.

Ordinal versus nominal coding.—There is an inexhaustible variety of coding schemes for dummy variables,⁶ though some of them serve special interpretive purposes better than others. Boyle proposes one of them (Decomposition I, p. 466) for maintaining assumed ordinal distinctions among a set of categories. The more conventional "nominal" coding (Decomposition II), however, is more flexible than might appear. The coefficients produced by regressing a dependent variable on the set of nominal dummy variables are interpreted simply as the difference between the means of the corresponding dummy variables (X categories) and the mean of the omitted X category, which is equal to the intercept value. The important implication of this is that one may readily *rank* these *nominal* categories according to the magnitude and sign of their individual effects *on that dependent variable*. It is then only an easy additional step to derive Boyle's ordinal path-regression coefficients for each dummy, which is done by subtracting from its nominal coefficient the nominal coefficient of the dummy variable ranked immediately below it.⁷

⁵ The variance of any dichotomous variable is a simple function of the relative sizes of its two categories; a 50-50 split has the largest variance for a given sample size.

⁶ "Any real numbers, positive or negative, whole or fractional, can be used in the coding [of dummy variables] subject only to the nonsingularity constraint, that is, no X_i may have a multiple R of 1.00 with the other independent variables" (Cohen 1968, p. 434).

⁷ The intercept value is included in the ranking just above the smallest negative and/or below the smallest positive coefficient (since each coefficient is, again, the deviation of each dummy-represented category from the intercept or mean of the omitted category) and is given the value of zero in the subtraction procedure. The lowest

So just as Boyle suggests the possibility of using an ordinal dummy decomposition to discover the "true" size of one's intervals, one might also use a nominal dummy decomposition to discover the "true" ranking of a set of nominal categories, though both of these procedures can be highly questionable and make severe theoretical demands on the particular dependent variable used to obtain the ranking or interval sizes.

A final caution in the use of either nominal or ordinal dummy coding, not mentioned by Boyle, is that the size of the omitted category must be "sufficiently large" or the solution is likely to be quite unstable—or there may be no solution obtainable because of the singularity produced among the other categories. This is often a small-sample problem, but it may be particularly troublesome for the ordinal coding scheme, which requires that the lowest (or highest) ranking category be omitted, and these categories are often the small tails of distributions containing more than a very few categories.

The Desirability of Effect-proportional Recalibration

Boyle advises us that we should avoid "as long as possible" *any* assumptions about the interval properties of underlying "true" scales (p. 465)—assumptions made explicit in the reconstruction of variables to make them effect-proportional. He also points out "the possibility that the effect-proportional scale implied by one dependent variable may not be the same as the one implied by another dependent variable," and notes that this may be due either to measurement error or to actual nonlinear relationships with one or both dependent variables (p. 465). It should be added that nonsystematic, nonrandom measurement error in the *dependent* variable (not discussed by Boyle) and sampling error might also contribute to an unwarranted effect-proportional rescaling. But even apart from these problems, a good rationale for the general use of effect-proportional recalibration is difficult to formulate.

Effect-proportional recalibration is a form of data transformation based on bivariate information, and it has a very straightforward justification in the special case where one uses it to calibrate on a dependent variable taken to be *the* criterion variable of interest. For example, one might wish to calibrate a set of religious denominations so that the resulting scale has a linear relationship with some scale of conservative-to-liberal religious attitudes that is well distributed and known to be reliable. This would avoid entirely any assumptions about underlying "true" scales and attendant problems of multiple dependent variable criteria.

coefficient serves as a base, and specifies the new omitted category, as in Boyle's illustration of the ordinal scheme.

Univariate transformations.—For other problems involving the appropriate scaling for measures, an alternative and in many cases perhaps more reasonable admonition is to attend first to *univariate* rather than *bivariate* distributional problems. For example, we know the distortions that may be associated with using highly skewed or bimodal distributions in correlation and regression analyses (Blalock 1960, p. 290), but such measures can easily be “corrected” through simple univariate area transformations (recalibration). Furthermore, many variables of interest can be conceptualized as having something between normal and flat underlying distributions, and if we can represent them as such empirically, the problem of finding true interval sizes has been solved: our intervals can be expressed as standard deviation units, which of course are all equivalent with reference to the parent distribution (Borgatta 1968). Bivariate irregularities between well-constructed univariate measures could then be treated as findings and not troublesome aberrations.

Focusing attention on univariate distributions has its own demands, of course, but they are far more practically dealt with than the problem of finding “true” scales through effect-proportional transformations. Boyle’s seemingly casual prescription of effect-proportional scaling as an alternative procedure (even though he disavows it as a foolproof technique for finding true scales (p. 476)) is viewed with a great deal of caution. Rather than exert our energies being concerned about “true” scales for simple measures, it is probably more reasonable in most cases to attend to the building of univariate distributions with desirable empirical properties (form, precision, reliability, validity). This is in part a plea for a bit more of the “raw empiricism” associated with the construction of adequate measures, and a bit less of the “raw mysticism” attending the search for true scales for items of unknown quality.

Summary

The primary concern of this comment has been an attempt to correct some statistical mistakes in Boyle’s paper. Specifically, a number of points have been made relative to the appropriate use of dummy variables in path analysis. First, the use of dichotomous variables as dependent variables in a regression equation may create distortions in the resulting regression estimates—a problem that, it is suggested, may be effectively handled with certain techniques used by econometricians. Second, Boyle’s use of .50 as the effect from a trichotomous parent variable to each of its two ordinally coded dummies is shown to be completely arbitrary. The correct solution is to use, instead, the empirical regression coefficients. Third, Boyle comes to the false conclusion that utilization of

dummy variables as independent variables (including the parent variable in the analysis) implicitly assumes an effect-proportional scale for the parent variable. We have shown that, to the contrary, such a procedure, when correctly performed, assumes an equal-interval scale for the parent variable. Finally, after some observations on the use of standardized coefficients and the flexibility of nominally coded dummies, we have cautioned against an uncritical acceptance of effect-proportional recalibration as a technique for discovering "true" scales. In so doing, we have suggested that the use of simple univariate transformations may be generally a more justifiable approach to calibration problems.

APPENDIX A

That the regression of either dummy on the parent variable is a function of the relative sizes of the three categories of the parent variable can easily be seen by rewriting the algebraic equations for the path-regression coefficients. In the general case, this coefficient may be expressed as:

$$b_{YX} = \frac{N\Sigma XY - (\Sigma X)(\Sigma Y)}{N\Sigma X^2 - (\Sigma X)^2}. \quad (A1)$$

Given that individuals characterized by 0, 1, and 2 on ID will be characterized by 0, 0, and 1 on ID_1 and by 0, 1, and 1 on ID_2 (see fig. 2), equation (1) reduces to:

$$\begin{aligned} b_{ID_1 ID} &= \frac{n_1(n_2 + 2n_3)}{n_1(n_2 + 4n_3) + n_2n_3}; \\ b_{ID_2 ID} &= \frac{n_3(2n_1 + n_2)}{n_1(n_2 + 4n_3) + n_2n_3}, \end{aligned} \quad (A2)$$

where n_1 = number of observations for $ID = 2$; n_2 = number of observations for $ID = 1$; and n_3 = number of observations for $ID = 0$ (the omitted category). It is clear, then, that the *relative sizes* of the categories of ID determine the values of the path-regression coefficients. Further, these two coefficients will equal .50, in the case of the trichotomy, when either the category sizes are equal or $n_1 = n_3$. (This does not generalize to parent variables with more than three categories.) This is seen by setting $n_1 = n_2 = n_3$, and rewriting the equations as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} b_{ID_1 ID} &= \frac{n(3n)}{n(5n) + n^2} = \frac{3n^2}{6n^2} = .50; \\ b_{ID_2 ID} &= \frac{n(3n)}{n(5n) + n^2} = \frac{3n^2}{6n^2} = .50. \end{aligned} \quad (A3)$$

APPENDIX B

Given a parent variable X (trichotomous in this example) and its two ordinally coded dummies X_1 and X_2 , we may write the structural equations for X_1 and X_2 as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} X_1 &= a_1 + b_1X + e_1 \\ X_2 &= a_2 + b_2X + e_2. \end{aligned} \tag{B1}$$

Further, given that $X = X_1 + X_2$, as a consequence of the decomposition procedure, we may write:⁸

$$X = (a_1 + a_2) + (b_1 + b_2)X + (e_1 + e_2). \tag{B2}$$

Since the coefficients of the same power of X must be equal on both sides of the equation (Taylor 1955, p. 613), we have $(1.0)X = (b_1 + b_2)X$, or $1.0 = b_1 + b_2$. This proof easily generalizes for the parent variables with more than three categories, given the ordinal decomposition.

APPENDIX C

We have asserted from empirical findings (e.g., fig. 1, diagrams *a* and *b*) that the following identity holds when the effect of a parent variable (X) is traced through its dummies (X_1 and X_2) to some dependent variable (Y), when there are no other independent variables in the model (Model I):⁹

$$b_{YX} = b_{YX_1 \cdot X_2} b_{X_1 X} + b_{YX_2 \cdot X_1} b_{X_2 X}. \tag{C1}$$

Since $X = X_1 + X_2$ as a consequence of the ordinal decomposition procedure, we may write the equations for the required regression coefficients as follows (where C_{ij} = Covariance of i and j ; V_i = Variance of i):

$$b_{YX} = \frac{C_{XY}}{V_X} = \frac{C_{X_1Y} + C_{X_2Y}}{V_X}; \tag{C2}$$

$$b_{X_1X} = \frac{C_{X_1X}}{V_X} = \frac{C_{X_1X_2} + V_{X_1}}{V_X}; \tag{C3}$$

$$b_{X_2X} = \frac{C_{X_2X}}{V_X} = \frac{C_{X_1X_2} + V_{X_2}}{V_X}, \tag{C4}$$

$$b_{YX_1 \cdot X_2} = \frac{V_{X_2}C_{X_1Y} - C_{X_1X_2}C_{X_2Y}}{V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2}, \tag{C5}$$

$$b_{YX_2 \cdot X_1} = \frac{V_{X_1}C_{X_2Y} - C_{X_1X_2}C_{X_1Y}}{V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2}. \tag{C6}$$

⁸ We are indebted to Seymour Spilerman for suggesting this proof to us.

⁹ We are indebted to Arthur S. Goldberger for suggesting these proofs to us.

Thus, in order to show that formula (C1) holds, it is sufficient to show that the following holds:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{C_{X_1Y} + C_{X_2Y}}{V_X} &= \left(\frac{V_{X_2}C_{X_1Y} - C_{X_1X_2}C_{X_2Y}}{V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2} \right) \left(\frac{C_{X_1X_2} + V_{X_1}}{V_X} \right) \\ &+ \left(\frac{V_{X_1}C_{X_2Y} - C_{X_1X_2}C_{X_1Y}}{V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2} \right) \left(\frac{C_{X_1X_2} + V_{X_2}}{V_X} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (C7)$$

Canceling V_X from formula (C7) yields:

$$\begin{aligned} C_{X_1Y} + C_{X_2Y} &= \frac{(V_{X_2}C_{X_1Y} - C_{X_1X_2}C_{X_2Y})(C_{X_1X_2} + V_{X_1}) + (V_{X_1}C_{X_2Y} - C_{X_1X_2}C_{X_1Y})(C_{X_1X_2} + V_{X_2})}{V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2}. \end{aligned} \quad (C8)$$

Multiplying through the numerator and simplifying, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} C_{X_1Y} + C_{X_2Y} &= \frac{C_{X_1Y}[V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2] + C_{X_2Y}[V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2]}{V_{X_1}V_{X_2} - (C_{X_1X_2})^2}. \end{aligned} \quad (C9)$$

Thus,

$$C_{X_1Y} + C_{X_2Y} = C_{X_1Y} + C_{X_2Y}. \quad (C10)$$

For *Model II* (illustrated by including an additional independent variable $[Z]$ in *Model I*), we found from our data that the following was true:

$$b_{YX \cdot Z} \neq b_{YX_1 \cdot X_2 Z} b_{X_1 X} + b_{YX_2 \cdot X_1 Z} b_{X_2 X}. \quad (C11)$$

The problem is determining what $b_{YX \cdot Z}$ is in fact equal to when the dummies of X are included in the model. Operating with the full model, we may express $b_{YX \cdot Z}$ and $b_{YZ \cdot X}$ (see fig. 4, diagram *e*) in the following matrix notation (Goldberger 1968, chap. 3):

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_{YX \cdot Z} \\ b_{YZ \cdot X} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} b_{X_1 X \cdot Z} & b_{X_2 X \cdot Z} & b_{ZZ \cdot X} \\ b_{X_1 Z \cdot X} & b_{X_2 Z \cdot X} & b_{ZZ \cdot X} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_{YX_1 \cdot X_2 Z} \\ b_{YX_2 \cdot X_1 Z} \\ b_{YZ \cdot X_1 X_2} \end{bmatrix}. \quad (C12)$$

Multiplying these matrixes, and taking into account that, by definition, $b_{ZX \cdot Z} = 0$ and $b_{ZZ \cdot X} = 1$, we obtain the two equations:

$$\begin{aligned} b_{YX \cdot Z} &= b_{X_1 X \cdot Z} b_{YX_1 \cdot X_2 Z} + b_{X_2 X \cdot Z} b_{YX_2 \cdot X_1 Z}; \\ b_{YZ \cdot X} &= b_{X_1 Z \cdot X} b_{YX_1 \cdot X_2 Z} + b_{X_2 Z \cdot X} b_{YX_2 \cdot X_1 Z} + b_{YZ \cdot X_1 X_2}. \end{aligned} \quad (C13)$$

Thus, the inequality in formula (C11) occurs to the extent that X and Z are correlated, which has the effect of making $b_{X_1X} \neq b_{X_1X \cdot Z}$ and $b_{X_2X} \neq b_{X_2X \cdot Z}$.

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REJOINDER TO WERTS AND LINN, LYONS AND CARTER

I feel a little strange writing a rejoinder to comments on a paper which I wrote two years ago and have lost interest in since. From my perspective, sociology today is imploding and exploding in a turmoil of underlying energy forces as potent and conflicting as what is going on in American society today. Path analysis, and the potential implicit in that technique, is one part of this turbulence. The comments generated by my paper help clarify just what this potential is.

The Werts-Linn paper stands by itself—I can only give it a pat on the back. The use of multiple indicators to get at underlying theoretical variables has been accepted for some time. The paper shows how this can be incorporated directly into the system of analysis and in doing so opens new possibilities for surmounting the measurement problems which are inherent in most of our data collection techniques, particularly questionnaires and interviews.

Lyons and Carter probe more directly into the contents of my paper. I will limit myself to the following remarks: (1) I was clearly in error in stating that the regression determination of dummy variables by their

(trichotomous) parent is .50. This was first pointed out to me by Neil Henry, who also concluded that the .50 figure works when only the two extreme categories have equal N . (2) Concerning the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable via its dummies: my constant reference to effect-proportional scaling is overly mystical. In this case, since effect-proportional scaling means straightening out the zigzag regression line by moving around the boundaries of the intermediate categories (and assuming monotonicity), the slope of the new, straight line is determined beforehand by the means of the two extreme categories. This is also what is accomplished by taking the simple average of the dummy variable b 's; hence this procedure "implicitly assumes effect-proportional scaling." If the category N 's are equal, the *slopes* of the equal-interval and effect-proportional regression lines are the same. But letting the extreme categories determine the regression line is obviously undesirable. My discussion to this point in the paper was intended only to prepare the logic for considering the more interesting, and practical, case of dummy variables serving as intervening variables, with their parents removed from the system. (3) In stating that adding paths through dummy variables implies effect-proportional scaling, I am really saying that doing this gives the same results as recalibrating category boundaries *within the scale range* determined by the two extreme categories. In figure 6 of the Lyons and Carter paper, and the discussion of it, the rescaling I did was, for convenience, different from this. An equal-intervals scale was assigned to X_4 (Research Choice) in the obvious way, 0, 1, and 2. However, since the effects of the dummy variables RC_1 and RC_2 on X_1 were .401 and .213, respectively, an effect-proportional scale was assigned as 0, 2, and 3. Since unstandardized b 's depend on scale range, the effect of the effect-proportional X_4 should be two-thirds the size of the original X_4 acting through its dummies. This is in fact true, as Lyons and Carter show. I continue to assert, therefore, that combining paths through intervening dummy variables gives results equivalent to effect-proportional scaling, with scale range taken into account. Since the "weights" used in this "averaging" operation are determined by the effects of other independent variables on the intervening variables, I also continue to believe that this is an alternative path analysis to assuming equal intervals and hence useful as a check on possible distortions. Note that the effect of such an independent variable on one of the set of dummies is in no direct way influenced by the category N 's of the parent of the dummy variables, and that hence the logic remains consistent with the (unfortunate) assumption of .50 in the earlier case.

The remainder of the Lyons and Carter paper provides useful elaboration of some of the complexities involved in using path analysis for sociological data. It is a highly sophisticated technique which is at the same

time applicable to a wide range of traditional sociological data analysis. For me, one of the most immediate lessons is how crude our data are and how puny our efforts at learning from these data have been. There is a direct and unavoidable line of descent from cross-classification tables to path analysis to representation of theory in terms of systems of simultaneous equations, and it is toward this point that functional and systems theories converge. To do this well, I think we have to sit down to the intensive study of a relatively small number of reliably and uniformly measured variables. At the same time, I have more and more conviction that for most sociological problems, rather than move ahead toward this level of sophistication, we ought to be moving backward to a real reassessment of what it is that we are trying to do. Most applications of quantitative methodology, especially to exploratory or psychological (attitudinal) problems, seem to me an almost complete waste of time.

What fascinates me the most about path analysis is the way it makes explicit, and immediately artificial, the assumptions upon which sociology has been based for a long time. It is a mechanistic, linear thought structure—this is a classification and not a value judgment, because it can work very well for some things. If things in the world cannot be understood in terms of it, they will keep on happening in spite of not being understood. But I am happy that there is much more happening in (and out of) sociology, than developments such as path analysis.

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REISS COMMENTS ON SELBYG'S REVIEW OF ZETTERBERG

In Arne Selbyg's review of Hans Zetterberg's recent book on sexuality in Sweden (November 1970), one or two statements concerned me and I would like to make a few comments. The reviewer states (p. 534), "It is the first study of sexual behavior where statistically satisfactory conclusions can be made about the whole population of a country." This is not quite true. I conducted a study of the United States adult population twenty-one years of age and over in a probability type sample drawn for me by the National Opinion Research Center. I published a book on the results of this study under the title *The Social Context of Premarital Sexual Permissiveness*. This sample was generally representative of the American adult population, and thus, the Zetterberg study is not the first such study. I might also mention that there are other studies with very broadly based samples, such as Michael Scofield's English study published in 1965.

One other point: on page 535 the reviewer states, "In most other countries, including the United States, a study like this could not be done as satisfactorily at the present time. There would be too much resistance from pressure groups, and the material would be biased by nonresponse from many groups." This, too, I think is an overstatement. My own experience has been that, if you make your respondents aware of the fact that you are not morally judging them, that they will be anonymous and that the project has some scientific value, then the problem often is turning people off, not turning them on. Refusal rates under such professional interviewing conditions have been rather low. I might note here that some of the national population researches also have reported such low refusal rates on sexual conduct questions relating to contraception and intercourse. The 1959 Freedman, Whelpton, and Campbell book *Family Planning, Sterility, and Population Growth* make mention of this. The authors, on page 14 of that book, report a low refusal rate in questions related to sex: "Of the 2,713 wives who were interviewed, only 10 (less than $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1 percent) were unwilling to answer the questions about their attempts to avoid conception. This is less than the refusal rate for questions about income." Note that this study was done in the 1950s.

In short, I think the reviewer misrepresents to some extent the state of recent studies in the area of sexual relationships and the willingness of the American population to talk about such things. To leave such statements without comment is possibly to mislead your readership, and I have therefore written this brief letter.

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SELBYG REPLIES

I regret to say that Professor Reiss is wrong when he states that his own study measures up to my statement about Zetterberg. Zetterberg put all his questions to a probability sample of the Swedish adult population. Although one of the samples used by Reiss was a national probability sample, the respondents were not asked about their sexual behavior, only about their sexual attitudes. The questions about sexual behavior in the Reiss study were only given to a nonrandom sample of white students from one college in Iowa (later "checked" by drawing a larger sample from an even more limited population). Reiss may thus have been the first to use a national probability sample to study attitudes toward premarital sex, but as a study of sexual behavior it falls far short of Zetterberg's.

The Scofield study was based on a sample of youth fifteen to nineteen

years old in three English cities. It was thus broadly based compared with some studies, but not when compared with Zetterberg's.

On the other point taken up by Reiss, I acknowledge, of course, that I speculate. Perhaps I should have added "I believe" or something like that to the sentences quoted. One of the bases for such a belief is Reiss's remarks on pages 10-11 of his book: "Although behavior is dealt with in this study, it was decided to focus more on the measurement of attitudes than on behavior. First, it was assumed (and this proved to be the case) that resistance to asking behavioral questions of young people would occur among high school principals in some of the samples. Secondly, it was assumed that less deception would be attempted concerning questions of attitude. Third. . . . Fourth. . . ."

I understand his present remarks to mean that he was wrong then, or that things have changed so that neither pressure groups such as high school principals nor nonresponses or deceptive responses would be a deterrent for such a study today. Personally, I am afraid these problems are still with us.

They are especially relevant here since Zetterberg studies the most intimate aspects of sexual behavior. In the questionnaire, there are questions on the time and circumstances of first sexual intercourse, frequency of intercourse during the last month, positions used, the circumstances and satisfaction, the first partner, the total number of partners, homosexual and lesbian activity, and many other items. Personally, I think he went too far, but that is another matter. The point here is that the response rates in studies focusing on population planning may not be very relevant. Therefore, I am not convinced that the remarks in my review were an overstatement. But I certainly hope so, and it is up to those who believe that they were to prove it by doing such a study.

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Book Reviews

The Political Sciences: General Principles of Selection in Social Science and History. By Hugh Stretton. New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. xii+453. \$10.00.

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This is a brilliant book. It uses an excellent exposition of true component ideas to construct an overall argument that seems wrong to me. Stretton's central argument is (p. 262): "[Social science] must be persuaded to stop indoctrinating its recruits with the peculiarly stupid ideas of generality, objectivity, and cumulation." I therefore feel a conflict between the role of a reviewer, which obliges me to write an essay about why you should read the book, and the role of citizen in the republic of science, which obliges me to answer especially the opposition that is most nearly sound. I will try to discharge my reviewer function as fast as I can, in order to smuggle a bit of serious debate into the review pages where it does not belong.

The central argument is built of three components: (1) The people in a social science explanation should act like the people you and I know, except perhaps for being in a different situation and having learned different things about the world and about what is a valuable life in the world. We are more likely to have such an accurate picture of them if we study them in detail than if we apply general laws to them. I will call this the "*verstehen*-historicist" principle. (2) Social causation is a seamless web, and you can therefore follow the threads as far as you want. How far a man follows them before he says, "Aha, that's it!" is determined by nonscientific considerations. If these nonscientific considerations are a sophisticated value position, the work will be more valuable. Examples of cutting the web at a point determined by values are Lenin's "Aha, Martov and Kautsky and other democratic socialists are to blame for the continuation of the imperialist war" (see below) or Hugh Stretton's own tracing of sociologists' bad writing to the philosophy of science that he does not like (see pp. 148 and 181, and a lovely bitter example on p. 299). I will call this the "explanations cut to fit" principle. (3) Men often use the fact that they have made a study conforming to an ideal of a quantitative generalizing science as an excuse for not having succeeded in explaining something. Though the patient dies, the operations followed the canons of science. I will call this the "lots of stupidity in your camp" principle.

These principles are true, of course. They are very similar to the principles behind David Matza's *Becoming Deviant* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969). The "*verstehen*-historicist" principle Matza calls "naturalism" (pp. 1-10). The "explanations cut to fit" principle

Matza speaks of as "becoming more or less one-eyed" (p. 143). The "lots of stupidity in your camp" principle Matza manages by putting his positivist opponents at an earlier stage of development of the discipline. I am then reviewing an exemplar of a general movement.

Further, Stretton exemplifies his argument with telling formulations of the structure of people's thought, for example, this perfect characterization of Leninism: "not how to contrive revolutions which would otherwise fail, but how to lead revolutions which would otherwise be led by others" (p. 40). Or after describing Bernhard von Bülow's imagery of military Prussia as male and democratic South and West Germany as female, he describes von Bülow's policy of isolating the Social Democrats by foreign-policy "tensions, but without serious territorial ambitions and without actual war. An irritating condition of permanent tumescence" (p. 84). Or his description of Talcott Parsons's strategy: "He gambles for general truths by the method of insisting on the generality, then seeing what truths can be found there. If sufficiently useful truths were found, they might indeed be more powerful than anybody else's" (p. 293). These brilliant characterizations and argument are applied mainly to the theory of capitalist imperialism, which is almost as relevant to our lives as Matza's marijuana use.

Perhaps I can illustrate my doubts by the cases of Hobson and Lenin. Stretton finds that they chose out of the seamless web causation of imperialism in the light of their values and purposes. So far so good. But Hobson traced back mainly along a causal thread that is not there: it is not true that a necessity to find a place to put extra capital for which there was no profitable outlet in Europe caused imperialism. (Stretton says this, and I agree; see p. 123 and p. 436, n. 13.) To this false economic theory, Lenin added a false theory of why democratic socialists supported national governments in war more than did left socialists (I don't know what the right theory is, but Lenin's is clearly wrong) and an irresponsible identification of pacifism as opportunism (pp. 110-13). Are these supposed to be examples of how it helps us to cut our argument to fit our values? It seems to me, rather, to illustrate how easily arguments fit into aesthetic and "relevant" wholes for the simple-minded if you can make it all up. Fiction has higher relevance to the life of the simple soul, because an accurate picture of reality does not lead to certainty in action or to a clear allocation of praise and blame.

Stretton would agree that social science should not be simpleminded propaganda, for he talks of the dialectical relation between radical values and research (pp. 139-40), and in describing Lenin's misrepresentation of his friend Martov, he comes very close to calling Lenin a liar (p. 113). But when he comes to the second part of his book, "Truth," he drops these value-oriented studies to poke at Merton's theory of political bosses. He does not show that Merton's theory is wrong, but only that he (Stretton) would not have written about it in the language of latent functions and would have studied Jersey City as a unique historical product. Matza says that Merton's explanation comes down to the observation

that a political machine is a good racket, which seems to me much more destructive than anything Stretton says. In short, we have false theories praised for value relevance and (as far as we know) true theories blamed for scientific pretensions.

A social science theory is in part a theory of what people are up to, in part a theory of what situations they will be acting in, and in part a theory about how the resulting actions create new motives and new situations of action, giving a systemic quality to the whole. The part about how people act will work better the more the people in the theory behave the way real people behave. Thus, social science theories should be naturalistic, in the sense that the models of men they use have to have the mechanisms in them analogous to those in real men.

We all have more or less inchoate theories of what men are like and what makes them go. These inchoate theories are very often better than our formal theories, so we do better recreating a man who supported the Boer war (Stretton spends a lot of time on Joseph Chamberlain, a social reformer turned imperialist around the turn of the century in England) by "interpreting" his life than by "testing a theory of imperialism." But as Stretton says, "Anthropology, sociology, and political science . . . differ from history in their efforts to formulate their general knowledge, but not really in the *kind* of knowledge they can expect to accumulate" (p. 212). I would put it, rather, that the social sciences take responsibility for the truth of the theories they use, while historians typically only take responsibility for their plausibility. Naturally then, social scientists fail more often, and look more ridiculous when they fail because of their pretensions. The chief advantage of history in being value-relevant is that it allows the simpleminded to generalize without examining the generalization.

The more general one can make a notion of how a class of men work, the more relevant it is to our values. The reason we feel illuminated when we read of von Bülow's isolating the Left from the middle class by a tumescent foreign policy is that we suspect that it might be what a lot of monarchist-feudal foreign ministers of Germany, or a lot of right-wing foreign ministers of Germany, or a lot of right-wing foreign ministers of capitalist countries with strong socialist oppositions, or a lot of right-wing foreign ministers, would do. And perhaps, once tumescent, they cannot stop themselves from rape.

The romantic radical moves immediately from von Bülow to Rogers. There are two alternative nonsentimentalist strategies. One is to try to generalize about conservatism and aggression by reconstructing the general features of the world view of conservatives, the situations they find themselves in, and the alternative strategies for dealing with them; the other is to study Rogers in detail. To generalize successfully about foreign ministers without loss of precision would be a great, and perhaps unlikely, achievement. But guessing what Rogers will do by studying him in detail is only a slightly better bet.

A model or picture about how men work may be formulated in less or

more general terms. It is an achievement to move from a more concrete formulation of how particular men in particular situations work to a formulation of how a class of men in a class of situations work, without losing the precision of particularity. Stretton is right that we social scientists have an occupational psychosis of mistaking vagueness for generality. But when this achievement is made, it helps future historians interpret particular cases *and also* has quantitative consequences for the behavior of that class of people in that class of situations.

Paul Lazarsfeld has been as much engaged in *verstehen* as Max Weber, though he is not as good at it. But not being as good as Weber is a common condition that distinguishes Lazarsfeld from very few living historians. If Lazarsfeld does not understand rightly what goes on in the minds of Erie County voters, they will not, statistically speaking, change their minds when he thinks they should. The idea that there is something inherently external, nonsubjective, or inhumane about a number is false. This false identification of history with *verstehen*, or a correct perception of what is in men's minds, and quantitative general social science with objectivism both flatters historians unduly and underestimates quantitative social scientists. Stretton builds his case in large part by quoting generalizing works that try to create generality by incantation rather than research; he uses David Easton rather than S. M. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. S. Coleman's *Union Democracy* (New York: Free Press, 1954) to show how theories of political systems are fruitless.

I do not object, then, to Stretton's persuasive argument that the social sciences ought to be more humble about their achievements of generality and value-relevance, especially in relation to our capacity to tell people how to achieve their (and our) values in the social world. What I do object to is generalizing and quantitative science doing all of the "being humble." It is, after all, not a quantitative social scientist with too much aspiration to generality of whom Stretton says "all definitions in Chapter One reappear as conclusions in Chapter Nine" (p. 127). Stretton needs to notice that not all historians are Elie Halévy, E. H. Carr, or Max Weber.

International Community Power Structures: Comparative Studies in Four World Cities. By Delbert C. Miller. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970. Pp. xx+320. \$11.50.

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This volume contains much of the collected work of Delbert C. Miller on community power structure from 1953 to 1970. Generally, it attempts to integrate his research on four large cities in four separate countries. Readers familiar with this literature will recall Miller's work in Seattle and in Bristol, England. In this book he has added material on Cordoba,

Argentina, and Lima, Peru, endeavoring at the same time to further develop his concepts, methods, and comparative generalizations.

With these objectives in mind, Miller describes influence patterns—or, more specifically, how institutional sectors and influential people are ranked—in the four cities. In the more familiar cases of Seattle and Bristol, he finds certain similarities. Imaging a continuum from a “highly stratified pyramid dominated by a small but powerful business group functioning through cliques of high solidarity” (p. 80) to a “ring or cone model” whereby there is no single elite or dominance by a single institutional sector, Seattle would fall somewhere near the middle, with Bristol toward the end. In both cities, business, labor, education, government, and the professions are important, although they occupy different slices of the ring or cone. The most important contrasts between these two cities include the higher status accorded businessmen in Seattle and the more representative city government in Bristol.

The Latin cities provide an interesting contrast. Cordoba was under military government at the time of the study and also has a strong Catholic tradition. Accordingly, the military and church were important institutional sectors but, curiously, contributed few of the “influentials” identified by Miller’s technique. In an interesting discussion of this “slippage” (pp. 122–28), Miller explains that church and military operate without representatives in particular local activities so as not to be picked up by this technique. In fact, this arena is populated by people from business, government, education, and the political parties, such that Cordoba, “like Bristol and Seattle, fits an institutional ring power model” (p. 128). If the reader begins to expect a pattern, he is not disappointed by Lima, which, despite local-national leadership convergences, a history of military coups, and rumored oligarchies, is salvaged by the congenial model. Important sectors include government, business, political parties, and, to a lesser extent, the church, military, and labor. Because these sectors and their representatives fail to engage in collective action, Miller concludes that the leadership structure is fragmented, belying the thesis of oligarchy or a stratified pyramid. His most general observation is, “It may be concluded then that the cone or ring structure predominates in all four cities” (p. 224).

With respect to its ambitious goals, the book is hard working though often redundant or unsatisfying. Much of the same material appearing in ten of the fifteen chapters can be found in earlier publications, albeit one of these was originally in Spanish (see chaps. 1–7, 9, 10, and 14). Where something new has been added to an earlier formulation, it is often done so at the cost of clarity. For example, in chapter 1 Miller introduces “ten mutually exclusive forms of power that are easily distinguishable” (p. 5), which include things like “political influence,” “governmental authority,” “specialized knowledge and skill,” “superior qualities of leadership,” etc. Without bothering to persuade the reader of the doubtful assertion that these forms of power are indeed mutually exclusive or easily distinguishable, he quickly moves on to introduce three “types of

power," positional, reputational, and issue-decisional (p. 7). The connection between "forms" and "types" is never made clear as the discussion moves to conclusion by way of a reintroduction of the old Miller-Form "five components of community power structure," or here, the "community power system model."

The point of this is simply to illustrate that the book begins in conceptual confusion that bodes ill for subsequent clarity of the findings. This is due, perhaps, to an overly eclectic bent that constrains Miller to include in his approach everything that has been cited as an omission in earlier work.

In my judgment, Miller has also been overly ambitious in his claims for methodological continuity among these separate studies. Certainly he has quizzed people about the top influentials and institutional sectors in the four cities as well as interviewed some of these top influentials to determine their favorites or the key influentials. Nevertheless, there appear to be differences in how the original pools of names were assembled, how judges or raters were selected to screen these lists, how many raters were used, how many steps took place in the screening process, how many of the reputed top influentials were ultimately interviewed, and what questions they were asked.

The most useful technique presented in the book charts overlapping organizational memberships of Seattle key influentials (p. 70). He goes on to assert that the same thing was done in Bristol and summarizes the findings but does not present the data in tabular form. If systematic data exist it is a pity they were not presented, since this technique conveys a good deal more substantive information than many of the tables and diagrams he offers. A somewhat different but equally interesting table is presented for Lima, although here a larger group of "powerful persons" is compared on the basis of overlapping participation in various public and private activities. Once again, no such data are available for Cordoba or, strictly speaking, for any of the other cities.

Finally, in view of the controversy over methods in this field, it probably would have been wise for Miller to augment his later studies with analysis of actual participation in projects and issues. Although the wording of some of his conclusions often implies that he has done so (e.g., pp. 122, 180, and 194), all of his data on the topic are opinions about the participation of people and do not result from his observation or reconstruction of specific events.

The study of Lima is seriously deficient in its sampling design and sensitivity to social change. Through his more and less standard means (positional leader pools, raters, etc.), Miller identified 120 top influentials in Lima. As a U.S. citizen and visiting scholar, he then felt obliged to consult with the U.S. embassy, which advised him to interview only "approved" influentials—"those whom officials of the United States Embassy felt would not embarrass the United States, the Fulbright Program, or the researcher" (p. 149). Perhaps the most interesting datum in this book is the fact that, from Miller's list of 120, the embassy "ap-

proved" only twenty-five, or 20 percent! In a comment that the reader will have to judge for himself, Miller observes, "It is possible that this criterion introduced a bias, but every effort was made to secure a representation of persons who were thoroughly familiar with the community" (p. 149). Incredulous as this may be, Miller never even compares the 20 percent he was left with, after the embassy's purge of his list, with the 120 to investigate any "possible" bias in his group of "friendly" respondents. This is probably not accidental, since repeated comments suggest that Miller shares the biases of these censors; he speaks enthusiastically about the role of foreign-owned industry in "supporting" the economy and offering community services without manipulation, the development of democratic traditions, the rising middle class, the value of private enterprise, the stabilizing effects of the military, the value of foreign aid, and, generally, all of the catchphrases that justify the status quo relationship between the United States and Latin America. By this I do not mean to suggest that bias inevitably is wrong or that honest men may not debate these issues. What I do mean is that Miller does not debate the issues or recognize his bias and does not question how it might have influenced his work.

The question, of course, is whether these biases affected the results. I believe they did. Without data, Miller describes how industrialization is producing a rising middle class capable of acting as a moderating political force between rich and poor. He ignores, for example, work done in Peru by David Chaplin indicating a direct relationship between industrialization and greater inequality of wealth and income. Similarly, he ignores the thoughtful analysis of Bourricaud, who shows how Peruvian oligarchies have indemnified the middle classes, until recently, as they have moved from a position of absolute to relative dominance. His methods repeatedly indicate a low-profile role of the military. "The military remains inert except as it becomes concerned with a Communist threat, increasing inflation or its own budget" (p. 194). Nevertheless, two years after Miller completed his fieldwork, the military took control of the government, not because of any of the concerns mentioned, but because of of the president's failure to renegotiate the leases under which Standard Oil operated in Peru. In a somewhat confusing passage, Miller notes that "people of all social classes are aware of these dangers [of nationalized industry] and so resist or are indifferent to political pressure and threats to throw private enterprise out. For more than ten years all major political parties in Peru have been calling for the nationalization of the oil fields and refineries of Standard Oil. Only naked military coercion finally prevailed in 1968" (p. 207). What this observation ignores is that the people of most social classes, the Lima newspapers Miller himself recognized as influential, as well as leaders throughout Latin America roundly supported the junta once it declared its intention to expropriate the oil and large foreign-owned agricultural properties.

In short, the biases of U.S. political and economic interests brought to or imposed on the study may have led to a serious misreading of the

situation in Lima, which should give pause to other U.S. social scientists working abroad concerning the inevitable ideological choices they must confront.

These political questions aside, the book is unsatisfying on strictly conceptual and methodological grounds. Miller's overall intent seems to be a "test and evaluation of the system model of community power structure," or assessing the "fit" across cities of institutional, organizational, and influential rankings. This is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, the separate rankings are not independent of one another; they all derive from similar interview questions with a relatively small number of people. Second, there are no unambiguous quantitative measures of more or less "fit" with rival models; the question of whether we have a stratified pyramid or a ring or cone (and these are by no means exclusive or exhaustive alternatives) yields only an impressionistic solution. Hence, we are left with the uninformative conclusions that these cities look more or less alike, business and government everywhere are important in varying combinations with labor and education, and so on.

Ambitious books invite ambitious criticisms. Aside from what has been said, perhaps the most impressive feature of this work is the sheer amount of time and effort it represents. For that reason, students of the field would be well advised to survey and build on these ground-breaking labors.

Politics and Society. By Robert M. MacIver. Edited by David Spitz. New York: Atherton Press, 1969. Pp. xx+571. \$12.95.

Barry Skura

University of Chicago

The eminent political theorist David Spitz includes in this volume forty-seven of the occasional essays written by MacIver over the last sixty years. While only seven of these are new, many are likely to have escaped current sociological attention due either to their age or to their place of publication. Too, a large number of these will be appreciated less as contributions to sociology, narrowly conceived, than for the insight they provide into an incisive, multifaceted mind as much concerned with the "ought" as the "is." For instance, the index to this volume cites Plato fifty-two times but Weber only twice. A selection of MacIver's articles on sociology and social theory will be published soon in a companion volume.

The unifying theme of the essays in *Politics and Society*, Spitz says in his introduction, is "the relationship between the One and the Many, the Many in the One, and the One again in the Many" (p. xv). In the "frame or structure of the relationship between the One and the Many" (between group and individuals, government and groups, international community and nations), MacIver looks for permanence. In "the ever-evolving character or process of that relationship" he locates change (p. xvi).

To find the principles by which unity emerges from diversity is a central problem for MacIver. Unlike some current system builders in the Hegelian tradition, he realizes that social phenomena cannot be reduced to those unifying principles. MacIver knows that socialized men retain some uniqueness and that the scholar cannot understand social values apart from the activities of concrete men. While the government may be the most important vehicle for attaining national goals, he argues, such goals do not subsume all social ends. In a multigroup society, further, loyalty to the state does not exhaust one's social attachments. That state and society are distinct is one of MacIver's key themes. Because the democratic principle accepts diversity, in loyalties as well as ideas, that author is passionately committed to it. He is aware, though, of how far America is from realizing her ideals, particularly with regard to race.

The articles in this book, in which his ideas of the One and the Many are elaborated, are arranged under six headings. Under the rubric "The Quest for Meaning" are mixed four mediocre pieces on the scholarly process, an excellent short essay where he distinguishes signs (denotative) from symbols (evaluative) and points to their differing roles in communication, and a very significant essay, "The Historical Pattern of Social Change." In this he examines the principles of order in history with a perspective approaching that of the Parsons of *The Structure of Social Action*. Rejecting organic conceptions, he thinks of society "as an array of diversely ordered systems overlapping and merging into each other" (pp. 35-36). These are culture, instrumental systems (economic, political, technological), and material factors (biology, physical environment).

The second section is on ethics and politics. In the first article, by the same name, he deals with the competing claims of political and ethical obligations. The next piece gets at the same problem by first criticizing the ethical assumptions behind ideas of historical necessity and evolution, particularly the confusion of the "is" and the "ought" that occurs when the ethical value of a situation is gauged by its persistence. Next is a fine piece on the ethical significance, and dilemmas of, Plato's idea theory. Of the succeeding four articles, the one most interesting sociologically is "Personality and Suprapersonal." This takes a symbolic interactionist perspective in explaining social order and, like most of the book, is an excellent antidote to the tendency of some sociologists to reify social phenomena. "The Passions and Their Importance in Morals," a previously unpublished essay, deals with the nature of emotions, character structure, and consciousness.

"State and Society," the third—and perhaps best—section, includes an exchange of letters between MacIver and Bosanquet (dealing with the latter's failure to distinguish between society and state), a piece on Bertrand Russell's political and social ideas, and an exegesis of *Mein Kampf*, all of which are newly published.

I find the initial three articles in this section especially good. "Do nations grow old?" asks the first. "No," MacIver responds, distinguishing between the social life of a society (for which "birth" or "death" are misleading terms, since the attendant culture is transmitted between

generations and across societies) and its organizational structure (which may die or be born). He elaborates his open-ended view of society and criticizes views of social change such as Spencer's. Next, "The Foundations of Nationality" includes a classification of different bases for a people's consciousness of themselves as a nationality and historical changes in that sense. "Society and State" explicates the grounds upon which the two phenomena should be distinguished and criticizes Rousseau, Hegel, and Bosanquet for merging them in their Hellenistic interpretation of the "general will."

Under "Government and Social Change," the fourth part, are pieces dealing with the philosophical background of the Constitution, a more popular description of political changes of the last two centuries, remarks on the 1931 papal encyclical on labor, and programmatic comments on government, economic goals, and social welfare.

The theme of section 5, "War and International Order," concerns sovereignty; the social interrelations between nations render the absolute notion of sovereignty out-of-date. He prefers a world organization in place of the balance-of-power system for maintaining peace. Its establishment would presuppose that people recognize that an international community exists which transcends state boundaries—or, more basically, that state and society are not coterminous. On a world scale as well as national, MacIver feels, the democratic principle could bring unity while realizing diversity.

Like most of the prior two parts, the last, "Ends and Means," is valuable more as an illustration of the author's breadth than for its substantive sociological contribution. The articles deal with "educational goals," "the art of contemplation," privacy, unequal life chances, and the "assault on privacy." A fascinating concluding piece tries to place contemporary creative efforts, of which existentialism is characteristic, in a wider social context.

MacIver is always worth reading. My only complaint here is that Spitz, in his "act of piety" (p. ix), is a little too enthusiastic. Many of the articles could have been discarded. Is it important to know with what MacIver, in 1946, thought UNESCO ought to occupy itself? Otherwise, the editor should be commended. The introduction and the index are good, and he compiled the first complete (except for book reviews) bibliography of the author's work. A selected list of critiques is included.

On Communication and Social Influence. By Gabriel Tarde. Edited, with an introduction by Terry N. Clark. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. viii+324. \$11.00 (cloth); \$3.45 (paper).

Edward A. Tiryakian

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Who in the world bothers to read Tarde today?—to paraphrase the opening query of *The Social Structure of Action*—and most sociologists

under thirty (to say the least) will probably add, "Tarde who?" In the firmament of the *belle époque* of French sociology, the star of Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) was eclipsed by the brilliant galaxy of the Durkheimian school, and until the present volume, one could say, in his case, "Out of sight, out of mind." Now, however, a young scholar has done a signal service to this neglected figure by editing a selection of Tarde's major works in the distinguished Heritage of Sociology series edited by Morris Janowitz. And the real appeal of this volume is Terry Clark's own extensive sixty-nine-page introduction, which as a condensed intellectual portrait nearly qualifies as a tour de force, and certainly represents a valiant effort at rehabilitating the stature of Tarde.

Before we get to the introduction, let us note that the selections are organized into twelve sections, designed to indicate the sweep of Tarde's sociological pen (including selections on collective behavior, social control and deviance, public opinion, mass communications, and personal influence). Most of Tarde's major works are represented, from *The Laws of Imitation* and *Social Laws* (both of which appeared in English shortly after their French publication and were favorably received in America by Baldwin, Ward, Giddings, Small, and others) to works previously untranslated but worth perusing, such as *Opinion and the Crowd* and a general treatise on conflict, *Universal Opposition*, which, in view of the new vogue of interest, deserves attention (if not a complete translation). To provide spice to the rather undramatic contents, the editor has inserted two selections (pp. 112-40) which feature, so to speak, "confrontations" between Tarde and Durkheim. And Clark, in his introduction, suggests that the dispute between the two involved more than two men: it brought into play two "opposing sectors of French society," two cultural configurations (p. 8).

Clark places in one camp (presumably the one championed by Durkheim) Cartesianism and the legacy of rationalism found in such institutions as the army, the state university system, the church, and the governmental administration; its adversary, he claims, was the camp of "Spontaneity," including romantic nationalists of the Right and anarchists of the Left. In terms of institutional settings, Cartesianism had a stronghold at the Sorbonne, while Spontaneity had a niche at the College de France, where Tarde was elected to a chair. (Very roughly speaking, the situation was analogous to the styles of Harvard and the New School.) In introducing this dichotomy of Cartesianism and Spontaneity, Clark mutes a more significant split in French society, political in nature—that between Left and Right, on the one hand, and on the other between radical Left and the liberal Left (the latter being essentially in power during the period from 1870 to 1914). To lump "church" and "state university system" as part of Cartesianism is to play down the very violent struggles between the two. And to lump, as Clark does Action Française of Maurras with romantic nationalists and Spontaneity of the Left is simply not warranted in terms of the violent opposition of Maurras, the leading figure of the radical Right, to what he considered the mystical, romantic subjectivism of the Left. Besides, in reading

Tarde, one sees little that would suggest his affinity with Spontaneity—for even his writings on innovation and imitation do not really give much emphasis to spontaneity but, rather, to the structural regularities in the process of diffusion of ideas and inventions. The real split between Tarde and Durkheim, it seems to me, was over the nature of social reality—Durkheim was a realist, Tarde a nominalist—but, as Clark certainly indicates well and wisely, they really had more points of sociological concord than discord, for example in their common rejection of the biological school of criminology.

Although this book will do as much as can be done to redirect attention to the unassuming criminologist, social psychologist, and sociologist that Tarde was, there are some limitations. Tarde was not a stimulating writer, and there is a humdrum quality to his style which at times slips into rather bizarre metaphors (see, e.g., the bottom paragraph on p. 170, where he speaks of “two rays of instances” and “imitative radiation”). His analysis of social facts and social phenomena is simplistic in comparison with Durkheim’s—most of his ideas tend to be variations on the theme of imitation as *the* key to social reality. Finally, although a reviewer should guard against the temptation of picayune criticism, there is such a plethora of typographical errors in this volume, both in the introduction and in the selections, that this constitutes, after a while, a major distraction to appreciating the contents. As examples of this, let me cite such items as “phasmagoria” (for phantasmagoria, p. 17), “spititualism” (for spiritualism, p. 112), “contact theorists” (for contract theorists, p. 15), “teleological duals” (for duels, p. 170), etc.

In conclusion, I doubt whether this volume will lead to a revival of Tarde, in part because, despite Clark’s affirmation (p. 17) that Tarde was right in espousing philosophical nominalism and Durkheim was wrong in espousing the realist position, our own emergent social climate today is much more inclined to social realism than to nominalism (even if realism is a tacit position of radicals as well as right-wingers, and nominalism of liberals). But the lasting merit of this volume is its contribution, though more suggestive than definitive, to the social and intellectual context of French sociology.

White Protestant Americans: From National Origins to Religious Group. By Charles H. Anderson. Ethnic Groups in American Life Series. Milton M. Gordon, general editor. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970. Pp. xx+188. \$6.95 (cloth); \$2.95 (paper).

E. Digby Baltzell

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This monograph is part of the series *Ethnic Groups in American Life*, edited by Milton M. Gordon, which will include other monographs on Jewish Americans, Japanese Americans, black Americans, Mexican

Americans, and so forth. The author has written a sensible and solid book on a slippery subject—slippery because there is some question as to whether “white Protestants” are best understood as one of the many “ethnic groups” in American life. Thus, the traditional sociology of ethnic relations in this country has largely concentrated on minority groups, especially those whose members came here after the Civil War from southern and eastern Europe or Asia and subsequently suffered various forms of discrimination in the course of their attempts to rise out of pariah and lower-class status into the mainstream of middle-class life. White Protestants, on the other hand, have always been and still are both a majority of our population and situated in the higher levels of middle-class life. They have been considered Americans rather than hyphenated Americans, discriminators rather than objects of discrimination. This has been the case ever since sociology became a recognized science in the early years of the twentieth century.

The author has, nevertheless, handled this problem wisely and well by taking a historical, or what I should like to call an up-hill-and-down-dale, approach. In other words, part 1 of the book is devoted to a discussion of how the various non-English, national-origin groups from northern Europe, faced with an established, British hegemony, gradually melted into a new white Protestant majority in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The author brings a wealth of judiciously selected detail to show how this process worked for the members of the various national-origin groups—Scots and Ulstermen, Swedes, Norwegians, Finns, Dutch, and Germans. The language barrier was, of course, the main factor determining the rate of assimilation; time and place of first migration were also important. Thus, the Scots and Ulstermen were highly educated and spoke English, came early, and were rapidly assimilated into the very highest levels of the social structure, as such men as Thomas Jefferson, Patrick Henry, James Wilson, Washington Irving, and John Paul Jones illustrated so well. The Continental, with his different language and culture, of course, took longer to melt into the pot. But even they melted differently; for example, the Dutch in New York had an experience different from that of the Germans in Pennsylvania (some of whom, such as the Amish and other sectarians, still remain apart). In this connection, and considering our long interest in the Protestant ethic, I should have liked the author to have placed more emphasis on religion (regardless of national origin) as a vital factor in assimilation. One has the impression, for instance, that it was the Calvinists, whom Weber incidentally used as the prototypical example of the Protestant ethic, who assimilated fastest, while the Lutherans and the Sectarians were more likely to lag behind in their religious and ethnic islands. There is no space to go into details here, but it is indicative that all the major denominations, except the Lutherans, have had at least one president of the United States; and the Calvinists (Presbyterian, Reformed, or Congregational), whether Dutch, English, German, Scots, or Irish in national origin, have produced more

presidents than any save the Episcopalians, many of whom were, like the Roosevelts, of Calvinist background.

After part 1 has shown how the non-English stock struggled uphill to form part of the Protestant-British dominant majority which ruled America from the Civil War to World War II, part 2 shows how the Protestant hegemony went down after World War II. Unfortunately, this book is weak in analyzing just how, when, and why this waxing and waning of Protestantism took place. At any rate, "Protestantism in America today," wrote Will Herberg in 1960, "presents the anomaly of a strong majority group with a growing minority consciousness." No doubt the use of the term "WASP" is now used, within this new context of competing ethnic groups without a hegemonic majority, as a kind of compensatory and negative epithet not entirely unlike such older epithets as "wop" and "kike" which are no longer permissible in polite society. Perhaps there is a crisis in American leadership today partly because we are now all marginal men, doubting our right to rule in an age when who's to say who's right and no values are any longer sacred. This book is weak in that it makes no attempt to analyze this very vital problem. Thus, part 2, like part 1, is largely descriptive—and, strangely enough, largely descriptive of Catholic-Protestant differences; "anti-Semitism," "Jew," and "Jewish" are not to be found in the index.

But men are always better judged by what they do than what they do not do. This author has done a fine job of documenting the rise and fall of white Protestantism in America.

The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an American City. By John A. Gardiner. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. Pp. xi+129. \$5.95.

Humbert S. Nelli

University of Kentucky

The Politics of Corruption is an effort to determine the impact of corruption and organized crime on the urban political process, and the roles played by politicians, law enforcement agencies, and the public. The study began as a research project for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and focuses on the experience in Wincanton, "an Eastern industrial city which has been controlled by a crime syndicate for most of the last fifty years" (p. 5).

The book offers a number of insights, including that the average voter is interested in crime only when it affects him personally; that corruption is a fact of political life and probably will always exist; that, in consequence, the successful urban reformer will place priority on defining and limiting corruption rather than on eradicating it; that political reform is doomed to failure if it offers only opposition to crime without a clearly

formulated program for dealing with a multitude of less sensational urban problems; and that corruption can have beneficial side effects, but that the long-term costs are disastrous—in Wincanton, for example, the pervasiveness of corruption has dissuaded competent, energetic men from seeking office.

Wincanton is presented as a typical American city. Yet evidence offered by John A. Gardiner suggests that the Wincanton experience is, in many ways, atypical. At a time when organized crime in urban America is allegedly controlled by Italian-Americans, Irving Stern, a Jew, is able to “go it alone” with impunity. Currently, the racial composition of American cities, particularly industrial ones, is undergoing drastic changes; yet Wincanton seems to suffer no ethnic antagonisms or rivalries, and apparently requires no elaboration concerning the role of race in local politics. The city’s vice and corruption must indeed be unique, since Wincantonites are ashamed to mention their place of residence when they are elsewhere (p. 86).

“Wincanton” and “Irving Stern” are pseudonyms, like other proper nouns in the book. If Gardiner has sufficient documentation for his statements, why should he disguise the names of syndicate leaders and corrupt politicians and law enforcement officials? This fictionalizing hinders further research, hampers comparative studies, and imparts an air of make-believe.

A more serious shortcoming is the book’s lack of historical perspective. For example, cities like Chicago and New York contained organized criminal gangs and a tradition of police-politician-gangster cooperation decades before the 1920s. Was this true of Wincanton? If so, how did Stern take advantage of the situation and eventually dominate it? Gardiner provides no answers and, in fact, does not ask these or similar questions. Furthermore, the presence of the commission form of government, which Gardiner identifies as the source of a ruinous fragmentation in city government as well as of a political vacuum attracting criminals, was a favorite panacea of progressive-era reformers. This suggests the possibility that Wincanton has a long-standing (although doubtless sporadic) reform tradition along with its history of crime and corruption.

This book raises some vitally important issues but does not fulfill Gardiner’s promise to answer questions “concerning the interrelationships among law enforcement, corruption, and urban politics” facing mid-twentieth-century America (p. 5). Instead, Gardiner provides the results of a 1966 survey which (he points out) is probably not definitive. Indicating that the situation is extremely complex, with a variety of opinions on both sides of all issues, he notes accurately that the status quo in cities like Wincanton “is intolerable” (p. 104). Many of his suggestions for improving it—like expanding the power of the mayor and guaranteeing job protection for policemen against political interference—have been tried in other American cities and bent to the use of criminal organizations. It seems naïve to believe that criminal leaders will accept reforms designed to curtail profits; in Wincanton, as elsewhere, syndi-

cates can find other areas of activity. Another suggestion—that the role of state and federal enforcement agencies be expanded—is promising, because the only effective action against entrenched crime has come from state and, especially, from federal agencies. Yet Gardiner does not explain what he thinks this new state and federal policy should be.

The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control. By Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. xi+271. \$5.95.

Michael R. Sonnenreich

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It is a rare occurrence indeed when I can say that I enjoyed reading about the state of our criminal justice system, but I feel, in this case, that my enjoyment is justified. Instead of the usual platitudes and pontifications, which are now de rigueur for persons writing about crime in the United States, we are introduced to two men's view of what the problem is and their fearless forecast as to what to do about it. While for some this fearlessness will be considered fearsome, for those truly concerned with the state of our criminal justice system this is, nevertheless, provocative and necessary reading.

Because of the increased interest in crime, unfortunately galvanized by personal fear and a high group awareness of its impact on "the good life," criminal justice and its attendant administration has recently been theorized to death. The value of this call to action is that it is a distillation of the best thinking from the multitudinous trivia that has been written about the subject in recent years and it pinpoints for the reader not just the problems but plausible solutions as well. While many of the ukases propounded have a *de minimis* chance of becoming government policy, the authors' careful delineation of their approach has great potential value in directing legislative and executive bureaucracies toward needed compromise positions. Many of their initial propositions are already becoming both de facto and de jure in many states of the Union, such as the ukases regarding abortions, disorderly conduct, and sexual behavior, while others, I feel, will remain with us for a long time. I believe this is so because of the peculiarities of American criminal jurisprudence, which has a tendency to meld church restrictions into governmental prohibitions. While Herbert Packer stole most of the thunder from the authors in this area, I was somewhat disappointed that they did not extrapolate in greater detail the moral issues underlying this area of concern. Inchoate crimes are certainly worthy of more sociological scrutiny in the context of practical criminal law reform.

The book is basically divided among nine major areas of concern, the first of which has just been alluded to above. The authors discuss the ir-

vidence, costs, victims, and causes of crime which, coupled with their last chapter, dealing with research, constitute a much needed plea for more practical studies and less esoteric models. The authors recognize that, while basic research, including models, has some merit, what is needed now is directly applied research that will result, hopefully, in more pilot programs in the areas of police administration, juvenile delinquency, and corrections.

I felt that the authors, in their discussion of crimes of violence, explained the impact of these acts on society in a nonhysterical, realistic way. All too often, this area acts as a trigger and has been successfully used by all sides to becloud the larger issues. Crimes of violence are not new and will be with us regardless of what changes take place in our system of justice, mainly because they unfortunately appear inherent in the human fabric. As a practical approach to minimize this human condition, their propositions relating to the prohibitions against the use of firearms are rational and, I predict, not long in coming.

The chapters relating to rehabilitation and juvenile delinquency are more in the nature of a compilation of current thinking rather than an advancement of new ideas and approaches. The merit of these chapters lies in the fact that they are well written and present a valuable distillation of what has been said before. I found the chapter dealing with "Crime and the Psychiatrist" most provocative in that their ukase relating to the abolition of the defense of insanity opens up a new area of thought that will leave most attorneys and judges somewhat adrift and disoriented. I feel this is good. Our insularity as professionals in this area is all too apparent, and I for one have felt uneasy about the coat of many colors we have created regarding this defense. Once again, it is somewhat disappointing that this area was not more fully explored by the authors, and I look forward to a fuller exposition.

The chapter relating to organized crime and God is perhaps the one area where the authors are completely out of their element. While I agree that organized crime requires more of an in-depth analysis than is usually given, to dismiss its importance as unprofitable, unfounded, or for that matter, unnecessary of definition is irresponsible. The "brief" submitted by the authors on this point is not convincing—metaphysics and theology aside. The arrest of persons based on information obtained from their own mouths as a result of wiretapping refutes the authors' arguments. Recent wiretaps in gambling and drug cases, as well as the much publicized wiretaps in New Jersey relating to corruption in government, make it apparent that there is indeed organized crime in these United States. Whether it all flows into a common funnel is irrelevant. What is important is its structure, its organization, and its incredible effectiveness. While I disagree with the authors' argument in this regard, it does, however, have a salutary effect by requiring the law-enforcement community to be more selective in marshaling evidence and more sensitive to categorizing what is and what is not organized crime.

The value of this book is great as a starting point for the thoughtful reader into an area of public concern which affects him directly. The authors have created a useful tool and have performed a public service. To fail to understand the issues of crime control in our society today is to limit one's real understanding of the nation's current problems and urban turmoil.

Financing the Metropolis: Public Policy in Urban Economics. Edited by John P. Crecine. Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, vol. 4. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970. Pp. 632. \$20.00.

Terry N. Clark

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This volume is a good illustration of the convergence of political scientists, sociologists, and economists who have focused on questions of urban public policy. The convergence derives from several sources, but in both sociology and political science it reflects a concern to move beyond the study of community power structures and governmental processes in order to link these aspects of decision making to specific policy outcomes. Economists in recent years have become increasingly interested in questions of public finance and urban economics; in expanding their traditional perspectives, they have begun to incorporate elements of social organization and the political process heretofore largely ignored. The rapid growth of the Public Choice Society (which holds annual meetings and publishes *Public Choice*) is part of this same convergence, and several contributors to this volume are active in the Public Choice Society. Crecine has done a good job of assembling contributions that complement one another to illuminate the subject of urban public policy. Like earlier *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews*, this volume is oriented toward the general public as well as the social scientist.

There are reviews of earlier research, one of the most careful of which is Gail Wilensky's critique of the literature on the determinants of public expenditures. After summarizing some of the major empirical results, she points out the methodological inadequacies of much of this work and includes suggestions for future improvement.

There are reports of original empirical research. Arnold Meltsner and Aaron Wildavsky summarize some aspects of budgetary decisions in Oakland, emphasizing the logic of the internal administrative process and warning against premature adoption of Planning Programming Budgets Systems (PPBS) by local governments. Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker present some interesting findings about black and white attitudes toward city services, the police, and race questions in Detroit. In a series of propositions about community and governmental factors affecting different budget items. W. Ed Whitelaw summarizes his work on Worcester. Peter

Eisinger presents a pessimistic evaluation of six community antipoverty programs in Brooklyn.

There are several articles which consider the application of models, generally derived from economic theory, to urban questions. James Buchanan uses a simple model involving private and public goods to illuminate the process of the erosion of urban public facilities. Otto Davis examines urban-renewal decisions as illustrations of Prisoner's Dilemma Games. Anthony Pascal develops a somewhat analogous model to explain the maintenance of racial segregation in housing.

There are evaluations of existing programs and recommendations for new policies throughout the volume. Some of the most pointed are Albert Reiss's suggested combination of certain aspects of welfare, health, law enforcement, and other services in a single agency in more client-centered fashion; Arnold Meltsner's advice to city leaders on how to squeeze more out of existing fiscal arrangements at the local level; the discussions of federal aid by John Riew, Lyle Fitch, and Terrance Sandlow; the implications of PPBS by Selma Mushkin and Donald Borut.

The economics of the poverty sector is discussed by Daniel Fusfeld; by Richard Muth with a focus on housing; by Dick Netzer with a focus on tax structures; and by Roger Noll from the perspective of the geographic distributions of people and jobs.

Sociologists, especially those not familiar with the public-choice perspective and concerned with urban policy questions, should read this volume both for its substantive contributions and as an illustration of thinking sharper than that characteristic of most sociologists.

Woodruff: A Study of Community Decision Making. By Albert Schaffer and Ruth Connor Schaffer. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970. Pp. 325. \$10.00.

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Community studies frequently provide only the broad historical material that is needed for a vague background to recent events and contain very limited information regarding the structure and operations of the formal organizations quietly influencing decision making. The Schaffers' book effectively overcomes both limitations in a well-executed study of resistance to political change in a city and township entangled in a developing metropolitan region. The report illustrates some of the sources within urban stratification systems of problems for the political integration of metropolitan areas. However, it is hampered somewhat by its methodological origins in reputational studies of community power, resulting in a tendency to focus on individuals rather than the social structures in which they operate. Further emphasis upon the structure of local institu-

tions would have improved the usefulness of the book for current issues concerning the internal integration of urban communities.

The midwestern city of Woodruff and the township of the same name which nearly surrounds it are described as having been locked into economic competition by local industrial development accompanying and following World War II. However, the two municipalities adopted very different historical patterns of decision making originating before the Depression, regarding the encouragement of economic development and the risks of social and political changes which could result. These patterns are shown most clearly in the expansionist and restrictionist orientations adopted by the township and city, respectively, toward the development of public sanitation (water and sewage treatment) facilities which would allow both territorial redefinition and community development. The cultural and socioeconomic conflicts which led to the different development policies also set the framework within which several attempts to resolve problems through merger of governmental units were stopped.

More important than the single issue of municipal sanitation, the authors explore in some depth the role of three elite leadership institutions in the community—the banks, chamber of commerce, and newspaper. The development and structure of these institutions are described for the period since the Depression. From that time through the late 1960s, each of these institutions influenced local decision making, largely through selective inaction and the prevention of important issues from being opened to community-wide consideration.

Finally, the dual pressures of established decision-making patterns and elite institutional interests are described as having greatly influenced the failure of two attempts (1957 and 1963–64) to consolidate the city and township into a single municipal administrative unit. These failed largely due to the efforts of leaders in the two municipalities—the older, established business leaders of the city and the younger, mobile political leaders of the township—to maintain the power and advantages of their current positions. Especially in the city, these outcomes were a continuation of established decision-making patterns whereby top leaders in effect undercut the influence of younger, mobile second-level leaders. The banks and chamber of commerce stayed out of the controversies, each responding to area-wide constituencies and the desire to maintain existing social and economic patterns. The newspaper made some effort to support the mergers, but was ineffective largely as a consequence of its previous reluctance to educate the community regarding the sources and effects of ongoing social change. The events of both attempts also reduced the influence in the community of the few leaders ready to act as agents of social change on a variety of issues.

The generalizations of the study are restricted somewhat by its orientation toward individual leaders rather than the internal organization of local elite groups. Beyond merely describing the various activities of leaders, the differentiation of tasks within elites would have allowed a

more direct analysis of the community without resorting to the rather spurious anonymity of contrived names and places. Such a horizontal elaboration of the valuable institutional research of the study, combined with a vertical extension downward into the social organization of lower socioeconomic strata of the community and upward to the organization of regional and national institutions, could have allowed more direct reporting of events. Many aspects of such horizontal and vertical structures are described in the study, but in terms of individual actions instead of being systematically presented as role behavior within informal associations. Such description might have provided the community with perspectives concerning its own internal processes which could have been used in establishing the more orderly and reasonable decision-making patterns that the researchers as participants and activists would have preferred to have occurred.

The Negro Peasant Turns Cityward. By Louise Venable Kennedy. Reprint. College Park, Md.: McGrath Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 270. \$10.00.

Negro Problems in Cities. By T. J. Woofter, Jr. Reprint. College Park, Md.: McGrath Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. 285. \$12.00.

Zane L. Miller

University of Cincinnati

In recent years, publishers have been persuaded, in Louis Harlan's phrase, that black is green, and a few have discovered that historical studies of urban blacks represent one of the safest investments available in an increasingly competitive market. Yet the current curiosity about Negroes in cities is not unprecedented. Well before the great flight of blacks from the South during World War I, both journalists and scholars had noticed and commented upon the increasing number of Negroes who were moving into urban places. After 1915 the migratory drift became a flood, and the quantity of commentaries on the process swelled enormously. These two books, both written in the 1920s by professional social scientists, are products of those developments. Unfortunately, one volume confuses race with class and the other fails to distinguish ghetto from neighborhood.

Kennedy's book, one suspects, will have less interest for sociologists. First published in 1930, it was prepared as part of a study of Negro population movements sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences. According to Frank Alexander Ross's foreword, the project directors felt that contemporary sociologists, "welcoming the seeming precision that the statistical method affords," had too often merely demonstrated the obvious or reiterated what was already accepted. Miss Kennedy preferred, instead, to rely on "the carefully weighed opinions of a consider-

able number of individuals so placed as to have had adequate opportunity for large-scale investigations and with the necessary mental qualifications to arrive at sound generalizations from their experience," especially "when the options are expressed after elaborate survey by statistical and other approaches" (p. 6). Hence, the book is not a piece of original research but, rather, a survey of surveys.

Miss Kennedy's chief concern was with the impact of migration on Negro migrants, on northern urban Negroes and whites, and on institutions in the cities in which the newcomers settled. The coverage, however, is neither chronologically nor topically balanced. She considered only northern cities and literature on the post-1915 phase of the migration, and the analysis of the economic status of blacks took sixty-three pages, while race relations and demography occupied but nine and seven pages, respectively. She concluded that the new residents were not inherently inferior or vicious and argued that their problems stemmed essentially from their poverty. But their prospects were not bleak. On the whole, she contended, Negro peasants had made occupational progress in northern cities, and if whites managed to be tolerant and understanding, these most recent newcomers would continue to take advantage of the economic opportunities available to them in the cities and would make a satisfactory adjustment to urban life.

Woofter's study appeared two years before Miss Kennedy's and took a slightly different approach. Supported by the Institute of Social and Religious Research, his survey focused on the determinates of neighborhood life and on the aspects of neighborhood most subject to direction by municipal governments and local organizations. The volume is divided into four parts, each signed by a separate author. Three sections cover housing, schools, and recreation facilities and contain valuable information on conditions of life among urban Negroes in both the North and the South. But the most important contribution is the first. Written by Woofter and entitled "Neighborhoods," it carries the book's interpretive thrust.

Woofter argued that the neighborhood had been a vital agency in assisting rural migrants to adjust to urban life. It was the crucible in which the newcomers were subjected to the process of urbanization, a process which included migration, segregation, concentration, neglect, self-improvement, and amelioration of conditions, as city-wide concern about and interest in improving the worst districts took shape. He conceded that the "problem of the new environment has proved grave for the Negroes and for the cities into which they have moved" (p. 20). Yet his conclusion, like Kennedy's, was optimistic. The "person who is interested . . . can find encouragement in the tendency toward improvement in newer neighborhoods, in the increased interest of cities in these sections and in the movement of Negroes from the poorer to the better sections of each city" (p. 21).

Despite their different emphases, both books are, in the final analysis, based upon a mistaken analogy. They assume that the black experience

in cities would parallel that of the white rural migrants who had allegedly preceded them. That notion has proved incredibly persistent. We are still told by scholars and high government officials alike that, if we ignore race and keep our voices down, the city will eventually work its magic and the blacks will be quietly and peacefully absorbed into the urban mainstream. Urban historians now know better.

Blacks were not new to American cities in the opening years of the twentieth century. They had been urban dwellers from almost the beginning, and the ghetto had begun to take form even before Emancipation. After Appomattox, blacks pushed into southern cities in substantial numbers, and by 1930, Atlanta, Savannah, Richmond, New Orleans, Louisville, and other places in Dixie had a half-century's experience with the shift and growth of Negro neighborhoods within the context of the modern city. Those who know this story recognize that central city ghettos which housed the black middle class as well as the poor had become a permanent part of the southern urban scene as early as 1900. And though the blacks' position in the occupational structure had changed and continued to change, their peculiar neighborhood pattern did not. Thus, the blacks' problem was not simply a question of class, as Kennedy suggested, nor was it resolved, as Woofter argued it might be, by the attempt to establish separate but equal neighborhoods. In this view, the chief utility of these two books is that they remind us that race is the central domestic issue of our times and is not merely a hallucination produced by feverishly guilty white middle-class consciences. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that the publisher did not see fit to add an introduction to each volume which would have placed each in the appropriate historical perspective.

The Mexican-American People: The Nation's Second Largest Minority. By Leo Grebler, Joan W. Moore, and Ralph C. Guzman. New York: Free Press, 1970. Pp. xviii+777. \$17.95.

Paul Kutsche

Colorado College

Here at last is the long-awaited major publication of the Mexican-American Study Project at UCLA. It is a good gray book which few people will sit down and read but which every concerned student from whatever discipline will use as a factual reference for the near future. It is instantly obsolete (almost all scholarship is, but this more than most), particularly concerning political movements and the census. Perhaps obsolescence is inevitable when the research design is so massive and the people under study are so mobile.

The scope of the Study Project is evident in the publications which have already emerged: eleven "advance reports," five doctoral disserta-

tions, and at least two monographs (Nancie Gonzalez's *The Spanish-Americans of New Mexico* [Albuquerque, N.M., 1969] and Thomas P. Carter's *Mexican Americans in School* [New York, 1970]).

"The investigation was initiated in 1963 with a prospectus for a 'comprehensive study of the socioeconomic position of Mexican Americans in selected urban areas of the five Southwestern states.' The actual research work began in January 1964. . . . The study was completed in the summer of 1968" (p. v). This volume, and some of the other publications, happily go beyond the prospectus in directions indicated in the table of contents.

The book has seven parts totaling twenty-four chapters, plus eleven appendices, a bibliography, and an index. The parts are (1) "The Setting," mostly socioeconomic; (2) "Historical Perspective," emphasizing the century since U.S. conquest, with little about Mexican history; (3) "Socioeconomic Conditions: A Detailed Portrait"; (4) "The Individual in the Social System," with focus on social class, the family, and cultural tenacity; (5) "The Role of Churches"; (6) "Political Interaction," which echoes and booms with the almost total absence of the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee, the Crusade for Justice, or the Alianza Federal de Pueblos Libres, but which does analyze older Mexican-American organizations; and (7) "Summary and Conclusions." The appendices tell the reader the design and source of most of the information in the text.

The geographical boundaries of the study include the statistical Southwest—all of the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Texas—not the ecological or culture-area Southwest. The urban areas selected for the most careful study are Los Angeles and San Antonio, the two largest concentrations of Mexican Americans. Some readers may share with me a bias toward seeing Spanish-surnamed people in the Southwest as rural and in some ways still peasant. If they do, they are in for the same surprise I experienced in discovering that this population is very heavily big-city.

The virtues of this study are intertwined with its limitations. It presents masses of charts, graphs, and statistical information in institutional-gray prose. It is low on analysis and argument. The dynamic interrelation of separate institutions as an organic whole, which is integral to studies in my own discipline of anthropology, is almost totally lacking. Argument for the relative importance of the several cultural traditions (Spanish, Indian, and Anglo) which lie behind modern Mexican Americans is omitted. Most of this book is blandly noncontroversial, and this will be one of its particular strengths when its monumental collections of facts are used to support the positions of those in and outside of scholarship. Fortunately, the charts and graphs are very clearly presented and carefully indexed. "Distinctive Population Patterns" (pp. 105-41) should be singled out for useful manipulation of census figures to demonstrate rural-urban shifts, geographical concentration county by county, dif-

ference in sex-age distribution between Anglos and Mexican Americans, and so forth.

More incisive than most of the book are the two chapters on Catholic and Protestant churches. Analysis of the role of Catholic clergy in Mexican-American life, made for the most part by clergymen, lays out the dispute between conservative upper echelons of the regional hierarchy versus liberal priests and representatives of national Catholic organizations on the question of support for the United Farm Workers strikes. In fact, almost the only mention of Cesar Chavez's movement in the book is contained in this chapter. As the senior authors say, "This kind of institutional analysis is rare either in the standard literature on religion or . . . in the writings about Mexican Americans" (pp. 443-44).

The obsolescence of this study, which was completed in 1968 and published only in 1970, is particularly regrettable in three areas.

The first concerns the virtual omission of indigenous political movements, as noted above. The United Farm Workers and the Alianza would, I should think, fit properly into the primary focus on socioeconomic conditions, even if it might be argued that the Crusade for Justice does not. The omission is deliberate. An introductory note about popular images which the study aims to counteract says that the "exciting events" with which the UFW and the Alianza have been associated "happened to involve fringe problems of the Mexican-American population. . . . The news reports served to reinforce a false national image of Mexican Americans as a rural people with special complaints that are only loosely related to the main problems of our urban society" (p. 6). I am willing to let the Alianza go, for the sake of this argument, as an isolated rural group. But to dismiss wage laborers in national-conglomerate-owned agribusiness as "rural people with special complaints" is to see "factories in the field" as if they were farms. This error also misses the intimate ties between Mexican-American life in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and the central valley of California. And it ignores the role of Cesar Chavez as spiritual symbol and elder statesman of the Chicano movement everywhere. It would be parallel to discussing the poor in India without Gandhi, because Gandhi advocated a return to cottage industry.

The second obsolescence is that the population data, which are so central to much of the factual presentation, are a full census out of date when the book was published.

Third, the bibliography contains no sources past 1968 and very few past 1967. Since publication on Mexican Americans is expanding at a frightening rate, most specialists on this minority will be disappointed to find that what they have anticipated as the definitive work is not very useful as a source for other literature. In passing, let me remark that the bibliography is divided in a fairly standard manner which has always struck me as unnecessarily time consuming to use: books, pamphlets, and government publications; journal articles; unpublished dissertations; other unpublished materials; only the last part (entitled "Bibliographies") is a functionally separate category.

The Study Project should finally be judged against its own aim, "to depict factually and analytically the present realities of life for Mexican Americans in our society" (p. 8). I feel that it succeeds, to a very considerable degree, in presenting pertinent facts, except in areas where Mexican Americans are constructing their own present realities faster than prosaic scholarship is following them. Analysis is seldom attempted by the senior authors but, rather, is left to contributors of specific portions of the project.

Cherokee Tragedy: The Story of the Ridge Family and of the Decimation of a People. By Thurman Wilkins. New York: Macmillan Co., 1970. Pp. x+398. \$10.00.

Robert K. Thomas

Monteith College, Wayne State University

Another rich volume has been added to the growing literature on the history of the Cherokee tribe. *Cherokee Tragedy* by Thurman Wilkins is a welcome examination of Cherokee history in the first half of the nineteenth century. The focus of the volume centers around the Ridge family, who were prominent leaders of Cherokee affairs in that period, providing direction for much of Cherokee development in their lifetimes. They are most widely known for their part in the controversy centered around the Cherokee Removal, and several members of the family were assassinated by Cherokees in retaliation for their signing of the Removal Treaty of 1835, a treaty which the majority of the Cherokee tribe and the Cherokee governmental officials felt was illegal.

As a scholar, I am impressed by the wealth of detail in this volume and by the very precise documentation of that detail. The book is a fine example of scholarly craftsmanship. I am further impressed with how the Ridges come alive as human beings in Wilkins's presentation of them. One manages to get a rare perspective not usually encountered in historical volumes, a kind of "worm's eye view" of Cherokee history in that period, the world as seen through the eyes and actions of the Ridges. Unfortunately, there is a negative side to such a complete immersion into one family's life. It is sometimes difficult for the reader to understand the context in which the drama of the Ridges occurs. I had to turn to other volumes to get a picture of general events in the Cherokee nation during that epoch.

In all honesty, I must say that I found the author a little innocent about the use of source material. Almost all sources seemed to be of equal weight. Little attempt was made to evaluate very emotional and value-laden accounts in such a stormy period of Cherokee history.

I hope that these comments will not be taken as nit-picking, which I abhor. The strength of the book far outweighs its shortcomings. As I have

indicated above, the Ridges come alive as real human beings. As an anthropologist, I find this quality of the book refreshing. One could use this material to make a classic case study of marginality, for instance. As a Cherokee, I was touched by how the family patriarch, Major Ridge, emerged as such a fine gentleman in the Cherokee style. This was my first experience in grasping the quality of the man; his faith in white education was both pathetic and noble; his respect for the guidance of his well-educated and ambitious son and nephew pointed out the timeless dilemma of such simple men as he; and his courage in signing his own death warrant, as he put it, is both admirable and repugnant.

The only real objection I have to Wilkins's portrayal is that the Ridges come off just a little too noble for the times and the situation. Many new emerging nations have the problem of what Westerners refer to as corruption in government. Very marginal and individuated tribal groups like the Ridges are always difficult for their community to control. The Ridges, after all, were the product of a tremendous social upheaval in a tribal group.

It is this last point that I would like to talk about most emphatically in this review. I will first apologize for using Wilkins as a "straw" man, but I'm afraid that there are no Cherokee Indians in his volume. This is reflected in many ways. For one thing, there are voluminous records in the Cherokee language. These records are not utilized by Wilkins. I am afraid that ignoring these sources has, until recently, seemed to me normal historical procedure. However, recently a friend of mine who is a Chinese historian pointed out to me that most historians read the language of the people they are studying. At that point I realized that no western historian of Cherokee history has bothered to learn the Cherokee language. Further, no western historian has bothered to talk to modern Cherokees about an era in which most of our great-grandfathers lived. There are few Cherokees over sixty who could not recount stories told of these times by eye witnesses. Granted, there are dangers in naively accepting all oral history, but that sin is much more venial than to ignore such a body of data.

I must say that I never cease to be shocked by the sophistication of most of the authors who write about Cherokee history. Their attitude regarding Cherokee culture seems to be on a par with the local missionary of the time. Let me take an example from Wilkins's volume. In speaking about Cherokee reaction to the visit by the great Shawnee leader Tecumseh he says: "They refused to associate with Tecumseh's coming the great comet that swept slowly across the sky, lighting up the heavens at night, a spectacle which held the backward and more ignorant Creeks in awe and doubtless prepared the way for Seekaboo's secret machinations" (p. 54). I would like to assure my friends among the Creek tribe that this is Wilkins's evaluation of their way of life and not a Cherokee view. These kinds of statements about savages, progress, etc., are replete in this volume and reflect a general attitude, which I can only characterize as naïve racism.

I suppose that I could forgive racism. Sometimes racists are very astute observers of human behavior even though they make distorted and negative interpretations of that behavior. But I cannot forgive the fact that there are simply no Cherokee Indians in the volume except insofar as individuals are measured against a gross yardstick of "progress." Only the recounting of actual behavior and direct quotes saves this volume from a crude ethnocentrism. Fortunately, one can read behind the interpretation and get a notion of Cherokee culture and society as it undergoes a florescence in the early 1800s.

Since I have used Wilkins as my "straw" man, I would like to apologize for overstating the culture boundness of his volume in order to make my case. His work is certainly no worse than most books dealing with Cherokee history and, in fact, better than most. Further, the wealth of detail in this volume and his sympathetic portrayal of the main action on the Cherokee stage make this volume a must for American Indianists and of general value to social scientists as a whole.

Let me end my review by congratulating Wilkins for his contribution to our search to understand the human condition.

Masses in Latin America. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 608. \$13.50 (cloth); \$3.95 (paper).

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Horowitz and the publisher's blurb introduce this volume with some almost explicit digs at Lipset and Solari's *Elites in Latin America*—to which Horowitz and Oxford University Press (not to mention me) had contributed some years ago, no doubt to the best of our respective abilities. The digs are along the lines of "we are probably more correct and better for not being elitist." The present volume does indeed differ in emphasis from the Lipset and Solari collection, but not nearly as much as the titles would indicate. This is only to be expected, since most analyses of "the masses" must take the elites into account, and vice versa.

Horowitz's book, as he indicates, is a convenient reprinting of some of the essays and reports published separately in the series *Studies in Comparative International Development*, edited by Horowitz, which in turn are often reprints of material presented or published elsewhere, though often very difficult to get hold of, since they may be papers presented at conferences sponsored by, for example, various United Nations agencies. The quality of these papers is inevitably uneven and the rationale for their being included sometimes not clear. But there is no doubt that much of the material is of high quality. I would not pay \$13.50 for the hardcover edition; I would, however, pay \$3.95 for the paperback.

The essays fall into three groups, my divisions differing from those of

Horowitz, whose organization I found difficult to discern. The first group deals with the urban population. In this category belongs a highly abstract piece by Touraine and Pécaut on working-class consciousness, in which cross-cutting typologies of causes, effects, and stages are superimposed on one another in ways which, somewhat similar to the writings of Talcott Parsons, are very stimulating but difficult to follow, not too well written and/or translated, and short on illustrative material let alone proof. The notions of withdrawal, defense of status, and development consciousness are fascinating. But I am not sure whether they are, as a sequence, a realistic description of anything. At the opposite end is a less overwhelmingly ambitious, but very effective, piece by Goldrich, Pratt, and Schuller which, for the first time, compares squatter settlements cross-nationally as well as within-country. It ends with the provocative hypothesis that groups can become depoliticized, even after a positive experience with mobilization. Two further contributions, one by Bryan Roberts (based on a study of the social organization of slum dwellers conducted in Guatemala City with Richard N. Adams) and the other by Andrew Gundar Frank, likewise address themselves to the squatter problem.

A second group of essays focuses on the rural sector. Among these is, first, Stavenhagen's already, and deservedly, well-known conceptualization of Indian populations as sometimes "class," sometimes "colonial"; second, Cotler's parallel analysis of Peru which, predictably, portrays a politically much more fluid situation and examines it at the national as well as local level; and third, Huizer's well-condensed history of peasant organizations in Mexico and their relation to the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*. Also into the rural group falls a very wide-ranging analysis of the entire Latin-American agrarian situation (ownership, productivity, types of reform, etc.) by Barraclough and a brief piece by Flores on the financing of expropriations in Mexico.

Finally, there are a group of essays which deal essentially with national social structure, often little related to masses, but not for that reason any less good. Furtado's analysis of how the kind of interaction between commercial and agrarian elites invariably halts national development at some point, regardless of substantial between-country variations and regardless of changes over time, is brilliant. And Germani's historical portrait of mass immigration into Argentina and its cultural effects (and noneffects) is also excellent. Articles by Weffort and by the late Camilo Torres focus on how unsatisfactory elite-mass relationships are, whether by design or because there are dilemmas inherent in the situation. Two final essays, by Victoria and Germani, deal with revolutionary situations in Cuba and Argentina, respectively, again at the level of total social structure. The introductory essay by Horowitz poses very clearly, but very understandably solves less well, the issues of the conceptual definition of "mass"; its relationship to other concepts such as class, elites, and marginality; and the empirical relationships between mass and mobilization, revolutionary consciousness, urbanization, etc. This is a very useful collection.

The Impact of Communication on Rural Development: An Investigation of Costa Rica and India. By Prodipto Roy, Frederick B. Waisanen, and Everett M. Rogers. Paris: UNESCO, 1969. Pp. xvi+160.

Communication and Social Change in Latin America. By Paul J. Deutschmann, Huber Ellingsworth, and John T. McNelly. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968. Pp. xvi+123. \$15.00.

Frank W. Young

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These two books are representative of the "diffusion of innovations" paradigm that is especially pervasive in sociological research in developing countries. The approach fits nicely into an era of American technical expansionism because it purports to explain how innovations spread from the creative center to the potential users at the periphery. The emphasis on technological innovation, on individual-level processes of acceptance and adoption, and on the importance of mass media in the total process are quite congruent with American technologically oriented aid policy and with the psychological bias in American sociology. Thus, these research reports are significant beyond their particular findings.

The Impact of Communication on Rural Development concerns two experiments, in Costa Rica and in India, that deal with the process of communicating knowledge about innovations and, especially, the most efficient techniques for accomplishing it. Both designs show the pretest-posttest treatment versus control pattern that is typical of work in this paradigm. The treatments consist of listening to and discussing radio broadcasts about agricultural innovations, reading a pamphlet and discussing it, and, for India only, discussing the uses of innovations with one of the members of the community who has special training (animation). The research involved fourteen villages in Costa Rica and eight in India, with several hundred respondents in each place. The reports show a high level of research competence, especially in view of an active volcano in Costa Rica and an unpredictable budget situation in both countries. The reports are clear and concise, and the comparison and a summary by Rogers wrap up the two more detailed analyses nicely.

What did they learn? In Costa Rica, neither radio forums nor literacy classes worked very well, although radio forums were somewhat better. In India, the radio forums were clearly superior. In Costa Rica, there was not much rub-off on the villagers who did not attend the forum, but in India the "nonparticipants" seemed to learn more than the actual members of the various groups. This surprising outcome is explained in terms of "ceiling effects"; that is, the somewhat higher-status and more knowledgeable forum participants already knew a lot about agriculture, so had less room to change than other people in the village. However, all of these results deal mainly with *knowledge* of agricultural innovations; the effect on favorable evaluation of them and especially adoption was less pronounced.

In addition to the ceiling problem, the authors are aware of the effects of contamination (i.e., information spread) between treatment and control villages, class (literacy groups for literates and neoliterates), and comparability of meaning across cultures. They seem less aware of, or were unable to do anything about, the problem of the quality of the treatments, the self-selection or biased selection of participants for the various treatments, and the location of the villages in the hinterlands of large cities. Would these treatments have had any effect outside these urbanized areas? Roy et al. did attempt to measure and control on the modernization of the villages, but the measure was insensitive in India and nonpredictive in Costa Rica.

The Deutschmann et al. book has three purposes: to describe the perceptions of 309 professionals and technicians from fourteen Latin-American countries with respect to social change; to determine whether exposure to different types of "communication" affected the performance of these potential change agents; and to evaluate the effects of a one-week "communications seminar" that 169 of the members of the sample had participated in. This group was selected from some 3,500 seminar participants who had come to Michigan State University between 1959 and 1961, usually after a period of training somewhere else in the United States. These seminar participants were interviewed in their home countries after they had returned to their jobs, and the control group consisted of 140 "counterparts," colleagues working in the same bureaucracy for the most part. Deutschmann and his associates found that the professional people in the sample did see major changes occurring in their countries—in industry, public administration, agriculture, etc., and less so in the more invisible areas, such as nutrition—and they felt that their own agencies were involved in these changes and that they themselves were contributing. As a group, these middle-level professionals were well read, well traveled, and generally well placed in their governments. As a group, they were "making it" and were inclined to be optimistic about the progress of their countries. Only five respondents mentioned the Soviet Union as a source of influence, and Czechoslovakia and Cuba each received two mentions.

These change agents relied on technical publications and had access to foreign media. Those who had been to the United States for training made somewhat heavier use of the media, especially U.S. media. When media exposure is taken as an independent variable, it showed a significant correlation of .24 with the self-estimated percentage of time spent in introducing change. A somewhat different result was obtained with respect to the number of months of foreign training. The association with self-estimated percentage of time spent in introducing changes was negligible, and the correlation within the participant group (who had all been to the United States, at least) was $-.11$ as compared with $.17$ for the counterpart group. Moreover, number of months of foreign training did not correlate with degree of mass media exposure. So the basic hypothesis of the whole study and the justification for concentrating on

this particular group of communicators appear problematic at best. Even with consistent results we can never know whether "time spent in innovation activity" leads to change.

The results of the third area of investigation fare little better despite the authors' firm conclusion that "U.S. training was a significant influence in the direction of involvement in change" (p. 105). Although correlations were found between participation and various self-estimates of change activity or influence, the counterhypotheses are not dealt with. The participants may have been selected from jobs that gave them more opportunity to engage in change activity, the seminar may simply have reinforced their career patterns in this and other respects, the result may hold only at the verbal level and bear little or no relationship to what others might call change, and even if the result does hold, it may still fade quickly.

However, the book is a useful description of a certain type of professional in Latin America, and the chapter on the use of the semantic differential in evaluating attitudes is innovative. The information is broadly and clearly enough presented to suggest a general counterinterpretation along the lines that a subcommunity exists in these Latin-American countries that links middle-level bureaucracy with U.S. influence and that, while no one element of U.S. training makes much difference, the total package constitutes a significant linking structure between the center and periphery of a far-flung technical-bureaucratic culture.

The Machiavellians: A Social Psychological Study of Moral Character and Organizational Milieu. By Stanley S. Guterman. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970. Pp. xvii+178. \$9.50.

John D. McCarthy

Vanderbilt University

In this study Stanley Guterman has shown us the quality we have come to expect of the University of Nebraska Press. His work is an example of Lazarsfeldian methodology carefully and thoughtfully applied, exhibiting all of the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach. He employs tests of significance as a standard in spite of his recognition that their use is not appropriate to his data. He employs multiple indicators of concepts when possible and a theoretical focus to examine patterns of evidence rather than allowing ad hoc hypotheses to rise or fall upon single zero-order tests. Guterman remains close to his evidence as he leads the reader through the intricacies of his story, carefully avoiding at all times any overstatement of his case. But what of the story?

"Machiavellianism [is] . . . an amoral, manipulative attitude toward other individuals, combined with a cynical view of man's motives and of their character" (p. 3). Using a scale developed by Richard Christie to

measure this concept, Guterman administered questionnaires to 482 white-collar and managerial employees in twenty-six hotels located in the eastern coastal states. Employing Freud's notion of a superego as a theoretical focus, he examines the respondents' relations with parents and school during the adolescent years in order to illuminate the antecedents of Machiavellianism. Using Cooley's "looking-glass self" concept as a theoretical focus, Guterman examines the relationship between Machiavellianism and both sympathy and need for social approval. Finally, Toennies's theoretical discussion of solidarity leads Guterman to investigate the relationship between friendship ties, family ties, size of adolescent community, and size of current community, and Machiavellianism. In general, the data support his hypotheses and hunches. For instance, the better the rapport between parent and respondent, as remembered by the respondent, the less likely he is to be highly Machiavellian. The greater the need for social approval, the less likely is the respondent to be highly Machiavellian. The larger the community in which the respondent was raised, the more likely he is to be highly Machiavellian; and this is especially so for respondents whose family situation fostered Machiavellianism. But what of social milieu?

All of the milieu variables utilized by Guterman are either analytic or structural in Lazarsfeld's terms. He does not employ variables which Lazarsfeld terms "global." For instance, he uses the average score of the employee respondents in each hotel on his measure of solidarity feelings to characterize each employee no matter what his own score. The same is true of the average Machiavellianism score of each hotel and the average Machiavellianism score of management respondents. One of the structural variables employed is hierarchical incongruity—a difference between the average scores of the management and the rank and file on Machiavellianism. In this analysis of the effects of milieu, however, Guterman focuses upon the solidarity feelings of employees rather than Machiavellianism as his dependent variable, for instance: "Three characteristics of hotels—a high level of Machiavellianism, an incongruity between the management and the rank and file in Mach scores, and heterogeneity among rank and file with respect to Mach—are associated with low SF [Solidarity Feelings] scores" (p. 130).

The milieu analysis, according to Guterman, is carried out at two levels. One he terms contextual where analytic and structural properties of hotels are used to account for the behavior of individuals. The other—we might term it ecological, though he does not name it—relates two such properties of collectives. Guterman's presentation is somewhat fuzzy here, as he continually slips back and forth between levels of analysis and at several points implies that the same hypothesis can be tested with both types of relationships. It is not necessarily the case that a relationship between an analytic group variable (x) and an individual variable (y) will be similar to the relationship between the analytic variable (x) and an analytic variable (z) constructed from the same indi-

vidual variable (y) if the unit sizes differ (and Guterman's unit sizes do differ). This problem is similar to the ecological fallacy.

Though the Machiavellianism scale has been in use for quite some time, I find its use relatively restricted, judging by the number of publications reporting it. Maybe we should count ourselves the lucky ones. Hopefully, we will not be subjected to a legion of social scientists marching to the promised land with publications on their vitae reporting correlations of Machiavellianism with every other conceivable variable. We might be led to expect such a legion of our fellows based upon their performance with the scales originally reported in T. W. Adorno et al.'s *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1950). Even if such a barrage is forthcoming, however, Guterman's little study may serve to usefully direct the marchers through his focus upon milieu. Even if Machiavellianism is a relatively stable personality characteristic, and Guterman believes that it is (p. 79), action stemming from the characteristic ought to vary with milieu. That a society is rife with Machiavellians may be little reason for concern if the milieus in which Machiavellians find themselves inhibit action stemming from such a characteristic. The same is true of authoritarians, a point which Adorno and his colleagues overlooked as a result of their heavy emphasis upon personality as a predictor of behavior and which was recognized by some of their critics.

Guterman directs almost no attention to Machiavellian behavior, but his study is suggestive in this respect. He does not ask whether the Machiavellians he studied were more successful in their work than "men of conscience" (his term). We might expect this to be so, since Machiavellians have been shown to be quite successful in manipulating their fellows in laboratory situations. The milieu he studied may reward Machiavellian behavior—another situation where "nice guys finish last." A question which may make this sort of study relevant to the problems of our time and the concerns of Guterman, too, I suspect, is whether Machiavellians are likely to behave nicely in situations where nice guys finish first.

Men in Crisis: A Study of a Mine Disaster. By Rex A. Lucas. New York: Basic Books, 1969. Pp. xiii+335. \$10.00.

E. L. Quarantelli

Ohio State University

On October 23, 1958, a sudden underground upheaval in Canada devastated one of the deepest coal mines in the world. Twenty-one miners were trapped underground, fourteen in one location, the other seven in another group elsewhere. This book is a description and analysis of the behavior of the men in these two groups who were rescued more than a week later.

Immediately after their rescue, the miners were intensively studied by an interdisciplinary team of sociologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists.

This team reported their observations in a monograph, *Individual and Group Behavior in a Coal Mine Disaster* (Washington, D.C., 1960). However, as is often true in joint research efforts, one of the sociologists in the team felt that all the sociologically relevant data had not been fully exploited. The consequent result was the book under review.

Chapter 1 describes the cultural and structural aspects of community life in a coal-mining town. The author shows that many of the norms, codes, and institutional arrangements are organized around problems of danger, injury, and death, including the possibilities of highly unpredictable events in the mines themselves. The "disaster subculture" involved is well depicted, although, surprisingly, the author does not use this rather current concept in the disaster literature.

The next chapter describes the initial escape-oriented behavior of the two groups. This narrative is organized in terms of the successive redefinitions of the situation the trapped men applied to their plight. About two-fifths of this long chapter consist of direct quotations from the later interviews with the rescued men. These capture well the progressive risk taking engaged in by the trapped miners. An attempt by the author to quantify initiators of actions during this period of entrapment seems rather forced and unconvincing, dependent as it is on self-reports.

The third chapter analyzes the group discussions that went on as the men realized they could not escape. Their behavior turned toward survival. Particularly in this chapter a reader cannot help but be impressed by the reasonableness, ingenuity, determination, and cooperation of these men in a very desperate situation. While this observation merely confirms what has been consistently observed in disasters, it comes through very forcefully in this account.

The bulk of the book deals with different aspects of the survival period, from the time when escape efforts were abandoned until the men were rescued. There is an extensive discussion about the control of expressive behavior. It is couched in such terms as anticipatory socialization, role expectations, role observability, and role set. In many respects, what the author is saying in a jargonistic fashion is that the men had a conception of the masculine miner's role which was reinforced when they observed it manifested in the behavior of others trapped with them. A particularly good case is made that self-control was maintained because of the observed self-control of others in the situation. In a basic sense, it is social control rather than self-control that is involved in situations of this kind.

The best discussion in the book is the analysis of how the trapped men engaged in behavior which was abhorrent to them, for example, drinking their own urine. How the act became socially permissible is very well depicted. What occurred was that, in the course of verbal interaction, self- and other legitimation for the act slowly developed. In symbolic interaction terms, although they are not used by the author, a new meaning emerged.

On the other hand, there is a disappointing analysis of how the miners

maintained their hope for rescue. No clear picture emerges. There is no real explanation of why optimistic definitions of the future were exchanged.

The book has no useful summary. A reader has to decide for himself important implications and extrapolations to other stress situations. But there is a good and useful discussion of the methodological problems in this kind of research.

There are four questions that bothered me in reading the book. Why is there a denial that this study is in the disaster research tradition? Even the subtitle of the book implicitly makes this claim. Why is the recent disaster literature on panic behavior and related matters ignored? There are only seven references to sources after 1964, and these include two from the author himself. Why is it emphasized that this is a sociological study when almost all the concepts used and even activities examined are generally thought of as being clearly social-psychological? Finally, why give a pseudonym to a town when even in the footnote references allow anyone with access to a library to learn its real name?

However, on balance, the book not only is a worthwhile addition to the disaster literature but is also of value to social psychologists interested in processes and mechanisms of adjustment to stress. Anyone interested in such problems should have this book in his library.

Demography: Principles and Methods. By T. Lynn Smith and Paul E. Zopf, Jr. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1970. Pp. xvii+590. \$10.00.

Nathan Keyfitz

University of California, Berkeley

Consumer guidelines are needed for textbooks of demography. The expanding supply of such books is brought into existence by a rising demand for knowledge that might enable the nation and the world to cope with its problems of population and environment. Competition among publishers is keen, but this does not always ensure a product of quality.

For textbooks, as for dress shirts or lawn mowers, quality has a number of dimensions. These include judgment in selection of themes; logic and clarity in the sequence of exposition; presentation of theory in relation to data rather than these two in separation; and introduction of such techniques as are needed to process the data and bring them into effective confrontation with theory. A good text should assemble in coherent form the results of relatively recent research. Originality on the part of the author is less of a virtue than a balanced presentation of the discipline as a whole.

I believe that an impartial consumer panel would rate Smith and Zopf below standard quality. It would find that they particularly fail to incorporate research results. Ansley Coale's research on age distribution that

shows that high birth rates rather than high death rates are responsible for a young age distribution; Norman Ryder's analysis of cohort as against period data in his study of birth changes; the demographic transition as studied by Frank Notestein and others; the relation of dependency ratios and age distribution generally to development—none of these central topics is treated in any detail, and some are omitted altogether.

In some instances, gross distinctions are covered over. The geographical center of population is defined as "the point at which all [the inhabitants] could gather with the minimum total amount of direct airline travel" (p. 44). This makes the center of population a function of the airline network; much worse, the discussion here and on page 60 suggests that the writers are unaware of the difference between the center of minimum travel and center of gravity. One can convince himself that these are not the same by considering even the simple case of a country with three inhabitants living on a straight line.

The book is written for the reader who comes to demography with no previous knowledge (though even for such a reader it seems too elementary). He would obtain a peculiar impression of the corpus of knowledge in our field. He would find that most contributions have been made by T. Lynn Smith, with eighty-eight references. The second most important source of knowledge is Paul Zopf, with thirty-seven references. Hawley, Henry, Kirk, Lotka, Notestein, Ogburn, and Ryder, with one reference each, are barely noticed, and Berelson, Potter, Sheps, and Tietze are not mentioned at all.

But perhaps names are unnecessary in a textbook, which after all should synthesize a body of knowledge. The best parts of the present work are those that are descriptive. The mechanisms responsible for the growth and decline of populations deserve more attention in a book on the principles and methods of demography.

Poverty and Health: A Sociological Analysis. Edited by John Kosa, Aaron Antonovsky, and Irving Kenneth Zola. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. xvi+449. \$12.50.

Howard Waitzkin

Harvard University

The senior editor introduces this collection of essays with the rather hackneyed biblical aphorism "The poor always ye have with you." This determinist cast pervades a verbose and largely unoriginal book whose principal usefulness derives from an exhaustive fifty-three-page bibliography.

Although the editors claim to eschew an explicit political position, their politics are clear throughout. Anticipating the reader's surprise at not finding an angrier or more passionate book, they claim that professional-

ism and an enhancement of understanding is "more of a service than ranting" (pp. ix-x). Politics, according to the editors, is "one irrational element that perhaps unavoidably intrudes." Academic research, on the other hand, "inhibits impulsive actions" and promotes "rational action" through "systematic knowledge" (pp. 332-33). The editors' political approach is unmistakably conservative. This orientation is understandable, in view of the senior editor's previous outspoken criticism of Communist social science in Eastern Europe (*American Sociologist* 3 [May 1968]: 152-53 and 3 [August 1968]: 247).

Perhaps because of underlying political conservatism, the editors are satisfied to document in great detail the already well-known association between poverty and illness in the United States. The health of the poor, however, is inextricably related to the political system under which the poor must live. Certain countries with more socialized governmental systems (examples are the Scandinavian countries, some Canadian provinces, and Cuba) have acted to reduce or eliminate poverty; in these countries the health care of the poor has improved enormously. By choice, the editors intentionally exclude a comparative international perspective from their analysis (p. x). As a result, they fail to consider the basic political changes which almost certainly must precede significantly improved health care for the poor in this country. The volume lacks any analysis of the possible benefits to the poor of a socialized health care system. Although they offer no evidence, the editors claim that it would be "unrealistic to demand that private-practice medical care should be made available to all citizens of the country, but it would be even more foolish to strike out for abolishing private practice or denying it to those who wish to use it and can pay for it." Instead, the editors hope that private-practice medical care will become more widely available and that the existing system of public clinics will be improved (p. 337). To implement this goal, the editors support a system of national health insurance, which—as many writers have commented—promises another huge financial bonanza for physicians in private practice and no fundamental change in the organization and delivery of medical services in poverty areas.

Another disappointing hiatus in this book is its failure to consider institutional power structures, especially the relationships between large medical institutions and low-income communities. There is great irony in R. H. Ebert's foreword to the volume. Ebert, dean of the Harvard Medical School, states: "The evidence is overwhelming that just as the poor are deprived politically, educationally, and environmentally so are they deprived medically. . . . They are relatively powerless in the medical care system" (pp. v-vi). In a later exhaustive paper on social differences in mental health, Marc Fried hypothesizes that the feeling of powerlessness—"the expectation that one has no control over his own destiny"—may comprise a primary determinant of psychiatric disorders among the poor (p. 153). Despite much publicly expressed concern about

the powerlessness of the poor, such urban institutions as the Harvard Medical School have shown little interest in the preferences or feelings of poor people in immediately surrounding communities. The Harvard Medical School, for example, has attempted to destroy low-income housing and to displace residents of an entire community in order to build a complex of highly specialized research-oriented hospitals, even though alternative sites of empty land were available (see my article "Expansion of Medical Institutions into Urban Residential Areas," *New England Journal of Medicine* 282 [April 30, 1970]: 1003-7). The power position of large medical institutions, as well as the almost complete lack of influence which low-income individuals can exert over the type or quality of services they obtain from these institutions, apparently is not a topic of interest for the editors or authors of this book.

An even more surprising omission is the issue of community control. Throughout the United States, members of low-income communities have begun to attain control over the health services they receive in their neighborhoods. The Black Panthers, the Young Lords, and other organizations have established clinics in several cities which attempt to provide free primary medical care. In contradistinction to the public clinics of urban hospitals, these community-controlled free clinics offer services in the evening and on weekends—often the only times when low-income people can conveniently seek medical attention. As an extension of community control in health, low-income activists in New York have demanded control over a segment of the services provided by a large medical institution, Lincoln Hospital. Increasingly, members of low-income communities are coming to believe that, for effective medical care, the people themselves must be able to determine the services they receive and the personnel who serve them. The issue of community control in health and the development of the free-clinic movement, however, are beyond the purview of the present volume.

Several contributions to the book are noteworthy. In a discussion of social differences in physical health, Monroe Lerner postulates a U-shaped relationship between morbidity and social class—highest morbidity in the poorest and the wealthiest strata—but, unfortunately, supplies little data to verify the association. Fried's account of social differences in mental health provides an exhaustive substantive review and methodologic critique of the extensive previous literature in this field. Julius Roth offers a trenchant descriptive account of treatment of the poor in emergency clinics, inpatient wards, and chronic-disease facilities. Although Arthur Shostak develops a convincing paradigm for successful programmatic intervention in the relief of problems associated with poverty, he does not specifically apply the paradigm to health-care programs. Finally, John Stoeckle provides a valuable historical and critical review of urban and rural health centers, together with comments on their future potential.

Contributions by other authors offer little that is new or illuminating.

Much of the book is composed of naïve and unsubstantiated speculation, such as the following assertions by the senior editor (in a chapter entitled "The Nature of Poverty"):

In an almost cathartic outburst of emotions [in the 1960s] the nation suddenly realized that large-scale, unattended poverty existed in the most affluent country of the world and set out with earnest dedication to resolve this "paradox." [P. 12]

As for family structure, the nuclear family, with a planned number of children, is the ideal acquisitive unit since it implies the optimal state of having a male breadwinner and an optimal ratio of breadwinner and dependents. [P. 19]

On the other hand, some of the social factors are resistant to any action program; old age and the female sex will always constitute deprived categories in acquisitive competition, and no change can be expected in such hard facts of life. [P. 32]

With the arrival of Marx, poverty became the central issue in European politics and social philosophy. [P. 11]

One should expect more from medical sociology.

Adjustment to Retirement: A Cross-national Study. Edited by R. J. Havighurst, J. M. A. Munnichs, B. Neugarten, and H. Thomae. New York: Humanities Press, 1969. Pp. xii+195. \$6.25 (paper).

Harris T. Schrank

Equitable Life Assurance Society

Matilda White Riley

Rutgers University

Extensive discussion of methodological issues is particularly appropriate in cross-national or comparative research, especially when an unusual effort has been made to achieve cross-national comparability. Much of this volume consists of such discussion, putting into perspective the data presented on adjustment to retirement among workers in several countries. Hence, this is a thoroughly self-conscious and self-critical book—conscious of the limitations of reliability and validity inherent in cross-national data and critical of almost every attempt the authors make to overcome those limitations.

The essays and working papers reported in this volume pursue, according to the authors, a line of inquiry designed to support either of two theories of aging: the "disengagement" theory or the "increased option" theory. The controversy surrounding these alternative theories provides the intellectual context for the work the authors have done to this point. But they ask us not to judge too harshly if they fail to help us assess the usefulness of either theory, for this is only a "pilot study" designed to "generate hypotheses" and to "explore a method and research design"

(p. 4). The authors not only limit their objectives, but whatever remains they also criticize mercilessly. The reviewers are left, then, merely to summarize, comment, and despair that this project, involving so much effort and so many talented people, concludes with results that are at best inspirational or suggestive.

In an ingenious sample design, retired steelworkers and teachers in six cities (Chicago, Vienna, Milan, Bonn, Warsaw, and Nijmegen [Holland]) were interviewed in order to determine their patterns of social interaction, their involvement and satisfaction with various roles, and their perceptions of the changes in these patterns after age sixty. Open-ended questions were asked, and a complex set of rating scales was then imposed upon the answers. Because of the small samples of workers per country (usually twenty-five steelworkers and twenty-five teachers), "conclusions regarding cross-national differences cannot be safely drawn" (p. 13). Moreover, chapter 2, devoted to an explication of both intra- and international "reliability" problems, persuades us of the difficulties of obtaining cross-national and cross-lingual agreement among judges rating the same materials—though some agreement is found. (A fascinating peripheral finding points to the dependence of ratings upon national differences among rating teams.)

Since "present level of role activity" seemed comparatively reliable as a base for cross-national comparisons, special attention is paid to this variable throughout the volume. In a chapter exclusively devoted to the topic (using the analysis-of-variance technique), several statistically significant differences among nations are reported, and for certain roles the interaction effect of nation and occupation is significant. Of course, this analysis is offered "primarily as a demonstration of a method that is likely to be fruitful in future cross-national studies" (p. 38). After all, the statistical refinements are scarcely congruent with the crudity of the measuring devices. And the great variations in the social and economic environments of the samples (the special provisions for retirement housing in Milan, for example, or the unique job market for older teachers in Chicago) leave us uncertain as to how or which "national" factors account for differences in role activity. But again, one should not carp at a shortcoming of which the authors (most explicitly, H. Thomae in a critical last chapter) are completely aware.

The several chapters reporting results, each with its own analytical model, vary widely in scope and in interpretative sophistication. The short chapter on Warsaw is largely anecdotal. The Holland team, using a younger control group as well as an older group, is particularly interesting insofar as they note the importance of differentiating between aging and generational effects. The chapter on Milan explores unique aspects of the Italian context in describing the role of the educator in the Italian family, the possible impact of the Fascist period, and Italian mores affecting association membership. The German researchers examine intranational variations in retirement attitudes, but their report seems to have little direct relationship to the project as a whole.

These "data presentation" chapters are filled with speculations as to the factors, largely occupational, shaping the life-style of each type of retired worker. In Chicago, the "fact" that teachers exhibit "a high level of activity as well as autonomy, initiative, and life satisfaction" (p. 67) during the retirement period is attributed largely to their being teachers. The Milanese teachers are "more individualistic and broader in their varied interests, so that they have less common ground than the steelworker to serve as a basis for social interaction" (p. 78). Perhaps. But the similarly individualistic Chicago teacher is reportedly more active than his steelworker counterpart in the "informal social relations" area. Conversely, "the lesser engagement of the steelmakers in 'creative' activities, and their lesser patience and tolerance of solitude than the teachers have, makes workers more open to social interaction" (in Milan, p. 78). But "after retirement, the [steelworker's] lack of disposition to initiate activity and, in many individuals, the profound need for external structuring of activity, probably led to further constrictions and passivity in spheres such as the friend role and in non-family centered leisure pursuits" (in Chicago, p. 68). All in the cause of "generating hypotheses," one must suppose.

This leads us (and the authors) to the truism that retirement must be studied as another phase of the life cycle, influenced at least as much by prior career and life-style as by the contemporary situational context. Given this approach, the introduction of cross-national cultural and economic experience adds to the range of variables for building a theory of adjustment to retirement. Even this volume, with all its inadequacies, thoroughly documents the limits of the "disengagement" approach for those who are still concerned about this controversial theory. And, as a by-product, the enterprise affords a useful laboratory for practice in international data gathering and analysis.

Interns: From Students to Physicians. By Emily Mumford. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Commonwealth Fund Book, 1970. Pp. ix+298. \$8.50.

Elvi Whittaker

University of California, Berkeley

Earliest among the sources that gave substance to this study was a nationwide survey of interns and residents conducted in 1958 by the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia. Subsequently, the author did fieldwork in both a university and a community hospital; she made briefer observations on two consecutive years at the time of beginning internship; she interviewed both physicians and medical professors; and, while working as a medical sociologist during a period of ten years, she observed and interviewed numerous health workers in some sixteen hos-

pitals. Finally, in 1968 she again did research in five hospitals, particularly at the time one group of interns left and another entered. Such apparent breadth in data collecting leads one to expect much.

The major theme in the analysis that Emily Mumford offers is one of socialization during the internship phase. Across this time, the student presumably is converted into the full professional. She indicates how differing institutional climates, value emphases, and perspectives on patients, as well as varying social arrangements within the institution and outside it, mold professional interests and future careers. In short, those medical students who find their way to university-affiliated hospitals are shaped and directed by a milieu which defines situations in terms of their learning and teaching potential, and accords prestige to performances which indicate diagnostic and abstracting proficiency. Meanwhile, the community hospital fosters greater informality and self-sufficiency, stresses interactional skills with patients, nurses, and attending physicians, and suggests a lively involvement with medical networks in the community.

The author seems to have ignored some sociological conventions, in particular the one calling for a background chapter in which the nature and attributes of the group under study are made clear. The omission of pages devoted to age, sex, class, and religious distribution, sometimes completely irrelevant in light of the ensuing argument, might be a blessing. Yet when socialization, a process, a continuum, is at issue, the omission is more troublesome. The intern of whom the author writes is a peculiarly ahistorical figure. Except for a slight passing reference to choice of hospital, medical-school status, academic achievement, and parental education—in the most general terms (pp. 78–79)—it is not at all clear who the interns are and how they got there. By what processes had students come to define themselves as suited to one hospital or another? Which students found their way to which hospitals? How were choices and disappointments rationalized? In order to appreciate socialization during internship and the resulting divergent career trajectories as a continuum, it seems of no small significance to be able to recognize and understand the individual who comes into the institution. One might also ask about the “foreign-born,” whom the author carefully differentiates from the native-born for reasons that were not clear to me. Did their socialization eventuate in a different outcome? What of female interns, whom the author did not differentiate? Are their career trajectories to be envisioned as the same as those of their male counterparts?

Much of the argument and generalization lacks a sharpness and a poignancy, and the reader familiar with hospital routine and medical professionals might at times wonder what is new in this book. The weakness in this respect may arise from the author's tendency to be niggardly in providing pertinent quotations from her interviews or from the field. Indeed, the book is at its best, the sense of the socializing process most acute, when we are afforded the occasional glimpse of individuals and their perspectives. On the other hand, the nature of the data itself may

be at fault. One labors against the sense that the researcher has been fed the official party line, that only the outer layer has been revealed. This does not necessarily call for a Goffmanesque revelation of the backstage of the intern's life. Rather, the author could have explored what she, in several places, refers to as the "emotionally charged" environment. For example, instead of peripheral references to the strains inherent in situations where nurses instruct new interns, interview material exploring interns' feelings and experiences could have been used (p. 129). At times, the extensiveness of data might have been complemented with greater intensity.

Happily, this review can be balanced with a much more positive tone. While those wishing for great advances in socialization theory may well be disappointed, and medical sociologists may find parts lacking in novelty, the book could serve as a worthwhile overview of selected hospital routines for the uninitiated. Further to her credit, Emily Mumford has provided an insightful analysis of norms governing the performance of interns in the university hospital, namely, those of the open mind, of relay learning, and of graduated specialization. She has written a convincing chapter on the medical chart as a means of articulating values and socializing the intern and as preserving not only individual successes but also individual failures. Also, she seems to have a good grasp of relevant literature, although one feels she is tempted to write another book through the footnotes. Finally, the book is at its best when it offers situational evidence—backed up by data—of the effects of value configurations on individual performance, or when it suggests how individual actions confirm the institutional structure.

Paying the Doctor: Systems of Remuneration and Their Effects. By William A. Glaser. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. Pp. x+323. \$10.00.

Social Settings and Medical Organization: A Cross-national Study of the Hospital. By William A. Glaser. New York: Atherton Press, 1970. Pp. xi+210. \$6.95.

Ronald Andersen

University of Chicago

The author gathered data for these books concurrently by visiting sixteen countries in Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Soviet bloc. He conducted interviews about medical care organization, primarily in 1961 and 1962; examined organizational files; and reviewed the pertinent literature. It is a challenging assignment to summarize and compare the development and effects of important features of health service organizations in as few as two or three countries. Consequently, one must be skeptical of a design that includes sixteen countries. However, I think that the author has described succinctly the various systems and their development.

The fundamental question asked in *Paying the Doctor* is, If doctors are paid by one or another method, what is the difference in how the public is treated? The basic payment systems examined are fee-for-service, salary, and capitation. Means of organizing the various payment systems and the resulting effects on the work and status of physicians are discussed. An attempt also is made to summarize the political circumstances that led to these systems. Some of Glaser's generalizations might be disputed by those with special knowledge of particular countries or methods of payment. Still, many primary sources are documented, and most of the conclusions seem plausible and reasonable and, at least, should be considered important hypotheses.

Some of Glaser's interesting conclusions in *Paying the Doctor* concern (1) the apparent ability of the medical profession to obstruct any unacceptable legislation in a democratic system; (2) the comparatively high salaries of physicians, regardless of the system; (3) the uniform difficulty in attracting physicians to rural areas, which leads Glaser to suggest "that there is no substitute for urban practice"; and (4) the conviction that physicians, according to their own pronouncements, think they make less than they actually do relative to other occupations and professions, suggesting that more publicity on relative salaries might moderate physician demands.

Although Glaser has been largely successful in describing the payment systems and relating them to the physician's practice, his success in determining effects on the public is more problematic. To deal with this question effectively, population data on mortality, morbidity, medical care utilization, and sociodemographic characteristics must be correlated with characteristics of the payment systems. Glaser does allude to population characteristics such as disability days and length of hospital stay from time to time, but the emphasis is on structural characteristics of the system and on the views of administrators, practitioners, and researchers in the countries he visited.

The second book, *Social Settings and Medical Organization*, is the more theoretically oriented of the two. It is presented as an exploratory effort in organizational sociology concerned with how different social settings produce different organizational forms. More specifically, it focuses on the relationships between the hospital and the religious, family, and economic institutions. Separate chapters describe some effects upon the hospital of cross-national variations in each institutional sector. Each of these chapters concludes with a list of tentative propositions about non-medical social structures and hospital structures that seem, to the author, to be supported by the evidence available.

Some of these propositions might have been more fully developed if the author's primary purpose was to contribute to the systematic development of organizational sociology. However, the work is buttressed by a most helpful set of references and many valuable insights. I found the chapter dealing with "Economics and Urbanism" particularly appealing because of its incisive treatment of the problems of the modern hospital in developing countries. In the final summary chapter, Glaser tussles

with the question of whether his cross-national comparisons can be used to predict social change within countries. He concludes that such an approach may be less fruitful for hospitals than for organizations such as factories, where the greater constraints of technology have a more homogenizing effect. I suspect that some other students of hospital organization might give greater weight to the effect of modern medical technology on hospital organization than is inferred by Glaser (p. 190).

Both of these books have been released at an opportune time for U.S. readers, because of the growing debate about the "crisis" and the "need for change" in the U.S. health service system. Administrators, policy makers, and researchers can all profit from the experiences in other countries aptly summarized in these volumes.

Fifty Years of the Tavistock Clinic. By H. V. Dicks. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Pp. xiv+415. \$10.08.

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Official histories arouse justified suspicions. This book is an official history, and the reader is reminded of this whenever he is confronted, within the text, by a long list of names of vice-presidents of the council, staff members at a certain date, or speakers in some ceremony thirty years ago. Nevertheless, the book is an important contribution to the history of modern psychiatry, and when you learn what pages to skip, it makes good reading as well.

This is a history of a fifty-year war. It started in 1920 when Hugh Crichton-Miller, with some other young psychiatrists, established the psychoanalytically oriented Tavistock Clinic as an outpatient clinic for neurotic clients unable to afford private fees. Orthodox psychiatrists, working in mental hospitals and faithful to physiological doctrines and organic methods of treatment, reacted with mistrust, sometimes even with contempt. Orthodox psychoanalysts were suspicious, too. The approach of the Tavistock seemed too diluted, its whole conception of psychotherapy not intensive enough.

The latter conflict belongs to the past; during the years following World War II, the Tavistock and the British psychoanalytic movement were reconciled. The Tavistock still exists, and has clear practical consequences. In 1970, in spite of the fame it acquired throughout the world, the Tavistock is still not recognized as an academic institution; hundreds of mental health workers have been trained by the clinic but have received no degrees.

Dicks, who for many years was one of the central figures of the Tavistock, clearly blames the nonpsychoanalytic psychiatric establishment for this state of affairs. He names two persons in particular, both affiliated with the Maudsley Hospital in London, Hans J. Eysenck and the

late Edward Mapotler. "Whatever may be the historical evaluation of Professor Eysenck's own work in behavioural psychology and Pavlovian methods, his sustained polemics under the umbrella of the Maudsley against the lack of scientific validity of psychoanalytic psychotherapy had, one may be sure, a fairly serious result on the standing of the Tavistock's work" (p. 250).

This controversy is far from being exclusively British. The war between psychodynamic and behavioral-somatic approaches is waged in the United States—in the National Institute for Mental Health (the selective appropriation of research funds is directly influenced by it), in the universities, in public opinion. This book, openly partisan, may be seen as an aid from overseas to the psychodynamic wing.

In addition to being psychodynamic, the Tavistock has always been sociologically oriented. It contributed much to the development of "social psychiatry," a trend which gained great influence in this country. Dicks emphasizes, however, that community mental health never meant for the Tavistock a renunciation of psychotherapy. Treatment of the suffering individual was supplemented by efforts to educate and aid the community, but never replaced by them. This is not always the case with the American exponents of mental hygiene.

Another issue which may be relevant for the American reader is the consequences for the Tavistock of its incorporation, in 1948, within the National Health Service then established by the British government. In spite of several conflicts (usually budgetary) described by Dicks, his overall evaluation of this change is positive. The problems of research not directly related to the service function of the clinic were solved by a legal separation between the clinic and the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, now organized as an independent private corporation. (The history of the latter body is outlined but not analyzed in the present book.)

The specific details are not always as stimulating as the general issues. This book, by its nature, cannot do justice to the wealth of scientific developments occurring in the Tavistock. The unavoidable theoretical superficiality is sometimes frustrating. One case is the laconic discussion of the years spent in the Tavistock by Ronald Laing, the renowned existential psychiatrist.

The book is written in open identification and pride. Nevertheless, it deals frankly with delicate areas, such as the circumstances leading to the retirement of the clinic's founder, H. Crichton-Miller (in 1933), and of his successor, J. R. Rees (in 1947). In some other problems, however, the limited perspective prevents a critical evaluation. The process of bureaucratization of the Tavistock is acknowledged, but is accepted as self-evident. The parallel process, in which a clinic established to serve those who could not afford private fees became a middle-class agency, is indirectly explained by hinting at the lower intelligence of manual workers (p. 71). This dubious assertion serves to prevent a serious social analysis of this process, which characterizes many other mental health agencies.

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